

MACEDONIAN LEGACIES

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*Macedonian Legacies:
Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture
in Honor of Eugene N. Borza*

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
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MACEDONIAN LEGACIES

STUDIES IN ANCIENT MACEDONIAN
HISTORY AND CULTURE
IN HONOR OF
EUGENE N. BORZA

TIMOTHY HOWE
JEANNE REAMES
EDITORS

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Eugene N. Borza

EUGENE N. BORZA, BIBLIOGRAPHY

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REVIEWS AND REVIEW-ARTICLES (about 90)

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PREFACE

Gene Borza once characterized the wealth of books and monographs about Alexander as a “small cottage industry in publishing.” It was, obviously, said in jest, but contains the seeds of truth. Nonetheless, we think this new volume a justified addition to library shelves, not only because it celebrates one of the foremost scholars in the field, but for the strides in new research offered here in his honor. This volume’s contributors include some of the most distinguished names currently working in Macedonian scholarship and related areas of ancient history. Furthermore, they went all-out. It was a humbling experience for us to serve as editors to such a splendid field of writers. Gene can take great pride in having inspired this collection. The range of papers is impressive—in areas, in disciplines, and in foci.

We open with Carol Thomas’s survey of attitudes, internal and external, ancient and modern, toward ancient Macedonia. It seemed appropriate to start by “centering” this heretofore “peripheral” border state—just as the study of Macedonia itself (not only of Alexander and Philip) has come increasingly into focus among Hellenists, beginning with the work of Charles F. Edson and N. G. L. Hammond in the late 1960s and early 1970s. So instead of looking into Macedonia from the Greek-Athenian south, this collection hopes to look out from the *north*—a particularly Macedonian view. We think Gene would appreciate that. The closing paper comes from Kenneth Harl, writing on the battle of Magnesia, which might be seen as the sunset of Macedonian power brought about by yet another initially peripheral state that re-centered that periphery: Rome. In between Thomas’s paper and Harl’s, are a wealth of others that employ recent archaeology, art history, social history, military history, philology, comparative literary analysis, prosopography, political analysis and even interdisciplinary work

utilizing the social sciences. What we find particularly exciting about these papers is how they often combine academic disciplines in fruitful ways to shine new light on old questions.

Following Thomas's paper, we begin with Argead Macedonia. Edward Anson considers in detail how Philip II transformed Macedonia by breaking the traditional ties between regional rulers and their local populations, rebinding them to himself, and William Greenwalt builds a careful case that Philip and Olympias's initiation into the Samothracian Mysteries was a cover for negotiating alliances between Macedonia and Epiros with regard to the larger Illyrian threat. Elizabeth Carney summarizes scholarship-to-date about the institution of the *Basilikoi Paidēs*, the Royal Pages, and offers some useful conclusions that tie it all together, while Lindsay Adams lines up a similarly thorough synopsis of how athletics and *Agonēs* in Macedonia illumine the culture generally, as well as the Argead quest for Hellenic recognition and identity. William Murray explores the development of Argead naval power from Philip to Alexander, and explains how Alexander could so rapidly construct his naval force and siege equipment, and do so with such effectiveness that the Successors later followed his example.

Mark Munn takes an extensive look at possible ties between ancient Macedonia and the Phrygian kingdom of Midas, and why Alexander believed a trip to Gordion of particular *Macedonian* significance, not just a whim to fulfill a local legend, and Jeanne Reames uses psychology and sociology to add another puzzle piece to the scholarly conversation regarding the Philotas Affair. Stanley Burstein reveals a new Egyptian text that has important implications for understanding Cleomenes of Naucratis's appointment in Egypt under Alexander, while Olga Palagia similarly reveals new evidence regarding a Hellenistic burial that could add significantly to our prosopography of the Argead and Antipatrid royal families.

Papers take a more literary bent with Timothy Howe, who uses comparative literary analysis to point out similari-

ties between Ptolemy's history of Alexander as embedded in Arrian, and older, traditional Egyptian Royal Accomplishment Narratives. Then we come full circle with Sulochana Asirvatham, who discusses the deep ambiguity in how the Macedonians were regarded by Greeks and others, echoing—albeit from a different angle—the themes in Carol Thomas's initial paper regarding the “peripheral” Macedonians.

What a splendid tribute this collection is to the work and legacy of the man Oswyn Murray once called “Mr. American Macedonia” at a panel for the One Hundred Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Philological Association, and whom Beth Carney in this volume names “the dean of U.S. scholars of ancient Macedonia.” The ultimate contribution of a scholar to his or her field can be measured not only in the impact of his or her work, but also by the extent of his or her inspiration to others. Eugene N. Borza can claim both.

As editors, we would like to thank the contributors for being patient and generous with our requests, including the necessary transliteration of Greek into Latin characters due to publication constraints. A few other minor notes about our choices for the volume. While we did make an attempt to regularize citation formats, we deliberately did not regularize the spelling of names, the choice of dating systems, nor the transliterations of some familiar Greek words (thus the Greek upsilon is rendered sometimes as a Latin /y/, sometimes as a Latin /u/). We decided to leave these decisions to the authors, reflecting their particular stylistic preferences.

In the hope that this collection can not only add to critical discussion of aspects of ancient Macedonia, but also serve as a pedagogical tool, we decided to include a complete bibliography of sources cited at the end. Behind the bibliography is a *Tabula Memoriae* containing brief statements submitted by Gene's colleagues who wanted to have an opportunity to honor him, but do not work in areas sufficiently close to Macedonia, or who were otherwise unable to contribute papers due to previous obligations.

Last, we would like to thank Richard Burns and Regina Books for their support in publishing this collection, as well as the Charles and Mary Caldwell Martin Fund for History at the University of Nebraska and the Associate Dean of Humanities at Saint Olaf College.

Jeanne Reames

Timothy Howe

September 2008

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CENTERING THE PERIPHERY

Carol G. Thomas
University of Washington

Maps dating to the Babylonians' conception of their relation to other peoples reveal an early awareness that certain peoples stand at the dynamic center of power vis-à-vis regions distant from the hub of authority. A Babylonian *mappa mundi*¹ pictures an inner circle complete with detailed features surrounded by a sea and regions outside that sea. Persian inscriptions reflect a similar focus on the core of that empire with lists of subject peoples proceeding from those nearest the center to those most distant.² In his effort to give the geography of the known world, Herodotus too proceeds from the known to the less well known to the unknown. Northward from Persia is the region of the Medes, beyond them that of the Saspies, beyond them the land of the Colchians (4.37), and beyond them the Red Sea (4.40.1). And still further toward the dawn everything is deserted and no one can say what it is like (4.40.2). Inhabitants of the more remote lands of the Persian Empire, such as those dwelling around the Black Sea, are also the most stupid (4.46.1).³

The ancient view of centers of power and surrounding regions is couched in terms of distance, otherness, and inferiority of the others. Only recently have scholars begun to employ the conception of core/periphery to such a relationship not only in geographical measurement, but through consideration of the factors creating the relationship. In his useful introduction to *Centre-Periphery Relations in the Ancient World*, Michael Rowlands points to the early 1960s as a point of changed understanding of cultural self-identity associated with a "sense of boundedness," a sense that "requires a definition of 'otherness.'"⁴

This extended goal encourages the attempt to track the dynamics responsible for transformation of a peripheral region to a recognized core, a process inherent in a change of status but not explicitly tracked in antiquity. Macedonia is an excellent case study for core-periphery analysis: its "meteoric rise . . . to the position of a great power"⁵ can be seen as a long, painful process of the realization of its marginal status.

Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries knew that the region north of mainland Greece was peripheral. It was distant, other, and marginal both in location and culture. On the other hand, the resources of Macedonia were highly valued and the weakness of the kingdom encouraged Greek states to secure these assets by force. The actions of other players in the northern Aegean sphere show that they also found Macedonian rims penetrable: Illyrians regularly pushed eastward into the lands bordering their territory while Thracians advanced westward and the Persians made Macedonia the staging point for the real objective of the Persian Wars.

Macedonia is not mentioned in general discussions of core-periphery relations although its history offers a vivid example of developments transforming a marginal, weak region into one of commanding power and importance in a far greater region than lands adjacent to its original sphere. Its absence is due in large part to the fact that the story of Macedonia is still being revealed. Akin to much of the Greek core in earlier periods, the region, apart from a few large cities, was increasingly marginalized from larger contact from the time of the Roman conquest.⁶ When Greece achieved freedom from Ottoman control with the aid of more powerful nations, the new state did not include Macedonia until 1913. One result of this ninety-some-year delay was the lateness of archaeological activity in the North. In the South, the Greek Archaeological Department was established as early as 1834, followed soon by the creation of foreign archaeological institutions in Greece that produced an explosion of evidence from early periods. This was not the case for Macedonia.

Consequently, invisible evidence of past greatness, Macedonia gained a peculiar, accessory role as “subaltern” and “other.”⁷ Its location together with the lack of a visible past encouraged a view of Macedonia as a principal highway or a passage;⁸ in fact even its rivers were natural routes for others to travel into and through the region. While it could be seen as having a kind of “integrality” with the Aegean world, Macedonia was detached from that world.⁹

Annexation of Macedonia to the Greek state in 1913 began to alter that image. As in the earlier struggle for independence, the role of outside powers was important to the expansion of Greek territory. William Leake surveyed in Macedonia during the first decade of the Nineteenth Century to provide information for the British who would aid the Greek effort to regain more territory from the Ottomans.¹⁰ Napoleon III’s commission of Leon Heuzey to Northern Greece to investigate antiquities represents the interests of another “great power,” France. It is interesting that the Greek archaeological service expanded into Salonika in the same year, albeit with the presence of a single person.

Inspection soon accelerated when, on the heels of Macedonia’s inclusion into the Greek state, World War I brought more outside troops into the north. As Fotiades reports, knowledge of Macedonian history “grew in military trenches and reconnaissance trips of the Entente army.”¹¹ Situating emplacements in mounds useful for camping and protection produced physical evidence of the past regarded as sufficiently significant that British troops were ordered to report finds before the end of 1915 and a *Service Archéologique* was added to French army in 1916. At the same time, publication of finds—many by soldier-scholars—began in the journals of the British School and *École Française*.¹² The Second World War brought other soldier-scholars into Macedonia: one of the giants of Macedonian studies, Nicholas Hammond, served as a liaison officer between the British and Greek resistance forces and continued to study Macedonia during the remainder of his long career as

archaeologist and historian. Although those mounds that held emplacements during WWI revealed no such treasures as the finds from Vergina discovered in 1977 under the direction of Manolis Andronikos, increasing evidence encouraged on-going investigation at increasing numbers and types of sites. No longer was military activity a prerequisite for archaeological study and, in fact, not all the earlier archaeologists working in Macedonia were soldier-scholars; initial finds brought others, like Walter Heurtley of the British School, who excavated between 1922-31 gaining by his efforts the title, "The Father of Macedonian Prehistory." From the 1960s and continuing today, Eugene Borza has dramatically advanced the understanding of Macedonia. In 1990, he wrote, "The obscurity of Macedonia has ended. There has been revealed a culture more sophisticated in the later periods than we had heretofore suspected . . . we stand on the brink of understanding for the first time the history of one of the most important nations of antiquity." Nearly two decades later we are well beyond the brink.¹³

Terra incognita is becoming *cognita*. The expanding knowledge enables us to employ core/periphery theory to examine the transformation of the region from weak and subaltern to a central power in the configuration of lands reaching from the Adriatic Sea to the Indus River. To trace the process calls for consideration of several important factors in defining status in addition to the inverse relationship between distance and the strength of the center. Of course, an evident need was to remove the condition that allowed Macedonia to serve as a passage or a highway for others to traverse whenever they wished. Barriers in the form of physical obstructions such as fortifications and in human form as warriors were obviously essential and the Argead rulers acted to implement them. Yet there are other elements that were involved in the transformation. John Cherry has indicated five additional, important factors in creating a relationship between a core and its periphery: common linguistic, ethnic, and economic factors; common political ideology; and common enemies.¹⁴ Macedonian leaders recognized the value of these commonalities, probably not acci-

dentally, and used them to convert their situation as a highway to one of centrality. It took time but the process can be seen developing from the Fifth Century.

Initial strengthening of the position of the kinglets of Macedonia may rest in common ethnic and linguistic affinities among most people of upper Macedonia. By the Bronze Age, Indo-Europeans prevailed in this region although there were exceptions, for example the Bryges.¹⁵ Differences in the closeness of affinity existed: the language of the Macedonians residing in lower and upper Macedonia appears to have come from the same limb of the Indo-European tree while that of more distant people—those of Thrace and Illyria—represented a different limb, albeit still Indo-European.¹⁶ In addition, the peoples of lower and upper Macedonia shared a common way of life in combining sedentary agriculture with transhumant pasturing. Geography furnished similar resources in the rivers and the riches of the mountains—wild animals, timber, and minerals. The history of settlement also created a common political life with personal leadership vested in a particular family.

Recognition of these commonalities allowed the nominal confederacy of Elimeia, Orestis, Lynkestis, and Pelagonia with lower Macedonia during the kingship of Alexander I (498-454). It was fragile, as the assertion of independence by Lynkestis under its ruler Arrhabaios during the Peloponnesian War testifies (Thuc. 2.99.2). Renewed efforts to centralize the larger Macedonian area occurred during the reign of Archelaos (413-399) with centralization at Pella and fortification of the core that had been weakened by events in Greece following the end of the Peloponnesian War. In fact, upon the death of Archelaos, kingship quickly changed five times in less than six years and the long reign of the victor in the chase for rule—Amyntas III—was sorely troubled. At his death, the rule passed to his eldest son who lived for less than three years, then to his second son who lasted five. With the death of this son and 4000 troops in 360/59, his youngest son, Philip II, inherited an unpromising future. To adapt Herodotus's assertion of Greeks that poverty makes one clever (7.102.1), fragility of Macedon's

future pushed Philip to the height of cleverness. He had a key to his efforts: lower Macedonia was regarded as significant—that is, central—to the interests of others.

Incursion of the Illyrians in 360-59 may have been the main impetus for growing integration. Traveling to lower Macedonia had taken the Illyrian warriors through upper Macedonia to kingdoms west and north. Thus, the Illyrians were a common enemy, distanced by language, as noted above, and also by way of life. On succeeding to the kingship, Philip used commonalities to build a mutual alliance against the enemy (the other). Alliances were cemented by marriage to women of the allied kingdoms as well as by the institution of training at Pella for sons of the rulers of those kingdoms. The training created a larger corps of officers while it also served, hopefully, as guarantee of good behavior on the part of the boys' fathers.

The location of the hub of the kingdom was a force in the transformation of Macedonia in another respect: lower Macedonia had access to the sea. While an asset for purposes of trade and potential expansion by sea, it harbored threats in encouraging closer relations with other, more distant peoples, initially the Greeks and later the Persians.

Inhabitants of the southern Greek mainland and Macedonia had been neighbors for centuries, even millennia. The diffusion of agriculture from the Near East had reached Macedonia, and Thessaly by ca. 6000 BCE where self-contained settlements reflected a similar mode of life. Even though the Bronze Age complexity of southern Greece was not replicated in Macedonia, Mycenaean products did travel to Macedonian sites.¹⁷ By the early Iron Age, "Macedonia seems to have been part Greek,"¹⁸ but even more, regular contact began in the Iron Age when Greeks returned to the sea as traders and as colonizers of new settlements. Aigai/Vergina has produced evidence of contact with the Greek world as early as the Tenth and Ninth Centuries while the coastline of the northern Aegean attracted Greeks in the Ninth Century: Greek settlement areas included the coastal territory of the Thermaic Gulf, which defined the Macedonian kingdom on its original eastern border.¹⁹

Interaction rose in frequency, with greater contact providing the Macedonians with fuller knowledge not only of the nature of Greek culture but also the basic institutions of their neighbors to the south. Alexander I is credited with innovation in infantry tactics based on first-hand knowledge of Greek hoplites' success in dealing with the Persian forces in 480-79.²⁰ In coping with the rival states of Sparta and Athens in the Peloponnesian War, both of whom had interests in Macedonia, Perdiccas learned the nature of Greek alliances and treaties while his son and successor, Archelaos, acted to strengthen the core of the kingdom by establishing border forts, constructing roads, and planting a watch tower at the gates of the Axios river. Earlier lessons in dealing with the Greek states were not forgotten by later kings, as the career of Philip II clearly demonstrates: he used the affinities between the two cultures as well as those lessons to create a kingdom of ca. 16,689 mi² (compared to the 6,600 mi² during the reign of Alexander I) with a population of ca. 700,000 (compared with 228,000 at the end of the Fifth Century) that would recognize Macedonia as its core.²¹

Greeks and Macedonians were Indo-European in both language and basic institutions, although not perhaps as closely related as Macedonians in the kingdom bordering the Thermaic Gulf were with the majority of other peoples of upper Macedonia. Even so, Philip was able to understand, and later put to use knowledge gained during his enforced sojourn in Thebes of that state's reformed hoplite force as well as with polis governance and current difficulties of one of the leading poleis. He adopted elements of Greek political organization as well as attracting to Macedon individual Greeks with valuable skills or lineage, for instance, in his marriage alliances.

Features of Greek culture had been incorporated into Macedonian life long before the reign of Philip. It is telling that many of these features are of a religious nature since a people's own religion is regularly a firmly-held element of its identity. Zeus was reported to be the father of Makedon in the genealogy of Hesiod while the Argead link to Herakles is embedded in the tradition of the clan's descent from the Heraklid Temenos.

Demeter was honored in two Sixth-Century megarai, and her daughter, Persephone, is the subject of a dramatic fresco in the Vergina tombs. An altar of Dionysios has been identified at the theatre remains at Vergina, and Euripides composed his *Bakkhai* while in Macedon. Archelaos established Olympic-style contests at Dion and Macedonians also participated in the games at Olympia. Macedonian coinage offers clear evidence of the embedding of religious elements into its culture.

Macedonian regal coinage nicely illustrates the incorporation of others' cultural elements to describe Macedon's growing strength. Prior to ca. 480, Macedon's coinage was one of many regional series with the image of a kneeling goat recalling the tradition of that kingdom's origins. The goat continues its prominence in the coins of Alexander I, often paired with a horse and rider, while coins of Perdikkas II combine the horseman, or horse alone, with a helmet or forepart of a lion. Herakles's head adorns issues from the reign of Archelaos and continues into the coins of Philip and Alexander, but with the pronounced presence of Apollo and the *biga* with charioteer in Philip's issues and Zeus and Athena with Nike in Alexander's coins.²² These developments announce more than inclusion of cultural borrowing. As early as the reign of Alexander I, annexation of territory led to replacement of the coinage of the annexed kingdom with that of Macedon;²³ by the end of the Fourth Century, "Macedonian regal issues provided the dominant large-denomination issues throughout Greece, Macedonia, Thrace, and the Aegean coastlands of Asia Minor . . ."²⁴

Other adoptions include use of the Greek alphabet for the written language of the kingdom, adaptation of the Greek form of theatres, and the design of Pella on the Hippodamian plan. While these similarities may not reflect common ethnicity or language, they do demonstrate cleverness in converting Macedon from peripheral/alien to central/similar. In a word, Macedon was no longer "other" and increasingly, it was the focus of developments in southern Greece as well as north and east of Macedon itself. During Philip's reign its eastern extent reached the northern coast of the Black Sea while Persian

control reached to that sea's southern coast. In 337, an advance force was dispatched to Anatolia to undertake the campaign of the League of Corinth against the Persian enemy. Hegemon of that league was Philip.

Peoples previously at centers of power recognized the change in Macedon's status from peripheral to core during Philip's reign. Illyrians changed from victorious attackers in 360-59 to allies joined to Macedon through the marriage between Philip and Audata, daughter of the Illyrian king. Within a year or a little more, Epirus was peacefully unified with Macedon, a union symbolized by the marriage of Philip to Olympias. Marriage to the Thracian Meda reflects the defeat of the Thracians in a final confrontation with Philip's troops in 342. To the immediate south in Thessaly, marriage to Philinna of Larisa and Nikesipolis of Pherai created alliances with two major states of Fourth-Century Greece. Soon Philip assumed official positions in Greece: *tagos* of Thessaly, membership in the Delphic Amphictyony, convener of the League of Corinth and then its hegemon. As his role expanded, Philip gained partisans in many states. Although Demosthenes calls them traitors (*On the Crown* 18.295), one partisan, Isocrates, urged Philip to attempt to reconcile the major states of Argos, Sparta, Thebes, and Athens and then extend his sights to Asia. Philip did both and, in doing so, centralized even greater power in the core of Macedonia.

Nor would Artaxerxes III and Artaxerxes IV, the Persian kings during Philip's reign, have to ask "Who are the Macedonians?" as Cyrus the Great was said to have asked of the Spartans.²⁵ Much had changed since the late Sixth Century when Persians had taken an active interest in the northern Aegean during the reigns of Darius and Xerxes. Yet, Macedon is not mentioned in the royal inscription of Darius I which lists countries and people ruled.²⁶ Ionian Greeks and "those of the sea" are on the distant western margins."²⁷ Given this order, Greeks, that is Ionians, and "those of the Sea" are on the distant outer margins. Macedonia is not only unknown but is likely scorned, for as Herodotus notes, "respect decreases as the distance grows, and the most remote are the most despised."²⁸

Philip did not live to complete his campaign in Persian territory; that goal became the task of Alexander. Without diminishing the brilliance of his execution of that task, it is important to appreciate that the transformation from periphery to core had been accomplished for him by both the Achaemenids and the earlier Argeads. When the mission of the League of Corinth had been achieved, the original marginality of Macedon had been even more dramatically altered by the addition of a second enormous core.²⁹ "There is a clear sense . . . that the locus of power has shifted to a new centre across the sea."³⁰ References to this new centre begin soon after the death of Alexander. "We find references to Macedon and Macedonians, a completely new element in the geographical lexicon, which show a very lively awareness of the precise identity of the new rulers."³¹ The information provides not only a personal name, but also the title *basileus* and identification of the kingdom with which that title is associated.

F. W. Walbank has defined the nature of rule of the Diadochi as "not in any sense national (except in Macedonia)."³² Thus the qualification "Makedon" is revealing in identifying the locus of this new power. Would-be successors of Alexander also understood the significance of Macedon in returning to it to build, rebuild, or extend their own base of power.³³ Clearly, the kingdom of Macedon had retained its status as the core in the far greater scheme of power. Its early role as a conduit began the political and cultural synthesis that defines the Hellenistic Age.

The cultural dimensions of the emergence of Macedonian centrality deserve fuller discussion than space in this essay offers. Briefly, however, it is important to include Macedonian use of the culture of others to achieve its position as core. As noted above, Macedonian culture was becoming syncretic for centuries before the reigns of Philip II and Alexander III.³⁴ The result was a multi-faceted culture spread by Alexander and his troops that gained even more facets during the rule of his successors.³⁵

That the Macedonians were Indo-Europeans does not identify either their more specific ethnicity or their language. On the other hand, it does reveal relations with the majority of their neighbors. Closeness of affinity varied among neighbors yet institutions and even language could be understood and shared. It is noteworthy that the form of Greek that became the language of the Hellenistic kingdoms was *koine*, a form of Greek that may be indebted to the adoption of Greek as the language—perhaps initially for largely diplomatic purposes—of the Argead rulers.³⁶ Greek place names and names of deities testify to a deeper foundation of the language in Macedonian culture. Techniques of portraying the gods or humans demonstrate the same proclivity to combine native Macedonian traditions with those of their neighbors. Macedonians certainly commissioned Greek artists, as the role of Zeuxis illustrates, but, as art and architectural historians are increasingly realizing, the role of Macedonia is strong.³⁷

Finally, but probably most importantly, the vehicle of Macedonian success obviously owed much to others: the knowledge on the part of Alexander I of Greek hoplite tactics; Philip's acquaintance with the reformed phalanx on Theban model; the wisdom of combining the expert Macedonian cavalry with that of other regions, notably Thessaly; adoption of contingents of light-armed troops from other neighbors, such as the Agrianian archers; the creation, by alliances based on mutual needs and proximity, of a trained officer corps. The success of this combination ensured its durability.³⁸ The Macedonian sarissa, not the Greek spear prevailed and the heavier Macedonian form of the phalanx was adopted by Alexander's successors. A policy of incorporating allied contingents of specialists as well as mercenaries persisted, often drawn from those peoples found essential by Philip and Alexander but—also in a similar spirit of adopting valuable new allies—taking on previously unknown participants such as Persian troops and Indian elephants. Professionalization of military service rather than use of citizen militias continued. Elite units were still closely associated with the king and the effective successors embodied strong leadership in the field.

In its adoptions and adaptations, Macedonian culture united valuable institutions, practices, technologies, and beliefs from a wide array of regions, initially those close at hand but gradually reaching well beyond immediate neighbors. In sum, the “barbarian” kingdom of Macedon centralized, both purposefully and unconsciously, elements that created a *koinon* embodying elements of the cultures that, by 336, recognized that they were peripheral to the core whose hub was Pella. By 323 the Achaemenid empire was attached to that core even though the new configuration would not depend entirely on Pella. However, Macedonian institutions and culture remained a leavening agent in the Hellenistic world and into the Roman sphere.³⁹ As the culture of the core continued to exert a strong influence, it is notable that recent discoveries in the rude mounds of Macedonia have described a path from Lefkadia to the frescoes of Pompeii,⁴⁰ an inheritance that endured well beyond Pydna, Antioch, and Actium.

NOTES

1. W. Horowitz, *Mesopotamian Cosmic Geography* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1998).
2. An excellent analysis of the Mesopotamian and Persian views is Amelie Kuhrt, *'Greeks' and 'Greece' in Mesopotamian and Persian Perspectives: a lecture delivered at New College, Oxford on 7th May 2001* (Oxford: Leopard's Head Press, 2002).
3. "The model of a symmetrical world in which normality and balance at the centre are surrounded by the fantastic, the threatening, and the beautiful at the extremities is nowhere more explicit in *Herodotus*." John Gould, *Herodotus* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1989) 94.
4. "Centre and periphery: a review of a concept," in *Centre and Periphery in the Ancient World*, ed. M. Rowlands, M. Larsen and K. Kristiansen (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987) 2.
5. Charles Edson, "Early Macedonia," *Archaea Makedonia* 1 (Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1970) 43.
6. Dio Chrysostom, *Oration VI* reported his experience of being shipwrecked on the coast of Euboea (2), taken in by a man (7) who, together with his own family and that of another man, lives primarily by hunting and farming a small bit of land (10). The other man has never been to town (polis) although the rescuer has been to town twice (21). On the second occasion he was told that two-thirds of the land is wilderness through neglect and low population. Land outside the gates is "absolutely wild" (38).
A similar situation is described for the Byzantine period in the writing of Michael Acominatus, archbishop of Athens from 1175 (or 1182) to 1205. He describes ill-fed, ill-clothed people (*Epistle* 8.1) beggarly in mind and in body (*Ep.* 8.3) living in a poor and wretched place where sheep graze at will (*To Demetrius Drimys* 5). He experienced official corruption and widespread piracy directly and often (*Ep* 42.5). K. M. Setton, "Athens in the Later Twelfth Century," *Speculum* 19.2 (1944): 179-207 expands on this description.
For Ottoman Greece, Nicholas Biddle reports in his journal and letters (*Nicholas Biddle in Greece: The Journal and letters of 1806*, R. A. McNeal, ed. [University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1993]) that when bound for the Morea by boat, "the aspect was . . . barren and unpromising." In the town of his destination he found "a custom house & two huts" (90). Of Delphi, he sighed, "How sad and solitary a picture" (95).
7. Michael Fotiadis, "Imaging Macedonia in Prehistory, ca. 1900-1930," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 14:2 (2001) 115, 116.
8. L. Rey, "Observations sur les sites préhistoriques et protohistoriques de la Macédoine," *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 40 (1916) 257.
9. Fotiadis, 2001, 127.
10. Much of Leake's discoveries were published as *Travels in Northern Greece*, 4 vols (London: J. Rodwell, 1835).
11. Fotiades, 2001, 117.

12. Léon Rey, a former student at the *École des Chartes*, had been a sergeant at the campaign front; Stanley Casson had been with the British Salonika Force.
13. E. N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon*, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992) 18. The most recent issue of *Archaeological Reports* (2006-2007) includes 25 pages of information on Western, Central, and Eastern Macedonia reporting evidence from Paleolithic times through the Ottoman control (Hertford: Stephen Austin and Sons, 2007) 48-73.
14. "Power in Space: Archaeological and Geographical Studies of the State," in *Landscape and Culture: Geographical and Archaeological Perspectives*, ed. J. M. Wagstaff (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) 146-76.
15. Jean-Nicolas Corvisier, *Aux Origines du Miracle Grec* (Paris: Presses Univ. de France, 1991), especially "Le peuplement de la Macédoine," 51-89.
16. Colin Renfrew, *Archaeology and Language: The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987) 69.
17. Ch. Koulouli-Chrysanthaki, "Macedonia in the Bronze Age," 105-15, and G. Karamitrou-Mentesidi, "Upper Macedonia in the Late Bronze Age and the Early Iron Age," 116-22, in *Greek Civilization: Macedonia, Kingdom of Alexander the Great* (Athens: Greek Ministry of Culture, 1993). Just recently, for example, excavation at Leivadia has yielded Mycenaean wheelmade *kantharoi*, *kyathoi*, *prochoi*, 4-handled *amphorae*, *skyphoi*, *alabastra* and a bronze spearhead. *Archaeological Reports*, 2006-2007, 48 f.
18. J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas*, 4th ed. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1999) 235.
19. Ch. Koukouli-Chrysanthaki and J. Vokotopoulou, "The Early Iron Age (Eleventh-Sixth Century B.C.)," 129-37; and M. Pappa, "Vergina—the Tumulus Cemetery," 138-42, in *Greek Civilization: Macedonia, Kingdom of Alexander the Great* (Athens: Greek Ministry of Culture, 1993). Current work at Archonitiko has produced numerous and varied Attic, Corinthian, and Ionian items from the Archaic and Classical period that "confirm the commercial relationships between the Macedonians and the W and the E parts of the Mediterranean world (E Aegean, Asia Minor, Phoenicia, and Egypt) as well as the cities of S Greece (Athens, Corinth, etc.)," *Archaeological Reports*, 2006-2007, 57. Many of the items were luxury goods; however, recent excavation at Asomata has produced a utilitarian Corinthian hexaleipton pot used to hold cosmetics in a Sixth-Century burial. I am grateful to Laura Winn Antikas for this information that she learned while at Asomata in September 2007.
20. Arnaldo Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* (Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1934) esp. 10 f.
21. Corvisier, 1991, territory, 259; population, 262.
22. *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum: Part I, Macedonia to Attica* (New York: American Numismatic Society, 1961).
23. B. V. Head, *Historia Nummorum: a Manual of Greek Numismatics* (Oxford: Henry Frowde for the Clarendon Press, 1887; repr., Chicago: Argonaut, 1967) 198.
24. Ian Carradice, *Greek Coins* (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1995) 56.

25. Hdt. 1.153.

26. Pierre Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander: a History of the Persian Empire* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2002) 180 ff. Persia and Elam are at the center of the empire. Stretching to the south and southeast are Babylonia, Assyria, Arabia, Egypt; further east are Parthia, Drangiana, Aria, Chroasmia, Bactria, Sogdiana. Along the center-east and southeast-west axis one finds Gandhara, Scythia, Sattagydia, Arachosia, and Makran. The west-east axis is home to "Those of the Sea," Sardis, Ionia, Media, Armenia, and Cappadocia.

27. Kuhrt, 2002, 20.

28. Hdt. 1.134.

29. Not surprisingly, a single new core was not determined by Alexander's death in 323, nor would a single hub be established by his successors.

30. Kuhrt, 2002, 24.

31. The Diadochi Chronicle attests that someone, probably Antipater, crossed in 319/8 to Macedon; in the following year, King Philip is associated with affairs "in Macedon." Seleucus, after victory over Lysimachus, moved his troops to Macedon, "his land." The foundation cylinder from Borsippa of his son and successor, Antiochus I, records in Akkadian that he is *basileus Makedon*.

32. *The Hellenistic World* (Glasgow: Fontana, 1981) 74 f.

33. Cassander, Demetrios, Seleukos, Ptolemy Karaunos, Lysimachos, Pyrrhos, Antigonos Gonatas.

34. *Greek Civilization*, 1993, especially Part II: Catalogue: Koukouli-Chrysanthaki, 105-27; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki and Vokotopoulou, "Macedonia in the Bronze Age," 129-47; and Koukouli-Chrysanthaki and Vokotopoulou, "The Archaic Period," 149-95. More recent is Stelios Andreou, Michael Fotiadis, and Kostas Kotsakis, "The Neolithic and Bronze Age of Northern Greece," in *Aegean Prehistory: A Review*, ed. Tracey Cullen, American Journal of Archaeology Supplement 1 (Boston: Archaeological Institute of America, 2001) 259-327.

35. Hellenistic does not do justice to the range of elements that had been wedded to Macedonian culture.

36. The mixture may well date to much earlier times. Important places in later Macedonian history - such as Petra, Dion, Leibethra, Paltamon, Pieria, Herakleion, Helikon - have names intelligible in Greek and many of those sites have archaeological histories reaching back to the Late Bronze or Early Iron Age. By the Fourth Century, of 47 grave stelai from Aigia/Verginia recording names of the deceased, the majority are Greek. The individuals named seem to have been ordinary Macedonians. See I. K. Promponas, "Makedonika kai Om̄rika Glōssa," *Archaia Makedonia* 2 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1977) 397-407.

37. See the volume edited by Beryl Barr-Sharrar and Eugene N. Borza, *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times, Studies in the History of Art*, vol. 10 (Washington DC: National Gallery of Art, 1982): essays ranging from coinage, to metal vases, jewelry, tombs, architecture, sculpture, mosaic and painting uniformly illustrate the role of Macedonian culture in these arts.

On architecture, while influence from major Greek centers is clear, Stella Miller proposed that the Macedonians were unfamiliar with these traditions and thus

recognized few constraints, which encouraged eclecticism (157). Moreover, the “illusionistic style of architectural painting evidently did actually develop independently in that region (166), while the Philippeion was the work of a Macedonian architect” (161) of pebble mosaic, Martin Robertson asserts that Macedon was the “beginning and first flourishing of pictorial mosaic in relation to the integration of Macedonian culture with that of old Greece” (247). The pottery found in Macedonia from the Early Bronze Age demonstrates “reciprocal cultural interchange and mutual influences that developed a kind of cultural koine in the Early Bronze Age . . .” *Greek civilization*, 1993, 107. Alexander’s plan for Alexandria may well have been modeled on Pella in its location and its plan.

38. A concise summary is R. M. Errington, *A History of Macedonia* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990) 238-48.

39. Tristan Goldman, PhC in ancient history at the University of Washington carries the importance of culture even further: “It may be worth at least mentioning . . . how a dominant military/political power like Macedonia can be seen to assert itself as a center, and yet show signs of its own culture being subsumed by different modes of thought brought on by contact with the periphery. In antiquity, I definitely think you could make the argument that what we see in Macedonia helps us better understand what eventually happens in Rome.” Personal communication 12/03/2007.

40. P. H. Blanckenhagen, “Painting in the Time of Alexander and Later,” in *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times, Studies in the History of Art*, Vol. 10, ed. B. Barr-Sharrar and E. N. Borza (Washington DC: National Gallery of Art, 1982) 251-60, esp. 257.

PHILIP II AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MACEDONIA: A REAPPRAISAL

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Philip II, ruler of Macedonia from 359-336 BCE, followed the typical pattern of a Macedonian king: he rewarded his supporters. Spear-won land and booty, these were the means by which a monarch cemented his relationship to his people.¹ This was certainly part of the traditional *hetairos* relationship. Macedonian kings gave their aristocratic "cavalry companions" vast tracts of land (*FGrH* 115 F-225B; *Plut. Alex.* 15.3-6),² and this aspect of the tradition was extended to the heavy infantry when they became the *pezhetairoi*, or "foot companions."³ A successful Macedonian king ruled through patronage. Philip differed in one respect from earlier rulers. He was by far the most successful Macedonian king down to his time and, as a consequence, had far more land and financial resources with which to be generous. Thanks early in his reign to the defeat of Bardylis and many of Illyrian's erstwhile aristocratic Macedonian allies, especially those in Upper Macedonia,⁴ Philip was in the position to treat much of his realm as "spear-won" land.⁵ As he supposedly proclaimed to the Athenians with respect to his possession of Amphipolis, it was his "by the right of conquest in war" (*Dem.* 12.22). His son Alexander was later to claim all of Asia as his by the same right of conquest (*Diod.* 17.17.2; *Justin* 11.5.10). For Philip the key to his power and ultimately that of Macedonia itself was the breaking of personal ties between the rulers/landlords of much of Macedonia and their dependent populations, and replacing these bonds with attachments to himself.⁶ (Philip) Through extensive grants of land to individuals, created a manpower pool of both cavalry and heavy infantry. With land he not only rewarded his supporters and built a new army, but he also in the process transformed Macedonia.

It is the contention of this paper that Philip changed Macedonia in terms of its wealth, military manpower, urbanization, and centralization as a direct result of his distribution of land especially to the rural poor, the tenant farmers and hired pastoralists. In particular, Philip converted what had been almost exclusively a dependent population of herdsmen and tenants into a nation containing tens of thousands of loyal landowners. One result of this transformation, and most likely its intended outcome, was that under Philip the Macedonian cavalry grew to more than five times its size under his predecessors, and the Macedonian infantry appeared virtually out of nowhere (Diod. 16.3.1-2).⁷ Ultimately, Philip created a military force of at least 3,300 cavalry and 24,000 infantry.⁸ These holders of King's land became "citizen soldiers" (*stratioton politikon*) (Diod. 18.12.2).

Many have examined Philip's achievement from the perspective of creating political unity through his military reforms,⁹ building an army-based state,¹⁰ generating an economic metamorphosis based on the exploitation of royal monopolies,¹¹ or shaping a constitutional revolution,¹² but his most revolutionary act was social and psychological. In transforming many thousands of peasants and herdsmen into land-owning Macedonians, he created a confident and exceedingly loyal population, loyal both to the individual monarch who had given them their land and who had defended their possession of it, but also to the institution of monarchy itself.¹³ As Billows notes with respect to the later Hellenistic monarchs, the granting of land was "a powerful inducement to future loyalty."¹⁴ The importance of land to a rural population has not changed from Antiquity to the modern day. The desire for land on the part of the landless or the small landowner encumbered by debt or obligation has sparked revolution across the centuries. Peter Brunt has demonstrated that it played a significant role in the so-called Roman Revolution that saw the overthrow of the Republic and the installation of the regime of Augustus,¹⁵ and it has become a truism among commentators on modern rural revolutions that what the peasants want is unencumbered land, and that they very often employ violence to obtain it.¹⁶ In a purported

speech to his troops at Opis (Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.2), Alexander III stated: "Philip found you wandering and poor, wearing goat-skins and grazing a few goats on the mountains . . . he brought you down from the mountains to the plains . . . and made you dwellers in cities." While the speech has been questioned from a number of perspectives,¹⁷ and certainly is not a verbatim transcription, it should be regarded—if not as an accurate reflection of an actual speech—at least as a partially correct summary of Philip's achievement.¹⁸ John Ellis and Richard Billows write that most Macedonians held a status akin to that of the Thessalian *penestai* or of the Spartan helots.¹⁹ In the respective Hellenistic states in Asia there were the *laoi*; these individuals were part of the indigenous population, as distinct from the Macedonian/Greek settlers. Greeks had often created serf-like populations from those conquered in foreign lands,²⁰ and both Aristotle (*Pol.* 7.1330a 25-31) and Isocrates (3.5; *cf.*, 4.131) encouraged making "barbarians" into serfs for the Greeks. The Milesians turned the native Mariandynians into serfs when they colonized Heraclea on the Pontus (*Pl. Leg.* 6.776 c-d; Strabo 12.3.4; *Athen.* 6.263c-d),²¹ and the Megarians had enslaved the local Bithynians in the foundation of Byzantium (*FGrH* 81.F-8).²² Likewise, the *penestai* and the Spartan helots were believed to be a "foreign" element by the "free" population (*Thuc.* 1.101.2; *FGrH* 87 F-8; *Athen.* 6.284).²³ Even though there is no reference to a distinct subject class in Macedonia, Ellis's and Billow's conclusion would appear likely, especially with respect to Upper Macedonia. Here the neighboring Illyrian Dardanians and Ardians had subject populations who apparently tilled the soil (*Athen.* 6.272d; 10.443c).²⁴ Macedonia's dependent class, however, probably had more in common with the *hektemoroi* and the *pelatai* of Solonian Athens (*Ath. Pol.* 2.2),²⁵ than with Thessalian *penestai* or Spartan *helots*. The Macedonian practice historically had been to exterminate or expel conquered populations (*Thuc.* 2.99.3-6).²⁶ While foreign slaves may have been in some quantity during and after the reign of Philip II,²⁷ the dependent pastoralists and farmers freed from this status by Philip were poor Macedonians themselves, not a subject, conquered population, real or imagined. Alexander's army in

Asia did contain *lixae* and *calones* (Curt. 6.8.23),²⁸ but inscriptional documentation provides no evidence of racial differentiation in the Macedonian population. Individuals are most often listed simply by their name, or by their name and patronymic; sometimes by their name, patronymic, and their city; occasionally by name, patronymic, and the ethnic "Macedonian;" and less often by name and Macedonian ethnic only.²⁹ As concluded by Janice Gabbert with respect to such evidence from Antigonid Macedonia, there is no indication of "different classes of citizenship."³⁰ The evidence also strongly suggests that the common citizenry in Philip II's urban foundations enjoyed complete equality, and even in his re-foundations no distinction was drawn between the new and old citizens.³¹

Urbanization clearly did accelerate during Philip's reign.³² While Xenophon describes Pella in 383 BCE as the largest city in Macedonia (*Hell.* 5.2.13), Strabo (7. frg 20) later comments that prior to Philip II it was a "small city." Philip is also recorded as founding "strong cities at key locations" in Thrace (Diod. 16.71.2; Dem. 8.44), and along his frontier with Illyria (Dem. 4.48).³³ In Thrace, there are references to Philippopolis (*FGrH* 115 F-110; Pliny *NH* 4.18), Drongilus, Calybe, and Mastira (Dem. 8.44; Str. 7.6.320C). Alexander, while acting as regent, founded his own city, Alexandropolis, with a mixed population in Thrace (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1).³⁴ Additionally, many Greek cities along the coast became part of the kingdom during Philip II's reign (Diod. 16.8.2-3).³⁵

The population of cities would frequently be augmented by the incorporation of Macedonians, or by settlers from surrounding areas, into the existing population (Dem. 18.182).³⁶ Philip captured the Thasian colony of Crenides (Diod. 16.3.7) in 356, and refounded it as Philippi.³⁷ Its acquisition is mentioned without a hint of a siege or the expulsion of any of its citizens, but it is noted that Philip increased its population (Diod. 16.8.6, 3.7). There is no mention of the origin of these new settlers, but Griffith may well be correct that they came from the surrounding area and, perhaps, included numbers of Chalcidians,³⁸ but it is also likely that many Macedonians were included as well. Previously, in 357, when Amphipolis

was betrayed to Philip, much of the population of Amphipolis remained and was subsequently supplemented by a large number of Macedonian settlers (*cf.*, Diod. 16.8.2; Dem. 18.182; Aeschin. 3.27).³⁹ Miltiades Hatzopoulos has shown through an examination of deeds of sale from Amphipolis that Macedonians from both Upper and Lower Macedonia became settlers in Amphipolis.⁴⁰ A similar situation was apparently also true with respect to Pydna.⁴¹ Certainly much can be made of Philip's city foundations and refoundations, but the evidence suggests that the vast majority of Upper Macedonians continued to live in villages, and hence individuals from these areas were denoted by their regional designations.⁴² Yet, at least three of the six heavy infantry battalions came from this area (Diod. 17.57.2). When Methone was captured and razed to the ground, Philip distributed its land among the "Macedonians" (Diod. 16.34.5; *cf.*, Dem. 4.35; Justin 7.6.14-16). Viriata distribution probably was most often the case in Upper Macedonia—land was given out to Macedonians, but not always as part of city foundations.

The evidence is very clear that Philip gave extensive land holdings to prominent members of his *hetairoi*.⁴³ Nearchus, Laomedon, and Androstenes are all later associated in Arrian's listing of Alexander's Indus River fleet commanders with Amphipolis (*Ind.* 18.4), and listed as Macedonians. None, however, was native to Macedonia. Androstenes was from Thasos;⁴⁴ Laomedon, from Mytilene;⁴⁵ and Nearchus, from Crete.⁴⁶ Further, one of the cavalry squadrons employed by Alexander was listed as from Amphipolis as well (Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.5). While this squadron might represent the original Amphipolitan cavalry, it more likely was composed of Macedonians who had been given land in the area by the king.⁴⁷ Even though no cavalry group is listed as from Pydna, prominent Macedonians were given land near that city as well (*cf.*, Arr. *Ind.* 18.5).⁴⁸ Those aristocrats and prominent foreigners who had joined willingly with Philip at the start of his reign or who had joined him later were granted land from the king's cache of royal land apparently in areas distant from their ancestral holdings. Leonnatus is referred to as from Pella (Arr. *Ind.* 18.3), but was in fact a native Lyncestian.⁴⁹

But it was not only noble Macedonian allies and important non Macedonian *hetairoi* who received grants of land. As the passage from Arrian, quoting Alexander concerning his father indicates, many new landholders came from the landless class of Macedonia. While it is certain that herding did not disappear from the Macedonian landscape, Philip, however, did liberate tens of thousands of such individuals from their landlords. After Philip's acquisition of Amphipolis, in addition to the extensive grants of land to prominent members of the Macedonian aristocracy (*cf.*, Arr. *Ind.* 18.4), land was also given to a broad range of non-aristocratic Macedonians.⁵⁰ G. T. Griffith has argued that, when Methone was destroyed and its land given out to "Macedonians" (Diod. 16.34. 5; *cf.*, Dem. 4.35; Justin 7.6.14-16), these recipients were ordinary Macedonians, not aristocrats.⁵¹ This was probably also the case with Apollonia, Olynthus, and thirty-two other communities in or near Thrace (Dem. 9.26; *cf.*, Diod. 16.53.3; *cf.*, Justin 8.3.14-15).⁵² These towns and villages are associated by Demosthenes with Methone as having been destroyed by Philip, and while he does not state that the land was given to Macedonians, it would—given the example of Methone—appear likely. Philip did reward soldiers with "worthy gifts" (Diod. 16.53.3),⁵³ and he distributed land to Macedonians near Potidaea (*Syll.*³ 1.332).⁵⁴ This inscription records the renewal of land grants that were made during the reigns of Philip and Alexander by the then-monarch Cassander. Another inscription records Alexander's gift to the "Macedonians" of the Bottiaean towns of Calindoea, Thamiscia, Camacaea, and Tripoatis.⁵⁵ After the battle on the Granicus, and probably as a general practice with regard to war casualties, Alexander remitted for the families of the Macedonian dead all property taxes and personal liabilities (Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.5; *cf.*, Diod. 17.21.6). At Opis, Alexander, referring to those who had died on the long campaign in general, stated that "their parents have been freed from all services and taxes" (Arr. *Anab.* 7.10.4). Helmut Berve and most recently Miltiades Hatzopoulos have pointed out that the remission of tax indicated that the dead and their families held royal land,⁵⁶ thus confirming that land was held by common Macedonian

soldiers, as well as by aristocrats. The practice of granting land in return for either infantry or cavalry service was certainly a common practice in the Hellenistic period.⁵⁷

While these lands could be inherited, bought, and sold, they were still subject to repossession by the king.⁵⁸ This was apparently true of all land. Even though Hatzopoulos asserts that this revocability was true only of "royal land," not of land that became associated with a city or "city land,"⁵⁹ Billows argues effectively that the king retained "at least a limited right of 'eminent domain' over the land granted to the colonists of [a] city."⁶⁰ This is certainly borne out by the ability of Macedonian monarchs to transfer populations almost at will. During Philip's reign there were numerous forced movements of peoples into and within Macedonia (Justin 8.5.7 - 8.6.1; Polyæn. 4.2.12).⁶¹ More than a century later, Philip V transferred Macedonians and their families from the "chief cities" of Macedonia to Emathia and replaced them with Thracians and "barbarians" (Polyb. 23.10.4-7). Earlier, Amyntas had offered the entire region of Anthemus, in western Mygdonia, to Hippias as a gift (Hdt. 5.94.1). Philip II ceded the same region briefly to the Olynthians (Dem. 6.20), but later it supplied one of Alexander's cavalry squadrons (Arr. *Anab.* 2.9.3.).

An important effect of the granting of land was the creation of loyalty among these new upland Macedonian landowners—to Philip in particular, and to the lowland kings in general. Given Upper Macedonia's history of practical independence from the Argead monarch, it is curious that after Philip II's annexation of Upper Macedonia (Diod. 16.8.1; *cf.*, 16.1.5) right up to the Roman conquest, there is only one attested regional revolt of an area roughly corresponding to a former Upper Macedonian kingdom, and that, if it occurred at all, took place in 197 BCE (Polyb. 18.47.6), one-and-a-half centuries after its annexation.⁶² If these areas had retained any sense of loyalty to their former rulers, it is very unlikely that Alexander would have brigaded troops from Upper Macedonia according to their old kingdom (Diod. 17.57.2).⁶³ But landowners, created by his father, would be very loyal to their benefactor's successor.

With respect to Philip and Alexander, the troops' loyalty appears more closely connected to their regard for Philip than to that for his son.⁶⁴ When in difficulties with his soldiers at Opis, Alexander reminded them that Philip had brought them prosperity, safety, and power (Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.1-5). In the disturbance in Babylon after the great conqueror's death, the troops turned not to Alexander's offspring, nor to his generals, but rather to Alexander's half-brother, Philip's son Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10.7.1-10), who immediately after his elevation to the throne changed his name to Philip (Curt. 10.7.7; Diod. 18.2.4). A similar situation occurred with Cynane, Philip's daughter and Alexander's half-sister. In 321, she had raised her own Macedonian troops (Polyaen. 8.60), and led them to Asia, where she demanded a marriage between her daughter Adea and the new king, Philip III, the former Arrhidaeus.⁶⁵ When Cynane was murdered, the royal army rioted and forced their leaders to acquiesce to the marriage.⁶⁶ Her connection to Philip II is clear, but that to Alexander is ephemeral at best. After her marriage, Adea changed her name to Eurydice, which was the name of Philip II's mother.⁶⁷ In her new role, Adea/Eurydice's personal influence was profound. She sparked riots in the royal army (Arr. *Succ.* 1.31; Diod. 18.39.1-2), and was even briefly the regent for Macedonia (Justin 14.5.1-3; Diod. 19.11.1).

During Philip's reign, tens of thousands of formerly landless men were given land. While a few of the inhabitants of the cities and villages continued as herdsmen, the predominant occupation of city-dwellers was farming. Greek animal husbandry in general appears not to have been a sedentary activity, but a transhumant one.⁶⁸ Philip, by his actions both inside and outside of Macedonia, apparently gained a reputation as a friend of the common man. Polyaenus (4.2.19) reports that Philip was "a friend to the people," and Strabo (9.5.19; cf., *FGrH* 115 F-81) has this monarch freeing the *penestai* of Perrhaebia from the control of Larisa and eliminating their tribute.⁶⁹ Within Macedonia, Philip began immediately upon his accession to the throne to reward soldiers with land. Billows estimates the overall population of Philip's kingdom as between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000.⁷⁰ His analysis, while based

on a number of assumptions, appears to yield a fair estimate. If roughly one fourth of this total were eligible for military service, or 250,000 to 375,000 men, then Philip's grants could potentially have gone to between ten and fifteen percent of the families of Macedonia.⁷¹ A significant number, but the vast majority of Macedonians at the time of Philip's death would still have remained in some form of tenancy or serfdom.⁷² This is clear from the large number of Macedonians during and after Philip's reign who controlled vast territories and the people inhabiting these lands. Plutarch (*Alex.* 15.3; *cf.*, Justin 11.5.5) reports that Alexander gave to various members of his *hetairoi* farms and villages. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F-225B) reports, probably with much exaggeration, that 800 of Philip's *hetairoi* possessed as much land as 10,000 of the richest Greeks. Aside from the military and political implications of Philip's land grants, the economic and social changes would have been great. Hammond argues for an economic revolution during Philip's reign, involving a change from transhumance to agriculture, the reclamation of land for cultivation rather than for livestock, an increase in the labor force as a by-product of territorial expansion, and the emergence of cities.⁷³ All of these are at least in part true, but Philip's revolution involved much more. Much of the economic transformation was the result of the efforts of these new landowners. Non land-owning agricultural workers are not likely to make significant improvements to the land they work.⁷⁴ They tend to plant annual crops, not those that require years of nurture before they become productive.⁷⁵ Now, these new Macedonian landowners had a vested interest in improvement. Additionally, their new wealth gave them the wherewithal to equip themselves as the new Macedonian heavy infantry, but more importantly the desire to do so. Protecting their king now meant also protecting their lands. In the final analysis, Philip transformed Macedonia in ways not even he could have imagined.

NOTES

1. A. E. Samuel, "Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian and Merovingian Parallels," *AHR* 93 (1988) 1276; cf., R. A. Billows, *Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism* (Leiden: Brill, 1995) 137; E. N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990) 215.
2. G. S. Stagakis, "Institutional Aspects of the Hetairos Relation" (Madison: Unpub. Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1962).
3. Philip early in his reign extended the traditional hetairos relationship to infantry soldiers (*pezhetairoi*), at first to his infantry "bodyguard," but later to his entire heavy infantry, thus strengthening the personal bond with these troops. The identity of the king actually extending the relationship to the infantry is disputed, but see the discussion and argumentation for Philip in E. M. Anson, *Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek Among Macedonians* (Leiden: Brill, 2004) 226-30.
4. J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976) 48, 55-9; N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia: Volume II*, 550-336 B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 216, 650-52; Borza, 1990, 210-11; cf., N. G. L. Hammond, *Philip of Macedon* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1994) 26-7.
5. In general with respect to "spear-won" land, see B. Funck, "Zu den Landschenkungen hellenistischer Könige," *Klio* 60 (1978) 45-55; A. Mehl, "Doroktetos Chora," *Ancient Society* 10/11 (1980/81) 173-212.
6. These attachments came in part through the creation of the *pezhetairoi* (see note 3).
7. With respect to cavalry, in 358 Philip had 600 horsemen (Diod. 16.4.3). Alexander crossed to Asia with 1800 Macedonian cavalry (Diod. 17.17.4), having left 1500 behind in Macedonia (Diod. 17.17.5). While Alexander may have added some numbers to the forces he inherited from his father, it is clear that this was basically the army assembled by his father. See W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (London: Routledge, 1992) 3, *passim*. Prior to Philip's reign the Macedonian army contained but few heavy infantry soldiers (Thuc. 2.100.5, 124. 1; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.38 - 3.6).
8. At Chaeronea Philip's army contained "not less than 2000 cavalry" and 30,000 infantry (Diod. 16.85.5). Alexander took 1800 Macedonian cavalry and 12,000 Macedonian infantry with him to Asia (Diod. 17. 17. 3-4), leaving behind in Macedonia 1500 cavalry and 12,000 infantry with his regent Antipater (Diod. 17.17.5). There was also an advance force in Asia, but its size and composition are unknown (Diod. 16.91.2; Just. 9.5.8; Polyæn. 5.44.4).
9. Ellis, 1976, 8, 231.
10. Billows, 1995, 15-20.
11. N. G. L. Hammond, 1979 2: 658-74; *The Macedonian State: The Origins, Institutions and History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 177-87; "Philip's Innovations in the Macedonian Economy," *Symb. Osl.* 70 (1995) 22-9.

12. M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings: I. A Historical and Epigraphic Study. II. Epigraphic Appendix*. *Melethemata* 22 (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1996) 1: 270-71.
13. Early modern rulers often sided or pretended to side with their peasantry against the aristocratic landlords, and these small land holders often became staunch supporters of the royal regime. See H. Rebel, *Peasant Classes: The Bureaucratization of Property and Family Relations Under Early Habsburg Absolutism, 1511-1636* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983) 3-4.
14. Billows, 1995, 132-7. Billows, however, sees this loyalty as stemming from the inherent revocability of the royal grants (see below).
15. "The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution," *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, ed. P. Brunt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 240-75.
16. S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968) 375; R. Prosterman and J. M. Riedinger, *Land Reform and Democratic Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1987) 10; J. S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution; Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974) 158-9, 201. For specific studies, see especially, N. Harvey, *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1998), and N. Wiegersma, *Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution. Patriarchy and Collectivity in the Rural Economy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988).
17. For example, F. R. Wüst, "Die Rede Alexanders des Grosswen in Opis," *Historia* 2 (1953/4) 177-88; E. Carney, "Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander," *CP* 91 (1996) 29, 33, 38.
18. The most enthusiastic defense of the speech as a basically accurate account of what was said and what had indeed occurred is to be found in N. G. L. Hammond, "The Speeches in Arrian's *Indica* and *Anabasis*," *CQ* 49 (1999) 249-50, see also A. B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988) 133; G. L. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London: Faber, 1978) 17-18. More recently, D. B. Nagle, "The Cultural Context of Alexander's Speech at Opis," *TAPA* 126 (1996) 151-172, has declared that "the substance of the speech was spoken by Alexander at Opis" (152), but that it was a piece of propaganda summarizing the "official version of Philip's reign" (153, *cf.*, 169-70).
19. Ellis, 1976, 27; Billows, 1995, 9-10, 136-37, 200-1.
20. H. van Wees, "Conquerors and serfs: Wars of conquest and forced labour," *Helots and their masters in Laconia and Messenia: Histories, ideologies, structures*, eds. N. Luraghi and S. E. Adcock (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2003) 34.
21. J. Ducat, *Les Hilotes* (Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1990) 31-3.
22. Ducat, 1990, 35.
23. Yvon Garlan, *Slavery in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1988) 95.
24. See Garlan, 1988, 104.

25. While both Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.9.2) and Plutarch (*Rom.* 13.5) equate Roman clients or plebeians with Athenian *thetes/pelatai* and/or Thessalian *penestai*, their comparisons imply only a similarity in terms of bondage. Appian's meaning of *pelatai* in his Roman context is clients (*BC* 4.4.18, 19; *Hisp.* 14.84).
26. Hatzopoulos, 1996 1: 170-71.
27. Philip did on occasion enslave conquered people (Diod. 16.8.5, 53.3; cf., Paus. 5.23.3). Justin (9.2.15) records the capture of 20,000 Scythian women and children by Philip. While these (*praeda*) are later lost (Just. 9.3.3), this probably reflects a not uncommon practice (Just. 8.3.2-3).
28. It is very possible that many of these were acquired in Asia since the passage in Curtius is associated with the trial of Philotas in 330, and Alexander had likely limited the number of servants in the army that had initially crossed to Asia. See D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1978) 12.
29. Hatzopoulos, 1996 2: *passim*.
30. J. Gabbert, "The Language of Citizenship in Antigonid Macedonia," *AHB* 2 (1988): 10-11.
31. Hatzopoulos, 1996 1: 182. A similar policy of equality was pursued by Philip and Alexander in the ranks of their *hetairoi* (see E. Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times. Studies in the History of Art* 10, ed. B. Barr-Sharrar and E. Borza [Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1982] 39).
32. See Ellis, 1976, 34; Billows, 1995, 9-11; N. G. L. Hammond, "The Macedonian imprint on the Hellenistic world," in *Hellenistic History and Culture*, ed. P. Green (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993) 19-20.
33. Hammond, 1979 2: 654.
34. See Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 2: 558.
35. The relationship between the coastal cities and the Macedonian kings was complicated. Pydna, at least, had been part of the Macedonian king's domains during much of the Fifth Century (Thuc. 1.137.1; Plut. *Them.* 25-6; Diod. 13.49.1-2), and well into the fourth (cf., Isoc. 15. 113).
36. Justin (6.8.1) even records that Philip II increased city populations with prisoners of war.
37. See Hammond and Griffith, 1979 2: 358.
38. Hammond and Griffith, 1979 2: 360-61.
39. Ellis, 1976, 66.
40. Hatzopoulos, 1996 1: 182.
41. See evidence collected by Griffith (1979 2: 356-7; cf., Hatzopoulos, 1996 1: 180). Pydna is described during the reign of Perseus as a city of numerous nationalities (Livy 44.45.6).
42. Hatzopoulos, 1996 1: 70, 77-79, 92, 103.
43. *FGrH* 115 F-224; Philip V likewise gave tracts of land associated with his cities to his *hetairoi* (Polyb. 22.13.5).

44. H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (Munich: Beck, 1926; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1973) 2:40, no. 80); Laomedon, from Mytilene (Heckel, 1992, 211); and Nearchus, Crete (Heckel, 1992, 228).
45. Heckel, 1992, 211.
46. *Ibid.* 1992, 228.
47. See Hammond and Griffith, 1979 2: 352.
48. While Arrian does include them amongst the "Macedonian" trierarchs for his Indus fleet, he also lists the foreign born Nearchus, Androstenes, and Laomedon as Macedonians (see note 44).
49. Heckel, 1992, 91.
50. See Hatzopoulos, 1996 1: 182.
51. "The Macedonian Background," *Greece and Rome* 12 (1965) 136; Hammond and Griffith, 1979 2: 361-62; *cf.*, Fanoula Papazoglou, *Les villes de Macédoine à l'époque romaine*, *BCH Supplement* 14 (Athens: Ecole française d'Athènes; Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1988), 105-06.
52. Hatzopoulos, 1996 1: 190-2, 195-6.
53. Ellis, 1976, 55.
54. See M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Une donation du roi Lysimaque* (Diffusion de Boccard: Athens, 1988) 22-26; Billows, 1995, 133-4; *cf.*, Hammond and Griffith, 1979 2: 661. In 356 Philip captured Potidaea and, after selling the population into slavery, handed it over to the Olynthians (Diod. 16.8.5; *cf.*, Paus. 5.23.3). Philip obtained the region during his campaign against Olynthus in 349-8 (Diod. 16.52.9, 53.2).
55. I. P. Vokotopoulou, "He Epigraphe ton Kalindoion," *Ancient Macedonia* 4 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1986) 87-114, *ll.* 5-10; N. G. L. Hammond, "The King and the Land in the Macedonian Kingdom," *CQ* 38 (1988): 383, *ll.* 5-10; 385-6; Hatzopoulos, 1996, 1: 121-2; 2: 84-5 [no. 62].
56. H. Berve, 1973, 1: 357; Hatzopoulos, 1996 1: 437. In the various Hellenistic kingdoms the *phoros* was a regular requirement of possessors of royal land (see Billows, 1995, 126).
57. See Billows, 1995, 146-69. Antigonos in 316 attempted to undermine the loyalty of Eumenes of Cardia's army, in part, by offers of "large gifts of land" (Diod. 19.25.3).
58. See Billows, 1995, 132-37.
59. Billows, 1988, 45-49.
60. Billows, 1995, 134-37.
61. In general, see J. R. Ellis, "Population-transplants under Philip II," *Makedonika* 9 (1969) 9-16. Brian Bosworth's contention that Justin only refers to "a redistribution within existing settlements" is not borne out by the text. A. B. Bosworth, "ASTHETAIPOI" *CQ* 23 (1973) 250. See Hammond and Griffith, 1979 2: 661 n. 2.
62. A. B. Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," *CQ* 21 (1971) 105, sees this revolt as one indication that "the incorporation of the mountain kingdoms [Upper

Macedonia] proved ultimately unsuccessful." As noted, this conclusion appears to be contrary to the evidence. Hatzopoulos, 1996 1:103, challenges the existence of the entire revolt, calling it, perhaps, "a pious fiction invented by the Romans."

63. A cavalry unit was also formed from Upper Macedonia (Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.5). Of course, it could be argued, given the presence of Upper Macedonian aristocrats listed as from Lower Macedonia, that these horsemen were lowlanders who had received land in Upper Macedonia. It is unlikely that this could be said for the infantry from Tymphaea, Lyncestis, Orestis, etc., however.

64. A point noted by Hatzopoulos, 1996 1: 270.

65. Arr. *Succ.* 1.22-23; Polyæn. 8. 60; *cf.*, Diod. 19.52.5.

66. Diod. 19.52.5; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 22-23; Polyæn. 8.60.

67. Arr. *Succ.* 1.23; Polyæn. 8.60; Diod. 19.52.5.

68. See J. E. Skydsgaard, "Transhumance in Ancient Greece," *Pastoral Economies in Classical Antiquity*, ed., C. R. Whittaker (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) 78-82. *Cf.*, T. Howe, *Pastoral Politics: Animals, Agriculture and Society in Ancient Greece* (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2008). Vitruvius (*De Arch.* 2, Pref. 3) has Alexander put forth the maxim about ancient Greek cities. "For as a newborn babe cannot be nourished without the nurse's milk, nor conducted to the approaches that lead to growth in life, so a city cannot thrive without fields and the fruits thereof pouring into its walls, nor have a large population without plenty of food, nor maintain its population without a supply of it." Aristander, according to Arrian (*Anab.* 3.2.2), commented on the founding of Alexandria in Egypt that the city would be prosperous "especially in the fruits of the earth."

69. For the identification of the Perrhaebians as *penestai*, see Ducat, 1994, 67, 97.

70. Billows, 1995, 203.

71. With respect to the size of these grants, no evidence exists for Macedonia. However, an inscription from Attalid Pergamum lists three sizes of military land grants. The largest includes 125 *plethra* of cleared land and 12.5 of vineyard; the smallest 100 *plethra* of cleared land and ten of vineyard. See C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Era* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1934) 51, ll. 10-16. Since a *plethron* is a unit of length, 100 feet, these measurements of area are probably equivalent to a *plethron* squared, or 10,000 square feet (So Billows, 1995, 164, n. 53). The largest of these grants then was equivalent in area to approximately 31.5 acres; the smallest, about 25 acres.

72. Hammond, 1992, 153, 165, overstates the extent of this reform on Macedonian agriculture. Transhumant agriculture did not disappear or suffer a "steep decline." See above; *cf.*, J. E. Skydsgaard, 1988, 78-82.

73. Billows, 1995, 29.

74. V. D. Hanson, *The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization* (New York: Free Press, 1995) 35.

75. This is the conclusion of Peggy Barlett, "Adaptive Strategies in Peasant Agricultural Production," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 9 (1980) 555, after a review of a number of studies of modern dependent farm laborers.

3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NAVAL SIEGE UNIT UNDER PHILIP II AND ALEXANDER III

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Apart from his considerable skills as a commander of infantry and cavalry forces, Alexander also ranks among the great naval innovators of antiquity. This surprising fact stems from his development of the first naval siege unit worth the name and his effective use of it against the Phoenician city of Tyre in 332 BCE.¹ Located south of Byblos on a small offshore island, this well fortified city was thought to be virtually impregnable, but it fell to Alexander after a siege of only seven months, less, if we count the time when the navy was engaged. The siege tactics displayed at Tyre were so effective that his successors followed his example, built their own naval siege units and participated in an arms race that affected how navies were used for centuries following his death. My interest here does not concern the specifics of the siege, intriguing though they are, but rather the surprising speed and efficiency with which Alexander and his men built a new kind of naval force and used it so effectively.

A quick review of the tactics employed by his navy at Tyre reveals the basic characteristics of this new fighting force. The most important feature, by far, involved the placement of artillery and other kinds of siege machinery on the decks of his warships and transports. His engineers started with the horse transports and slower triremes (Arr. *Anab.* 2.21.1, 4) then placed catapults (Curt. 4.3.13; Arr. *Anab.* 2.23.3), battering rams and assault bridges (Arr. *Anab.* 2.21.4, 2.22.6-23.3; Curt. 4.3.13; Diod. 17.46.2) on other kinds of vessels. As the siege progressed, "threes" and "fours" were lashed together in pairs with their hulls spanned by a single, wide deck that carried both marines and machinery (Diod. 17.43.4, 46.1; Curt. 4.3.14-15). Along the front and sides of his advancing siege

mole where Tyrian defenders focused their disruptive attacks, we see warships, presumably fitted with artillery (Arr. *Anab.* 2.21.3-4) to defend the work crews and attack the city wall. Other specialists working from vessels fitted with cranes (Arr. *Anab.* 2.21.5, 7)² removed submerged obstacles strategically placed by the Tyrians to block access to their walls. When Tyrian fighters in specially armored ships cut the mooring tackle of his work boats, Alexander deployed his own armored triakontors in defense, and when this failed to stop Tyrian divers from cutting the lines, he replaced rope with chain (Arr. *Anab.* 2.21.6). The king focused other attacks on the harbor entrances where his larger vessels ("fours" and "fives") tried to break through floating barriers (*kleithra*) and sink galleys that had been deployed at the harbor entrances to prohibit entry (Arr. *Anab.* 2.24.1). Prow-to-prow ramming tactics and grappling hooks were used for ship-against-ship combat in these situations (Curt. 4.3.12; 4.4.7).

Since all this activity required specialized hardware operated by specially trained crews, one wonders how Alexander and his men learned these new skills so quickly.³ Four years earlier, when he came to the throne, the young king had shown no particular interest in his navy,⁴ and yet at Tyre we see him as a master of naval innovation, presiding over an engineering corps of great sophistication that provided him with all kinds of siege machinery used to great effect by his men. How was this possible? Most scholars seem to explain Alexander's success by the excellence of his engineers, by the power of his artillery, by his own personal excellence, by the practice he gained in siege warfare at Miletos and Halikarnassos in 334, by the skills of the Phoenician and Cyprian engineers who joined his staff during the siege (Arr. *Anab.* 2.21.1), or by a combination of these factors.⁵ Although each of these factors no doubt played a role, they do not explain the speed with which Alexander built up an entirely new kind of siege unit. In ancient terms, seven months is short for a siege—too short, really, for an untrained force to learn so many new skills by trial and error. Furthermore, the influx of foreign engineers did not occur until April or May, which reduces to four months the period in which our accounts

describe a frenzy of building and an operational strategy that introduced various tactics in quick succession.⁶ When one technique was blunted by effective countermeasures, another was quickly executed by work crews who seem as adaptable as their commander-in-chief.⁷ The questions therefore bear repeating: How was this possible? When and where did the men and their commanders acquire such an advanced level of skill in *naval* siege warfare?

In 1973, E.W. Marsden discussed the related issue of Alexander's skill in *siege warfare* at the Second International Symposium on Ancient Macedonia held in Thessaloniki.⁸ He concluded that Alexander's great success in waging this kind of war at the start of his reign was due to the existence of a "military department of mechanical engineering" that had been established by his father and that had begun to make some notable advances towards the end of Philip's reign.⁹ Marsden felt this engineering corps must have had a permanent workshop, probably in Pella, that prepared and tested new designs of increasing complexity, that made and stored specialized mechanical parts and components, and that trained apprentices.¹⁰ Although this hypothesis goes partway toward addressing the questions posed above, it still fails to account for the Macedonians' high level of preparedness in the techniques of naval siege warfare when they reached Tyre. As Marsden himself observed: "Some new theories could be introduced in machine-building during an actual siege, but the bulk of the planning, designing, and experimenting must have been done beforehand."¹¹ Since the process of attacking a coastal city like Tyre involved the expert use of machinery adapted to fit deck mounts on naval vessels, the question still remains: when and where did Alexander and his men receive their lessons in waging *this* kind of warfare?

In the following pages, I will argue that by the time of Philip's death, his engineering corps had already considered how best to attack a maritime city like Tyre and was therefore prepared when Alexander ordered his attack on the city. The institutions that are essential for my argument—the Macedonian fleet and engineering corps—have already been examined by H. Hauben,

E. W. Marsden and G. T. Griffith.¹² I hope to build on their arguments by bringing together the available evidence, by highlighting the position of naval siege warfare as an element in this process, and by showing that Alexander had already begun to use his navy for attacking coastal cities some two years before he led his fleet to Tyre.

Philip's Engineering Corps

Although the evidence is sketchy, Marsden has argued convincingly that Philip financed a corps of military engineers during his reign charged with enhancing his ability to besiege fortified positions.¹³ The corps was led by a Thessalian engineer named Polyidos about whom we know a little from a patchwork of sources.¹⁴ It seems likely that this man helped Philip build up an arsenal of more powerful torsion catapults that relied on twisted skeins of sinew-rope to increase the force with which a stone or arrow was launched.¹⁵ Since engineers were charged with developing both offensive and defensive technology, it appears that he also designed a fortification system to maximize the defenders' use of this new technology.¹⁶ In addition to catapults and fortification systems, Polyidos seems to have experimented with different types of covered siege machinery like rams.¹⁷ A Hellenistic "book of lists" includes him among the seven best engineers of all time and credits him with building a helepolis or siege tower for Philip's siege of Byzantium in 340 BCE.¹⁸ We also learn from Vitruvius, Octavian's military engineer, that Polyidos developed many new simplified designs for this same siege.¹⁹ The effect of these discoveries made by Polyidos in Macedonia and by others like him at Carthage, Syracuse, and Phoenicia, began to transform the nature of siege warfare for those who could afford to hire and maintain a team of military engineers.

Polyidos may have had a son, Epokillos, who turned up as an officer in Alexander's army, but if so, he did not follow his father in the craft.²⁰ Polyidos did have two successful pupils, however, Diades and Charias, both of whom continued their service with Alexander. The first of these two was famous enough to

make the Hellenistic list of greats, noted above, and become linked with Tyre “and the other cities” Alexander besieged.²¹ A contemporary of Vitruvius named Athenaeus Mechanicus tells us that Diades invented many devices and wrote down detailed descriptions of them in his “Engineering Compendium.”²² Thanks to Athenaeus and Vitruvius, who quote his descriptions in their own works, we know of his “so-called drill,” his “raven,” his assault bridge, his covered battering ram mounted on wheels, and his portable siege towers. Vitruvius remarks that he designed the siege towers to be broken down for easy transport, and this implies some sort of modular construction.²³ Diades also claimed to have invented a number of naval devices that he promised to describe, but never did, “although he made great claims that he would do so.”²⁴ From this information, it seems reasonable to conclude that Polyidos’ pupil Diades, the inventor of modular siege towers and numerous naval devices, was the chief engineer who directed the creation of a naval siege unit at Tyre. One may wonder where he derived this rather specific knowledge. It is a question to which we will now turn.

Philip’s Macedonian Navy

While Philip was building his engineering corps our sources show he also built up a naval force and established a naval infrastructure to support it. Although the force he built was small in comparison with the Athenian fleet, we can see clear evidence for its growth during the course of his reign.²⁵ Our earliest indication of a Macedonian naval force is found in a stratagem of Polyaeus referring to a fleet action dating to the period 354-52.²⁶ A few scattered references to a small Macedonian naval force occur as well in the forensic literature of the early 340s.²⁷ How Philip financed this undertaking is recorded nowhere, although we can make an informed guess. From the first years of his reign, the Macedonian king methodically gained control of communities and regions like Amphipolis (357), Pydna (357/6), Potidaia (356), Methone (354) Pagasai (352) and the cities of the Chalcidic League (348).²⁸ It has been observed that Philip’s many conquests were followed by grants

of estates to his followers.²⁹ Precisely how many estates were granted, where, and to whom is less important for us than the likelihood that some of these royal grants carried with them obligations to serve as trierarchs for his new navy.³⁰ A system like this helps to explain why, in 326, when Alexander built his Indus fleet from scratch, he utilized the same trierarchic system to share the burden of the duties and expenses among his noble followers. In what must be an official list drawn from Nearchos's account of his coastal voyage or *paraplous*, Arrian presents a total of 22 men from Macedonia, eight from Greece, and one from Persia who were tapped as trierarchs.³¹ Of the 22 Macedonians, nine were drawn from the region of Pella, three from Amphipolis, two from Orestis, two from Eordaia, two from Pydna, and one each from Tymphaia, Aigai, Aloros and Beroia. Since there seems to be no obvious reason for Alexander to have invented a new system for financing this fleet, he presumably followed the same liturgic system established by his father many years before.³² Such a system as this implies that Philip had made a lasting commitment to developing his naval power.

A similar conclusion follows from Philip's development of a naval infrastructure. In spring 342, the Athenian statesman Hegesippos warned his fellow citizens about Philip's imperialist intentions by referring to the triremes and shipsheds Philip had built.³³ He was particularly incensed by Philip's offer to help Athens clear the sea of pirates, and objected that Philip was really claiming the right "to cruise about and anchor off the different islands and, under pretence of protecting them from pirates, bribe the islanders to revolt from [Athens]" (Dem. 7.15).³⁴ Later this same year, the king's repeated interventions at Eretria and Histiaea (Oreos) in Euboea finally roused the Athenians to support a plan by Kallias of Chalkis to regain influence over the island. The plan apparently worked, they eventually succeeded in ejecting Philip's men and an issue of octobols on the Athenian standard at Histiaea probably alludes to an Athenian naval victory over the Macedonians in this effort.³⁵

Philip's Sieges of 340-39

Thus far, Philip's small fleet had enabled him to expand his political horizons by projecting power on his neighbors. The limits of this power, however, were clearly revealed when he decided to attack the Propontine coastal cities of Perinthos, Selymbria and Byzantion during the summer of 340. Diodorus provides a detailed account of the attack on Perinthos, presumably because Ephoros did so, but ignores Selymbria altogether and reduces his description of events at Byzantion to a misleading synopsis.³⁶ As a result, we must piece together from other fragmentary sources the outlines of what happened, the uses to which the fleet was put, and why Philip's attacks eventually failed.³⁷

It seems that, initially, the fleet did not accompany the army to Perinthos, but was sent to Peparethos to punish the islanders for their unauthorized occupation of Halonessos.³⁸ Only after the king saw reinforcements and supplies streaming into Perinthos through its open harbor (*cf.*, Diod. 16.75.2) did he summon his fleet. By this time, the Athenians had a force of 40 warships in the region under Chares and this compelled Philip to march an armed force to secure the shore along the route of his fleet's approach.³⁹ Even after the fleet had arrived, it largely remained quiet, being outclassed by the Athenian warships and by some others from Rhodes, Chios and Persia, whose western satraps had become alarmed by Philip's aggressive actions.⁴⁰ Chares, to be sure, was not in the region to fight with Philip, but rather to escort the grain fleet on its annual voyage from the Black Sea region to Athens. When the king learned that the Athenian commander had sailed off to confer with the Persian king's generals, he struck quickly by seizing the grain transports that had gathered at Heraion, just south of the northern entrance to the Bosphoros.⁴¹

How precisely he did this is not recorded. According to the *Atthis* of Philochoros, he tried to seize the transports with his warships, was unable to do so, and then shipped a force of soldiers to the Asiatic side of the straits who managed to bring about the capture.⁴² His own fleet was apparently limited to ferrying

his force of soldiers into position and then dragging away the spoils.⁴³ This single act netted a huge amount of booty (worth 700 talents), including hides and ship timber, which he subsequently used for his siege engines at Byzantion, and shows that his siege had not yet seriously started prior to the month of October 340.⁴⁴ The Athenians responded to this act of war by sending a superior naval force into the region under Phokion and dashed Philip's hopes for cutting off the city from outside help.⁴⁵ Despite the best efforts of Polyidos, who constructed the earliest known helepolis for this siege, Philip was forced to admit defeat and break off his attack toward the end of winter/early spring, 339 BCE.⁴⁶ The main reason for his failure was easy to discern: he lacked control of the sea.⁴⁷

Lessons Learned

The problems faced by Philip and his engineers during this abortive campaign must have caused a great deal of theorizing about how best to avoid a similar failure in the future. I say "must have" because we have no direct evidence to suggest that Philip or his engineers conducted any sort of debriefing following their withdrawal from the Propontus. If they did (and it is hard to imagine otherwise), we might guess the substance of their conclusions. Philip's lack of naval power resulted in a number of direct consequences. First, he was unable to close off the harbors of those under siege and thereby stop direct shipments of aid from outside allies. Second, he failed to establish a zone of naval dominance in the region of his siege, a condition that would prevent the besieged from receiving aid through indirect routes and enable the attacker to import supplies safely. And finally, he still lacked the raw firepower to force the city's defenses in areas that were open to attack. He and his men would have to rectify these problems if they hoped to reduce a coastal city by siege in the future. The last problem involved an engineering solution, and we might imagine that Philip directed Polyidos and his pupils, Diades and Charias, to analyze the problems, theorize solutions and carry out experiments in the years that followed.⁴⁸ Since it was generally known

that a city's harbor defenses were among the weakest sectors of the wall, I presume their discussions also involved methods of attacking a city's harbor defenses where vigorous attacks might have the greatest effect.

Such a conclusion seems to be confirmed by Diades's subsequent naval inventions and his known ability to fit catapults, landing bridges, ladders and assault towers to the decks of warships at Tyre. In the years between 339 and 334, Philip's engineers must have refined the designs of their artillery and other devices and calculated the centers of gravity and worked out the problems involved in fitting these devices on warships.⁴⁹ At this same time, no doubt, they redesigned and simplified certain machines to include modular sections for easier transport and deployment once the ships had reached their stations.⁵⁰ The limiting factor, however, was money because a serious naval siege unit would require a large conventional navy to protect it. Since the combined cost would be staggering, Philip (and his son after him) decided he could not yet afford the cost, but I suspect that he and his staff theorized what would be required.

I also suspect that a simple review of the failed sieges would have underscored the crucial role a naval force, even an inferior one, could play in the siege of a coastal city. Successful siege warfare involved *perceptions* of power as much as its possession. If the attacker gave the impression of being able to enforce a naval blockade, this might tip the balance in the attacker's favor and bring about a speedy resolution to the siege. Even an inferior force, if deployed skillfully, could allow the attackers to make a show of enforcing a blockade. In the absence of a navy, however, the besieged could hope for aid and ignore those who argued for quick submission. There was also the matter of transport. Siege machinery was heavy and transport by sea was generally preferable to transport by land. It seems clear from Vitruvius (10.13.3) that Diades recognized this fact and built siege towers in sections that could be disassembled and thus moved more easily by sea to the region of the siege, offloaded onto carts and then taken to the attack site.⁵¹ Transport by sea

involved certain risks associated with shipwreck, but it also brought a degree of protection since the vessels supervising the transport could insure the safe import of machinery and supplies to staging areas near the targeted city. It might also provide the attacker with a means to strike quickly and accomplish the unexpected, as Philip had done when he seized the grain fleet in the Bosporos. If anything, the sieges of 340-39 would have affirmed the need to keep building and maintaining the Macedonian navy.

Alexander's Siege of Miletos in 334

Before turning to the siege of Miletos in 334, we should remember that, upon the death of his father in 336, Alexander inherited intact the assets of his father's military forces: the army, the cavalry, the fleet and the engineering corps. We should also remember that Alexander began his campaign into Asia a mere five years after the failures in the Propontus with engineers who had participated in all three sieges. By this time Polyidos was either dead or otherwise unavailable, but his two pupils Diades and Charias continued their service with Alexander, with Diades succeeding his master as chief engineer, presumably by the start of the campaign.⁵² In addition to these two, we know the names of two additional engineers on his staff—Posidonios and Philippos—and there must have been others.⁵³ The fleet gathered by Alexander at Amphipolis in 334 was much larger than anything Philip ever possessed, being drawn primarily from his Greek allies.⁵⁴ At Sestos in the Hellespont, 160 triremes and numerous merchantmen assisted Parmenio in moving the army across the strait. Alexander, meanwhile, took a force of 60 warships to the Troad where he conducted a number of ceremonial acts.⁵⁵ J. S. Morrison sees in this force a separate Macedonian squadron *apart from* the 160 units in the allied fleet, but this cannot be correct since Arrian gives the same total (*i.e.*, 160) for the entire fleet when it reached Miletos later in the summer (Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.4).⁵⁶ Following the crossing, we lose sight of the fleet until the army reaches Miletos.

Here, Alexander's surprising speed secured for him two of the three strategic objectives that had caused Philip such trouble at Perinthos, Selymbria, and Byzantion. By reaching Miletus with his fleet three days before the Persians arrived (Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.4), he was able to close the city's harbor and establish a zone of naval dominance around the city. Although inferior in number to the Persian fleet, he not only avoided a pitched naval battle, he was also able to deploy his army in such a way as to deny the Persians access to convenient anchorages and watering places. When Alexander began his assault of the city by land, Nicanor moved the fleet to the harbor and closed off the entrance by placing triremes side-by-side in the narrowest place with their bows turned outward (Arr. *Anab.* 1.19.3). This posture physically prevented the Persians from breaking into the harbor and the besieged from breaking out of it (Arr. *Anab.* 1.19.3-4).

We are not provided with any details, but it seems likely that the fleet was also used to attack the harbor defenses, at least toward the end of the siege, and was thus able to achieve the third objective learned from the failures of 340-39. We might reasonably conclude this from an episode recorded by Arrian (1.19.4-5) toward the end of the fight for control of the city. It seems that a group of mercenaries paddled in desperation on their upturned shields to a small unnamed islet in the harbor while others boarded small skiffs and tried to evade "the triremes of the Macedonians" before getting captured by (other?) triremes at the harbor mouth.⁵⁷ Once the town was in his hands, Alexander himself (*autos*) sailed to the little island to deal with the mercenaries. Its shores were steep, and so he ordered that ladders be carried at the prows of his triremes so they could land on its shore "as if attacking a city wall from their ships."⁵⁸ Although the mercenaries surrendered to avoid a fight, he and his men were clearly prepared to force a landing by employing a tactic of naval siege warfare. While the events at Miletos were not presented by our sources to highlight the fleet, its capabilities, or its importance to the campaign, these events demonstrate clearly that Alexander avoided the main

mistakes that contributed to his father's earlier failures. Clearly adjustments had been made.

The Disbanding of the Allied Fleet

Alexander's next move struck both ancient and modern observers as risky: before proceeding southward to Halikarnassos, he disbanded his allied fleet, in spite of its apparent usefulness at Miletos.⁵⁹ Our sources record multiple reasons for this decision, but the fact remains that the Hellenic fleet was a clear mismatch for its Persian adversaries and Alexander was unwilling to risk defeat by allowing a pitched naval battle.⁶⁰ And a pitched naval battle definitely loomed in his future if he kept the fleet. Memnon, avoiding the mistakes made at Miletos, gathered his forces at Halikarnassos and prepared his defenses (Diod. 17.23.4-6). For a time, the Persian fleet lagged behind and continued to harass the Greeks, hoping to provoke a naval battle. After Alexander dispatched a cavalry force to hinder their foraging efforts on the Mykale peninsula, they made one final attempt to force a battle and then withdrew southward (Arr. *Anab.* 1.19.7-11). By the time he was ready to march toward Halikarnassos, Alexander knew from reports that Persian triremes were already in the harbor there (Arr. *Anab.* 1.20.3). Henceforth, Memnon's fleet would challenge him repeatedly to a battle that he could not win. Rather than pay for a force he would have to restrain from fighting, and then dealing with the morale problems that would certainly follow, he decided to send the fleet home except for his core of Macedonian warships and 20 triremes from Athens who were assigned to transport his siege equipment.⁶¹

The decision was indeed risky, but Alexander's other choice was no better and he apparently found no advantage in protecting, feeding, and paying the wages for 160 warship crews under these conditions.⁶² It also indicates, perhaps, that he had already decided to follow the model of Cyrus in 400 BCE, to leave the Aegean coast as soon as was feasible, and stake the success of his campaign on a decisive battle with the Persian king in the East.⁶³ In any event, at Halikarnassos we

hear nothing about the fleet although we see its indirect presence in the siege equipment that was used against the city. Where it anchored and how it avoided coming to blows with the Persians, we are not told.⁶⁴ The outcome of the siege here was less positive than the one at Miletos. Although Alexander eventually gained control of the city, he failed to capture the two citadels, Salamacis and Zephyrium, and the Persian fleet, based on Cos, remained operationally intact. A garrison, left behind by Alexander, proved insufficient to contain the Persian forces and the city "remained a bastion of Persian strength until early 332."⁶⁵

After Halikarnassos, his men's lagging morale may have convinced Alexander to follow an operational strategy emphasizing forward movement and the avoidance of protracted sieges. This is not to say that he abandoned the strategy of attacking coastal cities, just that he carefully selected his targets to maximize the appearance of forward momentum.⁶⁶ The result was a string of successful approaches to towns in Lycia and Pamphylia that continued his progress and contributed to a healthier level of morale. And what of his fleet during these actions? After the brief statement of Diodorus mentioned above, the naval force remains invisible. Nowhere do we hear that he unpacked his siege equipment. We glimpse sight of one triakontor just prior to the Battle of Issos, when Alexander sent some Companions up the coast to check on the whereabouts of Darius.⁶⁷ But other than this, we hear nothing of the fleet until Alexander contemplated how he would besiege the offshore island of Tyre. By this time, Parmenio had gained control of the considerable Persian war chest at Damascus; the naval ports of Arados, Sidon and Byblos had surrendered without a blow; and Alexander controlled access to the timber reserves in the mountains of Lebanon and stocks of local manpower should he require them.⁶⁸

Alexander's Decision to Besiege Tyre

At Tyre, Alexander abandoned the strategy of avoiding protracted sieges. He communicated his change in policy to his

officers and men and Arrian may preserve the broad outlines of what he said (2.17.3-4):⁶⁹

. . . with the accession of Cyprus and the united fleets of Macedon and Phoenicia, our supremacy at sea would be guaranteed, and the expedition to Egypt would thus be a simple matter, and finally, with Egypt in our hands we shall have no further cause for uneasiness about Greece: we shall be able to march on Babylon with security at home, with enhanced prestige, and with Persia excluded not only from the sea, but from the whole continent up to the Euphrates.⁷⁰

Scholars have debated the authenticity of this speech, and some have questioned its grand justifications as irrelevant to the main issue—the siege of Tyre—facing Alexander and his men.⁷¹ But the inclusion of the Macedonian fleet as an element of strategy strikes me as believable, unexpected (given the previous invisibility of the fleet) and therefore possibly authentic, indicating that the speech, or its main strategic points, may descend from an authentic speech in Ptolemy's account. Genuine or not, Alexander must have delivered some sort of explanation to his men because their avoidance of protracted sieges was about to change.

Once the decision was made and something of it communicated to his men, Alexander burrowed into the details of preparation in a process he clearly enjoyed. Although no one describes precisely what he did, we can deduce the main outlines from the events that followed. Detailed discussions were held with his officers and engineers regarding where to initiate the attack, what kinds of machines to deploy, what forces to use, and where to get them. He started by building a siege mole, but Tyrian naval dominance and threats of Carthaginian aid convinced him that he needed to gather a fleet as well. Precisely when he came to this decision is difficult to tell, but I suspect that he lost no time in sending out messengers. Some went to Cyprus to ask the kings there for naval help, others went to Greece with generous terms of service for all Phoenicians who gathered at Sidon.⁷² By spring, these diplomatic efforts had netted more than 200 warships, including a number of heavier galleys like "fours" and "fives."⁷³ In the meantime, crew chiefs were sent to the shipyards of Phoenicia to enroll shipwrights,

carpenters, sawyers and ironsmiths and requisition stocks of pitch, tow, leather, timber and everything else that might prove useful.

As the siege mole approached the city and the workmen along its front and sides came under increasing attack, the Macedonians erected leather screens on wooden scaffolds and deployed catapults in protective towers. In spite of these efforts, however, the attacks would not cease until Alexander achieved naval dominance and forced the defenders to divide their forces by attacking other sectors of the city walls.⁷⁴ I suspect he came to this conclusion long before a Tyrian fire ship destroyed his protective barriers or a spring storm eroded the foundations of his mole. In the meantime, his men continued to procure, cut and stockpile timber, forge metal fasteners, and construct the modular sections needed to transform the fleet into a siege unit.⁷⁵ Perhaps by April, the fleet had finally swelled to a size that exceeded the Tyrians' own force and, soon thereafter, Alexander brought the fleet southward to Tyre, arrayed in battle order to insure an unopposed arrival.⁷⁶ Dismayed by the numbers that faced them, the Tyrians declined the challenge to fight, blocked up their harbors and prepared to resist the coming naval siege. By all accounts, the transformation was carried out quickly. At first, Diades and his staff selected horse transports and older triremes for duty as machine carriers, but before the siege was over, they deployed catapults, mobile towers, assault bridges, and rams on almost everything that floated.⁷⁷ The speed of the transformation they wrought highlights not only their skills as engineers but also their high level of preparedness and the existence of a well-conceived plan that guided their actions.

Conclusion

What happened between May and August, 332, altered the definition of naval power for the next century or more by transforming the strategic objectives that determined how navies were built and the expectations of those who built them. The evidence at our disposal reveals a number of

factors that show how Alexander efficiently transformed his allied fleet into an effective siege unit. First, he possessed a core of Macedonian warships with crews and commanders who had skills in breaking down, setting up, and transporting siege equipment as well as an ability to attack city walls from ladders mounted on their ships. These skills, probably developed in response to the failed sieges of 340-39, prepared them to meet the demands of besieging Tyre. Second, he possessed a corps of military engineers who had theorized how to adapt terrestrial siege engines for use aboard warships. Third, he was able to gather additional engineers from Phoenicia and Cyprus who were skilled in building siege machinery. Under the direction of Diades, these men, along with the labor gathered from the nearby shipyards of Phoenicia, would enable him to convert a large number of ships into floating siege platforms of various designs in a short period of time. Fourth, he gained access to a number of Cyprian and Phoenician "fours" and "fives" whose crews would have understood the basic techniques of attacking harbor barriers and of fighting at harbor mouths.⁷⁸ And finally, he was willing and able to devote incredible amounts of money and manpower to the process of creating and then deploying this naval siege unit.

Money alone cannot solve every construction problem. Success depends upon proper managerial oversight so that one's expenditures result in a labor force that is sufficient for the task at hand, that is supplied with the tools and raw materials it needs, and that is adequately protected, supervised, and held accountable for achieving its goals. Expert management of expert personnel brought about the transformation of Alexander's fleet, and for this, Alexander deserves his full measure of credit. But so do his engineers. When he directed them to fit catapults, battering rams, siege towers, assault bridges, and other devices on the decks of his warships, they were already familiar with the problems, had theorized solutions, and had conducted the necessary experiments to produce immediate results. This was partly Philip's doing.

The force they built at Tyre deeply impressed everyone who participated. The lingering message was both impressive and simple: it was possible to shorten the siege of a coastal city by bringing to bear on its harbor defenses the awesome new power that a naval siege unit could provide. This revelation would drive a naval arms race among Alexander's successors and spark a burst of fortified harbor construction throughout the eastern Mediterranean in the century that followed. There can be no doubt that Alexander deserves credit for building the first naval siege unit worth the name. He was able to do so, however, because of the experts hired and nurtured by his father and because of the adjustments these men had theorized following the failed sieges of 340-39. Alexander brought to perfection what his father began. In the final analysis, the Hellenistic naval siege unit was a father-and-son affair.

NOTES

1. The main sources for the siege are Arr. *Anab.* 2.20-24; Diod. 17.40.2-46.6; Curt. 4.2-4; Plut. *Alex.* 24.4-9, 25.1-3; and Justin 11.10.10-14. In general, see A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, Vol. I: *Commentary on Books I-III* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); J. E. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni: Books 3 and 4* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1980); Justin, *Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus, Volume I. Books 11-12: Alexander the Great*, trans. and append. by J. C. Yardley, comment. by Waldemar Heckel, Clarendon Ancient History Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); and J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, "Alexander," A Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).
2. There is a problem with the meaning of this passage: cf., E. W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery. Historical Development* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969) 103; and Bosworth, 1980, 248.
3. Effective naval fighting was a skill acquired through training: cf., Thuc. 1.142.6-9 and 2.89.8-9. The same applied to naval siege tactics: cf., Philo *Pol.* D 22: (22) "And breaching the harbor boom with your largest hulls (if you have cataphracts) make the attack with those [*i.e.*, marines] who are the most experienced and, above everything else, who are able to fight at sea." The Tyrians understood this principle as well. For one raid against Alexander's forces, they employed their "most exact crews and marines best armed to fight from the decks and also boldest in naval fights" (Arr. *Anab.* 2.21.9).
4. Cf., Hans Hauben, "The Expansion of Macedonian Sea Power under Alexander the Great," *Ancient Society* 7 (1976) 79.
5. See W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great, Vol. 1, The Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1948) 38-40; Ulrich Wilcken, *Alexander the Great*, ed. E. N. Borza, trans. G. C. Richards (New York: Norton, 1967) 109-10; J. F. C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1960, repr., New York: Da Capo Press, 2004) 206-16; Marsden, 1969, 101-103; Bosworth, 1980, 239-56; Peter Green, *Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C. A Historical Biography* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1991) 251-52; and Robin Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great* (London: Allen Lane for Longman, 1973) 187-88.
6. The addition of the foreign engineers is paired with the arrival of the fleet which did not occur until the spring sailing season allowed contingents to gather at Sidon from Greece and Cyprus; see "Alexander's Decision to Besiege Tyre" below, with ns. 71 and 75.
7. The removal of underwater obstacles provides a good example: cf., Arr. *Anab.* 2.21.5-7.
8. E. W. Marsden, "Macedonian Military Machinery and its Designers under Philip and Alexander," in *Archaiia Makedonia 2* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1977).
9. *Ibid.*, 211-15.
10. *Ibid.*, 217.
11. *Ibid.*

12. Hans Hauben, "Philippe II, fondateur de la marine macédonienne," *Ancient Society* 6 (1975): 51-59; Marsden, 1969, 104; Marsden, 1977; and G. T. Griffith, "Part Two: The Reign of Philip the Second," in N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia: Volume II, 550-336 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 444-49.
13. Marsden, 1969, 58.
14. See especially Ath. Mech. 10. 5-10 and Vit. 10.13.3. Both Athenaeus and Vitruvius produced very similar texts and are now thought to have been contemporaries working from similar sources; cf., David Whitehead and P. H. Blyth, *Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Machines (Peri Mēchanēmatōn)*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 182 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004) 14-31.
15. Cf., in general Marsden, 1969, 58-60. Marsden argues (59) that Philip's keen interest in catapult technology may go back to a defeat he suffered in Thessaly at the hands of a Phocian force aided by stone-throwing field artillery. The incident, dating to the year 354 BCE, is mentioned by Polyaeus (2.38.2).
16. For his saw-toothed system of defensive fortifications in which all the towers were pentagonal, see Philo Pol. A 44 (= 83.7-14) with Yvon Garlan, *Recherches de poliorcétique grecque*, Fasc. 223, Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome (Paris, 1974) 245-46; and Whitehead and Blyth, 2004, 84 with n. 13.
17. This is the natural conclusion from Ath. Mech. 9.4-10.10 ff.
18. See H. Diels, "Laterculi Alexandrini: aus einem Papyrus ptolemäischer Zeit," in *Abhandlungen der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (Berlin: Reimer, 1904): col. 8, lines 5-8 and M. Huys & Collaborators, "Catalog of Paraliterary Papyri," Record 0273 = <http://cpp.arts.kuleuven.be/index.php?page=closeup&id=0273>, Col. 8.5-8: *Poluidos hō tēn helopolin en Buzantiōi kai tēn en Rodōi tet[ra]kuklon* (i.e., *poiēsas*) = "Polyidos, the one who built the helopolis [sic] at Byzantion and the four-wheeler at Rhodes . . ." This list of seven engineers occurs before a list of "Seven Wonders" (*ta hepta th[aumata]*) and stems from a Second or First-Century BCE papyrus whose text presented shorthand lists of important facts like highest mountains, longest rivers, most famous lawgivers, sculptors, architects, engineers, etc. The papyrus presumably formed part of a school library; cf., Leonid Zhmud, *The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity, Peripatoi* 19, trans. Alexander Chernoglazov (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006) 283. Polyidos's "helepolis" was a wooden tower from which the besiegers attacked the city walls. How they carried out their attacks is not recorded. The "four-wheeler" is otherwise unknown.
19. Vit. 10.13.3.
20. For Epokillos, see H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf Prosopographischer Grundlage*, 2 vols (Munich: Beck, 1926) 2: no. 301; for objections to this view, stemming from the incorrect spelling of the patronymic, see the references cited by Whitehead and Blyth, 2004, 84 n. 12.
21. Diels, 1904, col. 8, lines 12-15: *Diadēs ho met' Alexandrou tou basileōs Turou kai tas loipas poleis poliorkōn* = "Diades, the one who besieged Tyre and the other cities with king Alexander."
22. Ath. Mech. 10.10-11 (*en tōi mēchanikōi autou suggrammati*). On Athenaeus and his text, see now Whitehead and Blyth, 2004. Vitruvius (10.13.3) also refers

to Diades's "writings" (scriptis suis) but does not provide a specific title. Of the two accounts, however, Vitruvius seems to provide a more accurate and informed version of the original source; cf. Whitehead and Blyth, 2004, 85-89.

23. See Vit. 10.13.3 with Whitehead and Blyth, 2004, 86-87. For Alexander's use of naval transports to move his siege equipment, see below, pp. 15-16. For an attempt to visualize these towers, their modular construction, and how they were used, see Whitehead and Blyth, 2004, 176-87 with Figs. 2-3 on 194-95.

24. For Diades's unfulfilled promise, see Ath. Mech. 15.7-9; Vit. 10.13.8; and Whitehead and Blyth, 2004, 108.

25. The evidence for the creation of a Macedonian navy by Philip must be extracted from speeches and letters contained within the Demosthenic corpus, among other sources. Hauben, 1975, collects much useful evidence.

26. Polyaeus *Strat.* 4.2.22: Philip ravaged the territory of Abdera and Maroni with "many ships" (*naus echōn pollas*) and a land force. On the return march, Chares set an ambush near Neapolis with a force of 20 triremes. Philip sent his four fastest ships in advance of his main force to draw off the enemy and then passed along the coast unmolested. Despite his "many ships," Philip apparently felt his own force was no match for Chares and his 20 triremes. The date of the attack must be placed between 354 and 352 BCE: see J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976) 76-77.

27. In 352/1, Demosthenes (4.22) advised the creation of a fast moving strike force of 10 triremes as a counter-measure to Philip's aggressive acts; for the date, cf., R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and His Time: A Study in Defeat* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) 132-33. The "soldiers of Philip," who robbed an Athenian on his way to Olympia in 348, were probably operating from some small Macedonian naval squadron; cf., Dem. 19.2, *Hypothesis* 3 with Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 474. By 344, the time of Demosthenes's *Second Philippic*, the orator seems to allude to a victorious naval action won by Philip or, at the very least, an episode where his small fleet reached the coast of Attica unopposed: Dem. 6.36; Hauben, 1975, 54, argues that the expression used by Demosthenes (*nausi dēpou kratēsas*) implies a naval victory of some sort.

28. Hauben, 1975, 53, presents this list to show how Macedonian interests turned more and more seaward during Philip's reign. See Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 230-58 and 315-28, for a useful discussion of these actions along with a listing of the source record.

29. See Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 348-82, for a discussion of treatment of captured cities and regions, and 366-70 for grants of estates to Macedonian nobles.

30. *Ibid.*, 367-70, for the fact that service in the Companion cavalry was an obligation that accompanied the grant of some estates. Noble retainers might have recouped their expenses for these liturgies from revenues assigned to them such as were paid to Philip's father Amyntas (see M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, Vol. II: From 403 to 323 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), no. 111, lines 9-14), or were transferred by Alexander to his companions prior to his departure from Macedonia in 334 (Plut. *Alex.* 15.3-6).

31. Arr. *Ind.* 18.3-8 (=FGrH 133 F1): The regularity of the format listing name, patronymic, and city or region suggests an official list.

32. Although the wide distribution of regions implies that men without any maritime connections could be eligible for service, others clearly come from coastal regions: Pydna, Amphipolis, Aigai, Beroia and Aloros are all on the sea or close to it during the Fourth Century; *cf.*, Map 50 in the Barrington Atlas, with Eugene N. Borza, "Map 50 Macedonia," in *Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World, Map-by-Map Directory*, vol. 2, ed. R. J. A. Talbert (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000) 761.
33. [Dem.] 7.16: "And yet some people say that he has no interest in naval power! Why, this man who has no interest is building triremes and constructing shipsheds, and is willing to send out squadrons and incur considerable expense in facing risks at sea, and for objects that he does not value!" On Hegesippos as the author of this speech, see G. L. Cawkwell, in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth, 3rd ed. rev. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003) "Hegesippus (1)."
34. *Demosthenes*, vol. I, trans. J. H. Vince, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1938); translation taken from the machine readable text included in the Platform Independent Perseus 2.0 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1995).
35. For the history of this event, see Ellis, 1976, 164-66 and 169-70. For the octobols, see Edward T. Newell, *The Octobols of Histiaea*, Numismatic Notes and Monographs 2 (New York: American Numismatic Soc., 1921), esp. 11-17. The coins' reverse shows the nymph Histiaea sitting on the stern of a warship holding a stylis, upon whose cross-bar is inscribed the letters ATHANA. According to Newell (23), these issues should date to the period immediately following the expulsion of Philip's allies, *i.e.*, 340-338 BCE.
36. Diod. 16.74.2-76.4; he remarks (17.76.5) that Ephorus concluded his history with this siege. Evidence for the siege of Selymbria is discussed by Griffith, 1979 2: 574. Diodorus's brief synopsis of events at Byzantion is found at 16.77.2-3.
37. For attempts to reconstruct these events see, for example, Arnold Schaeffer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1886) 2: 499-517; Ellis, 1976, 174-85; and Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 566-81.
38. Ellis, 1976, 175 suggests that the action might have also been intended to discourage the Athenians from sending a force northward along the normal route past Peparethos (Skopelos).
39. This is the context for the letter sent to Athens by Philip that appears in the Demosthenic corpus as #12; *cf.*, especially 12.16. See Ellis, 1976, 176-78; and Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 570-71, who argues that the army's action would have served to protect the fleet from Athenian colonists in the region as well as to discourage Chares from initiating a sea battle.
40. See Ellis, 1976, 178-79 for the details.
41. For Heraion's location, see Phillip Harding, *Didymos: On Demosthenes*, Clarendon Ancient History Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) 213: "It was situated on the Asiatic side of the Bosphoros (*cf.*, Polyb. 4.50.2), north of Khalkedon, about seven miles from the entrance to the Black Sea . . . It can be found at E2 on map 53 in the Barrington Atlas."

42. Philochorus (*FGrH* 328) F 162 = Didym. in *Demosth.* 11, 1 col. 10. 45-11.5; the Greek text, with English translation, notes and commentary can be found conveniently in Harding, 2006, 78-81, with 210-15.
43. For a sensible attempt to explain how Philip might have accomplished this feat, see Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 576, n. 1.
44. *Ibid.*, 578, is no doubt correct to suggest that "it was very probably soon after the capture of the corn fleet that the siege itself of Byzantium began," in light of the additional statement from Philochoros that Philip broke up the captured ships to provide timbers for his siege machinery. Since the sailing season comes to an abrupt end in mid-November, we will not be far wrong to date the seizure of the grain fleet to September or early October; cf., Vegetius *re mil.* 4.39 with Lionel Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971) 270.
45. Cf., Plut. *Phoc.* 14; Hesychios Frag. 1.26-32 [*FGrH* 390 F 1.26-32]; and Front. *Strat.* 1.4.13. Although Ellis, 1976, 181-83, makes an attempt to reconstruct the outlines of a connected narrative, Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 578-79, is more defensible: "We hear of Philip's siege-train, of damage to the walls, of a surprise assault on a very wet night when dogs of the city gave the alarm, of a naval defeat for Philip's squadron, of Chares with forty ships based on the coast opposite near Chalcedon, of the popular and trusted Phocion arriving with reinforcements and of the Athenians thereafter based on the city and harbour itself." As he says (578), "only isolated details" survive which enable us to see that the siege was "a full-scale affair lasting some months at least, from about October of 340 to probably spring of 339."
46. For the helepolis of Polyidos, see n. 17 above. Front. *Strat.* 1.4.13 preserves a stratagem associated with Philip's extrication of the fleet from the region.
47. For other contributing factors, see Marsden, 1969, 101.
48. Cf., Philo *Bel.* 50.14-51.12 who explains how advances in knowledge were achieved through trial and error: "[In the old days] it was impossible to obtain [this measurement] except by experimentally increasing and diminishing the perimeter of the hole . . . Later engineers drew conclusions from former mistakes." If a practicing engineer like Philo learned through "much association with the craftsmen engaged in such matters and through intercourse with many master craftsmen in Rhodes," surely others did as well.
49. For an appreciation that such details needed attention, see Ath. Mech. 28.3-5, whose statement is repeated in slightly different words by *Parangelmata Poliorcetica* 53.12-13: "otherwise the ships were likely to capsize as a result of their superstructures, with the weight of the burden outside." On this difficult passage (in both authors), see Whitehead and Blyth, 2004, 139, and Denis F. Sullivan, *Siegecraft. Two Tenth-Century Instructional Manuals by "Heron of Byzantium,"* Dumbarton Oaks Studies 36 (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Press, 2000) 105 and 236. A related passage from the *Geodesia* (8.108-19), ascribed to Heron of Byzantium, clearly reveals that the texts are discussing centers of gravity; cf., Sullivan, 139 and 265.
50. Whitehead and Blyth, 2004, 180-81, suggest these developments occurred early in Alexander's reign, but it makes better sense for these innovations to start in *Philip's reign*, immediately following 339.

51. Although Whitehead and Blyth, 2004, 181 suggest that Diades's main purpose was to facilitate transport by cart, shipment by sea and cart may have been Diades's primary consideration when he first theorized his design. Only later, after Alexander decided to march into Mesopotamia, did he contemplate moving these towers over long distances by cart alone.

52. Marsden, 1977, 220.

53. Posidonios built a famous helepolis for Alexander; *cf.*, Biton 52.1-56.7 with Marsden, 1971, 70-73 and 84-90. We know nothing about Philippos "the engineer" beyond the fact he was a guest at Alexander's last symposion before he died: *cf.*, Ps. Call. 3.31.8 and Berve, 1926, no. 789. Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 447 argues that we should "guard against overestimating" the numbers in the engineering corps and cautions that most of the work was carried out by the infantry or by teams of local labor. Nevertheless, I suspect there were many master craftsmen and apprentices, founders, smiths and carpenters whose names have gone unrecorded.

54. For the nature of this fleet, see Hauben, 1976, 80-81.

55. Crossing: Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.6; Alexander's side trip: Diod. 17.17.1-3.

56. J. S. Morrison, *Greek and Roman Oared Warships*, with contributions from J. F. Coates, Oxbow Monographs in Archaeology 62 (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1996) 3-4, argues that Arrian's total at Miletos applies only to the Greek allied fleet, but fails to explain why Arrian should have ignored the Macedonian squadron of 60. The natural conclusion from Arrian's narrative is that his source for these numbers (Callisthenes?) indicated a total fleet strength (whatever the origin of individual ships) of roughly 160 units. Diodorus's 60 ship squadron must therefore derive from a different source and cannot simply be added to Arrian's total. Furthermore, if Alexander only took his Macedonian squadron to the Troad, we would have to assume that he excluded his Greek allies from ceremonial acts that were intended for both Greek and Macedonian audiences. Finally, if Diodorus's statement (17.22.5) about the "few ships" he retained when he disbanded the fleet (see below) goes back to any reliable source, it implies a Macedonian squadron numbering far less than 60 units. Other problems arise from the kinds of vessels that were counted for the totals provided by our sources. Arrian defines his total as triremes, but we know there were other classes of warships in the fleet as well, such as triakontors (*cf.*, Arr. *Anab.* 2.7.2). Perhaps Justin's total of 182 (11.6.2) includes these smaller units.

57. It is unclear from the context whether Arrian uses the term "triremes of the Macedonians" to signify the entire Hellenic fleet, a specific Macedonian contingent of warships operating inside the harbor, or the triremes at the harbor mouth. The Greek is not clear. It is possible that we see here the Macedonian contingent in action, as Morrison, 1996, 4, argues.

58. Arr. *Anab.* 1.19.5: *Alexandros de echomenēs edē tēs poleōs epī tous es tēn nēson katapefugotas epeplei autos, klimakas ferein epī tas prōras tōn triērōn keleusas, hōs kata ta apotoma tēs nēsou, kathaper pros teichos, ek tōn neōn tēn apobasin poiēsomenos.* "Alexander, when the city was already in his hands, sailed out himself against those who had fled to the island, ordering ladders to be carried at the prows of the triremes, so that they could land on the steep shore of the island as if they were attacking a city wall from their ships." The reflexive pronoun

autos implies to me the presence of the Macedonian contingent. Who else would attend the king when he joined the fleet in person?

59. As many have noted, the decision might have caused problems but for the timely death of Memnon; *cf.*, Arr. *Anab.* 2.1.3; Plut. *Alex.* 18.5; Diod. 17.29.4, 30.7, 31.3; Curt. 3.1.21, 2.1; and Bosworth, 1980, 143: "The Persian fleet had been effectively contained at Miletus and Alexander may have thought that the same tactics would work elsewhere. If so, he committed a colossal error, which the Persians exploited but not fully enough."

60. See Arr. *Anab.* 1.20.1 and Diod. 17.22.5. Alexander's decision not to risk a pitched battle with the Persian fleet is the subject of one of his famous disagreements with Parmenio; *cf.*, Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.6-9. Modern scholars suspect that Alexander was uncertain of the fleet's loyalty; *cf.*, Bosworth, 1980, 143 for a summary of the different views.

61. Diod. 17.22.5. Although we are not specifically told that he kept his Macedonian squadron, it is logical to assume that he did so. The Macedonians had experience in siege warfare and their loyalty was beyond question.

62. A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: the Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) 47, correctly observes that Alexander's strategy of defeating the Persian fleet "from the land" worked fine "if the Persian fleet stayed close to him and contested his passage. If they took themselves elsewhere, the situation was very different."

63. The idea is explained more fully by Bosworth, 1988, 50, who thinks Alexander came to this conclusion *after* the siege of Halikarnassos.

64. Early inconclusive assaults, such as the attack on nearby Myndos, might have resulted from the late arrival of the siege equipment; *cf.*, Bosworth, 1980, 144. The fleet must have anchored somewhere under the protection of the army as was done at Miletos.

65. Bosworth, 1988, 48-49, describes the siege as much more difficult than Arrian presents, and feels that the men's morale was too low for Alexander to risk a second protracted siege of Salamacis and Zephyrium.

66. Arrian reports *Anab.* (1.24.3-6, 26.1-5) that he took the following towns without a fight: Hyparna, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus, Patara and about 30 smaller places (*polismata*), Phaselis and other unnamed towns in Lower Lycia, Perga, and Side. At a few places where there was resistance (Syllium and Telmissos: Arr. *Anab.* 1.26.5 and 1.27.5-28.2), Alexander chose to turn his attention to other more important nearby objectives (Aspendos and Sagalessos: Arr. *Anab.* 1.26.5-27.4 and 1.28.2-8). Upon occasion he was forced to fight (as at Sagalessos), but he always carefully picked his battles to maximize his victories.

67. Arr. *Anab.* 2.7.2.

68. Persian war chest at Damascus: Arr. *Anab.* 2.15.1; Curt. 3.13.1-17; 4.1.4; Arados, Sidon and Byblos: Arr. *Anab.* 2.13.7-8, 15.6; Curt. 4.1.5-26; timber reserves for rafts and siege engines: Arr. *Anab.* 2.20.4-5; Curt. 4.2.18, 3.1; manpower, especially carpenters: Arr. *Anab.* 2.21.1.

69. Both Arrian and Curtius use the speech to justify Alexander's decision to his men. Curtius's brief synopsis (4.2.17) lists various pretexts and religious justifications, while Arrian (2.17.3-4) writes a formal speech detailing a number of strategic objectives.
70. Translation: *Arrian. The Campaigns of Alexander*, rev. ed., trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt, intro. and notes J. R. Hamilton (New York: Penguin, 1971) 132.
71. For the various opinions, see Bosworth, 1980, 238-39.
72. Green, 1991, 254, is surely wrong to suggest that Alexander waited until his mole had been destroyed before sending out ambassadors to raise a fleet. If messengers were dispatched during the spring, then this leaves too short a time for the gathering of the fleet and its transformation into a siege unit. For the dispatch in winter of small squadrons on special missions, see Thuc. 2.69; 3.88; 4.50 and Casson, 1971, 270, n. 3.
73. For the numbers of ships gathered, see Arrian (2.20.1-3) and Bosworth, 1980, 242.
74. A number of daring exploits of Tyrian resistance date to this period of the siege. For this phase of the struggle, see Bosworth, 1980, 240-41.
75. Arr. *Anab* 2.21.1 states that large work crews had been assembled from Cyprus and from various parts of Phoenicia; for the expedition to secure timber supplies, cf., Arr. *Anab*. 2.20.4-5 and Curt. 4.2.18 and 4.3.1. Modular designs were a feature ascribed to Diades; cf., "Philip's Engineering Corps" above.
76. For the likely time of year, see Bosworth, 1980, 241-42.
77. Cf., Arr. *Anab*. 2.21.1 with "Introduction" above.
78. Since we do not hear of "fours" or "fives" in the Macedonian fleet before the Phoenicians and Cyprians decide to join his fleet, I presume he adds these larger units to his fleet at this time. The Macedonians had more than one "five," as we can see from Curt. 4.3.11 and 4.4.7, 9. The Phoenicians showed the Macedonians the usefulness of these larger units by ramming and sinking the three outer-most triremes blocking the northern harbor upon their arrival at the city (Arr. *Anab*. 2.20.9). Arrian records additional actions at the harbor entrances involving "fours" and "fives" (2.22.5). When the city finally fell, both harbors were forced: the Phoenicians broke through the barrier across the southern harbor and the Tyrians entered the northern harbor once the attention of the inhabitants turned elsewhere (2.24.1-2). These forced entrances were likely spearheaded by the heavier units of the fleet.

4

SPORT AND ETHNICITY IN ANCIENT MACEDONIA

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"Whoever wants to know the heart and mind of America had better learn baseball, the rules and realities of the game—and do it by watching first some high school or small town games."

Jacques Barzun *God's Country and Mine* (1954)

The point of this famous quote from the cultural historian, Jacques Barzun, goes beyond a key to understanding America. Indeed, it deals with a fundamental understanding of any society and its view of itself; and it is as true about Greek culture and the *Agones* as it is in Barzun's original context. In many ways, the Games defined Greek culture and certainly were seen by both the Greeks themselves and by those around them as an iconic representation of Greek civilization. As such, they also serve as a benchmark for Hellenic identity, both in Greece and outside it. Every *polis* and *ethnos* had its celebrations, rooted in religious practice, and from the Archaic Age onward, the Crown Games in particular came to represent Greece as a whole.¹

It is the intention of this contribution to the *Festschrift* of arguably one of the finest of all Macedonian scholars to look at the question of sport and ethnicity in regards to Macedonia in three contexts. The first is the role of Macedonians, both the Argead House and others, in the Panhellenic Crown Games: the Olympic Games; the Pythian Games at Delphi; the Isthmian Games at Corinth; and the Nemean Games of Argos. The second context is the role of Greek athletics in the reign of Alexander the Great, especially as a deliberate representation of Greek culture. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it will look at the role and context of Greek athletics within Macedonia, significant because it is devoid of the possibility of external propaganda and reflects its importance ultimately to the Macedonians themselves as part of their own identity.

I. The Greek Context

The first and most obvious place to start is with the Olympic Games and with Alexander I Philhellenos. The story in Herodotus is well known, and is still a matter of scholarly contention.² Alexander himself told Herodotus the story: that he had competed in the *stadion* race in the Olympic Games, and finished in a dead heat, though he withdrew from the second round.³ But the preface to this is that Alexander's qualification to compete was challenged by the other athletes on the grounds that he was a *barbaros*, not a Greek. Herodotus states: "But Alexander, having proved himself to be an Argive was judged to be Greek," and that "the Hellenodikai, who regulate the games at Olympia, determined it to be so" (Hdt. 5.22).

The controversial aspects of this tale range from its being entirely apocryphal, to when it could possibly have occurred. It may even have simply been in the context of a state visit to the Olympic Games of 476, which were a spectacular celebration of the victory over Xerxes.⁴ Gene Borza, discussing all of the possibilities involved with the tale, ultimately dismisses it as propaganda on the part of Alexander I, and has a point.⁵ For the purposes of this study, however, the point of the story is not that it is true, but that Alexander I used it to identify his Greek ethnicity, and did so in the context of sport.

Nor does this stand alone as an Olympic reference in regard to Alexander I. Justin mentions him as competing in a various events (*Olympio certamine vario ludicorum genere contenderet*).⁶ Finally, fragments of Pindar obliquely refer to an athletic victory of a "*pai . . . Amynta*," which can only mean Alexander I in this context.⁷ Neither of these proves the story told to Herodotus is true, though one has to assume that there is something behind the Pindar fragment. But it does show that the identification of Alexander I personally with athletics was widespread, even if by Alexander himself, and the propaganda point is that it was done in the context of *Greek* athletics. As such, it provides a point with which Greeks could see and identify with Alexander as a competitor (*agonistes*) participating in Greek iconic sport pastimes. And the original story could not

have had a wider audience, as it is in Herodotus's *Histories*, not some obscure source. Nor is there any recorded contemporary outrage, objection, or account denigrating it and Alexander as a fraud. The objections are all modern, though that does not make them wrong either. What it does prove is that Alexander chose to portray himself as Greek and by the means of Greek athletic prowess. That one of the Argeads fulfilled the Olympic requirement to be Greek to the satisfaction of the Hellenodikai is without doubt. Philip II's Olympic victories are proof enough of that. The question is, if not Alexander I, then "who" or "when."⁸ But note that the tale of any later Argead having to prove the family's Greek heritage is never again raised, nor is it with the Antigonids.

There is no Olympic or athletic tradition connected to Alexander I's successor, his son Perdiccas II. Perdiccas is unlikely to have done so, as he was at first plagued with internal dissension over the accession, partially stirred up by Athens, and then directly embroiled in Athenian imperial ambitions after that: survival had to suffice. When Thucydides opens his narrative of the Peloponnesian War, Athens is already at war with Perdiccas, and he will be caught up in and out of it for the rest of his reign.⁹ But Perdiccas's son, Archelaus, who followed him onto the throne around 412, does have a history of a Greek athletic agenda, both in terms of the Crown Games and internally in Macedonia.

Archelaus reigned from around 412 to his assassination in 399. He implemented a foreign policy of neutrality in the struggle between Athens and Sparta, and a domestic policy of Hellenization internally. Sport was used to demonstrate that Hellenism, both in terms of the Crown Games and at home.¹⁰ There is a late source that refers to Archelaus's chariot teams winning the *tethrippon* (four horse) competition at both the Olympic Games and Pythian Games to Apollo.¹¹ Though the reliability of the source can and has been questioned, there is, in fact, also no reason to reject it out of hand.¹² And, as part of Archelaus's Hellenization program, there are some cogent reasons to accept it. Archelaus welcomed *émigrés*, Greek poets

and artists (taking advantage of Macedonian neutrality in the Peloponnesian War), as well as introducing Attic Greek as the official court and the legal language of Macedonia.¹³ Finally, Archelaus founded athletic *agones* in Macedonia, at Aigai, following the Olympic program according to Arrian (*ta agona...ta Olympia*).¹⁴ Once again, a Macedonian king demonstrably used Greek athletics to project himself into the Greek Oikumene as a Greek, and this time evidently to support this by using them to establish a Greek identity at home as well.

Following Archelaus's assassination in 399, for the next generation there was little time in Macedonia for anything but survival. There were no fewer than five successors to Archelaus over the next six years. Eventually a cousin of Archelaus, Amyntas III, became king in 393 and managed to stay on the throne for the next twenty three years. But the situation had changed little and Amyntas's reign was anything but stable. His kingship was frequently threatened externally, forcing Amyntas to seek aid from the Spartans, Athenians, the Chalcidic League, and Jason of Pherae by turns. The kingdom was subject to frequent invasion by Illyrians, Paeonians, and Thracians as well as Greeks. Various parts of the kingdom either successfully broke away or were for all intents and purposes independent, though titularly part of the kingdom. Any kind of celebratory athletics, Crown Games or otherwise, must have been far from anyone's mind. Nor did this vary after Amyntas's death in 370, as his first two sons (Alexander II and Perdiccas III) quickly followed, the first assassinated after reigning but two years and the latter killed in an Illyrian invasion in 359.¹⁵

All of that will change with the accession of Philip II, though not at first. In the first three years of his reign, Philip defeated in turn the Athenians, Paeonians, Thracians and Illyrians. By 356, Philip had restored the kingdom and its prestige.¹⁶ Sport almost immediately became a component of Philip's policy. Plutarch records that in 356, while besieging Potidaea, Philip received news of three great events: "the first that Parmenio [Philip's favorite general] had beaten the Illyrians in a great battle; the second that his horses had won at the Olympics; and the third

announced the birth of Alexander" (*Alex.* 3.5). Plutarch goes on to say that "Philip took great care to engrave the victories of his chariots at Olympia on his coins" (*Alex.* 4.5). The first thing to note is that, even before the Illyrian border had been fully secured, Philip entered a *tethrippon* in the Olympics, which meant that by statute the competing teams had to have been in training for the previous ten months.¹⁷ Philip must have made this a deliberate effort, undoubtedly political and symbolic in its own way of the kingdom's recovery.¹⁸ Second, there is no account of his having to prove his Greek ethnicity to do so. And finally, this was an ongoing policy, as Philip's horses also were entered and won in the next two Olympiads.¹⁹

Philip made an even bolder statement regarding the Olympics, clearly political, but equally within the context of both Greek athletics and ethnicity. Pausanias states that after his victory at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338, in the Altis (the sacred precinct at Olympia), next to the *Prytaneion*, Philip constructed a building bearing his name, the Philippeion ("the place of Philip"), made "of burnt brick surrounded by columns," and that in it "were set statues of Philip and Alexander" (5.20.10). It also contained the statues of Philip's parents and wife, Olympias. Unmistakably, this was meant as a statement of Philip's power, achievements and ethnicity. He was permanently identifying himself with the greatest symbol of Greek unity, the Olympic Games. And its presence was undeniable, at the very point where the procession enters the sacred enclosure, next to the council house. The foundation walls of the tholos stand there to this day.²⁰ But as with Alexander I, Philip's connection with Greek athletics went further.

He also presided over the Pythian Games to Apollo twice, once by delegate in 342 and then by himself in 338.²¹ This was by virtue of his settlement of the Third Sacred War and dominance of the Delphic Amhictyony in both instances, as well as his victory at Chaeronea. It was clearly political, religious and athletic propaganda by Philip, but nevertheless sport was part of the whole picture and the occasion. Later Macedonian kings will preside, at times, over several of the Crown Games. Cassander

presided over the Nemean Games in 315, demonstrating his control and common cause (at least for the moment) with Greece against Polyperchon.²² Antigonos III Doson celebrated a restored Nemean Games following the victory in the Social War in 222, where Polybius states that the Achaean League and each city “piled on him every honor they could think of” (2.70.4). Demetrius Poliorcetes used the Isthmian Games to proclaim the reestablishment of the Hellenic League in 301.²³ There is even an archaeological connection with the Games of Hera at Argos, a victory trophy found among the grave goods at Tomb II at Vergina inscribed “I am from the Games of Argive Hera” held in connection with the Nemean Games.²⁴ But that aside, the others demonstrate the use of all the Crown Games for political purposes, and equally in terms of making clear common cause and purpose, as well as to exploit a Greek ethnic consciousness.

Alexander will form a special section of this discussion below, but the period after Alexander also demonstrates a clear broadening of Macedonian ethnic identification with Olympia, sport and Greece. The standard contention is that, regardless of the status of the Argead House, the average Macedonian would not pass the qualification of being Greek, and therefore not be permitted to compete in the Olympic Games. But there is clear evidence that common (insofar as any Olympic victor can be common) Macedonians not only competed but won at the Olympic Games. Eusebius’s Victor List for the premier event, the *stadion* (whose winner gave his name to the entire Games of that particular Olympiad), records that three times a Macedonian is listed as a winner in that event during the Third Century. An Antiochus won the event in both the 122nd Olympiad (292) and 123rd Olympiad (288), and a Seleucus won in the 129th Olympiad (268).²⁵ In other words, within a generation of Alexander the Great’s death, Macedonian subjects were competing at the Olympics in their own name. And Pausanias mentions as victors with monuments two other Macedonians who won in chariot events: “Belistiche, a woman from the Macedonian coast,”²⁶ and Lampus “a horse breeder and his chariot” identified by both his name and city “the last city

founded in Macedonia, named after its founder Philip, the son of Amyntas."²⁷ By definition, these individuals identified themselves as Greek, and were accepted as such by the Hellenodikai. And sport was the means by which they did this.

II. Alexander the Great

Alexander the Great constitutes a category unto himself as regards the use of sport both for political purposes and demonstrations of ethnicity. Indeed, Alexander used sport more clearly as policy than any other Macedonian monarch. Not counting the funeral games he held in honor of his father, or the *impromptu* race in honor of Achilles at Troy run by Alexander himself and his *philoï*, nor those held for Alexander on his death, Arrian records no fewer than fifteen separate occasions on which Alexander mounted athletic competitions (*agones gymnikoi*).²⁸ Many of these were elaborate events which stretched over days, and involved parallel events in drama (*agon mousikos*), or cavalry competitions (*agon hippikos*) and torch races (*lampas*). Arrian notes that Alexander usually held sacrifice "after a successful event and also athletic and dramatic competitions" (7.14.1). A careful study reveals that many of these were to permit the army to let off steam either before a major campaign or at the conclusion of one, and served as a kind of Greek USO show.²⁹ These also demonstrated the role of sport among the Macedonians themselves, and stand as evidence of identification with a Greek ethnicity that obviously goes beyond Argead propaganda. These games were for internal consumption only.

Equally, on four occasions, were spectacular events designed for public consumption, either to impress the newly vanquished and the newly allied, or to remind the army and Greek allies of their common nature and cause, and thus to demonstrate Greek civilization and culture. In reality, they involved all of these goals. The first was held after the long and hard-fought siege of Tyre in 332. On this occasion, Alexander made sacrifice to Heracles, who was the patron god of both Tyre (as Heracles-Melqart) and of the Argead royal house. It was the first time the event had an audience outside of the army itself,

and peoples other than the Macedonians and Greeks. As such it was aimed at reinforcing Alexander's superiority. He "held a procession of his forces under arms, and there was a naval review in honor of Heracles, and athletic games in the enclosure of the Temple of Heracles [on the conquered island] and a torch relay race."³⁰ In particular, the holding of Greek athletic events in the Temple of Heracles in the now ruined island city of Tyre showed the superiority of Greek ethnicity in the heart of a non-Greek enclave, and any distinction between Greek and Macedonian faded away in the face of that for the Tyrians and other Phoenicians, if no one else.

The second set of these broader games was held at Memphis in Egypt. If the first Tyrian games had been partially punitive, these Egyptian ones were entirely celebratory as Alexander was treated as a liberator. Alexander "sacrificed to the gods, in particular the Egyptian Apis," which drew the difference between Alexander's tolerance of Egyptian religion and the Persian persecution.³¹ After this, Alexander "held athletic and literary competitions" but on a grand scale and to which "the most famous performers and artists came there from Greece."³² Prior to this, the army itself had provided the *agonistai*, but in the heart of one of the world's oldest civilizations, Alexander clearly wanted to demonstrate, in both athletic and dramatic terms, Greek civilization at its best. It was an act of cultural and ethnic imperialism, and sport was one of its main instruments.³³

In 331, on the way to face Darius III at Gaugamela, Alexander paused once again at Tyre, and there held another set of spectacular games on the scale of the public games at Memphis. There he specifically received ambassadors, sacrificed again to Heracles, and held athletic and literary competitions.³⁴ Plutarch goes into details about the dramatic portion of the games, mentioning dithyramb choruses and complete tragedies that were performed "brilliantly." And again, as in Egypt, no expense was spared in bringing the best performers from Greece. The Athenian actor Athenodorus was fined for missing an appearance at the Greater Dionysia because he had chosen to perform in the plays at Tyre

instead. On the eve of launching towards his greatest confrontation with Darius, Alexander chose the athletic contests and dramatic festival both to remind his army of who they were, and equally to make that clear to others as well, by a classic presentation of Greek ethnicity and culture.

The final entry in this category, in scale and impact, were the planned funeral games for Hephaestion in 324. It was Alexander's intention to rival the games held by Achilles for Patroclus in the *Iliad*, and to these events he summoned 3000 *agonistai* (athletes) and *technitai* (actors and musicians) from Greece. It was the ultimate ethnic identification for Alexander, one in fact he had been making all his life, between himself and Achilles. Grief for his friend aside, it was an occasion to make yet another public declaration of his Greek ethnicity, the grandest of all. And it was to take place in the midst of the lands and peoples he had conquered: a statement to Greek and barbarian alike—a statement made in Greek sport. Ironically, those specialists summoned from Greece for Hephaestion's funeral games, would perform at Alexander's own funeral games the next year.

But Alexander used sport on less formal occasions as well to make a statement. Despite Plutarch's assertion that Alexander "appears [*phanetai*] to have had an aversion to the whole race [*genos*] of athletes," he certainly was not beyond using them for his purposes as demonstrated above.³⁵ And Alexander frequently honored other Olympic victors. Chaeron of Pellene, was a four-time Olympic victor in wrestling, whom Alexander made tyrant of Pellene.³⁶ And this usury was not only shown with his political supporters. In 333, following the Battle of Issus, a number of Greek envoys who had been treating with Darius III fell into Alexander's hands, among whom was Dionysodorus of Thebes. The actions were treasonable under the provisions of the League of Corinth. But Alexander let the Thebans go free because they were trying to restore their city, which Alexander himself had destroyed and he viewed their actions honorable. Privately, Alexander said he let Dionysodorus go free "because

he was an Olympic victor."³⁷ A private comment possibly, but one marked for public consumption and undoubtedly planned so from the beginning. It fits in with Alexander's use of grand gestures.

And there were other famous Olympic victors on Alexander's staff. Philonides was a famous runner from Crete, who served as both a *hemeredromos* (courier) as well as a *bemetistes* (surveyor). Pausanias notes that Philonides had a statue for a victory probably in the *pankration* dedicated at Olympia.³⁸ Most famous of all was the Athenian Dioxippos, an unchallenged (*akoniti*) victor in the *pankration* at the Olympic Games of 336.³⁹ Curtius refers to him as well known (*pernotus*) by Alexander, and a favorite (*gratus*) at court. An incident at court led to Dioxippos's humiliation and he committed suicide, but Alexander later said that he regretted the death of an honorable man.⁴⁰ Associating with famous athletes, for that matter Olympic victors, is an obvious and still frequent political identification which needs little elaboration. National sports heroes provide a sympathetic background, and yet another tool for ethnic "branding" in the sense of modern advertising.

Finally, Alexander used the Olympic Games directly as the platform for two of his most important, and autocratic, measures. At the games of the 114th Olympiad, in 324, Alexander's envoy, Nicanor of Stagira, announced to a crowd of 20,000 political exiles the Exiles Decree.⁴¹ This decree from Alexander required that the Greek cities take back all exiles in harmony or be forced to do so. It was an attempt to settle Greek affairs and promote unity. Alexander had deliberately chosen the most important stage and symbol of Greek unity and ethnicity on which to do that, a virtual shrine to Greek sport to this day. Alexander followed it up in the same forum with a second decree requiring divine honors from among the Greeks for his achievements.⁴² The point, beyond aggrandizement, was to provide a focal point for Greek unity and ethnicity, akin to later Hellenistic ruler cults. And both measures were deliberately done in the context of sport.

III. Sport in Macedonia

In the initial quote with which we began, Jacques Barzun suggested that to understand the nature of America one had to understand baseball, and one should start with high schools and small town games. As a point of emphasis, this discussion will close with them instead, but Barzun's point will be borne out. A logical place to start would be the personal level, and remarkably there is evidence there. It is hardly surprising that it starts with the royal family.

Alexander I Philhellenos, as already discussed, had claimed to participate in the Olympics as a runner, and for that to be at all creditable, he had to have been known to be one. Further, the citation from Justin suggests that he competed in various events, and the Pindar fragments confirm that sport was done by him on a personal level.⁴³ Philip II likewise had a personal athletic reputation. In Polyaeus's *Strategemata*, he refers to Philip training in a *palaistra* "trying his strength with one Menagetes in wrestling." Philip is approached by some soldiers clamoring for their back-pay, but "dripping with sweat and covered in dust"⁴⁴ Philip made a joke about "perfuming myself with this barbarian" so that he would be fit company for his soldiers. He then ran, jumped into a pool and swam around until the soldiers tired of standing there and left.⁴⁵ As a professional *pankratist*, Menagetes was no simple challenge, and physical training was clearly part of Philip's regimen.

And this is true not only of Philip. Aside from the games put on by Alexander, we have references to his Hetairoi going to considerable lengths to train. Athenaeus reports that Perdikkas and Craterus, two of Alexander's generals, "being lovers of gymnastic sports, always had in their baggage piles of goatskins that would cover a *stadion*...under cover of which they would exercise."⁴⁶ And Plutarch states that Leonnatus had camels transport special sand from Egypt for his wrestling exercises.⁴⁷ Strabo also mentions that when Alexander reached India, native craftsmen began producing strigils and oil jars because they were used in athletic activity, clearly

on a large scale by the Macedonians.⁴⁸ And finally, Alexander himself had a reputation as a runner, which is the origin of the story of his being asked if he would run at the Olympics.⁴⁹ Famously, Alexander stated that he would run only if his competitors were kings, but he and his companions did run a race honoring Achilles at Troy after Alexander crossed the Hellespont.⁵⁰ The point is that all of these activities are part of the Olympic program, typically (though not exclusively) Greek, and are being practiced on a personal level and therefore go beyond propaganda.

There is also confirmation of Macedonia's dedication to the Olympic style of athletic competition in the earliest attested games in Macedonia, those established by Archelaus. Diodorus states that Alexander the Great, in an attempt to raise the enthusiasm and spirits of his friends "for the *agonas* which lay ahead [the Persian campaigns] . . . made elaborate sacrifices to the gods at Dion in Macedonia and held dramatic contests (*skenikous agonas*) in honor of Zeus and the Muses, which Archelaus, one of his predecessors, had founded."⁵¹ Arrian's account of the same event is more revealing, reporting that Alexander "offered the traditional sacrifice to the Olympian Zeus, which Archelaus had established, and celebrated the games in the Olympic fashion (*ta agona...ta Olympia*)."⁵² He then continues, "Some also say he held games in honor of the Muses." Finally, Dio Chrysostom also mentions the festival at Dion, in the context of Philip and Alexander stopping there to sacrifice to the Muses and celebrate "games in the Olympic style, which were said to be ancient to them (*ton agona ton Olympion, hon phasin archaion einai par' autois*)."⁵³

There is no reference to these games prior to this, although equally there is no reason to doubt that it was Archelaus who established such a festival. What is interesting is the characterization of the games as *ta Olympia*, which must refer to the nature and style of the contests themselves. Diodorus's version really only refers to the theatrical events (*skenikous agonas*). There are several possible resolutions to these differences. First, the festival (wherever it was held) had more in

common with the program at the Pythian Games at Delphi or the Panathenaia in Athens, where literary and athletic games were held together, but the athletics followed the Olympic model. The second possibility is that Arrian is correct, and the athletic festival was celebrated at Aegae, while the festival to the Muses, which he mentions only obliquely, was celebrated elsewhere. Or that there were two festivals rather than one: one each at Aegae (the athletic contests) and at Dion (dedicated to the Muses), in which case both Arrian and Diodorus could be correct about Dion—Diodorus fails to mention the athletic contests at all because they were elsewhere or did not show up in his sources. Dio Chrysostom combines the two and places them at Dion, but states that they were ancient.

Regardless, the founding of the festival is controversial. Both Badian and Borza characterize the founding of the games as the establishment of a “counter-Olympics (as Badian puts it)⁵⁴ or a “Macedonian Olympics” (as Borza states).⁵⁵ It is much more likely that Archelaus did this as part of his Hellenizing program, and that the model for the overall festival was indeed either the Pythian Games or the Panathenaia (as so much of his cultural program was Athenian).⁵⁶ But the point here is that the athletic events were deliberately styled to be Greek. Whether based on local festivals, meant to be just a new national celebration, or a rival to Panhellenic events, it was a statement in sports about Greek ethnicity, and how successful it was is best measured (as Barzun suggests) at the local level.

There is a fair amount of archaeological material and one major epigraphical piece to back up the idea of an active Greek, even Olympic, athletic program at the local Macedonian level. Archelaus moved the administrative capital of the kingdom to Pella, because it gave access to the Thermaic Gulf.⁵⁷ The site has been undergoing excavation for the last 50 years, and is immense. Some twenty years ago, the Greek Archaeological Service began work on the palace structure on the Acropolis, a complex of some 60,000 square meters. In addition to the palace, this included barracks, training grounds, and specifically a *palaistra* and swimming pool, probably the site of Polyaeus

story about Philip.⁵⁸ Future excavations will likely reveal more athletic complexes, but efforts for now concentrate on the Acropolis and the Agora, which covers 70,000 square meters.

Though there are literary references, mentioned above, to athletic events at Aegae, to date no athletic structures or complexes have been found. But the theater in which Philip II was assassinated has.⁵⁹ Future excavations may yet prove fruitful and confirm the literary sources. The same holds true for Dion: only the theaters have been found (both a Greek amphitheater and Roman *odeion*), along with sanctuaries and parts of the town, but Borza notes that Dion is a rich archaeological site, so the potential is there.⁶⁰ Demetrias, the fortress city and naval base founded by Demetrius Poliorcetes, at the head of the Magnesian Gulf, is likewise currently undergoing excavation and has yielded one end of a stadium/hippodrome, as well as a theater. The athletic structure lies north of the theater, and is identified by its open horseshoe shape (similar to the *stadia* of Delphi and Nemea).⁶¹

The best archeological example is Amphipolis, on the lower reaches of the Strymon River. It was founded in 437 as a Panhellenic colony of Athens, which controlled it only for a little over a decade. The city was incorporated into Macedonia by Philip II, and Macedonian nobles and phalangites (and their families) permanently joined the Greek and Thracian population there. It remained a Macedonian town for the rest of the kingdom's independent history. Excavations began there in 1982 on a large athletic complex built into the south slope of the Acropolis, actually on the opposite side from the settlement. It looks out toward the coast and port of Eion. It was situated to catch the sea breezes and take advantage of the moderate Aegean climate as much as possible, sheltered from the north by the Acropolis itself.⁶²

The area had been locally known as "the steps" and the north side of the complex leading back up to the main part of the town consists of what was at first taken to be ceremonial steps, but could also have been used for stadium seating. The complex itself houses several *gymnasion* structures for

training, including a *paradromos* (a covered *stadion* for winter training), a *palaistra*, and a bath complex with a sophisticated water and drainage system similar to those found at Pella.⁶³ The standard use of a *paradromos* for training in the *stadion* is confirmed by the literary sources in the story about Perdiccas's and Craterus's goatskin *paradromos* on Alexander's campaigns. This was a comprehensive athletic training site, built on the standard Greek model, and worthy of any polis.

The single most extensive piece of evidence for athletics on the Macedonian local level is epigraphic: The Gymnasiarchal Law of Beroia. This is a two-sided stele containing an elaborate set of laws and rules governing the operation of the town's *gymnasion*.⁶⁴ Specifically, it established a public law to be displayed in accordance with the practice of other Greek *poleis* with formal *gymnasia* (by which it means an *aliemma* or state supported system that supplied oil).⁶⁵ The inscription lays out how the *gymnasiarch*, who will oversee the process, is elected; how the youths and boys (*neaniskoi* and *paides*) are to be trained and disciplined; restrictions on those who can enter the *gymnasion*; the sacrifices to Hermes and the festival to him (the *Hermaia*); the running of the *hoplitodromos* (race of armored men) and the *lampadedromeia* (torch races by both the boys and youths); and how the torch leaders and judges for the events are to be selected. The program is extensive and clearly along the Olympic model, with the exception of the torch races, which reflects local custom.

Conclusion

Macedonian kings, then, clearly represented themselves as Greeks to the broader Greek Oikumene, at least from Alexander I Philhellenos on, and did so in the context of sport. Alexander the Great, more than any other Macedonian king, chose sport and sports venues as a basic medium by which to express his identity as a Greek, and involved the Macedonians of his army in doing so, as well. Thus, by extension, Alexander represented them to the world as Greek, too. But even at the level of Barzun's "high schools and small town games," Macedonia reflects a

model of Greek sports and ethnicity. Too often ethnicity winds up instead reflecting the view of those around Macedonia: Romans, Egyptians, Persians, and even the Greek *poleis* of the south. Equally, it often meant seeing ethnicity through either the aspirations or policies of Macedonia's rulers, or the opinions of modern scholars. In the Hellenistic Age, this last category may be a clue as to how Macedonians themselves viewed their own ethnicity. If so, it was done through Greek sport in their small towns and schools.

NOTES

1. On the relationship of Greek sport and religion in general, see, for example, Mark Golden, *Sport and Society in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998) 10-23, and in particular for the *periodos* (the circuit of Crown Games) 10-11; and Arist., *Metaph.* 2.994a 24, 5.1018b 18. The relationship existed on the local level as well. See, for example, D. G. Kyle, *Athletics in Ancient Athens* (Leiden: Brill, 1987) 10-13; or for the latter Hellenistic cities, I. Kertész, "The Integrating Role of Sport in the Hellenistic World" in *Pandora Könyvek 2: "Zur Sozialpolitik der Attaliden" Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte, Religion und Körperkultur der Antike*, ed. I. Kertész (Eger: EKF Líceum K., 2006a) 223-28, but especially 225-26. Note, all dates in text of this article are BCE, unless otherwise stated.
2. For a discussion of the basic scholarship, pro and con, see my "Other People's Games: the Olympics, Macedonia and Greek Athletics," *Journal of Sport History* 30 (2003) 205-06, and notes 5-12.
3. Hdt. 5.22. There is an alternate reading of the Greek to the effect that "he was drawn to run in the first pair," see P. Roos, "Alexander I at Olympia," *Eranos* 83 (1985): 162-68 and especially 165, n. 13. See also I. Kertész, "When did Alexander I visit Olympia?" *Nikephoros* 18 (2005): 115-16 and N. Crowther, "Resolving an Impasse: Draws, Dead Heats, and Similar Decisions in Greek Athletics," *Nikephoros* 13 (2000): 125-40.
4. The most recent chronological argument takes the use of the term "Hellenodikai" as the key factor, since it was not used until after 480, the term *diaitater* being the norm in the Sixth Century (presumably itself supplanting the earlier term of *agonothetai*). See Kertész, 2005, 121-26. For the importance of the Olympics of 476 BCE, in addition, U. Sinn, "Die Stellung der Weltkaempfe in Kult des Zeus Olympios," *Nikephoros* 4 (1991): 31-54 and especially 50. As for the use of Hellenodikai, Herodotus may have been simply projecting back the term current in his day, as Alexander must have told him the tale much later in any event. But if the 76th Olympiad was indeed a major celebration, it would not have been at all odd for Alexander I to attend, and therefore the occasion for the story's telling or a conflation of some sort. The charm in this case being, since Alexander withdrew from the *agon*, it could not be checked in any event. See *FrGH* 7.F272, and especially T. S. Brown, *The Greek Historians* (Lexington: Heath, 1973) 32, n. 54. See, also, Adams, 2003, 205-06.
5. E. N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: the Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990) 112.
6. 7.2.14. See also, N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia: Vol. II, 550-335 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 60, and Kertész, 2005, 123.
7. Pindar, frags. 92-93. See also Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 60, concluding that the context must be that of the pentathlon, which would equally fit Justin's citation.
8. I. Kertész has made the argument that there was a deliberate attempt, using participation in the Olympics, to reach out to the "marginalized," by which he means Greeks on the fringes of the Oikumene (and specifically Sicilians, Thessalians and Macedonians). This would explain the introduction of the *apene*

(mule cart race) and *kalpe* (a dismount race in which the rider jumps off and runs the last leg with the horse) events, begun in 500 and 496 respectively, and then discontinued in 444. It was seen as a gesture to the Sicilians in particular, and the recorded winners are all Sicilian or Thessalian. The lack of a Macedonian victor, however, would make this entirely inconclusive as regards his point about Macedonians: "New Aspects in the connections between Macedonia and the Ancient Olympic Games," *Archaia Makedonia* 6 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1999) 1: 579-84.

9. Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 115-36.

10. See W. S. Greenwalt, "Archelaus the Philhellene," *Ancient World* 34 (2003): 131-53. Borza likewise discusses Archelaus's cultural policies, but does not come to the same conclusion on the athletic ones (see below), in "The Philhellenism of Archelaus," *Archaia Makedonia* 5 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993) 237-44, and in 1990, 171-77 ("Archelaus' Philhellenism").

11. Solinus, 9.16. See also Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 150.

12. Ernst Badian dismisses the passage, first simply because it is a late source (dated to between 250-390 CE), and goes on to reject it for content in that Solinus claims Archelaus founded the Macedonian navy and showed excessive grief in mourning the death of Euripides (who had come to the Macedonian court, written at least two plays there—the *Bacchae* and the *Archelaus*—and been made an *Hetairos* of the king): "Greeks and Macedonians" in *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times, Studies in the History of Art*, Vol. 10, ed. B. Barr-Sharrar and E. N. Borza (Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art, 1982) 35, n. 16. But Solinus is no later in date than Eusebius's *Victor List*, or the source on which it is based (Sextus Julius Africanus), which is accepted as standard. As for founding the Macedonian navy, no less than Thucydides (2.100.2) states that Archelaus did more than any of the previous Macedonian kings in reforming the army, building roads and fortresses. As Macedonia had been supplying ship timber to Athens and the Greeks since before Xerxes's invasion, and the necessity of some kind of fleet in the context of the Peloponnesian War, it is hardly outlandish that Archelaus would have done something in that regard. See E. N. Borza, "Timber and Politics in the Ancient World: Macedon and the Greeks," *Proceedings of the American Philological Society* 131 (1987): 323-52. As for "excessive mourning" of Euripides, that is perhaps a question of taste, but hardly proof that it was not done, especially in the light of the honors the Athenian had received from Archelaus. Nevertheless, Borza accepts Badian's reasoning (1990, 174-75). N. G. L. Hammond, on the other hand, accepts Solinus at face value (Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 150, n.5).

13. See Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 137-41, for the political narrative, and 149-50, for the cultural material.

14. Arr. *Anab.*, 1.11.1 a full discussion occurs below in Section III. Badian speculates that Archelaus's founding of the Games along the Olympic program was because he had been denied the right to compete at Olympia, a point predicated on Badian's rejection of the Solinus passage (1982, 35), and is followed in this by Borza, 1993, 241. The problem is that there is no evidence that Archelaus was challenged or rejected by the Hellenodikai. See Adams, 2003, 206-07 and 209-10.

15. For the historical narrative, see Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 167-200.
16. Again, for the historical narrative, *ibid.*, 203-95.
17. Participants had to swear an oath before the Hellenodikai that they had been in training for the previous ten months. See J. Swaddling, *The Ancient Olympic Games* (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1999) 50.
18. I. Kertész, "Philip II the Sportsman," in *Pandora Könyvek 2: "Zur Sozialpolitik der Attaliden" Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte, Religion und Körperkultur der Antike* (Eger: EKF Líceum K., 2006b) 209-14, and especially 211, where he sees sport as a component of Philip's policies.
19. See L. Moretti, *Olympionikai, i vincitori negli antichi agoni olympii* (Rome: Academia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1957) Nos. 434, 438, and 445 (the 106th, 107th, and 108th Olympiads respectively, which would also make Philip a *Triastes*, a significant three-time winner by virtue of which he held special status). See also Adams, 2003, 207-08.
20. See also E. D. Carney, "The Philippeum, Women and the Formation of Dynastic Image," in *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay, A Companion to Crossroads of History*, ed. W. Heckel, et al. (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2007) 27-60.
21. See Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 564 and 615, and Demosthenes 9 (*Third Philippic*) 32 where he complains about Philip organizing the festival, and then sending a delegate to preside.
22. Diod. 19.64.1
23. N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia: Vol. III, 336-167 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 176. Although one should note the Isthmian Games did not hold the same exclusivity, even admitting Romans to the competition after the First Illyrian War: Zon. 8.19. See also Hammond and Walbank just above, 334-35.
24. M. Andronikos, *Vergina: the Royal Tombs and the Ancient City* (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon, 1984) 164-66; and Borza, 1990, 253-66, for an excellent summary and bibliography on the finds. The tripod bore the name "Machatas," presumably a relative, possibly from the related princely house of Elimeia.
25. See D. Matz, *Greek and Roman Sport: A Dictionary of Athletes and Events from the Eighth Century B.C. to the Third Century A.D.* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1991) 123.
26. Paus. 5.8.11. The owner of the team was the victor, and hence the only category at the ancient Olympics in which a woman could compete. Famously, the sister of Agesilaus—Kyniska—won twice in the *tethrippon*. See D. G. Kyle, "The only Woman in All Greece: Kyniska, Agesilaus, Alcibiades and Olympia," *Journal of Sport History* 30 (2003): 183-203.
27. Paus. 6.4.10. The identification of Philippi by Pausanias as the last one named for its founder is incorrect, and not even the last city so named by Philip.
28. See my article, "The Games of Alexander," in *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay, A Companion to Crossroads of History*, ed. W. Heckel, et al. (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2007) 125-38, and especially 129-30, and n. 21, which lists all the references in Arrian.

29. For example see Arrian's citations for games at Aegae (1.11.1); Soli (2.5.8) Memphis (3.5.2); Susa (3.16.9); Hyrcania (3.25.1); Tanais/Ai Khanoum (4.4.1); Indus (5.3.6); Hydaspes (5.20.1); Hyphasis (5.29.2); Carmania (6.28.6); and Ecbatana (7.14.1). All of these occasions (eleven altogether) solely involved the army and were for its amusement. It is also interesting to note that after Susa, Alexander stops holding torch race events and substitutes cavalry competitions (*gymkhana*), clearly on the grounds such use of fire for sport would be offensive to Zoroastrians, but that they had a common interest in horses. Adams, 2007, 135.
30. Arr. *Anab.*, 2.24.6; Diod. 17.46.6. See also Adams, 2007, 133.
31. Arr. *Anab.*, 3.1. 3-4. See also A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 262, where he makes the point that although venerated and part of Egyptian religion, the Apis bull was not actually considered a deity by the Egyptians, but oddly, it was by the Greeks.
32. Arr. *Anab.*, 3.1.4.
33. In the spring of 331, Alexander held a second set of games at Memphis, but solely for the army as it set out on the Gaugamela Campaign. Arr. *Anab.*, 3.5.2. See also, Adams, 2007, 134.
34. Arr. *Anab.*, 3.6.1; Curt. 4.8.16, and Plut. *Alex.*, 29.1 (though Plutarch only mentions the literary competitions).
35. *Alex.*, 4.11. See Adams, 2007, 125-27.
36. Paus. 7.27.7; Athenaeus 11. 509B. See also Matz, 1991, 50, and Kertész, 2006b, 212.
37. Arr. *Anab.*, 2.14.4. Alexander eventually freed all the envoys, not just the Thebans.
38. For Philonides's achievements as a runner, see Pliny, *NH* 2. 181; Solinus 7.84. For the inscription, see Paus. 6.16.5. See also Adams, 2007, 129 and n. 19.
39. The term *akoniti* refers to dustless, meaning the practice of wrestlers and *pankratists* of covering themselves with a coating of dust before a match. In this case, Dioxippos won without having to do so because no one was willing to fight him. See Matz, 1991, 25-26. For Dioxippos's athletic career, see Ael. *VH* 10.22 and 12.58; Diog. Laert. 6.43; *P. Oxy.* 13.1607, and Plut. *Mor.* 521b.
40. Dioxippos had won a staged duel with a Macedonian *hetairos* named Corrhagus, which led to his unpopularity and a false accusation of theft. The incident has been used to demonstrate ill feelings between Greeks and Macedonians. See Adams, 2007, 127-28, and especially E. N. Borza, "The Symposium at Alexander's Court," *Archaiia Makedonia* 3 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1983) 45-55.
41. For the great scene of the Exiles Decree, see Diod. 18.8.3-5; Curt. 10.2.4-8. See also, A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: the Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) 220-28.
42. The bibliography on Alexander and divine honors is extensive. For an excellent discussion of all the material, *ibid*; 278-90.
43. Just. 7.2.14; and Pindar frags. 92-93. See notes 6 and 7 above. Hammond presumes that this is the *pentathalon*, Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 60.

44. Polyæn. 4.2.6. Menagetes was a *pankratist*. See Kertész, 2006b, 210. Plutarch has a similar reference to Philip and wrestling, see *Mor.* 602D.
45. Both a *palaistra* and pool have been discovered next to each other in the palace complex at Pella. See M. Siganiidou and M. Lilimpaki-Akamati, *Pella, Capitol of Macedonians*, 2nd ed. (Athens: Ministry of Culture, 1997) 16.
46. Athen. 12.539C.
47. Plut. *Alex.*, 40.
48. Strabo 15.1.67. See also Kertész, 2006b, 210.
49. The story comes from Plutarch, in fact from three separate places. In two of them Alexander is asked this by his companions (*Alex.*, 4 and *Mor.* 331B), and in one by his father Philip (*Mor.* 179D). But Plutarch states that the whole thing arose because of Alexander's prowess as a runner.
50. Plut. *Alex.*, 15.4. For a discussion of Alexander on running at the Olympics, see Adams, 2007, 125-26, and for the event at Troy, 130, n. 21.
51. 17.16.3-4.
52. Arr. *Anab.*, 1.11.1. Note that he has either incorrectly placed them at Aigai, the traditional royal residence and original capitol, or is perhaps referring to two sets of festivals, which will be discussed below. See Borza, 1990, 174-75, and especially n. 30.
53. Dio Chrys. *Peri Basileus* 2.2.
54. Badian, 1982, 35. Note that both positions are predicated on rejecting the Solinus passage mentioned above.
55. Borza, 1990, 174, and 1993, 240-42, for a slight revision of his original position. Borza also states that the games may have grown out of local festivals and were not intended as a challenge to the Panhellenic events.
56. See Greenwalt, 2003, *passim*, and Adams, 2003, 209-10.
57. Siganiidou and Lilimpaki-Akamati, 1997, 7-8.
58. For the archaeological material, *ibid.* 14-17, and specifically 16 for the *palaistra* structure.
59. Andronikos, 1994, 98.
60. Borza, 1990, 173-74.
61. A. Batziou-Efstathiou, *Demetrias* (Athens: Archaeological Receipts Fund, 2002) 16 for the overall plan, 33-35 for the theater, and 25-26 for the athletic structure.
62. D. Lazarides, *Amphipolis* (Athens: Archaeological Receipts Fund, 1997), 14-20, for the historical retrospect.
63. *Ibid.* 52-58.
64. SEG 27.261. For the sake of convenience, it is cited in total in S. G. Miller, *Arete: Greek Sports from Ancient Sources* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1991) nos. 126, 131-38.
65. Hellenistic parallels to this and Gymnasiarchal festivals are documented at Alexandria, Cos, Magnesia on the Maeander, Miletus, Pergamon, Priene, Teos, and even on a column in front of the *gymnasion* at Tanais/Ai Khanoum. This

puts Beroia in the Greek norm for the period. See Kertész, 2006a, 224-26. Many of these likewise-laid-out religious festivals in connection with the *gymnasion*: the Ptolemeia in Alexandria; the Leukophreneia at Magnesia; the Nikephoria in Pergamon, the Eumeneia at Sardis, the Asklepeia at Cos (Kertész, 2006a, 226-27) and the ones at Pergamon and Magnesia went so far as to be named *isolympios agon* (equal of the Olympics), and *isopythios agon* (equal of the Pythian Games).

PHILIP II AND OLYMPIAS ON SAMOTHRACE:
A CLUE TO MACEDONIAN POLITICS
DURING THE 360S

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About the first meeting between Philip and Olympias,
Plutarch (Alex. 2.2) writes:

*...we are told that Philip, after being initiated into the mysteries
of Samothrace at the same time with Olympias, he himself being still a youth
and she an orphan child, fell in love with her and betrothed himself to her at
once with the consent of her brother, Arymbas [= Arybbas].¹*

As it stands, there are problems with this passage beginning with Plutarch's misidentification of Arybbas as Olympias's brother, when in fact he was her uncle, and at some point in time, her brother-in-law.² Also problematical is Plutarch's characterization of the resulting union as a "love match," which few modern scholars accept without qualification. For example, Susan G. Cole in her monograph on Samothrace suggests that, "[t]his story is almost certainly a romantic fiction."³ If Plutarch is wrong about these particulars (other difficulties will be considered below), is he right to claim that Philip first met Olympias while both were being initiated into the Samothracian mysteries? Although it is not clear whether Cole rejects the historicity of this passage entirely, or whether she merely suspects its romantic melodrama, other scholars (including especially Grace Macurdy and Catherine Mortensen) accept the Samothracian setting for Philip's and Olympias's betrothal.⁴ Even Cole (whose criticism of Philip's romanticism is not without merit) admits that, "the association of Philip with Samothrace may well be fact,"⁵ both because the archaeological evidence suggests that the substantial development of the Samothracian sanctuary began when Philip was a young man, and because Philip's house seems to have had much to do with that subsequent development. If this is true, the conclusion that someone in Philip's family was initi-

ated into the Samothracian mysteries seems to follow, as does the supposition that that person was Philip himself, despite the arguments of at least one scholar to the contrary.⁶

But was Olympias also an initiate? And if so, was she initiated at the same time as Philip? And again if so, was their betrothal arranged while both were on Samothrace? In an attempt to answer these questions, in what follows I shall first review the evidence that links the Argead house and Philip in particular to Samothrace. Second, I shall consider why Philip and Olympias might have had reason to meet for the first time on Samothrace, keeping in mind (as others have not in print) the chronological problems such a visit to Samothrace presents. Finally, I will attempt to place the episode into a larger context, for if I am correctly understanding the evidence, Philip and Olympias's betrothal (correctly contextualized) is of great help in understanding the dynamics which propelled the politics of the Argead realm during the tumultuous decade of the 360s.

i

Plutarch is not the only ancient literary source to associate Philip with Samothrace. Quintus Curtius (8.1.26, in his preface to Alexander III's murder of Clitus) reports that Alexander disparaged his father's achievements, eventually to posit: "that praise was due, not to those who had witnessed the initiatory rites of Samothrace at a time when Asia should have been laid waste by fire, but to those who by the greatness of their deeds had surpassed belief."⁷ Whatever else this passage signifies, when taken with Plutarch it indicates that Philip was widely understood in antiquity to have been initiated into the Samothracian mysteries. Moreover, archaeological evidence supports his interest in the island, for at a time when Samothrace itself was not particularly wealthy and thus without the financial wherewithal to undertake a significant glorification of its sanctuary, a major building program began there. As Cole notes: "The first substantial building in the sanctuary, the Orthostate Structure, was built at about the time that Philip II came to power in Macedonia."⁸ What links this

construction to the Argeads (beyond Alexander's disparaging remarks and Plutarch's testimony) is the fact that during the spans of Philip's and Alexander's reigns four additional monumental buildings were erected within the sanctuary, the last of which was dedicated by Alexander the Great's joint successors, Philip III and Alexander IV.⁹ In addition to this evidence, Philip II and Alexander III also appear to have jointly dedicated a sacred precinct on the mainland (not far from where many would-be initiates into the Samothracian mysteries caught ships to the island) to the possession of the Samothracian gods.¹⁰ How dedicated Alexander III was personally to Samothrace is debatable in light of what Curtius reports, but at least one source records a dedication by him to the gods of that place.¹¹ Cole correctly notes all of this evidence to justify the conclusion that Philip II had "a special interest in Samothrace," an interest that clearly grew with the development of Macedonian political ambitions in Thrace and Asia, and an interest that was maintained by Macedonian dynasts after the demise of the Argead house.¹²

In a new consideration of this evidence, however, Mortensen argues that Cole mistakenly credits Philip with the initial visit to the Great Gods primarily because he did not have the money to begin the monumental construction associated with especially the "Orthostate Structure" (dated by McCredie to the first half of the Fourth Century) at the beginning of his reign.¹³ Mortensen thus associates the Argeads with Samothrace before Philip's accession, a conclusion also reached (but for different reasons) by J. R. Hamilton,¹⁴ but she goes further to assume that it was Perdiccas who visited the site, not Philip. To a certain extent, Mortensen is probably right, in that Philip undoubtedly visited the island as an agent of his brother, but it does not follow that Philip was not the first Argead to visit the sanctuary.

ii

Despite Mortensen's argument, Philip's personal interest in Samothrace is all but absolutely certain. That having been stipulated, we can return to a question posed above: that is, how likely is it that Philip met for the first time and was betrothed

to Olympias while both were being initiated into that island's mysteries? This question becomes even more significant when one keeps in mind two points. First, neither the Argeads nor the Aeacids had any known association with Samothrace or its mysteries before at earliest ca. 375 (McCredie's approximate date for the Orthostate Structure¹⁵). In fact, Plutarch's testimony is the only evidence that connects Olympias with the site.¹⁶ Second, a prior association with Samothrace for either royal house is unlikely both because the island was distant from both kingdoms, and because neither realm had any established maritime interests, whereas the principal benefit associated with Samothrace's mysteries was protection from shipwreck.¹⁷ Thus, whatever might have propelled both Philip and Olympias to be on Samothrace at the same time, it apparently had nothing to do with the island's traditional appeal to the interests of either of their families, or in Olympias's case, to any apparent devotion to the cult.

So, then, what might have enticed Philip and Olympias to Samothrace? If we discount as extremely unlikely the coincidence that two royals from kingdoms that abutted one another and had primarily landed interests (and that lay significantly to the west of the still underdeveloped sanctuary), just *happened* to visit Samothrace at the same time for reasons of private piety, two possible answers to this question spring to mind. The first and more likely pertains to the well-founded fear that the Argeads and Aeacids maintained toward common Illyrian enemies, for both Macedon and Epirus had been severely hurt by Illyrian incursions within at most a few years before Philip met Olympias for the first time.¹⁸ As a result, both kingdoms had much to gain from an alliance that had the potential for checking the perennial threat which the Illyrians represented to their respective kingdoms.¹⁹ Yet any attempt to establish the groundwork for a formal alliance between the Argeads and Aeacids before Philip's great victory over Bardylis in 358 would have been dangerous for the parties involved as the Illyrians, or their allies, were unlikely to remain idle if they prematurely discovered that the Macedonians and Epirotes intended to collaborate against Illyrian interests. Thus, if a mutual dread of the Illyrians

brought the parties of Philip and Olympias together, it is credible that they decided to do so under the cover of simultaneous initiations into the Samothracian cult. If this were the case, however, one imagines that the betrothal of the two principals must have come before the Illyrian threat had been radically reduced in 358, for it would only have been before that momentous occasion that the most attractive asset of Samothrace, its distance from Illyria and Illyrian interests, would necessarily have outweighed the time and effort it cost the interested parties to set up and hold their meeting at that place.

Samothrace would have fit the need for privacy from prying Illyrian eyes perfectly, and is, in fact, known to have been exploited for secret negotiations by other players at a later date.²⁰ Not only was the island distant from both Pella and Passaron, it was even more so from the centers of contemporary Illyrian power and interests (centered as these were to the north and west of the modern lakes Ochrid and Prespa).²¹ In addition, the focus of the mysteries celebrated on Samothrace fit the security needs of the negotiating parties very well. On the one hand, since the chief benefit of Samothracian initiation was protection from ship-wreck, and since the Samothracian sanctuary was far from being the most popular religious destination for most of Philip and Olympias's contemporaries, it would have been highly unlikely that news of what transpired there between the Macedonian and Epirote entou-rages would have made its way back to Illyria through any third party. On the other hand, although the primary advantage to be gained from these mysteries involved protection from the sea, that was not the only protection associated with Samothracian initiation. Among the other benefits bestowed upon initiates were thought to include: aid in battle, protection after death, and a kind of generic safety against danger.²² As such, it would not have been completely out of the question for a man and a woman (or an adolescent and a child, as Plutarch explicitly states) from families with few ties to the sea to have made the journey to Samothrace. Such being the case, even if a third party came to note the simultaneous appearance of Philip and Olympias (or more significantly, her ward,

Arybbas) on the island, it is quite likely that the "coincidence" would have been noted, but without undo interest among those whom Samothrace was most likely to attract, especially if at the time of their Samothracian sojourn the principals were *not* the centers of attention in their respective realms.

All things considered, if a fear of Illyrians lay behind the choice of Samothrace as the site of Philip's and Olympias's betrothal, then we must accept the likelihood that the arrangement preceded Philip's great victory over Bardylis (sometime) in 358, for if the betrothal was agreed to subsequently, it is not at all clear why either party (or the political interests they represented) would insist on a Samothracian meeting, when at least Philip was very busy with other business, and when the island was just a little *too* far off the beaten path and remote from the heritages of either family involved.²³ Of course, if the motivation for the exploitation of Samothrace was a desire to hide a burgeoning alliance from the Illyrians then we can also question the "love at first sight" motif already rejected by Cole. Overtly political marriages are frequently characterized as love matches, however, so it is not surprising that Plutarch depicts the initial meeting of Philip and Olympias as he does.²⁴ Indeed, although unlikely, it is not even impossible that Philip *was* physically attracted to Olympias when he met her, although there can be little question that their union was contracted less for love than for diplomacy.

A second possible explanation for Philip's inaugural visit to Samothrace exists. We know that the Argeads before Philip had long been eager to exploit opportunities as they arose to the east of Macedon, although until Philip's reign, their success in that direction had been limited. Indeed, by Philip's time a long and frequently hostile relationship existed between his house and both the Chalcidic League and Thrace.²⁵ Therefore, considering Samothrace's geographical location and close religious ties with Thrace,²⁶ it is not impossible that Philip could have used an initiation and an arrangement of marriage on the island to cover the procurement of regional intelligence and/or the forging of local contacts (part iii). Such a rationale for

visiting Samothrace is not necessarily at odds with another concerning an Illyrian agenda. If, however, Philip first visited Samothrace after 360, it is unlikely that Illyria and Thrace were equally on his mind. I note this because Philip had little reason to try to cover up his betrothal to Olympias after his victory over Bardylis in 358, whereas with everything else Philip was confronting, it is inconceivable that he began thinking much about Thrace (especially eastern Thrace) between his elevation in 360/59 and his military investment of Amphipolis in 357.

So where does this leave us? In what follows, it is accepted that the betrothal of Olympias to Philip was arranged on Samothrace. The primary reasons for doing so are two: 1) because it is difficult to imagine what value the out and out fabrication of a Samothracian betrothal might have had, especially since Alexander III appears to have been at best ambivalent about Samothrace, and Olympias is otherwise not associated with the island; and 2) because the extant archaeological evidence strongly suggests that the Argeads began to patronize Samothrace at about the time or slightly before Philip married Olympias. Concerning this Argead patronage, it need not be held that sentimentality stimulated a building program. Rather, it appears that having established a relationship with the island, Philip found it useful to develop Argead ties there as his eastern ambitions grew. If this assumption is valid, then Philip could easily have justified his patronage of the island's sanctuary by referring both to his personal initiation into its mysteries and to the fact that he had first met his "beloved" Olympias there.

One point should be made more explicit before turning directly to the problem of dating the betrothal. As noted, despite Olympias's attested interest in religion, Plutarch's is the only mention that links her to Samothrace in any way. Although the amount and nature of the extant evidence concerning both Olympias and Samothrace during the span of her lifetime makes generalizations about her interest (or lack thereof) in the site risky, far from undercutting Plutarch's testimony, the dearth of evidence connecting Olympias with Samothrace actually makes

it *more* likely that Plutarch was correct to situate her betrothal to Philip there. This is so because if Olympias had been widely known to have maintained a special affinity for Samothrace, it would have been easy for a creative source to manufacture Samothrace as the place where she met and was betrothed to her husband—precisely because the site would have reinforced a famous aspect of Olympias's public persona.²⁷ As things stand, it is difficult to see what value an invented story of her betrothal on Samothrace might have had. In fact, Olympias probably had two reasons for not embracing her Samothracian experience at a later date: the deterioration of her relationship with Philip, and her youth at the time of that initiation.

iii

When did Philip meet Olympias on Samothrace? This is not an easy question to answer because the sources for Philip's early career are not such as to allow a detailed accounting of his movements. Nor have scholars given this question much consideration in print. Most appear to assume that Philip's betrothal to Olympias occurred not long before the marriage itself. But even though the Illyrian threat to both Macedon and Epirus was as great as ever after Perdiccas III's tragic death, it is reasonable to ask: when could Philip have visited Samothrace after 360? (There is not enough known about Arybbas and Olympias to pose the same question of them with any credibility.) One fact pertinent to the present inquiry is undeniable: Alexander III was born in the summer (probably in July) of 356 BCE. Thus, his parents could not have been married any later than the fall (probably October) of 357.²⁸ Of course, the betrothal of Olympias to Philip predated their marriage, and almost certainly so by several months, for it is virtually certain that the party of Arybbas and Olympias would not have advanced to Macedon before first returning home,²⁹ and travel times to and from the island must be considered.

What are the chronological parameters as far as the mysteries are concerned? Since one could be initiated into Samothrace's mysteries at any time during the sailing season,³⁰ Philip and

Olympias could have visited the island at any time between April and November. However, if Philip and Arybbas agreed to conduct their business on Samothrace in order to exploit the island's remoteness from Illyria, they could very well have synchronized their joint visit so as to coincide with the sanctuary's peak activity, for otherwise the coincidence of a joint appearance might have been deemed an unnecessary risk. Since what scanty evidence exists suggests that Samothrace's most important annual festival was celebrated in June, it is possible (although hardly certain) that it was during that month that Philip and Olympias made their visit.³¹

Regardless of when between April and November Philip visited Samothrace, in what year did he do so? Although Samothrace's remoteness from Illyria likely played a role in its attractiveness as a betrothal site, in this case it appears inconceivable that Philip visited the island between the death of Perdiccas III (late 360 or early 359) and Philip's victory over Bardylis in 358. A lengthy argument can be proffered in support of this conclusion, but space constraints will keep my comments brief at this time. During 359 Philip strove to reinvigorate the morale of his subjects, to reinforce (or re-open) an alliance with Elimea (in the process, almost certainly marrying his first wife, Phila), to buy-off potential invasions from Paeonia and Thrace, to defend his throne against an Athenian backed invasion of Macedon by a royal rival, to win some temporary favor in Athens, and to extensively reorganize and retrain a dispirited army for showdowns yet to come.³² And, he did all this while living under the considerable shadow of an Illyrian military threat. Thus, any absence from Macedon would have created an unacceptable degree of risk for Philip. Nor was 358 any less busy or critical; for at least its first half Philip was devoted to additional military preparations and to the campaigns which saw Philip victorious first over the Paeonians, and then over Bardylis's Illyrians.³³ Because we do not know how far into the campaigning season it was before Philip defeated Bardylis, it is just possible that he might have visited Samothrace after that victory, but before the close of the sailing season.³⁴ That Philip did so, however, is extremely unlikely because his most pressing

concern after the victory over Bardylis was to take advantage of the stunning turn of events by securing Macedon's northwest against a resurgence of Bardylis's Illyria, or its replacement as a threat by some party as yet undefeated. This responsibility certainly included Philip's personal supervision of the necessary diplomatic and defensive arrangements, among which probably included Philip's second marriage to the Illyrian princess, Audata.³⁵ Although the alliance with Epirus constituted a major element in the settlement of Macedon's western frontiers, it seems extremely far-fetched to believe that Philip took the time out of a busy schedule to strengthen his hand against the Illyrians by *abandoning* the west shortly after his victory there for whatever length of time it would have taken to visit Samothrace and to return home. Surely, whatever Samothrace's draw was to Philip, there were places with far more traditional significance to his and Olympias's houses, much closer to the core of their respective concerns as they stood at the time. It seems clear, therefore, that if Philip's betrothal to Olympias had taken place in the second half of 358, it would have occurred in either Epirus or Macedon. Adding to the unlikelihood that he visited Samothrace in 358 is the fact that by the end of that year Philip had almost certainly begun the Thessalian initiative which generated his third marriage (to Philinna) in less than two years.³⁶ Thus, although there is an outside chance that if Philip fought Bardylis early enough in 358, he might have visited Samothrace in that year, it is unlikely that he did so.

Because pressing concerns almost certainly meant that Philip did not visit Samothrace in either 359 or 358, could he have done so in 357, even though the victory over Bardylis would have significantly mitigated any need for secrecy? Certainly, a June betrothal before a fall wedding in 357 would have allowed Olympias's party to return home in a not too hasty manner before she was required to proceed to her fiancé's kingdom for a public marriage celebration, but we must again wonder whether Philip had the time and/or the opportunity to visit Samothrace during that year. What is known about Philip's activities during 357 is that he spent most of its campaigning (and thus, sailing) season besieging first Amphipolis and then

Pydna.³⁷ If the advantage to be gained by visiting Samothrace was thought great enough, perhaps Philip would have deemed a trip to the island worthwhile, but it is extremely unlikely that Arybbas would have thought likewise, or that Philip would have demanded that his Epirote counterpart endanger Olympias by bringing her unnecessarily into an unsettled region. By 357 another "Social War" arose, in which the control of the Aegean was at stake and hostile fleets were afloat.³⁸

Considering all of the above, it is improbable in the extreme that Philip and Olympias met on Samothrace after 360. What makes this conclusion a virtual certainty, however, is the passage from Plutarch with which we began. Of particular note here is Plutarch's reference to Olympias as a "child" (*pais*) and to Philip as a "lad," or "stripling" (*meirakion*). We can take these references to be accurate descriptions of Philip's and Olympias's respective ages at the time of their introduction for several reasons, but mostly because Plutarch's notation of their youth appears on the surface to be at odds with his stated "love at first sight" motif. Although neither "*pais*" nor "*meirakion*" is a precise term, certainly the former refers to a pre-menarche girl and the latter to an inexperienced teen or young man. Since we do not know when Olympias was born, we can only roughly date her puberty, but since she was pregnant with Alexander by the fall of 357, it is not likely that "child" would have been an appropriate description for her after 360.³⁹

Even more problematic is the use of "lad" to describe Philip after the death of Perdiccas III (360/59). Hamilton notes that "the upper limit for *meirakion* was 21... [Plutarch's] description of Marius as a *meirakion* at Numantia in 134 (*Mar.* 3.4), when he would be about 23, is due to the fact that Marius was doing his first military service, normally performed earlier."⁴⁰ Unmentioned by Hamilton in his commentary on *Alexander* 2.2 is Plutarch's subsequent use of the word in the same *Life* both at 11.6 (where it is clear that Plutarch understood it had been used by Demosthenes as an insulting reference to Alexander's youth and inexperience not long after Philip's death) and at 48.5 (where Philotas is said to have applied the term in an insulting

fashion to Alexander). Regardless, and however chronologically loose Plutarch may have been at times when using *meirakion*, it is manifest that he would not have thought it an appropriate term for Philip during or after 359 when Philip not only began to demonstrate a mastery of war and diplomacy, but also began rather quickly to accumulate wives.

As Philip was born in either 383 or 382,⁴¹ if we accept that Plutarch could appropriately describe Philip as a *meirakion* when he met Olympias, and if we accept Hamilton's "21" as the upper age limit for the term, or at least agree that it could not have been used in reference to Philip after 359 without being intended as an insult (which was clearly *not* Plutarch's intent at *Alex.* 2.2), then the latest Philip could have met Olympias on Samothrace was during the reign of his older brother, Perdiccas III. Indeed (as noted) Hamilton dates our betrothal to the reign of Perdiccas III for precisely this reason, and Mortensen has concluded that Philip's house began its association with Samothrace sometime during the same reign, although she nevertheless argues that Philip and Olympias were betrothed in 357.⁴² Notwithstanding the latter's argument, the fact that Philip's marriage to Olympias was arranged before the death of Perdiccas III, the loss of whom thrust Philip into the political, diplomatic and military lime-light, seems apparent. Indeed, dating this betrothal to the reign of Perdiccas III may even account for Plutarch's assertion that Philip became infatuated with Olympias at first sight, although there are good reasons why such an infatuation would have been manufactured after the fact. Mortensen has made a strong case that, sexually, Philip preferred men to women.⁴³ If this was so, and if Olympias had not yet reached menarche when she first met Philip, then *perhaps* Philip may have been as physically attracted to her as Plutarch states.⁴⁴

So again, when during the 360s were Philip and Olympias betrothed? (A date before the death of Amyntas III is inconceivable.) Certainly we can posit with authority that the betrothal did not occur between 368 and 365 both because Philip spent these years in Thebes as a hostage, and because Ptolemy Alorites (who was responsible for the death of Alexander II, and who

thereafter was at odds with Perdiccas III and Philip, eventually being murdered by Perdiccas III) was politically ascendent in Macedon throughout this period.⁴⁵ We can also dismiss a dating of the betrothal before 368 (tempting as that window might be in the light of the following discussion) because even without knowing when Olympias was born, it seems very unlikely that she would have been old enough by then for Samothrace to have been of utility: if the pretense for Arybbas's presence at the sanctuary was his niece's induction into its rites, she would have had to be old enough to be cognizant of what the mysteries represented in order for such an excuse to have been of use. Before 368, it is unlikely that Olympias had reached the age where she could rationally partake of Samothrace's mysteries.

iv

Much of the previous discussion has been covered in some manner by earlier scholarship. What has largely been missed, however, are the significant implications of dating this betrothal to the reign of Philip's older brother, Perdiccas III. Thus, I offer the following reconstruction:

Argead Macedon knew peace during the last few years of Amyntas III's reign primarily because he adopted a non-confrontational approach toward other powers in the region, and because he sought security in an Athenian alliance.⁴⁶ Most threatening to Amyntas were the Illyrians who had invaded his realm at least once (and possibly twice) during his reign, and the Chalcidic League, which had also for a period occupied much of his kingdom.⁴⁷ Intimidated by enemies both to the east and west, but more in fear of Illyrian pillage than of Chalcidian territorial ambitions,⁴⁸ Amyntas married his (probably) second wife, Eurydice. Eurydice had kinship ties both to Illyria and the upper Macedonian canton of Lyncus, the latter lying bestride the most direct corridor between the locus of Illyrian power (to the north of lakes Ochrid and Prespa) and Amyntas's realm.⁴⁹ This marriage had the effect of stabilizing relations between Argead Macedon and the prevailing Illyrian powers, albeit with the former living under the shadow of the

latter. Eurydice stood at the center of a faction that wished to maintain proper (if not necessarily intimate) relations with the Illyrians who then overshadowed Macedon. Her allies within the Macedonian aristocracy, of course, profited by the placation of Illyrian interests. Chief among these was Ptolemy Alorites, perhaps an Argead himself, but clearly Amyntas's most important ally during the last year of that king's reign, a relationship that is known both from epigraphical evidence and from the fact that Ptolemy married Eurynoë (the only known daughter of Amyntas and Eurydice) before the king's death.⁵⁰

Sometime during the year 370/69 Amyntas accomplished perhaps his greatest feat: he died (apparently) of natural causes, leaving his throne to Alexander II, (apparently) without serious opposition.⁵¹ This latter point should be appreciated for the achievement it was, both because uncontested accessions were a novelty in Argead Macedonia, and because at the time there were several potential contenders for the throne (among whom were Amyntas's sons Archelaus, Arrhidaeus and Menelaus by his [probably] first wife, Gygaea, herself [probably] an Argead [whereas Eurydice certainly was not], a Pausanias, and an Argaeus).⁵² That none of these potential contenders claimed the throne at the time of Alexander's accession is attributable to the strength of the faction who supported Eurydice and her oldest son.⁵³ In particular, there was the soon-to-become-notorious Ptolemy Alorites, without whose initial support Alexander would not have had the easy accession he apparently did.⁵⁴ In fact, it is likely that originally this Ptolemy was to Alexander II what Parmenion and Antipater would later become to Alexander the Great.⁵⁵ The peace between Ptolemy Alorites and Alexander II, however, disintegrated rapidly after Alexander became king: in a little more than a year, Ptolemy went from royal supporter to royal assassin.⁵⁶ Perhaps even more surprisingly, sometime after the death of Amyntas, Ptolemy married Eurydice (what happened to Eurynoë is unknown).⁵⁷

Before discussing the reign of Alexander and Ptolemy's role in his death, it will be useful to consider Ptolemy's later marriage to Eurydice. This marriage gives rise to many ques-

tions which, if they could be answered, would greatly enhance our understanding of the period. The most important of these is: did Eurydice marry Ptolemy before, or after, the death of Alexander? Unfortunately, the extant evidence does not permit a definitive answer to this question, and as a result we may never know exactly what respective motives (especially Eurydice's) lay behind the union. Justin paints a lurid account of Eurydice's depraved lust for Ptolemy from a time even before the death of Amyntas, but it has long been realized that his account here is at times blatantly wrong and that the whole has been heavily influenced by a virulent anti-Eurydicean propaganda.⁵⁸ Although we will never know the whole story behind this marriage, it is probable that Eurydice agreed to it in part to protect those of her sons who were alive when the marriage came about. This has been noted before, but what has not been satisfactorily explained is, if Eurydice saw Ptolemy as a threat to the rule of her sons, why did she think that marrying him would necessarily limit his ability to do them harm?⁵⁹ It seems equally likely that when she married Ptolemy, Eurydice did not suspect him of harboring malicious intentions against at least Perdiccas, and that she thought Ptolemy a necessary bulwark against the potential or open rebellion of other Argeads (such as that of Pausanias⁶⁰). Further, it is likely that this "trust" stemmed from the fact that Ptolemy had, for some time before their marriage, been a political ally. But if so, what are we to make of Ptolemy's role in Alexander's death and the fact that Eurydice either *married* him after that event, or *stayed* married to him for some three years after that event? Again, although it has escaped scholarly notice, it is probable that Eurydice's willingness to marry Ptolemy (or to stay married to him) rested on her assumption that Alexander's death was not a prelude to Ptolemy's usurpation of royal authority or (necessarily) the extermination of Perdiccas and Philip, but rather, that it was an extreme response to Alexander's royal policies. In short, Eurydice may not have welcomed the death of her oldest son or Ptolemy's role in it, but she appears at least to have understood why Ptolemy had acted as he did.

Although the extant evidence for Alexander II's reign is scant, what exists suggests that from the moment of his elevation, he wished to project himself more boldly than had Amyntas III during the 370s. Alexander came to the throne ambitiously, intending to jettison the policies of accommodation that had for so long secured the throne of his father.⁶¹ The least controversial evidence in support of this conclusion concerns Alexander's activities in Thessaly. When Jason of Pherae (who had dominated Thessalian affairs in the years prior to 370) was assassinated about the time of Amyntas III's death, Alexander realized that an opportunity had presented itself for the expansion of his influence into Thessaly, faction-ridden as that land was. As a champion of anti-Pheraeon interests, Alexander of Macedon tried to beat his namesake from Pherae (now the master of that city) to the punch by occupying Larissa and other cities in northern Thessaly, ostensibly to "liberate" the region, having been invited to intervene by the Aleuadae of Larissa.⁶² Alexander II almost certainly accepted this commission to intervene for several reasons, first among them perhaps the desire to repay the Aleuadae for military support previously rendered to Amyntas III.⁶³ However, Thessaly's plight also gave Alexander the opportunity to seize the initiative along his southern border and, in the process, to assert a more active foreign policy than Amyntas had been able to muster during the waning years of his reign.⁶⁴ Buoyed by initial success, however, Alexander II over-reached his welcome in Thessaly when, instead of merely protecting allies from the threat posed by Pherae, he began to garrison cities. This overture proved both unpopular in Thessaly and unsustainable given the reality of Alexander's military resources.⁶⁵ As a result, Alexander was forced by Theban military and diplomatic intervention to withdraw from Thessaly.⁶⁶

Somewhat more controversial (because not all scholars accept that it pertains to Alexander II) is a second piece of evidence, provided by Anaximenes (*FGrH* 72 F 4) near the beginning of his *Philippica*, which reads that an Alexander "gave the name Companions to the most distinguished whom he accustomed to serve as cavalrymen, he divided up the majority, that is, the

infantrymen, into companies ... and gave them the name Foot-Companions, in order that both, sharing in the royal Companionship, should always be most zealous."⁶⁷ N. G. L. Hammond has argued that the placement of this fragment implies that the monarch in question pre-dated Philip II, thus making the Alexander referred to either the first or second Macedonian king of that name.⁶⁸ If this is a reasonable interpretation of the fragment (as I believe it is), then Anaximenes must have been referring to Philip's older brother, that is, Alexander II, for Thucydides and Xenophon make it clear that it was not until long after Alexander I that an Argead king had access to an organized and effective infantry.⁶⁹ Of course, a king's intentions are one thing, and the widespread acceptance of proposed reforms, quite another. Alexander may have intended no more than a stronger Macedon by organizing a new infantry and honoring it with a name, *pezhetairoi*, the "*hetairoi*" part having been long associated with the aristocracy alone; but in reality, the development of an upgraded infantry corps would have had the effect of weakening domestic aristocratic influence, for Alexander would no longer have to rely exclusively on near social equals for militarily mobilization. In addition, there probably would have been associated with Alexander's military reform some redistribution of economic resources, which would have threatened traditional aristocratic perquisites.⁷⁰ Under the circumstances, that Alexander's military reform alarmed his traditional *hetairoi* should surprise no one, especially as—if it was Alexander II who launched this reform—he must have moved on this policy almost immediately upon his accession. As noted, even the application of *hetairoi* to a newly militarized social class was bound to rankle, for even when qualified by the term "Foot," the use of "Companion" for both infantry and cavalry implied a kind of equality, and as such, was bound to be interpreted as a watering down of aristocratic privilege. However shocking Alexander's intentions may have appeared to his *hetairoi*, theirs were not the only interests affected by a reorganization of the Macedonian army, for surely the most compelling justification for this reform

was that it would *strengthen* Macedon against foreign enemies. Any attempt to beef up what had long been a third-rate army was bound to displease the neighboring powers who, at the time, over-shadowed Alexander's reign. How would these neighbors react? Although events would prove that Alexander was no soothsayer, he nevertheless would have to have been extremely naive to believe that his policies would not incite negative reactions among potential foreign threats. How much Alexander's unsuccessful Thessalian misadventure influenced his decision to attempt the creation of an effective infantry cannot be known, but it is highly unlikely that Thessaly alone launched Alexander's military plans. Far more plausibly, Alexander came to the throne with an agenda in mind, and that he acted as soon as he could to centralize his authority for reasons of personal ambition and national security. His rashness, however, led to his assassination by one of his staunchest supporters. Ptolemy probably murdered Alexander in part because of the threat of domestic consequences the latter's military reforms had, but he certainly acted knowing that Alexander's plans would antagonize the Illyrians and cause them to do what, in fact, they did do during the reign of Perdiccas III: invade and wreak devastation. Certainly, Alexander imperiled the precarious peace with the Illyrians that Ptolemy, Amyntas III, and Eurydice had helped to forge.

Perdiccas III's subsequent murder of Ptolemy would be justified as the appropriate response for the murder of his older brother and sold to both the Illyrians and their Macedonian allies as merely that: it need not be interpreted as the re-inauguration of his brother's more independent policies, although time would prove that it was as much a political as a private assassination. Nevertheless, Alexander's fate made it clear to Perdiccas that allies were needed against Illyrian dominance. An obvious place to look for allies against any Illyrian reprisal was in Epirus, whose Aeacid monarchs were likely to be receptive to an overture for alliance, because Epirus had also within recent memory experienced Illyrian invasion.⁷¹ The two realms as allies would present strategic problems for the dominant

Illyrian power, who would find a pre-emptive strike against either dangerous due to the prospect of a flank attack launched by the ally.

In short, all of the reasons why Epirus loomed so large in the plans of Philip when he became king had existed when Perdiccas was king too, although Perdiccas's death and the massacre of his army intensified the situation. Of course, an Epirote alliance was intended to hurt the Illyrian coalition. As a result, parties involved in any negotiations threatening the regional hegemony of the Illyrians would have sought secrecy from domestic as well as foreign eyes, lest the Illyrians strike decisively before the alliance was set. It is into this context that we should place the betrothal of Philip to Olympias. How the initial stages of talks proceeded, one cannot say, but clearly at some point in any such negotiations, it would have become necessary for the kings so engaged (or trusted confidants) to meet face to face. Because it would have been extremely dangerous for Perdiccas and Neoptolemus (Olympias's father) or Arybbas to meet openly, both parties sought as much confidentiality as possible. Here Perdiccas had a problem, for any alliance talks with his royal counterpart had to be kept from the Illyrians and his own mother and the faction who supported her (if for no other reason than that an Epirote alliance would have superceded the importance of Lyncus, and thus, would have weakened her influence at court). As such, a personal meeting between their agents could not be held in either of their realms, but had to occur at an appropriate location where a plausible cover could be maintained: Samothrace and its mysteries. Thus, Perdiccas turned to Philip to represent his interests, knowing full well that the betrothal would not be acted upon for some time: what was important was the betrothal and its accompanying alliance. The marriage could wait.⁷²

NOTES

1. Translation B. Perrin, Loeb edition. Justin, 7.6.11, corroborates Arybbas's role in the betrothal. This paper is offered to Gene Borza with respect and gratitude for his friendship and guidance over the years. Over the last generation, no one but N. G. L. Hammond has come close to having had Gene's influence over Macedonian studies, especially in the United States. We have all benefitted from his insight and counsel, rendered as only a gentleman and scholar could, even in disagreement. Here is to hoping for many more years of similar service from Gene.
2. Paus. 1.11.1-2 (supported in part by Plut. *Pyr.* 1.5) appears the most reliable ancient source for Arybbas's and Olympias's relationship, but in addition to Plutarch, see especially Justin 7.6.11-12. For a review of modern opinion see K. Mortensen, *Olympias: Royal Wife and Mother at the Macedonian Court* (Ph.D. Diss. University of Queensland, 1997) 5 (with note 1, 37). See also, E. D. Carney, *Olympias. Mother of Alexander the Great* (New York: Routledge, 2006) 12-14; 93-94.
3. S. G. Cole, *Theoi Megaloi: The Cult of the Great Gods at Samothrace* (Leiden: Brill, 1984) 17.
4. G. H. Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1932) 23; Mortensen, 1997, 22-24. Most modern scholars who have written about Philip's marriages have not considered in print the potential importance of a Samothracian setting for his betrothal to Olympias.
5. Cole, 1984, 17.
6. For the evidence in support of this assertion, see part i of this paper. Mortensen (1997, 17-24) contends that Perdiccas III, not Philip, was the first Argead to be initiated into the Samothracian mysteries, he having become involved there in the context of the eastward expansion of his interests. Mortensen both rightfully accepts that the Argeads were associated with the development of the sanctuary and correctly recognizes that the various crises which Philip faced during the first years of his reign would have precluded any investment in Samothrace at that time. As such, and with the archaeological evidence suggesting an earlier rather than later date for the Orthostate Structure, she concludes that Argead interest in the site began during the last half of the 360s. I agree with Mortensen's conclusion that the Orthostate Structure was probably begun during the reign of Perdiccas III, albeit for very different reasons than she offers. See below, part iv. It remains most likely that Philip was the first of his house to visit Samothrace and to be initiated into its mysteries.
7. "*Laude dignos esse, non qui Samothracum initia viserent cum Asiam uri vastarique oporteret, sed eos qui magnitudine rerum fidem antecessissent.*" Translation, John Rolfe, Loeb edition.
8. Cole, 1984, 16.
9. It is possible, although perhaps not very, that a second Samothracian building, the so-called "Altar Court," was also dedicated by Philip III. See Cole, 1984, 16-19 for a good summary of evidence linking the Argeads to the site, and for the difficulties associated with the restoration of the Altar Court's inscription.

10. Cole, 1984, 17 and Appendix One, no. 15. The latter records an inscription found at Alexandroupolis which reads: "*Horos hiers chōras thean tan en Samothraihei.*"
11. Philostr. VA 2.43.
12. Cole, 1984, 17.
13. Mortensen, 1997, 19.
14. J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, "Alexander," A Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969) 2.
15. J. R. McCredie, "Samothrace: Supplementary Investigations, 1968-1977," *Hesperia* 48 (1979): 32.
16. Noted by Cole, 1984, 20.
17. N. Lewis, *Samothrace: The Ancient Literary Sources* (New York: Pantheon, 1958), nos. 226-238; Cole, 1984, 2; Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), 281-85.
18. References to Illyrian invasions of Macedon before the accession of Philip II: Diod. 14.92.3; 15.19.2; 16.2.4-5; Isoc. 6.46. References to Illyrian invasions of Macedon before 359: Diod. 15.13; Front., *Strat.* 2.5.19. I include here references to Illyrian assaults on both kingdoms in 360/359, although I will argue that Philip met Olympias on Samothrace before either of these wars. Of course, the Aeacid house was the royal house of the Molossians, then dominant in Epirus as the Argeads were in Macedon under Philip.
19. H. J. Dell, *The Illyrian Frontier to 229 B.C.* (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1964) 39 f.; N. G. L. Hammond, "The Kingdoms in Illyria circa 400-167 B.C.," *BSA* 61 (1966) 239-52; *The Macedonian State: The Origins, Institutions, and History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 77f.; *Epirus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) 278 f.; N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia: Vol. II, 550-335 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 172 f.; W. S. Greenwalt, "Amyntas III and the Political Stability of Argead Macedonia," *AncW* 18 (1988): 35-44; E. N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Macedon: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, rev. ed., 1992) 180 f.; K. Mortensen, "The Career of Bardylis," *AncW* 22 (1991): 49-59. These conclusions are accepted by most scholars, see esp. Carney, 2006, 13-14; 93-95.
20. Livy, 42.25.6, where the Antigonid king Perseus convened a secret conference on Samothrace in 172, precisely to prevent a western power, in this case the Romans, from learning about the discussions. Carney, 2006, 13 without argument, doubts the need for secrecy.
21. Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 172.
22. Lewis, 1958, 226a; Cole, 1984, 6.
23. As the crow flies, Samothrace lies about 160 miles (= 255 kilometers) to the east of Pella, by far the nearer of the two royal centers of power. Of course, the actual distance traveled, especially by Arybbas and Olympias, would have been far longer. For a consideration of distances and time of travel to Samothrace see below, note 38.

24. The political nature of Argead marriages is amply documented and accepted by modern scholarship. For a review of the politics of marriage see W. S. Greenwalt, "Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia," *Arethusa* 22 (1989): 19-45. For other references to Argead marriages which were obviously political, but which were characterized as "love matches": Philip/Philinna or Nicesipolis, Plut. *Mor.* 141 b-c; Philip/Cleopatra, Plut. *Alex.* 9.6; Athen. 13.557d (although the exact nature of the political gain Philip anticipated from this last marriage has been debated, the reactions of Attalus, Olympias and Alexander to the union clearly underscored its political importance); Alexander/Roxane, Plut. *Alex.* 47.4, *Mor.* 332c, 338d, Arr. *Anab.*, 4.19.5, Curt. 8.4.24-26.
25. Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 125 f.; 172 f.
26. Lewis, 1958, 31, 37, 41, 44, 45, 47, 50, 51; Cole, 1984, 10.
27. On Olympias's religiosity see e.g., Plut. *Alex.* 2.7-9 and Athen. 14.659f-660a. For a good discussion of Olympias's Bacchic interests, see Mortensen, 1997, 72-84, and Carney, 2004, 88-103.
28. Although Philip was notoriously bi-sexual and apparently somewhat promiscuous, given Olympias's status, there can be no question of a sexual relationship between Philip and Olympias before their marriage. On Philip's sexuality, again, see the excellent discussion in Mortensen, 1997, 119-29. Thus, the betrothal must have occurred sometime before, or during, 357.
29. This would have been true regardless of whether or not the betrothal itself was meant to be kept a secret for some time. Such an important political union would have to be given its public due. As such, it would only have been humiliating for Olympias at home as well as abroad for her bridal train to have been anything less than suited her status. Her preparation for marriage would have taken some time and clearly would have involved other women of her house. She would not have proceeded directly to a husband without having prepared in a traditional manner.
30. B. Hemberg, *Die Kabiren* (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Uppsala, 1950) 108; Cole, 1984, 39.
31. Cole, 1984, 39. Considering the time it would have taken especially Arybbas and Olympias to get to Samothrace, if June was not the month of their visit, it is likely that they would have arrived later in the year rather than earlier.
32. See especially Diod. 16.2.5-3.6 and Just. 7.6.3-6. Of the modern accounts, see especially Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 208-13.
33. Diod. 16.4.1-7; Just. 7.6.7; Front. *Strat.* 2.3.2. Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 213-15.
34. One wonders how to take the testimony of Plutarch (*Alex.* 16.2) that the Macedonian kings did not customarily wage war during the month of Daesius (= May) in connection with the desperate situation Philip faced prior to his victory over the Illyrians. On the one hand, perhaps the situation was considered dire enough to dispense with a tradition that almost certainly was tied to a religious taboo. On the other hand, as we know that Philip at other times invoked religion to enhance the morale of his army upon need (at the battle of the Crocus Plain: Diod. 16.35.2 notes the low Macedonian morale before the battle, and Justin 8.3-4

Philip's use of laurel crowns to boost the confidence of his troops), it perhaps would have been dangerous for Philip not to abide by tradition in 358. If this latter is the more likely, then the Illyrian campaign that resulted in Philip's victory was unlikely even to have begun before June.

35. On the marriage to Audata: Athen. 13.557c. On Philip's spending time in the west, arranging the frontier in his favor: Diod. 16.8.1. Dell, 1964, 70, has suggested that it may have been at this time that Philip founded the city of *Herakleia* (Steph. Byz. *Herakleia*) as part of his realignment of the northwestern frontier.

36. Athen. 13.557c. The order and chronology of Philip's marriages, of course, have been disputed; see A. Tronson, "Satyrus the Peripatetic and the Marriages of Philip II," *JHS* 104 (1984): 116-26 for a basic review. On Philip's early involvement in Thessaly see Just. 7.6.8; Diod. 16.14.1 (implying a slightly later intervention); Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 224 f.; C. Ehrhardt, "Two Notes on Philip of Macedon's First Intervention in Thessaly," *CQ* 17 (1967): 296-301. I assume, but will not argue again here, that these unions represented true marriages (see note 24).

37. Diod. 16.8.2-3. On Amphipolis's history from the reign of Amyntas III through 357, Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 230-44. Late in his reign (probably 370) Amyntas recognized Athens's disputed claim to Amphipolis, an issue much discussed in the international arena before Philip's incorporation of the city (Dem. 19.253; [Dem.] 7.29; Aeschin. 2.32-33; M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. Vol. II, from 403 to 323 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948) no.129). Ptolemy Alorites is said (Aeschin. 2.29) to have committed an act of ingratitude against Athens when he reversed Amyntas's policy and supported Amphipolis's independence. Perdiccas III was initially an Athenian ally in a war against the Chalcidic League (Dem. 2.14; schol. 2.14), but this relationship did not last long. Although defeated by the Athenians under the command of Callisthenes (Aeschin. 2.30) who arranged an armistice, Perdiccas maintained his opposition to Athens, in part by throwing a Macedonian garrison into Amphipolis (362), which remained there until Philip (wanting temporarily to mollify Athens so that he could secure his authority in Macedon against both domestic and foreign enemies) removed it in 359 (Diod. 16.3.3). Amphipolis thereafter remained independent until Philip took the city in 357 (Diod. 16.8.2) with Athens's tacit approval, extended because Philip and Athens had apparently negotiated a "secret" deal that would have Philip hand over Amphipolis to Athens in return for the Athenian betrayal of Pydna to Philip (Dem. 2.5-6). There has been much discussion of this infamous agreement (see esp. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "The Alleged Secret Pact between Athens and Philip II," *CQ* 13 (1963): 110-19), but perhaps the most probable explanation is to be found in Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 2: 238-43, where the planned swap of Pydna for Amphipolis is accepted. Of course, Philip never intended to honor the bargain, so that once he had taken Amphipolis, he had a vested interest in taking Pydna as quickly as possible (Diod. 16.8.3). Thereafter, a furious Athens declared war on Philip and made an alliance with the Chalcidic League. Thus, during and after Philip's assault on Pydna, it would have been extremely rash of him to venture to Samothrace. For a recent review of these events and their chronology see J. Heskell, *The North Aegean Wars, 371-360 B.C.* *Historia Einzelschriften* 102 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997) 46-52.

38. For an account of the Social War from a primarily Athenian point of view, see J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1981) 161-88, with 179-80 and 187 especially, focusing on Philip's role in helping to incite the conflagration so as to exploit its opportunities. I have extensively considered the time it took Arybbas and Olympias to journey to Samothrace, but will cite only the conclusions here. Regardless of the timing of this trip, I assume it was made primarily by sea, because secrecy would have been put under strain if the two had taken the more time-consuming land route, especially if they were to follow the most natural route from Epirus through Macedonia to a port from which to embark for Samothrace. Anyway, if secrecy was unimportant, why travel to Samothrace when Macedonia was so much closer? By my calculations, the journey would have taken about five days from Passaron to the Ambracian gulf, four from there to Corinth, another day to Athens, and six more to Samothrace, for a one-way travel time of some 16 days at a minimum. I believe the trip would have been made somewhat more leisurely, both because of Olympias's presence and due to the need to dispel any doubt as to the religious nature of the pilgrimage. Moreover, layover days would probably have added to the total, for a royal entourage would certainly have been feted where locally appropriate. Philip's journey would have taken much less time, but again, unnecessary haste would probably have aroused unwanted curiosity. Hdt. 4.1.1.2-3 says that an average day's journey could cover about 200 stades (of about 200 yards each). At 5.53, he also notes that about 150 stades was a good average. For travel rates see, R. Chevallier, *Roman Roads* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1976) esp. 191-95; L. Casson, *The Ancient Mariners*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991) esp. 85, 103, 109; J. S. Morrison and J. F. Coates, *The Athenian Trireme* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986) 103-08, citing Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.27-30 and Thuc. 8.101.
39. Olympias's birth year is unknown, but probably fell between 375 and 370, see: Macurdy, 1932, 23 and W. S. Greenwalt, "The Marriageability Age at the Argead Court: 360-317 B.C.," *CW* 82 (1988) 93-97. Almost certainly, therefore, Olympias had reached menarche by 360 making the designation "child" an inappropriate one after that time.
40. Hamilton, 1969, 2, agreed with by Mortensen, 1997, 22.
41. Just. 9.8.1 and Paus. 8.7.6 report respectively that Philip was 47 or 46 when he died in 336.
42. Mortensen, 1997, 22-4; thus she rejects the propriety of the use of *meirakion* for Philip at the time of this betrothal.
43. *Ibid.*, esp. 119-29.
44. Jeanne Reames has reminded me of the curious Spartan marriage custom whereby women were carried off by their prospective husbands, had their hair cut short, and were "forced" to wear male attire as a prelude to marital consummation (Plut. *Lyc.* 15.3-4). Although we need not imagine a tie between Sparta and Macedon insofar as Philip is concerned, both Sparta and Macedon knew bisexuality, perhaps as much as heterosexuality. In it thus not inconceivable that a boyish Olympias aroused Philip. On Sparta see: Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Spartan Women* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), esp., 41, 42, 45, 137; Paul Cartledge, *Sparta and Laconia* (New York: Routledge, 1979); and W. K. Lacey, *The Family in*

Classical Greece (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968).

45. Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 2: 183-85, Borza, 1990, 191-95.

46. On Amyntas's falling under the shadow of Jason of Pherae: Diod. 15.60.2. This dependence on foreign powers is also demonstrated in the form of Amyntas's alliance with Athens, won in part by his recognition of that city's claim to Amphipolis: Tod, 1948, no.129; Aeschin. 2.32-33.

47. Diod. 14.92.3; 15.19.2-3; Isoc. 6.46. Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 173-75, accept Diodorus's two Illyrian invasions, claiming that there is enough difference between the two citations to suggest that the second is not a doublet of the first, an argument I have accepted, 1988, 37. This conclusion, however, has been rejected by several scholars, including Borza, 1990, 184, and Mortensen, 1991, 55.

48. Diod. 14.92.3; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.13. Amyntas's greater fear of the Illyrians undoubtedly stemmed both from the damage inflicted by their ravages and by the fact that against the Chalcidians he at least could appeal to Greek powers (eventually, Athens) who could check Chalcidian ambitions more effectively than they could those of the Illyrians.

49. This is not the place to engage in the debate about the ethnicity of Eurydice's father, Sirras. For a recent argument (with primary and secondary sources) see, Mortensen, 1991, 51-5, who succinctly puts forward the case that he was Illyrian, not Lyncestian. Although Plutarch refers to Eurydice as "Illyrian and thrice-barbarian" (*Mor.* 14 b-c), I doubt very much that Sirras was Illyrian primarily because of the inscriptions from Vergina (Ch. Saatsoglou-Paliadeli, *AEMTH* 3 (1989): 25-35) that identify Eurydice solely in relation to him, that is, there is no mention of her Argead husband, or heirs. Although we know nothing about the contemporary, royal Macedonian epigraphical tradition (if there was any), why this is pertinent in establishing Sirras's Lyncestian identity is that during Eurydice's lifetime I do not believe she could have gotten away, *in the center of ancient Aegae*, with identifying herself (or had someone else do so) merely as the daughter of an Illyrian. The memories of the recent Illyrian invasions (no matter exactly when these inscriptions were carved) would have been too recent for there not to have been great resentment against anyone who was so publicly presented; whatever else these inscriptions were intended to accomplish, they intended to portray Eurydice in a good light. Regardless, Eurydice had Illyrian connections (I suspect that her grandfather was Illyrian) through Sirras, and thus, by marrying her and promoting the interests of her children instead of those of Gygaea, Amyntas could placate his most dangerous neighbor.

50. Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 182 argue (on plausible grounds) that this Ptolemy was the son of Amyntas II. Although the Ptolemy listed as a Macedonian ambassador in line seven of the Athenian inscription testifying to an alliance with Amyntas III (Tod, 1948, no. 129) is not there identified either as Alorites or as Amyntas's son-in-law, the obvious conclusion is that he is the same man. As K. Mortensen notes, "Eurydice: Demonic or Devoted Mother?" *AHB* 6 (1992): 156-69, esp. 156-57, no source explicitly names the husband of Eurynoë. That Ptolemy Alorites was that man, however, is a more than probable inference to be drawn from Just. 7.4.7, schol. Aeschin. 2.29, Marsyas *FGrH* 135-136 F11, Diod. 15.71.1 and 16.2.4, and Plut. *Pelop.* 27.2. The self-interest that would have thrown Ptolemy's weight behind a pro-Illyrian coalition is deducible from the

epithet, “Alorites,” implying that he was a citizen of the town of Alorus, and thus, presumably held property there. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.13 reports that the Chalcidic League once held Argead territory as far as Pella. Since Alorus lay to the east of Pella, it was undoubtedly the case that for a time Alorus came within the Chalcidian orbit. On a personal level, therefore, it is likely that Ptolemy feared both a renewed Illyrian devastation of Macedon and the confiscation of his own lands by Argead Macedon’s more powerful eastern neighbor, unless that neighbor could be checked by Amyntas, supported by his wife’s connections. The best way to meet both concerns would have been to remain faithful to the interests that kept Macedon aligned with the Illyrian powers-that-were.

51. Diod. 15.60.3; Just. 7.4.7-8.

52. On Gygaea and her sons: Just. 7.4.5. On the revolt of Pausanias after Alexander’s death: Aeschin. 2.27, who had been exiled by Amyntas (Suid., *Karanos*); Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 184; and his opposition to Philip II: Diod. 16.3.4. On Argaeus, who appears to have challenged the accessions of Amyntas III and Philip II, but not of Alexander II: Diod. 14.92.3; 16.3.5-6. On Amyntas’s marriages to Gygaea and Eurydice see Greenwalt, 1988, 25-8, and Mortensen, 1992, 161-63.

53. Neither Perdiccas nor Philip were viable alternatives to Alexander, as Alexander was the only one of Eurydice’s sons to be of age when Amyntas died. Moreover, the three sons of Eurydice seemed content to cooperate politically.

54. Hammond and Griffith 1979, 182, and Mortensen, 1992, 160, rightly reject Justin’s lurid account (7.4.7-7.5.8) of Ptolemy’s and Eurydice’s adulterous lust and their plotting against Amyntas. But at least their having been coupled indicates that they were close associates throughout this period.

55. This, of course, is a novel interpretation of Ptolemy’s career, but the role of “king-maker” explains both the uncontested accession of Alexander II in the face of potential rivals and Ptolemy’s puzzling relationship with Eurydice (skewed out of focus by the source behind Justin) before the death of Amyntas.

56. Justin (7.5.4) makes no reference to Ptolemy, but names Eurydice as the figure behind Alexander’s death, while the scholiast on Aeschines (2.29) reports that she assisted Ptolemy in the deed. Marsyas (*FGrH* 135-136 F11), Diodorus (15.71.1; 16.2.4) and Plutarch (*Pelop.* 27.2) all credit Ptolemy alone with the murder. The account that almost certainly began with Marsyas is to be preferred in this matter, especially in light of Eurydice’s trumpeted affection for her children: Plut. *Mor.* 14 b-c; Nepos, *Iphic.* 3.2; Aeschin. 2.27-29. Although the latter almost certainly embellished the story somewhat, it is difficult to see how Eurydice could have been fondly remembered to Philip if she had personally acted against Alexander. See Mortensen, 1992, 156-59.

57. Schol. Aeschin. 2.29.

58. Just. 7.4.7-7.5.8; Greenwalt, 1998, 28; Mortensen, 1992, 168.

59. Mortensen, 1992, 165-66. The example of Ptolemy Ceraunus and Arsinoë (II) is illustrative here, proving as it does that marriage was no guarantee that a Macedonian “queen’s” sons would be safe from the savage ambitions of a new husband (Just. 24.2.1-3.8). Although this example is Hellenistic in date, Argead politics were just as brutal and known to be so by those involved. Certainly, if

Eurydice married Alorites before the murder of Alexander II, she did so to secure the throne for her sons, hoping to use him as a shield in the same way she later used Iphicrates against proclaimed rivals (Aeschin. 2.27-29). If the marriage came after the murder of Alexander, surely no assurance was possible that Alorites (having already demonstrated his viciousness) would not act in the same manner as Ceraunus until Alorites's own son became a Theban hostage (Plut. *Pelop.* 27). It is unlikely that Eurydice married Ptolemy after the Thebans intervened, unless they were then to some degree political allies, because any move of his against Perdiccas (Philip being also in Thebes) would certainly have been revisited on Ptolemy's heir.

60. Aeschin. 2.27-29.

61. Was Alexander II encouraged in this by Herodotus's largely fictional account of a few episodes from the reign of Alexander I, whose father was also an Amyntas? It should be recalled that 5.19-21 (certainly not historically accurate as it stands, even if Herodotus faithfully reported what his Argead source relayed to him) portrays a vigorous prince willing to act where his accommodating father was not.

62. Diod. 15.61.2-5. This was a stark contrast to the Thessalian policy of Amyntas: Diod. 15.60.2.

63. Diod. 14.92.3.

64. Diod. 15.60.2.

65. Diod. 15.61.5.

66. Diod. 15.67.4.

67. Translation, Hammond, 1989, 98. Among those who do not apply this evidence to Alexander II are: P. A. Brunt, "Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry," *JHS* 83 (1963): 27-46; M. M. Markle, "The Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon," *AJA* 82 (1978): 483-97 (esp. 485, n. 14); and Griffith in Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 705-13.

68. Hammond, 1989, 98.

69. Thuc. 2.100.1-2; 4.124-125; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.37-40 (where it is clear that the army of Derdas of Elimeia was considered more formidable than that of Amyntas III). See also A. Erskine, "The *pezhetairoi* of Philip II and Alexander III," *Historia* 38 (1989): 385-94. Erskine does not argue that Alexander II was the king behind the creation of the Foot Companions, but he points out that there is no real conflict between the testimonies of Theopompus and Anaximenes as concerns them, and that Alexander might have had good reason for creating an early version of the force (391).

70. H. Montgomery, "The Economic Revolution of Philip II—Myth or Reality?" *SO* 60 (1985): 37-47; W. S. Greenwalt, "The production of coinage from Archelaus to Perdiccas III and the Evolution of Argead Macedonia," in *Ventures into Greek History*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994) 105-34, esp. 119; W. S. Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" *Historia*, 48 (1997): 158-83.

71. Diod. 15.13.3. In 385/4, this citation reports the Illyrian slaughter of 15,000 Molossians in one battle. Whether or not this number is strictly accurate, clearly this incursion was a massive and debilitating one.

72. I assume here that some form of the Greek practice of *eggue* was practiced both in Macedon and Epirus, whereby a contract between two men established the eventual legality of the as-yet-to-come marriage.

6

ALEXANDER, THE GORDIAN KNOT, AND THE KINGSHIP OF MIDAS¹

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Beginning with his landing on the shores of Asia, our sources describe Alexander's march of conquest as if it were also a royal pilgrimage. From Troy to Siwah and beyond, Alexander visited famed monuments and performed various acts of devotion. Our narrative accounts represent these deeds and the omens associated with them as signs that Alexander's supremacy was predestined. As students of history we are justified in suspecting that some incidents and many details are the inventions and embellishments of those who have told and retold the story of Alexander's progress. But there is no reason to doubt that Alexander himself was mindful of omens and eager to demonstrate that his supremacy was predestined.² Tutored by Aristotle, accompanied by Aristotle's nephew, the historian Callisthenes, and advised by the seer, Aristander of Telmessus, and the philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdera, Alexander was certainly aware that his reputation depended on more than his skill on the battlefield, and that he was making a place for himself within a tradition of lore and learning that respected tokens of the past.

Among the tokens of the past that Alexander encountered was the Gordian knot, the significance of which may be briefly summarized (following the main accounts presented by Arrian and Justin, which largely coincide with the briefer notices given by Curtius, Plutarch, Aelian, and a scholiast to Euripides).³ This knot was the binding that fastened the yoke to the pole of the ox cart that was regarded as a token of kingship among the Phrygians. Alexander saw the ox cart and was told its story during his stay, early in 333, at Gordium, the royal seat of the legendary Phrygian king, Midas. The cart, which Curtius notes

was “hardly any different at all in appearance from the plainest ones in common use,”⁴ had belonged to Gordius, the father of Midas. Our chief sources relate an elaborate legend⁵ that culminated in an oracle to the Phrygians that they should take as king the next man who appeared to them riding in a cart. Either Gordius himself or the young Midas (according to different versions of this story) fulfilled this oracle, after which the cart was dedicated (by either Gordius or Midas) on the citadel of Gordium as a thank-offering to Zeus Basileios. Our accounts then state that he who undid the yoke knot of the cart was destined to rule Asia (or the *oikoumen*, according to Plutarch Alexander 18.1). Alexander undid the knot, either by cutting through it or by managing to remove the pin around which it was tied, and thus fulfilled the oracle.

The Gordian knot is singular among Alexander’s portentous encounters because, unlike the shrines of Athena at Ilium, Artemis at Ephesus, Heracles at Tyre, and Ammon at Siwah, it is completely unattested outside of the accounts of Alexander’s visit to Gordium. Although Midas himself was a well-known figure of legend, the ox cart of his father, Gordius, and the knot that tied its yoke to the pole is known to us only from this event. Despite this prior obscurity (or, in part, because of its prior obscurity), there is little likelihood that the incident was an outright invention of the Alexander tradition. Unlike, for example, the queen of the Amazons, the cart of Gordius was not a feature of popular lore that begged for a place in the legend of the new hero. The cart and its knot only became known to the wider Greek-speaking world as a result of Alexander’s attention to it, and the consequent attention given to it in our ancient sources. Four out of five of our surviving narratives give generally consistent accounts of the incident, and only one, Diodorus, omits it from a greatly abridged portion of his narrative.⁶ The accounts that do survive depend ultimately on accounts written by historians of Alexander’s generation. Aristobulus, who was with Alexander’s army, is cited by both Plutarch and Arrian for his version of how Alexander dealt with the Gordian knot (by removing the pin bound by the knot) as an alternative to the more commonly told version (that he cut the knot).⁷ Ptolemy,

who was present at Gordium, may have been among those in Alexander's company (*hoi amph' auton*, Arr. *Anab.* 2.3.8) who witnessed the event, but it is uncertain if he gave an account of it in his history of Alexander.⁸ Callisthenes, who also accompanied Alexander, is the most likely primary source for the details of local lore narrated on this occasion by Arrian and Justin.⁹ As will be seen below, there is independent evidence that a number of these details were part of authentic Phrygian lore.

Why was the Gordian knot, heretofore unknown to the Greeks, of such significance to Alexander? One might suppose that Alexander was simply indulging the Phrygians by devoting attention to a local tradition, but, if so, this episode would be out of keeping with every other such ominous encounter recorded by our sources. With perhaps the exception of his marriage to Roxane, the daughter of a lesser Sogdian chieftain, and his alleged interview with the Indian *gymnosophistai*, all of Alexander's symbolic encounters associated him with lore that was already known to the Greeks. Alexander's association with such monuments and landmarks as the tomb of Cyrus, the rock of Aornus, or the town of Nysa all served to situate Alexander's fame alongside that of the founder of the Persian empire, the fame of Heracles and his labors, and the fame of Dionysus and his conquests. So what did Midas mean to Alexander and his contemporaries, and why was the otherwise obscure cart of Gordius recognized on this occasion as a token of Alexander's destiny?

Midas in Macedonia

An answer lies, as has long been recognized, somewhere behind the fact that Midas was already a fixture of Macedonian tradition. Herodotus refers to "the gardens of Midas the son of Gordias [=Gordius]" below Mt. Bermium in the heart of the Macedonian kingdom, where, according to the Macedonians, Silenus was captured (8.138). The capture of Silenus was a well-known episode in the legend of Midas, depicted in vase paintings of the Sixth and Fifth-Centuries. The locale depicted in these vase paintings, the majority of them Attic, is usually quite

ambiguous, but by the Fifth Century some of them indicate an Asiatic setting, showing Midas as a parody of the Persian king.¹⁰ Literary sources also place the capture of Silenus in Asia, within Midas's Phrygian domain.¹¹ Inasmuch as Herodotus elsewhere identifies Midas the son of Gordias as king of Phrygia,¹² there can be no doubt that Herodotus understood the Midas known to the Macedonians to be one and the same as the celebrated Phrygian king. Our question now requires us to investigate the link between Midas the Phrygian and Macedonian tradition.

Once again, Herodotus provides a clue. He reports that the Macedonians regard the Phrygians of Asia as descendents of the Briges of Europe who had once been neighbors of the Macedonians before migrating to Asia and changing their name.¹³ According to Xanthus of Lydia, as cited by Strabo, this migration of the Phrygians from Europe took place after the Trojan War.¹⁴ Possibly drawing on the same source, Strabo elsewhere reports that the Briges formerly inhabited the region of Mt. Bermium before their migration to Asia and their change of name to Phrygians.¹⁵ Some notion of kinship, therefore, connected portions of Macedonia and Thrace with the Phrygians in Asia, yet it remains to discover the significance of Midas in this connection between Macedonia and Phrygia.

Ernest Fredricksmeyer has advanced an argument that has been generally regarded as the most authoritative explanation of the meaning behind Alexander's encounter with the cart that brought Midas to kingship.¹⁶ He has proposed that Macedonian tradition recalled that Midas was king in both Macedonia and in Phrygia because he was believed to have been the one who led the Briges out of Europe and to their new seat in Asia, and that the cart that Alexander found at Gordium was regarded as the vehicle in which Midas rode as he led this migration out of Macedonia. By fulfilling the oracle that sovereignty was the destiny of him who undid the yoke knot, according to Fredricksmeyer, Alexander was receiving a token of a royal heritage that had roots in his own homeland.

Fredricksmeyer's explanation thus connects the cart at Gordium with Macedonian tradition, but the connection is

entirely conjectural and is most likely incorrect. The first objection to Fredricksmeier's thesis comes from the fact that the earliest references to Midas's migration describe Midas as having come to Macedonia from Asia rather than the other way around. This is the account given by Euphorion of Chalcis, writing in the late Third Century BCE, who refers to Midas leading Phrygians and Lydians to Europe before establishment of the Macedonian kingdom.¹⁷ In the mid-Second Century BCE, Nicander of Colophon and Lycophron of Chalcis (if he is not the Lycophron who wrote in Alexandria a century earlier) also both explicitly describe Midas as coming from Asia to Europe.¹⁸ In a catalog of celebrated flowers, Nicander writes of the famous roses also described by Herodotus in the garden of Midas: "leaving his Asian realm, Midas cultivated roses from Odonia that always blossomed with sixty petals in his Emathian estates."¹⁹ Lycophron, in his *Alexandra*, a book of prophecies on the entanglements between Asia and Europe that were destined to follow from the Trojan War, describes the expedition of "the Phrygian" (referring to Midas) into the Thracian Chalcidice as an act of retribution on behalf of his Trojan kinsmen.²⁰

These accounts are all consistent with the points noted by Herodotus in his discussion of the founding of the Macedonian Argead dynasty. Herodotus notes the marvelous roses in the garden as a legacy of Midas's reign in Macedonia prior to the establishment of the Argead kingdom. Elsewhere Herodotus identifies Midas as Phrygian, and these Hellenistic authors expand upon that fact by describing Midas's advent from Asia, even, in the case of Lycophron, providing it with a motive. The foundation of the Argead Macedonian kingdom is also the occasion for Justin to refer to Midas as a prior king of the land.²¹ Justin (via Trogus) probably derived his account of early Macedonia from Theopompus's *Philippica*, written during Alexander's lifetime, where an account of the establishment of Philip's ancestors in Macedonia must have been given.²² Theopompus is known to have devoted considerable space to a discussion of Midas's encounter with Silenus in Macedonia, an event also noted in passing by Herodotus.²³ Like Herodotus, Theopompus identified Midas as "the Phrygian,"

an ethnic that always refers to Asiatic Phrygia.²⁴ Theopompus is known to have expanded on a variety of subjects, including mythological digressions, mentioned by Herodotus,²⁵ so it is possible that the details mentioned in the Hellenistic authors cited above were present in Theopompus's *Philippica*. Whether or not Theopompus mentioned the arrival of Midas in Europe from Phrygia in Asia, it is significant that authors writing over the course of the two centuries following Theopompus did so without any hint that a contrary tradition existed.

Another author of the mid-Second Century, Marsyas of Philippi, wrote a history of Macedonia in six books, and mentions the knot on the cart of Midas (or Gordius, their names are not preserved in the quotation) in his first book.²⁶ The most likely occasion for such a reference is in the well-attested context of the foundation of the Argead dynasty in the land formerly ruled by Midas. From this evidence Fredricksmeyer deduces that Marsyas must have "described the career of King Midas and his journey from Macedonia to Phrygia."²⁷ As Herodotus attests, the mention of Midas in connection with the establishment of the Macedonian kingdom could be the occasion for mentioning various aspects of Midas's legend, and later authors were inclined to elaborate these themes. Marsyas could well have been the first to introduce the story of the cart and its knot into this context, in an account of Midas's rise to kingship. But Fredricksmeyer merely assumes what he needs to demonstrate when he asserts that Marsyas "believed that the wagon referred to in the oracle about the rule over Asia was the same which Midas had used on his journey."²⁸ The fragment of Marsyas is not sufficient to show that there was "an old Macedonian tradition about the migration of Midas and the Brigians from Macedonia to Phrygia," as Fredricksmeyer argues. Only the mythographer, Conon, writing in the era of Augustus, specifies that Midas was king in Macedonia before leading the Briges from Europe to Asia and changing their name to Phrygians.²⁹ Here, at last, is testimony supportive of Fredricksmeyer's argument. But it defies an otherwise consistent tradition that accepts the priority of Midas' Asiatic Phrygian identity,³⁰ and it is not sufficient to support the view that this was Alexander's under-

standing of the significance of the cart that brought Midas to kingship in Phrygia.

The most serious problem with the notion that Midas came to Phrygia from Macedon in the ox cart that Alexander saw at Gordium is the fact that none of the accounts of the Gordian knot make any reference to such a migration. In the detailed narratives of Arrian and Justin, the Phrygians are already at home in Asiatic Phrygia when either Midas (in Arrian's account) or his father Gordius (according to Justin) fulfilled an oracle that the Phrygians should honor as king the first man to ride on a cart up to their assembly (according to Arrian) or up to the shrine of Zeus (in Justin's account). The cart of Gordius dedicated in the shrine of Zeus "the King" at Gordium was thus a commemoration of kingship realized within the land of Phrygia. If strict logic has a role in the analysis of such lore (I would not insist that it always must), then the fact that the ox cart and its portentous knot bore the name of Midas's father, and the fact that a variant makes Gordius king of the Phrygians before Midas, would preclude the possibility that Midas had exercised kingship elsewhere before coming to Phrygia.³¹ In any event, neither Arrian nor Justin, nor any of the several other brief references to the ox cart of Gordius and its knot offers so much as a hint that the story was ever told otherwise.

If the ox cart had been regarded by anyone, Macedonian, Phrygian, or Greek, as a token of the Macedonian origin of Midas's kingship, then Alexander's visit would have been a most appropriate moment to observe this fact; but none of our sources do so. Fredricksmeyer has recognized this objection, and in defense of his thesis he has argued that "the history of Alexander was written almost exclusively by Greeks.... The Greeks knew of Midas only as a king ... in Phrygia; they did not know of the Macedonian Midas...." Therefore (Fredricksmeyer implies, but does not outright state) it would have made no sense to a Greek audience to mention the Macedonian origin of Midas. This is a remarkably weak defense, for it assumes that readers of the history of Alexander would be unfamiliar with Herodotus's testimony. It also requires special pleading in the case of Callisthenes, Alexander's court historian (and a

Greek), who also, Fredricksmeyer acknowledges, “knew of the Macedonian Midas (No. 124, Frag. 54), and thus he may have known Alexander’s views on the dedicator of the ox cart [*i.e.*, that it was Midas who rode it from Macedonia to Phrygia]. He may have mentioned them in his history. But it is more likely that he did not; he wrote for a purely Greek audience.” This is no argument at all, for its major premise, that a Greek would not introduce a story unfamiliar to Greeks (or, if this is what Fredricksmeyer also means, an otherwise unattested tradition that served to validate Alexander’s claim on the kingship of Asia), is immediately confuted by the examples of Herodotus, Callisthenes, and Theopompus—Greeks who wrote of Midas in Macedonia—and by the story of the Gordian knot itself, which in fact was an unfamiliar local legend introduced to Greek readers. Moreover, in view of the fact that so many Greek contemporaries of Alexander wrote on the subject of Midas, namely, Callisthenes, Theopompus, and Aristotle, it is incredible to suggest that none of them knew of “Alexander’s views on the dedicator of the ox cart” or if they knew, they refrained from mentioning them out of some notion that they would offend Greek sensibility. The legends of Midas were a lively topic in Alexander’s day, which is significant in itself. We need to consider more carefully what meanings the attested stories may have had without supposing, simultaneously, that there were significant unattested details, or that these details were deliberately suppressed by all authorities.

Fredricksmeyer has drawn attention to an intriguing puzzle in the record of Alexander’s progress. He has correctly stressed our need to discover what Midas and the ox cart of Gordius meant specifically to Alexander and the Macedonians. But the hypothesis he has developed is unsupportable. There was no “old Macedonian tradition,” as he has argued, that spoke of Midas’s migration from Macedon to Asia on this ox cart. Theopompus and Callisthenes both wrote of Midas in Macedonia and both also identified Midas as “the Phrygian.” Theopompus and Callisthenes reflect a consistent tradition, found earlier in Herodotus and later in Euphorion and Lycophron, according to which Midas in Macedonia was the

Phrygian king whose dominion included Macedonia.³² In this respect, tradition is consistent with the evidence for the historical king known to the Assyrians as Mita, king of the land of Mushki, whose empire was centered in Phrygia at the end of the Eighth Century.³³ This was the Midas, of fact and of fiction, whose capital Alexander visited. How this Midas came to extend his sway, in fact or in fiction, over Macedonia is a question that lies beyond our concerns here, which have to do with perceptions in Alexander's day. So we return to the question: what was Midas to Alexander and the Macedonians, and why was his cart in particular such an important token?

To answer this question I propose to demonstrate four main propositions, and to explore their meanings as they would have been viewed in the context of Alexander's mission.

- 1 The Phrygians were widely seen as sharing a common cultural heritage with the Macedonians and their Thracian neighbors.
- 2 Within this cultural sphere, Midas was remembered as an archetype of kingship, and was regarded as the son of a divine mother.
- 3 Within this cultural sphere, the Persians and their subjects respected the attributes of kingship and its divine support associated with Midas.
- 4 Within this cultural sphere, Midas was considered the first to exploit wealth from the land, and his example was inducement to others to achieve his prosperity.

Phrygians, Macedonians, and Thracians

Herodotus reports that, in the time of Darius and Xerxes, among the neighbors of the Macedonians and the people of the Chalcidice were the Bryges, an ethnic group whose name was more or less familiar to the Greeks (*cf.*, the name of the Attic potter, Brygos, active in the time of Darius and Xerxes).³⁴ Elsewhere Herodotus identifies the European ancestors of the Asiatic Phrygians (*Phryges*) as the Briges, referring this tradition specifically to what "the Macedonians say."³⁵ Later commentators, ancient and modern, have assumed that the Briges and Bryges are one and the same.³⁶ Regardless of the historical accuracy of this tradi-

tion, there clearly was a belief among the Macedonians at least as early as the Fifth Century that the Phrygians in Asia were kinsmen of their own neighbors in Europe.³⁷

Such a belief was not exceptional, for the identities of several other nations were also believed to span the division between European Thrace and north-western Asia Minor. Herodotus reports that the Bithynians of Asia were Thracians who had crossed from Europe.³⁸ Herodotus also reports a migration in the other direction when he counts the movement of Mysians and Teucrians across the Bosphorus as one of the great Asiatic invasions of Europe.³⁹ The Mysians, historically neighbors of both the Bithynians and the Phrygians in Asia, are described in Homer as neighbors of the Thracians and of certain Scythian tribes, from which Hellenistic authors concluded that the Mysians must have come from Europe to Asia.⁴⁰ Teucrians were the original inhabitants of the Troad in Herodotus's reckoning, and he represents Paeonians, who lived to the north and east of Macedonia, claiming to be descendants of Teucrians from Troy.⁴¹ Other such bonds of kinship and migration across this region were alleged at one time or another. Mygdonia, a region bordering Macedonia to the east, was connected with Mygdonia in Asia (where Mygdon was also remembered as a name of a Phrygian king).⁴² The Dardanians who dwelt to the west of Macedonia were said to have been settled by the same Dardanus who founded the royal lineage of Troy.⁴³ The validity, nature, or origin of these migration stories are not of immediate concern here, except to note that the connections assumed in classical sources are borne out at least to a certain degree by the evidence of linguistics. Best attested in this regard are the Phrygians, whose language was related more closely to Greek and to the languages of the Balkans than to the group of Indo-European languages of Anatolia that included Hittite, Luwian, and later Lydian and Carian.⁴⁴

The affinity between Thrace as far west as Macedonia and north-western Asia Minor as far east as Phrygia was assumed as early as Homer, that is, by the end of the Eighth Century. Among the allies of the Trojans listed in the second book of

the *Iliad* are Thracians from across the Hellespont, Cicones from the Aegean coast of Thrace, and the Paeonians, who hail "from the broad streams of the Axius," that is, from the eastern portion of what became the Argead Macedonian kingdom.⁴⁵ Trojans are especially close to the Phrygians in Homer, both in terms of geography and kinship. In the *Iliad* the Phrygians occupy the lands in Asia where later classical sources also place them: coastal regions along the Asiatic shore of the Propontis (Hellespontine Phrygia), and along the Sangarius River on the Anatolian plateau (Greater Phrygia).⁴⁶ Priam's own lineage is given Phrygian roots, as his favored son, Hector, has a Phrygian mother, Hecabe, who is the daughter of Dymas, who "made his home in Phrygia by the banks of the Sangarius."⁴⁷ The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite similarly affirms the bond between Trojans and Phrygians by having Aphrodite present herself to Anchises as the daughter of Otreus, "lord of all Phrygia, rich in fortresses," before the two of them couple and conceive Aeneas.⁴⁸ The kingdom of Phrygia envisioned by Homer as a contemporary to Priam's dominion at Troy was in fact at its height at the time the Homeric poems were committed to writing, in the time of the historical Midas, in the late Eighth or early Seventh Century.⁴⁹ Contemplating the ruin of Troy, Hector's words in the *Iliad* prevision the consequent rise of Phrygia: "There was a time when mortal men would speak of the city of Priam as a place with much gold and much bronze. But now the lovely treasures that lay away in our houses have vanished, and many possessions have been sold and gone into Phrygia and into Maeonia the lovely, when great Zeus was angry."⁵⁰ The tradition represented by the *Iliad* thus clearly set the stage for the kingdom of Phrygia to be seen as the heir to Troy in the role of the most powerful and wealthy kingdom of Asia.⁵¹

Homeric tradition thus took shape in the context of the Asiatic empire of King Midas, a powerful king who was known to the Assyrians as Mita. From the Homeric perspective, the prototype of Midas's Asiatic empire, the Dardanid kingdom of Troy, embraced allies in Thrace and eastern Macedonia, the very lands where Midas's rule was later remembered, and where the memory of various bonds of kinship between Asia and Europe

were also preserved. After Midas, from the mid-Seventh to the mid-Sixth-Centuries, the Mermnad kingdom of Lydia became the model of wealth and power to the peoples living around the Aegean, and we shall see momentarily the evidence that Midas was remembered among the Lydians as a paradigm of kingship. When, in due course, the Lydian kingdom was overwhelmed by the Persians, we find the Persians extending their dominion into Europe by subjugating the former allies of Troy and subjects of Midas.


When Darius crossed into Europe, he made tributary subjects of the Thracians and Macedonians, and he attempted to do the same to the Scythians.⁵² Justification for the invasion of Scythian land, Herodotus reports, came from the memory that Scythians had earlier invaded the empires of Asia.⁵³ No such pretext existed for the subjection of Thracians and Macedonians. Yet the inhabitants of these lands had all once been supporters of a great kingdom of Asia, namely, Dardanid Troy. Having once been allies to the king of Troy, and after Troy subject to Midas of Phrygia, these peoples could now be expected to recognize their new overlord.⁵⁴ Across this land, linking Europe to Asia, the most celebrated exemplar of god-supported and prosperous kingship was that of Midas the Phrygian. The story of Midas's rise to kingship, as told to Alexander at Gordium, and symbols related to that story appearing in art and monuments of the Sixth and Fifth-Centuries, give reason to believe that the Persians were aware of this precedent.

Midas as a Great King and Son of the Great Mother

Within the realm of Greater Phrygia and its surrounding lands during the heyday of the Lydian Mermnad kingdom, Midas was venerated as an archetype of rulership. Such is the clear implication of the so-called Midas Monument at Midas City (see figure 1). The most impressive of a series of rock-cut façades in the Phrygian highlands, the monument bears a dedication in Phrygian by a person named Ates to Midas who is given the titles of *Lawagetas*, "Leader of the Host," and *Wanax*, "Lord" (to Hellenize the Phrygian titles that are given after Midas's

name, in the dative, as *MIDAI LAVAGTAEI VANAKTEI*).⁵⁵ The monument dates, as Susanne Berndt-Ersöz has demonstrated, to the first half of the Sixth Century, and by virtue of its grand scale it should properly be considered a royal monument, a dedication of the reign of either Alyattes or, more probably, of Croesus.⁵⁶ It consists of a gabled and decorated architectural façade more than sixteen meters in overall height framing a niche in the form of a doorway large enough to hold a life-size statue. The dedicatory inscription giving the name and titles of Midas appears in large letters above the left side of the gable; graffiti within and beside the niche four times mention the name or title, *MATER*-, "Mother," and again give the name of Midas, *MIDAS*. Judging by other monuments that preserve a sculpted figure in an architectural façade, the niche originally contained a statue of a standing female figure. The best preserved example of such a figure in relief shows a woman elaborately robed, wearing a tall *polos*, and holding a water vessel in one hand and a bird of prey in the other (see figure 2; other examples bear versions of these same attributes). She can be identified as the Phrygian Mother, known to the Greeks as the Great Mother or Mother of the Gods or Cybele.⁵⁷

The prominence of the Mother's name and image on this archaic monument bearing a dedication to Midas is consistent with the tradition, attested first in Plutarch, that the Phrygians came to regard the goddess whom they addressed as Mother to be the mother of Midas.⁵⁸ Among other testimonia to this belief, the Suda Lexicon reports that plaintive forms of aulos music were instituted by Midas "wishing to deify his mother when she had died."⁵⁹ Greek sources also claim that Midas was instrumental in establishing the cult of the Phrygian Mother of the Gods.⁶⁰ The Midas Monument suggests that the identification of the Phrygian Mother as the mother of Midas was already established in the time of Lydian rule, not later than the mid-Sixth Century. This suggestion is borne out by the correspondence of its features and those of related cult façades and reliefs of the Phrygian Mother with key elements of the Phrygian tradition about Midas's rise to kingship, as it was told to Alexander.



*Fig. 1 The Midas Monument, Sixth Century BCE., Midas City,
Phrygian highlands*

photo by author

The legend behind the ox cart is narrated only by Arrian and Justin, who give substantially the same account with occasional differences of detail.⁶¹ Both begin with the figure of Gordius as a simple peasant who tilled the soil with a team of oxen. One day while plowing, an omen appeared to Gordius. In Arrian's version the omen was an eagle that landed on the yoke

of his ox team and would not move even when Gordius wanted to unyoke his team at the end of the day; in Justin's version, birds of all kinds encircled Gordius while he was plowing.⁶² Gordius sought the meaning of this omen, either by seeking out a soothsayer from among the Telmessians (Arrian), or by going to a neighboring city (Justin). In his quest, Gordius met a young woman whom Arrian describes as a Telmessian fetching water from a spring, and whom Justin describes as a maiden of striking beauty coming out of the gate of the neighboring city. This young woman recognized the bird-omen as a sign of destined kingship. According to Arrian, she instructed Gordius on sacrifices that he should perform to Zeus Basileios; in both accounts, Gordius married her, and begat Midas. Some



Fig. 2 *The Phrygian Mother, relief, Seventh or Sixth Century BCE., Ankara*
drawing by author

time later, when the Phrygians were in political disarray, they sought an oracle that advised them to resolve their disputes by setting a king over them; further, the oracle told them that a cart would bring them their king. Arrian's account has Midas as a fine youth acclaimed king when he rode on the cart with his parents into the assembly of the Phrygians; Justin's account has Gordius acclaimed king when he rode his cart to the temple of Jupiter. In both accounts, the cart of Gordius was thereupon dedicated to Jupiter/J Zeus Basileios (and Justin reports that Midas eventually succeeded his father).

In this story, the mother of Midas appears as the unnamed woman who foretells kingship and in due course gives birth to and rears Midas. Her prophetic wisdom comes from her Telmessian identity, according to Arrian, a detail that could well have been provided by the Phrygians who told their legend to Alexander, since Telmessians were long known to have been prophets of sovereignty to the Lydians.⁶³ She recognizes the omens of birds, especially the royal omen of an eagle, which corresponds with the bird of prey in the hand of the archaic image of the Phrygian Mother. The role of Midas's mother as a water-drawer likewise corresponds with the image of the Phrygian Mother carrying a water vessel. Justin's account of the appearance to Gordius of the beautiful maiden in the gate of a city corresponds to the depiction of the Phrygian Mother in the rock-cut façades, as if she were emerging from a gate.⁶⁴ In all of these respects, the mother of Midas is identifiable as the divine Mother of the Phrygian cult monuments. Dating the Phrygian story by the evidence of the Phrygian monuments, it seems most probable that both were created during the period of Lydian rule, in the second or third generation after the historical Midas.

The divinity known to the Greeks as the Phrygian Mother, Mother of the Gods, or Cybele had an ancestry far older than Midas, and a legacy far greater than that of Midas, all of which lies outside the scope of the present study. What is pertinent here is the fact that the memory of Midas was so esteemed as an archetype of the successful and prosperous king that he was

considered to be the son of this divine mother. In the story of Midas and in the Phrygian cult monuments alike, the Mother represents successful and prosperous kingship on several levels. She augurs kingship, and so her appearance in her shrines is itself an auspicious omen of preeminence for those who honor her. As a water bearer, she presents an element essential to settled communities and to the kingship that rests on them, the abundance of fresh water from the earth. As the mother of Midas she represents the engendering of a kingship blessed with abundance. In this respect she could be seen as a figure to whom every mother would appeal for the well-being of her own child, royal or otherwise, since blessed abundance was associated with Midas already as an infant, according to a Phrygian song cited by Aelian:⁶⁵ "While Midas the Phrygian was asleep as a baby, ants crawled into his mouth and, with all of their tireless industry, brought him grains of wheat." This was a baby who would grow wealthy by the labor of countless others on his behalf. The memory of Midas, grown legendary over the course of time after his reign at the turn of the Eighth to Seventh-Centuries, represented the blessings that would come to a king and a kingdom favored by the Phrygian Mother.

The Persians and the Blessings of Midas

By the time that Persian rule had been established over Lydia and Phrygia, the attributes associated with the Phrygian Mother and Midas had become generalized as symbols of well-being, associated especially with beneficent and prosperous sovereignty. Plutarch tells a story that reflects the importance of these symbols in the eyes of the Persian rulers at Sardis. While Themistocles was in exile in Asia, he found in the sanctuary of the Mother at Sardis the bronze statue of a maiden called "the water-bearer" that had originally been dedicated by him when he was water commissioner at Athens. When Themistocles asked the satrap if he could return this statue to the Athenians, his request was treated as a matter that would greatly offend the king.⁶⁶ Evidently, the statue had been taken by Xerxes and dedicated to the Mother at Sardis because it represented a royal

prerogative: dominion over sources of water and the well-being that they provide. This same implication appears in a story that Herodotus attributes to the time when Darius was at Sardis after his return from Europe.

Two Paeonian brothers were resolved to persuade Darius to set them as rulers (*tyranneuein*) over the Paeonians. To achieve this, they came to Sardis and arranged to display their sister, beautifully attired, spinning flax and leading a horse as she walked to draw water, so as to catch the eye of Darius. She was in effect an advertisement of the prosperity of her people, and she succeeded in drawing the attention of Darius. As Herodotus tells the story, in response to the inquiries of Darius, the brothers declared who they were and where they were from, that their Teucrian ancestors were emigrants from Troy, and that they had come to submit themselves to Darius. They also admitted, when Darius asked, that all the women of their homeland were as accomplished as their sister. Rather than establishing the brothers as tyrants over their homeland by the Strymon River, Darius was inspired to order his general in Europe, Megabazus, to uproot and transport all of the Paeonians from Europe back to Asia. Herodotus offers no explanation for this outcome, but we may conjecture that the motive underlying this tale was that a sovereign would want such auspicious industry and prosperity to be close to him, all the more properly because these people belonged in origin to Asia. It is significant that the home to which the Paeonians were transported was Phrygia.⁶⁷ The woman in this tale was not deified, but she was explicitly presented as a sign of potential sovereignty, so used by her brothers (who hoped to gain sovereignty) and so recognized by Darius (who appropriated this potential for himself). She also links the Paeonians, living on the frontier of Macedonia, to Phrygia and to symbols associated with the Phrygian Mother and the kingship of Midas.

Other elements of Phrygian tradition, in this case relating to the cart of Gordius, also show up in archaic iconography, specifically in the context of the Persian dominion over Thrace. From lands along the Strymon and Axios rivers, in a region inhabited

by the Paeonians, Edonians, and others, a remarkable series of so-called "Thraco-Macedonian" coins was produced beginning possibly as early as the mid-Sixth Century, certainly in abundant production by the late Sixth Century, and ending early in the Fifth, roughly coinciding with the rise of the Macedonian kingdom under Alexander I and the collapse of Persian domination in Thrace and Macedonia.⁶⁸ From the distribution of these coins in hoards found across Asia and in Egypt, it is clear that they were in high demand within the Persian empire; they may even have been produced specifically in response to the European conquests of Darius and his generals, to serve the demand for tribute in silver.⁶⁹

The most impressive of these coins are the large dodecadrachms issued by the Derrones, a people known only from their coins, who most likely occupied the region of the middle Axios, in Paeonian territory. Among these the most common is a series whose obverse type depicts a seated, bearded man driving a cart pulled by two oxen; in the field above the oxen is a device, sometimes a shield with a star symbol, more often a Corinthian helmet; below the oxen a flower often occurs as a filler (see figure 3; flowers also occur as fillers around the most common reverse, a triskeles). These are often without inscription, sometimes with the ethnic, *DERRONIKON* (or abbreviations thereof), and rarely occur with the name of a ruler. The coin was popular enough to be imitated by neighboring tribes. Other coins of the Derrones depict the two oxen yoked to a pole without a cart, and a team of oxen pulling what may be a cart, driven by a young man, most likely Hermes, holding a *cadeucus*. Very similar types to these were issued, as octadrachms, by the Edonians, Orrescians, Tyntenians, and Ichnaeans. These depict a young man wearing a *petasos* and sometimes carrying either one or two spears or a goad, driving a team of oxen (see figure 4); reverse types of some of these coins depict a cart wheel.

The iconography of these coins resonates with the imagery described in the Phrygian legend of Gordius. The ox cart of the Derrones is suggestive of the ox cart of Gordius. Its bearded driver, accompanied as he most often is by symbols of martial

power, is most likely the figure of a ruler, or ruler-to-be. The flowers as minor devices recall the famous flowers of Midas in Thrace and Macedonia. In the second iconographic type, the team of oxen driven by a young man calls to mind Gordius the plowman before he became the father of Midas. There is no compelling reason to suppose that these coins were meant to depict Gordius or Midas; their significance lies in their testimony to symbols associated with Midas, especially in the Phrygian legend of the cart of Gordius as it was told to Alexander. The Phrygian legend depicts the transformation of Gordius, or that of his son, Midas, from a farmer into a king by riding in an ox cart; the rulers of the Derrones ride in such a cart. Perhaps the Derrones had their own version of the legend that a king would appear to them on an ox cart, or perhaps this was merely a royal conveyance (though a singular one, to be contrasted with the horse-drawn carts or chariots more commonly associated with royalty).⁷⁰ If the appearance of a king on an ox cart is to be read metaphorically, it means that kingship has its basis in the skill of cultivating the earth, and it alludes to the settled, cultivated lands of the *oikoumene* as the basis of rightful kingship. If, on the Thracian coins, the young man driving the team of oxen is sometimes or always meant to depict Hermes, this too should be seen as a depiction of the relationship between agriculture and kingship, for Hermes—Herodotus makes a point of noting—was particularly worshipped by the kings of the Thracians, who regarded him as their ancestor.⁷¹

In sum, here we find that distinctive symbols denoting the advent of royalty in the Phrygian story told to Alexander are represented on coins issued during the period of Persian rule in Thrace. This is a region that later authors, starting with Herodotus, associate with the memory of Midas, and that earlier tradition, attested in Homer, associated with the rulers of the Dardanid kingdom of Troy in Asia Minor. Here, in these coins and in the iconography depicted on them, are tokens of kingship that reinforce the notion that Thrace, as far as the borders of Macedonia, shared an ideology and iconography of kingship also found in Lydia and Phrygia.




Fig. 3 Derronian coin, late Sixth or early Fifth Century BCE.
(after Head, *BMC Macedonia*, 1879, p. 150 no. 1)




Fig. 4 Orrescian coin, late Sixth or early Fifth Century BCE.
(after Head, *BMC Macedonia*, 1879, p. 146 no. 2)

The Wealth of Midas

The final element that links these coins, and indeed the entire, impressive range of early Thracian and Macedonian coins to the memory of Midas, is their very nature as precious metal from the earth converted into currency bearing the marks of royalty. Although the kings of Lydia, famous for their wealth, are more generally credited with the invention of coinage, Midas too was associated with the invention of coinage.⁷² Midas was best known for his god-given wealth in gold, an abundance that, in the form of his golden touch, was even too much for his own

good. According to the legend of Midas as later told by Ovid, Midas was finally freed of the curse of his golden touch by washing himself in the river Pactolus, thereby transferring his golden touch to the river itself. The gold-bearing sands of the Pactolus at Sardis were identified with the phenomenal wealth that later made Croesus famous.⁷³ Here, as in the worship of the Phrygian Mother under the rule of the Lydians, we find Midas as the archetypal founder of royal prerogatives, even endowing the earth with its capacity to enrich kings.

The golden touch of Midas, Ovid recounts, was a consequence of Midas's capture of Silenus.⁷⁴ The traditions of Midas and Silenus in Macedonia and Thrace were certainly linked to the reputation of those lands for yielding gold and silver. The capture of Silenus was said to have taken place at the spring in the gardens of Midas below Mt. Bermium in Emathia; this was likely the basis for the tradition reported by Callisthenes that the wealth of Midas came from mines on Mt. Bermium.⁷⁵ The mythographer, Conon, who placed the origin of Midas's kingship in Pieria and by Mt. Bermium, says that Midas accumulated great wealth by discovering treasure, and that his nation became great and populous, after which he led it from Europe across the Hellespont to the land that became Phrygia.⁷⁶ Although the mines of Mt. Bermium might be more myth than fact, Macedonia generally was a land that yielded silver and gold.⁷⁷ More famous mines lay to the east of Macedonia, particularly along the Strymon and around Mt. Pangaeum. This region was the chief source of the "Thracio-Macedonian" coins described above, and a region where, beginning in the Sixth Century, conflicts over control of settlements and mines appear in the historical record.⁷⁸ This too was an area where Midas's legendary garden and the spring where he captured Silenus were to be found. Bion identifies the spring of Midas and Silenus at a place called Inna "between the Maedi and the Paeonians."⁷⁹ Nicander says that Midas brought roses to his garden in Emathia from Odonia. Stephanus names the Odones as a Thracian tribe bordering on the Maedi.⁸⁰ The Odones might be related to the Thracian Edones or possibly Odomantes; in

any case, the region indicated by both Bion and Nicander is along the Strymon River.⁸¹ The pseudo-Aristotelian work, *On Marvelous Things Heard*, reports a story of this region that evokes an image of Midas: "They say that in Paeonia the earth is so charged with gold that many find nuggets weighing even more than a mina. They also say that someone who found two nuggets, one weighing three minas and the other five, brought them to the king; they say he set them on the table before the king, and said that if he eats any of them, he should first offer a share."⁸² In popular lore, this was a land where the king, whichever king, was the recipient of so much easy wealth that he might have to eat it to enjoy it. Midas was the archetype of such a king.

The wealth of Midas was a sign for those who succeeded him in kingship. Like the wealth of Croesus, memory of this great wealth could serve two distinct purposes. Such abundance could be the subject of praise and the object of envy, or it could be a cautionary sign, and even a subject for ridicule or pity. Already in the Seventh Century, Tyrtaeus cites the wealth of Midas as an example of the uttermost of human desires, and Aristophanes and Plato also refer to it in this manner.⁸³ On the other hand, Attic vase-painting of the mid-Fifth Century suggests that Midas, with his asses ears, could be a subject of mockery, and Aristophanes also treats Midas as a ridiculous figure.⁸⁴ Aristotle, who makes the earliest attested reference to the golden touch of Midas and its undesired consequences, reinforces the message that Herodotus had already intoned in his advice of Solon to Croesus, that wealth is to be appreciated only to the extent that it meets the needs of the human condition.⁸⁵ From this we can glean that, on the one hand, the wealth of Midas was a symbol of all that one could desire; and on the other hand, in more reflective contexts, the wealth of Midas was a lesson on the relationship between humanity and divinity, and on the limits of the human condition.

The reflective message about the wealth of Midas, like Solon's lecture to Croesus about the true nature of wealth, was not a narrative embraced by those with ambition to rule.

The commemoration of Midas as Leader of the Host and Lord among the Lydians, and references to Midas in the narrative of the founding of the Argead dynasty, as found in Herodotus and Justin (the latter presumably deriving from Theopompus) were not likely to have been cautionary in intent, but were more likely to have signified the unique relationship to divinity and to the wealth of the earth to which a ruler could aspire. This was what the kingship of Asia, or of the domesticated lands of the *oikoumene*, held for the man who could undo the knot on the yoke of Gordius's ox cart.

Conclusions: The Meaning of Midas to Alexander

The evidence reviewed here demonstrates that Midas had an important place in the traditional lore of Thrace and Macedonia that was unlike his memory in Hellas to the south. In the north he was connected with the land almost as an autochthonous hero, much as he was in Phrygia; to the south he was remembered as a distant and foreign figure. In Thrace and Macedonia, Midas was associated particularly with wealth in silver and gold to be found in the ground, and with the authority of kingship that claimed the right to such wealth through the support of the gods. These attributes and prerogatives of kingship were claimed by the Argead kings of Macedonia and, most likely, by the tribal kings of the Thracians, each within their respective dominions. On a grander scale, these attributes and prerogatives had all previously been claimed by the Mermnad tyrants of Lydia, and after them by the Achaemenid Persians, specifically in their relationship with their western satrapies, and above all, at Sardis. Unlike the Lydians, who had honored the name of Midas, there is no evidence that the Persians gave particular respect to his memory, even though they appropriated the symbols of sovereignty that had been part of the lore of Midas. But Midas clearly was remembered as a significant figure by the Macedonians.

Midas stood for kingship, a form of sovereign authority that was not especially congenial to the ideals of the Greeks at the time of Alexander's expedition. Midas and the Phrygians,

moreover, occupied an ambiguous place in the relations between Europe and Asia, and the elevation of their memory might have appeared incongruous to the cause of punishing the Persians that Alexander championed in the name of the Hellenic League of Corinth.⁸⁶ To the Thracians and Macedonians, however, Midas was the measure of successful kingship. Midas was particularly meaningful to the Macedonians, if we accept Herodotus's telling of the foundation legend of the Argead dynasty as true to what "the Macedonians say." In Herodotus's account, the divinely aided foundation of kingship by Perdiccas began with the appropriation of the very place, by the gardens of Midas below Mt. Bermium, where Midas had gained his wealth. This act of foundation which was also an act of appropriation could have been used as justification for extending Argead dominion wherever lore remembered that Midas found his wealth in the earth. It was in the reign of Alexander I, whose role in the expedition of Xerxes against the Greeks was Herodotus's occasion for telling the legend of his royal ancestry, that the Macedonians began to assert decisive control over silver mines along the Strymon. It may well be that Midas, already a figure in local lore, became a particular fixture in Argead legend as Herodotus tells it as an immediate consequence of the ambitions of Alexander I.⁸⁷ The recession of Persian dominion over Thrace witnessed by Alexander I could have encouraged him to lay claim to the tokens of royal legitimacy that had long been associated in this quarter of the Aegean with the great kingship of Midas. When, a century and a half later, Alexander III arrived at Gordium, he made a deliberate show of resolving the oracle of kingship attending the Gordian knot, thereby appropriating the very center and source of an essential aspect of the royal legitimacy of the Argead house, and at the same time foreclosing the possibility that anyone else might lay claim to this symbol of power.⁸⁸

Alexander's stop at Gordium may have had this purpose from the beginning, for there is every reason to believe that Alexander was as well informed on the legends and lore of Midas as anyone could be. We are in an unusually strong position to make plausible conjectures about what Alexander knew

of Midas, as we have the evidence of literary men in his court or the court of his father, including Alexander's tutor, Aristotle. Both Theopompus and Aristotle wrote at length on the subject of what Midas eventually learned from Silenus about the nature of the world and the meaning of life.⁸⁹ Aristotle also cited the folly of Midas in mistaking boundless gold for true wealth, and he named the wife of Midas as an inventor of coinage.⁹⁰ Callisthenes, who is the most probable authority for the original account of Alexander's visit to Gordium, related the wealth of Midas to mines on Mt. Bermium, and told a tale about Midas at Celaenae in Phrygia learning a painful lesson about what was most precious to humanity.⁹¹ All of these authors came from regions where Midas was part of local lore: Aristotle and Callisthenes from the Thracian Chalcidice, and Theopompus from Ionian Chios close to the shore of Asia. In view of the antiquarian interests of all three of these authors, it is likely that they were well informed about most other attested legends of Midas. It is noteworthy that all of them are seen citing the example of Midas as a cautionary tale.

We can expect that Midas was treated as a subject for reflection on the intersection of humanity, divinity, and royalty in Aristotle's tutelage of the young Alexander. It is characteristic of Aristotle's treatment of the subject of kingship in the *Politics* that he allows the possibility that true kingship is uniquely connected to divinity.⁹² The example of Midas is appropriate to this theme since Midas was associated by tradition with the foundation of Macedonian royal identity. It is not unreasonable to suggest that Midas was a key thematic figure in Aristotle's instruction of Alexander, inasmuch as it took place in the sanctuary of the nymphs at Mieza, which is the likely locale of the spring below Mt. Bermium where Midas was said to have captured Silenus.⁹³ Instruction that dwelt on the paradoxes inherent in a figure like Midas, whom Aristotle refers to (in the words of Silenus) as "most powerful and most blessed of all,"⁹⁴ would certainly suit the sort of revealed, mystic wisdom that Aristotle was supposed to have imparted to Alexander at Mieza, according to Plutarch.⁹⁵

Private instruction touching on the connections between royalty and divinity may have induced Alexander to consider the conditions of his own birth and possible divine origin. Without opening the wider topic of Alexander's notion of his own divinity, we should note that the traditions of Midas's ascent to kingship entailed a special understanding of the role of the mother of the king. She was the augur of kingship as well as its bearer, and she was to be recognized as divine herself. Alexander was likely aware of the meanings of this relationship even before arriving at Gordium, when Queen Ada of Caria acknowledged Alexander as her son. By accepting this symbolic relationship, Alexander was accepting a portentous sign from a royal mother of the legitimacy of his kingship, while she was receiving acknowledgment of her own royal legitimacy in her land.⁹⁶ Acceptance of this paradigm also accounts for Alexander's professed intention, according to Curtius, to deify his own mother, Olympias, after her death.⁹⁷

Finally, we consider the meaning attached to the cart of Gordius and to the loosening of the Gordian knot. The cart dedicated to Zeus Basileios should have been familiar to Alexander as a symbol of sovereignty, if the royal ox cart depicted on the coins of the Derrones was still familiar to Macedonians and Thracians. The Gordian knot itself, however, has no obvious symbolic parallel in Macedonia or Thrace. Perhaps, as Brendan Burke has recently argued, the knot itself was a vestige of Anatolian lore going back to precedents attested in Hittite ritual.⁹⁸ Regardless of its origin, its meaning was explained to Alexander: he who undid the knot would rule Asia, or would rule the *oikoumene*.⁹⁹ Whatever actual term may have been used to describe the dominion to be gained by undoing the knot, it signified the archetypal kingdom of Midas. In archaic usage, Asia described the lands embraced by the greater kingdom of Lydia in western Asia Minor, or roughly the region identified by the later Roman province of Asia.¹⁰⁰ But since at least the time of Hecataeus of Milteus and his map of the *oikoumene*, Asia had also come to signify the entire continent facing Europe. Asia in this sense was largely identical with the *oikoumene*, the

original settled world of cities, from the perspective of those living around the Aegean. Both "Asia" and "the *oikoumene*" had sliding meanings, and we should consider these terms, as they are reported in the accounts of what the Phrygians said to Alexander, to be approximate descriptions of the idealized kingdom of Midas. One of the lessons taught to Midas by Silenus, according to Theopompus, was the true extent of the earth and its most distant lands. Awareness by a great king like Midas of the limits of the earth was prelude to a claim of dominion over such lands.¹⁰¹ In this sense, Midas was an idealized world ruler.

Midas's kingship was older than that of the Persians. His rule was remembered for its pervasive aura of divine favor, signified by the beneficence of the land itself. By associating himself with the dominion of Midas, Alexander was laying claim to a notional, idealized kingship that transcended anything that Persian dominion had grasped.¹⁰² There is good reason to believe that, by his determined and conspicuous solution of the challenge of the Gordian knot and in his thank offering to the gods afterwards, Alexander was already committed to proving that he was, in Aristotle's words, "most powerful and most blessed of all."

NOTES

1. These remarks on Alexander's tribute to a distinguished predecessor are offered to Eugene Borza, my own distinguished predecessor at the Pennsylvania State University, in appreciation of his legacy not only as a historian of Macedonia, but also as guiding example to those who teach and study the history of Greece and the Greek heritage at Penn State.
2. On Alexander's assiduous piety, see Lowell Edmunds, "The Religiosity of Alexander," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 12 (1971): 363-91, and Ernest Fredricksmeyer, "Alexander's Religion and Divinity," in *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, ed. J. Roisman (Leiden: Brill, 2003) 253-78, and in greater detail, Fredricksmeyer, "The Religion of Alexander the Great" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1958).
3. Arr. *Anab.* 2.3; Just. 11.7.3-16; Curt. 3.1.14-18; Plut. *Alex.* 18.2-4; Ael. NA 13.1; scholion to Euripides *Hippolytus* 671.
4. Curt. 3.1.14: *vehiculum . . . cultu haud sane a vilioribus vulgatisque usu abhorrens.*
5. Summarized below, at note 61.
6. While most commentators draw attention to the differences in details between the accounts of Curtius, Plutarch, Arrian, and Justin (see below, note 61), I would emphasize that they are by and large consistent: while at Gordium, Alexander made a point of inspecting the cart associated with King Midas, and he undid its yoke knot, thus fulfilling an oracle attached to it. Diodorus makes no reference at all to Alexander's stay at Gordium, summarizing his army's movement between Lycia and Cilicia in a single sentence (17.27.7).
7. William W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great: Vol. II, Sources and Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1948), 262-65, regards Aristobulus as a likely eyewitness and values his account of the undoing of the knot as "the right version beyond question." Aristobulus cannot confidently be taken as an eyewitness, however, nor can his account be embraced without skepticism. Unlike Callisthenes and Ptolemy, Aristobulus had no standing in the circle of Alexander's known associates; he wrote many years after the death of Alexander, and he gave versions of events that credited Alexander with patience and good judgment where others depicted rash haste, the treatment of the Gordian knot being a prime example. See Lionel Pearson, *The Lost Historians of Alexander the Great, American Philological Association* 20 (New York: APA, 1960), 150-87, and esp. 38, 157, and 160.
8. Tarn, 1948, 265, baldly asserts that "it is clear from Arrian that Ptolemy did not give the incident." This assertion can only be founded on Tarn's conviction that Aristobulus's unique version of the undoing of the knot was the factually correct one, and that Ptolemy was not worthy of being lumped among the "many others" who, according to Arrian, gave the account of Alexander resorting to his sword. Whether Ptolemy mentioned the incident or not, his account gave no reason for Arrian to doubt that it transpired (contrast Arrian's notice of Ptolemy's treatment of the alleged meeting of Alexander and the queen of the Amazons, Arr. *Anab.* 7.13.3, cf., Plut. *Alex.* 46.1).

9. On Callisthenes as the primary source for the story of the Gordian knot, see Pearson, 1960, 38-39; Luisa Prandi, *Callistene, uno storico tra Aristotele e i re Macedoni* (Milan: Jaca, 1985) 91-93.
10. Lynn E. Roller, "The Legend of Midas," *Classical Antiquity* 2 (1983): 299-317, esp. 304-08 and figs. 1-5; M. C. Miller, "Midas as the Great King in Attic Fifth-Century Vase Painting," *Antike Kunst* 31 (1988): 79-89; see also the list of vase paintings compiled by Samson Eitrem, "Midas," in *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. Georg Wissowa and Wilhelm Kroll, vol. 15 (Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1932), 1535-36.
11. Herodotus 7.26, mentions Marsyas "the Silenus" in the context of the springs of Celaenae in Phrygia, although he does not mention Midas in this context (see Callisthenes *FGrH* 124 F 56 for Midas at Celaenae); Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.13 mentions the spring where Midas caught "the satyr" at Thymbrium in Phrygia; Pausanias 1.4.5 mentions the capture of Silenus at a spring of Midas at Ancyra in Phrygia.
12. Hdt. 1.14.
13. Hdt. 7.73.
14. Xanthus *FGrH* 765 F 14 and 15 (from Strabo 14.5.29, C 680-681).
15. Strabo 7 fr. 25.
16. E. A. Fredricksmeyer, "Alexander, Midas, and the Oracle at Gordium," *Classical Philology* 56 (1961): 160-68, cited with approval or reflected by J. R. Hamilton, Plutarch, "Alexander," *A Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969) 47; *Alexander the Great* (London: Hutchinson, 1973) 64, 187; Peter Green, *Alexander of Macedon, 356-232 B.C.* (London: Penguin, 1974) 577 (cf., 213); Robin Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great* (London: Allen Lane for Longman, 1973) 149, 518; J. E. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni, Books 3 and 4* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1980) 87; N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great: King, Commander, and Statesman* (Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes, 1980) 88, 310 n. 32; Michael Wood, *In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1997) 49; Ian Worthington, *Alexander the Great, Man and God* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2004) 87, 309 n. 16. Fredricksmeyer's thesis is noted with reserve by Peter Frei, "Der Wagen von Gordion," *Museum Helveticum* 29 (1972): 115 n. 22, and by Lynn E. Roller (1984) 262. Skepticism about Fredricksmeyer's main argument is expressed by A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander, Vol. 1: Books I-III* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 185.
17. Euphorion frag. 33 (van Groningen = 30 Scheidweiler, from scholiast to Clement Protrepticus 2.11.8, Stählin p. 300 = Marcovich p. 189).
18. Fredricksmeyer, 1961, 161, unfairly dismisses Nicander and Lycophron both as "late and secondary," although neither of them is any later, or any less derivative in these matters, than Marsyas of Philippi, whose testimony Fredricksmeyer values greatly.
19. Nicander *Georgics*, frag. 74 (Schneider, from Athenaeus 15.31, 683b). Emathia was the location of the gardens of Midas below Mt. Bermium, see Hdt 8.138. On Thracian Odonia, see below, at notes 81 and 82.
20. Lycophron *Alexandra* 1397-1408.
21. Just. 7.1.7

22. The outline of Theopompus's account of the founding of the Argead house is attested in *FGrH* 115 F 393 (from Syncellus p. 449, 5), which Jacoby in his commentary (*FGrH* II D, 401) compares to Trogus (in Just. 7.1.7), also suggesting that Theopompus was the source for the testimony of Euphorion (above, note 17).
23. Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 75 (from Ael. *VH* 3.18), on Midas and Silenus in Macedonia. The locale of Theopompus's account is attested by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Letter to Pompeius* 787.
24. Theopompus is several times cited as referring to "Midas the Phrygian": *FGrH* 115 F 75a (from Athen. 2.23, 45c), F 75c (from Ael. *VH* 3.18), F 260 (from Ammianus Marcellinus 22.9.7). Despite this consistent testimony, Jacoby (in his commentary to 115 F 74-75 and to F 260, in *FGrH* II D, 367 and 391) rejects the reference to Midas as "the Phrygian" as a true reflection of Theopompus's words because he, anticipating the argument made by Fredricksmeyer, believed that Midas led the Briges out of Macedonia.
25. See Michael Flower, *Theopompus of Chios* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 160-65.
26. Marsyas *FGrH* 135-136 F 4 (from the scholion to Euripides *Hippolytus* 671).
27. Fredricksmeyer, 1961, 162.
28. *Ibid.* Fredricksmeyer wrongly asserts that "Jacoby is surely right in giving the whole passage [including the summary of the oracle] to Marsyas." Jacoby's citation (note 26) clearly follows the scholion in attributing to Marsyas only the information that the knot was made of a vine with. The fact that the scholion refers to the cart seen by Alexander as an *apēnē* while the quote from Marsyas calls it a *hamaxa* is a strong indication that the scholiast is not paraphrasing Marsyas when explaining the story of the cart. Other than the detail about the composition of the knot, there is no reason to assume that the scholiast drew from an account that contained any details not already attested in Arrian, Curtius, Plutarch, and Justin. The "oracle given to the Phrygians" is unlikely to have made any reference to Europe or Macedonia. The ox cart ride "to Phrygia" (not "to Asia," as Boswell, 1980, 185, paraphrases the passage) does not imply that it originated in Europe, but means only that it ended among the Phrygians, as the accounts of Arrian and Justin report.
29. Conon *FGrH* 26 F 1 (from Photius *Bibliotheca* 186), where no mention is made of the cart of Midas or Gordius.
30. So also Robert Drews, "Myths of Midas and the Phrygian Migration from Europe," *Klio* 75 (1993): 9-26, who argues still more forcefully (and, I think, wrongly) that Herodotus and Xanthus were responsible for inventing the Macedonian sojourn of Midas. His premise, that Midas was consistently regarded as a Phrygian and that there was a strong tradition of Phrygian autochthony in Asia, is sound (see also Roller, 1983); but here I explain the place of Macedonia in this tradition differently from Drews.
31. It is quite possible that the name of Midas's father, Gordius, and the name that attached to the cart, were both back-formations from the name of Midas's royal citadel, Gordium, a name which may mean "city"; see Roller, 1984, 260-61. If this is correct, it reinforces the local origin of the tradition about this particular "Gordian" cart.

32. Conon's innovative version (above, note 29) is the only significant exception, although even his account culminates with the establishment of Midas's dominion in Asiatic Phrygia. It should be remembered that Conon was writing in an era of heroic reinventions, which included tracing the original home of Dardanos, forefather of the Trojan royal house, back to Italy: Virgil *Aeneid* 3.166-167, 503-504; 7.206-208, 240-242.

33. On the historical King Midas, attested in contemporary Assyrian records as "Mita king of the land of Mushki," see J. D. Hawkins, "Mita," in the *Reallexikon der Assyriologie und Vorderasiatischen Archäologie*, Vol. 8 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994) 271-73; Oscar Muscarella, "King Midas of Phrygia and the Greeks," in *Anatolia and the Ancient Near East: Studies in Honor of Tahsin Özgüç*, ed. K. Emre, B. Hrouda, M. Mellink, and N. Özgüç (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1989) 333-44; Roller, 1983; Filippo Cassola, "Rapporti tra Greci e Frigi al tempo di Mida," in *Frige e Frigio. Atti del 1° Simposio Internazionale, Roma, 16-17 ottobre 1995*, ed. R. Gusmani, M. Salvini, and P. Vannicelli (Rome: Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche, 1997) 131-52.

34. Hdt. 6.45, 7.185. Strabo 7.7.8, C 326, places the Bryges to the west of the Macedonians; at 7 fr. 25 Strabo calls the Briges a *Thraikōn ethnos*. Stephanus of Byzantium s.v. Bryx, calls the Bryges a *Makedonikon ethnos proseches Illyriois*. Brygos the potter is known from his signature on late archaic red figure cups painted by an artist dubbed the Brygos Painter, see John Boardman, *Athenian Red Figure Vases: The Archaic Period* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1975) 135-36.

35. Hdt. 7.73.

36. So Strabo 12.3.20, C 550. On the historical geography and conjectural prehistory of the Briges/Bryges, see Hammond, *A History of Macedonia: Vol I, Historical Geography and Prehistory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) 72, 302-09, 317-18, 381-82, 410-14; E. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990) 65, 74.

37. Xanthus, *FGrH* 765 F 14, contemporary to Herodotus, testifies that this belief was more or less widespread. Strabo 14.5.29, C 680-681, citing Apollodorus, accepts the tradition, although he is troubled by the contradiction between the testimony of Xanthus that the Phrygians came to Asia after the Trojan War and the testimony of Homer that has them well established in Asia by the time of the war (see below).

38. Hdt. 7.75; see Strabo 7.3.2, C 295, where Phrygians, Mygdonians, Bebricians, and others are listed as peoples who, like the Bithynians, migrated from Europe to Asia.

39. Hdt. 7.20, where the comparison to Xerxes's expedition would make little sense if Herodotus were not reporting a widely held belief.

40. Strabo 7.3.2, C 295-296, citing Poseidonius, both referring to *Iliad* 13.3-6. See Strabo 12.4.4, C 564, on the difficulty of distinguishing the boundaries between Phrygians, Mysians, Bithynians, Mygdonians, Trojans, Thracians and others.

41. Hdt. 5.13.2. Note Strabo's list of homonymous toponyms linking the Troad to Thrace, 13.1.21, C 590.

42. Hdt. 7.123-24, 127, and Thuc. 2.99.4 locate Mygdonia near the Macedonians (see Hammond, 1972, 182-83; N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia: Vol. II, 550-335 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 33-35). Strabo (above, note 40) brings the Mygdonians to Asia. Mygdon is king among the Phrygians in Asia in *Iliad* 3.186. Hyginus, *Fabulae* 191 calls Midas a Mygdonian king.
43. Diod. 5.48.3 traces the Dardanians "beyond Thrace" to Dardanus who, from his home on Samothrace, also established his rule over "many nations in Asia"; cf., Strabo 7, fr. 49, and *Iliad* 20.215-18 on Dardanus and Troy. On the historical Dardanians west of Macedonia, see Hammond, 1972, 60-71.
44. On the linguistic affinities of Phrygian, see Günter Neumann, *Phrygisch und Griechisch*, Sitzungsberichte, Vol. 499 (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988), and Claude Brixhe, "Le phrygien," in *Langues indo-européennes*, ed. F. Bader (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1994), 165-78. Towards a definition of the wider cultural background of the connections between Thrace and Phrygia, see Alexander Fol, "The Paredroi between 'Midas' City' and 'Midas' Gardens,'" in *Frige e Frigio. Atti del 1° Simposio Internazionale, Roma, 16-17 ottobre 1995*, ed. R. Gusmani, M. Salvini, and P. Vannicelli (Rome: Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche, 1997) 261-66; Maya Vassileva, "Thracian-Phrygian Cultural Zone," in *Thracians and Phrygians: Problems of Parallelism. Proceedings of an International Symposium on the Archaeology, History and Ancient Languages of Thrace and Phrygia, Ankara, 3-4 June 1995* (Ankara: Middle Eastern Technical University, Faculty of Architecture Press, 1998) 13-17.
45. *Iliad* 2.844-50, 21.140-211. On the Cicones, see Hdt. 7.59, 108, 110.
46. *Iliad* 2.862-63; 3.184-90; 13.792-93; 24.543-46.
47. *Iliad* 16.718-19.
48. HH 5, *To Aphrodite*, 111-12.
49. See above, note 33, on the historical King Midas.
50. *Iliad* 18.288-92, trans. by Richmond Lattimore.
51. Among the Attic playwrights of the Fifth Century, Phrygians are synonymous with Trojans. Edith Hall, "When did the Trojans turn into Phrygians? Alcaeus 42.15," *ZPE* 73 (1988): 15-18, argues that this identification was a novelty introduced early in the Fifth Century by Aeschylus. But the roots of this identification are clearly present already in Homer, and in the Homeric Hymns.
52. Darius in Thrace: Hdt. 4.89-96, 143. Megabazus subjugates Thracians and Macedonians: Hdt. 4.144, 5.1-2, 10, 14-23. Earth and water are demanded of Scythians: Hdt. 4.126, 127; Macedonians: Hdt. 5.18. Note the reference to Scythian neighbors of the Thracians in *Iliad* 13.3-6.
53. Hdt. 4.1, 11-12, 7.20.2.
54. According to Herodotus 5.13, Paeonians explained themselves to Darius at Sardis by declaring that they were descendents of Teucrus from Troy. Note that Thrace and Scythia also marked the farthest limits of the conquests of the fabulous Egyptian king, Sesostris, according to Herodotus 2.103.

55. For the main text on the Midas Monument (where Midas's name also occurs in secondary texts), see Claude Brixhe and Michel Lejeune, *Corpus des inscriptions paléo-phrygiennes* (Paris: Editions Recherche sur les civilisations, 1984), text M-01a, 6-17. For discussion of the titles of Midas in this Phrygian text, drawing attention especially to their relationship with Mycenaean Greek and Homeric titles, see George Huxley, "Titles of Midas," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 2 (1959): 85-99; Michel Lejeune, "A propos de la titulature de Midas," *Athenaeum* 47 (1969) 179-92; Cassola, 1997, 145-46.
56. Susanne Berndt-Ersöz, *Phrygian Rock-Cut Shrines: Structure, Function, and Cult Practice* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 126-31, 232-34. See also the discussion of Lynn E. Roller, *In Search of God the Mother: The Cult of Anatolian Cybele* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1999), 69-70 and 84-105. It is noteworthy that the son of Croesus, named Atys by Herodotus 1.34-45 (*cf.*, 7.27), has the same name as the dedicator of the Midas Monument; on the likelihood of this identification of Ates/Atys, see Berndt-Ersöz, 130, 166.
57. On the relationship between the Phrygian Mother and the Mother of the Gods, or Great Mother, among the Greeks and Romans, see Roller, 1999; see also Mark Munn, *The Mother of the Gods, Athens, and the Tyranny of Asia: A Study of Sovereignty in Ancient Religion* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2006), where the connection of the Mother to kingship is examined more closely than it is by Roller.
58. Plut. *Caes.* 9.3. See also Hyginus *Fabulae* 191.1 and 274.6.
59. Suda s.v. *Elegos thrēnos*. See also Hesychius s.v. *Mida theos*.
60. Diodorus 3.59.8 says King Midas took a leading role in building a temple and establishing the rites of Cybele, also called the Great Mother and Mother of the Gods. Clement *Protrepticus* 2.12 names Midas as a student of Odrysus (Orpheus) in the transmission of mystic rites, including those of the Mother of the Gods and the gods of Samothrace. Justin 11.7.14 notes that Midas was initiated by Orpheus and established rites throughout his kingdom. Polyaeus *Strategmata* 7.5 describes Phrygian rites of the Great Gods (the Samothracian gods, who included the Mother of the Gods) as instrumental in establishing the sovereignty of Midas.
61. Arr. *Anab.* 2.3.1-6; Just. 11.7.5-14. For other comparisons of these accounts see Eitrem, 1932, 1536-38; Tarn, 1948, 263-64; Frei, 1972, 110-15; Roller, 1984; Cassola, 1997, 141-42; Maya Vassileva, "King Midas and the Gordion Knot," *Thracia* 15 (2003): 371-78.
62. Aelian *De Natura Animalium* 13.1 refers to the eagle that appeared to Gordius as an omen for the kingship of Midas.
63. See Hdt. 1.78 and 84. The Telmessian identity assigned to the maiden by Arrian has been cited as a sign of an inauthentic element, created by or to gratify Aristander, the Telmessian seer who accompanied Alexander; see Frei, 1972, 121; Roller, 1984, 262, 268. This conclusion is unjustified. The prominence of Telmessian seers attested by Herodotus makes it more likely that Aristander's descent was an important qualification for his position, and the prominence of Telmessians specifically in a Lydian context makes the identity of the mother of Midas, specifically in a story handed down since the time of the Lydian kingdom, all the more plausible as a traditional element of the story.

64. Door leaves of a gateway are actually carved on the sides of the niche of the Arslankaya monument, a rock-cut façade closely contemporary to the Midas Monument, and preserving a carving of a standing image of the Mother between two lions within the niche, see Berndt-Ersöz, 2006, 222-24.
65. Ael. *VH* 12.45. The same omen of Midas is reported by Cicero *de Divinatione* 1.78, and Valerius Maximus 1.6, ext. 2.
66. Plut. *Them.* 31.1.
67. Hdt. 5.12-13, 98. This story is closely paralleled by one told by Nicolaus of Damascus, *FGrH* 90 F 71, as excerpted by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *de thematibus Asiae* 3, and used by him to explain how the theme called Thracesion in Asia Minor got its name. This version sets the tale in the time of Alyattes of Lydia (so also at Sardis), and has the king command the transfer of population from Thrace to Asia as a result of the innocent appearance of a Thracian water-bearer, not as part of a conspiracy to attract the eye of the king.
68. The classic study of these coins is by Ioannes Svoronos, *L'Hellénisme primitive de la Macédoine, prouvé par la numismatique*. *Journal International d'Archéologie Numismatique* 19 (Athens: Editions Ernest Leroux, 1919; repr., Chicago: Obol International, 1979). For more recent scholarship, see C. M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1976) 138-41; Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 69-91.
69. This is the view of Kraay, 1976, 139; see also M. J. Price and Nancy Waggoner, *Archaic Greek Coinage: The Asyut Hoard* (London: Vecchi and Sons, 1975).
70. It is noteworthy that all efforts heretofore to find an analogy to the cart of Gordius as a sign of royalty have pointed to examples of horse-drawn conveyances, usually chariots (e.g., the chariot of Zeus that preceded Xerxes, Hdt. 7.40; the Roman triumphal chariot; the royal chariot of Tara in Ireland), or more fanciful conveyances (the lion-drawn cart of Cybele), but never ox-carts; see Eitrem, 1932, 1537, and Frei, 1972, 116-20, with citations of earlier scholarship.
71. Hdt. 5.7. Royal descent from Hermes may be connected the prominence of Hermes in the Samothracian mysteries (Hdt. 2.51), and to the role of those mysteries in royal initiations (cf., the initiation of Philip and Olympias at Samothrace, Plut. *Alex.* 2.1; Curt. 8.1.26).
72. The wife of Midas is named in a list of those said to have invented coinage: Arist. fr. 611 no. 37 (Rose); Pollux *Onomasticon* 9.83.
73. Hdt. 1.30, 50-52, 92 (wealth of Croesus); 1.93, 5.101 (gold of Pactolus, from Mt. Tmolus); Sophocles *Philoctetes* 394; Strabo 13.4.5, C 625-26; A. Ramage and P. Craddock, *King Croesus' Gold: Excavations at Sardis and the History of Gold Refining*, Archaeological Exploration of Sardis, Monograph 11 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Art Museums, 2000).
74. Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 11.127-45; also *Hyginus Fabulae* 191.
75. Callisthenes *FGrH* 124 F 54 (from Strabo 14.5.28, C 680).
76. Conon (above, note 29).
77. See Hammond, 1972, 12-13, 312-13; Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 70-71; E. N. Borza, "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia," in *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, ed. W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (Washington: Univ. Press of America, 1982) 8-12.

78. Income from the area of the Strymon supplied Peisistratus during his tyranny at Athens: Hdt. 1.64; *Ath. Pol.* 15.2. Histiaeus of Miletus was rewarded by Darius by the grant of Myrcinus by the Strymon, where there were silver mines, and where Aristagoras of Miletus later was defeated by the Edonian Thracians: Hdt. 5.11, 23, 124, 126. The expansion of the Macedonian kingdom to the Strymon valley under Alexander I is related to the acquisition of mines: Hdt. 5.17. Mines around the mouth of the Strymon; Mt. Panagaeum, and on Thasos were the source of conflicts involving the Persians, Thasians, Edonians, Athenians, and Spartans: Hdt. 6.46-47; Thuc. 1.100.2-3, 4.105.1. Note also the wealth of tribute in gold and silver accumulated from Thrace by Seuthes, the Odrysian king: Thuc. 2.97.3.
79. Bion *FGrH* 14 F 3 = 332 F 3 (cited by Athen. 2.23, 45c).
80. Stephanus of Byzantium s.v. *Ōdones*.
81. On Nicander, see note 19 above. On the geography of the Maedi, Edones, and Odomantes, see Hdt. 5.16, 7.112, 114; Thuc. 1.100.3, 2.99.4, 101.3; Hammond and Griffith, 1979, maps 2, 3, and 4, 66-67, and 128.
82. [Arist.] *Mirabilium auscultationes* 833b.
83. Tyrtaeus fr. 2.6 (Edmonds); Aristoph. *Wealth* 284-89; *Plato Republic* 3, 408b; *Laws* 2, 660e.
84. See note 10 above, and Aristoph. *Wealth* 287.
85. Arist. *Pol.* 1.3.16, 1257b.
86. The incongruity would have been sharpest in light of the identification of Phrygians with Trojans, since Trojans had long been seen as forerunners of the Persians, paradigmatic of the barbarian rulers of Asia. See Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition Through Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989).
87. This would suggest that Alexander I was as active in disseminating Argead propaganda in Macedonia and Thrace as he was among the Hellenes, see E. N. Borza, "Athenians, Macedonians, and the Origins of the Macedonian Royal House," in *Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History and Topography, Presented to Eugene Vanderpool*, Hesperia Suppl. 19 (Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1982) 7-13. On Alexander I and his expansion of dominion to the east, see Hdt. 5.17; Just. 7.4.1-2; Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 98-104; Borza, 1990, 115-23.
88. Arr. *Anab.* 2.3.7 makes a point of the fact that Alexander was concerned that if he did not undo the Gordian knot and fulfill the oracle, this would become known and could give rise to some adverse movement within his army.
89. Arist. fr. 44 (Rose, from [Plutarch] *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 115.B); Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 75. Theopompus set the meeting specifically in Macedonia according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Letter to Pompeius* 787. On the hostility between the Academics (of whom Aristotle was one) and Theopompus, while the latter was at the court of Philip, see Flower, 1994, 17-25.
90. Arist. *Pol.* 1.3.16, 1257b; fr. 611 no. 37 (Rose).
91. Callisthenes *FGrH* 124 F 54, F 56.

92. On the possibility of absolute and god-like kingship, see Arist. *Pol.* 3.13.13, 1284a3-10, *cf.*, 13.13.24, 1284b 27-34. *Cf.*, also Isocrates *Letter 3, to Philip* 5: *Ouden gar estai loipon eti plēn theon genesthai.*
93. Charles F. Edson, "Strepsa (Thuc. 1.61.4)," *Classical Philology* 50 (1955): 187 n. 66; Fredricksmeyer, 1962, 163; Borza 1990, 81; Katerina Rhomiopoulou, *Lefkadia, Ancient Mieza* (Athens: Ministry of Culture, 1997).
94. Arist. fr. 44.11 (Rose, from [Plutarch] *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 115.B10): *Ō kratiste pantōn kai makaristotate.*
95. Plut. *Alex.* 7.3-4.
96. Arr. *Anab.* 1.23.8; Plut. *Alex.* 22.4. Diodorus 17.24.2 describes Ada's meeting with Alexander, without the symbolic niceties, simply as the occasion of her request that he recognize her rulership in Caria. The assimilation to divine status implied by Ada's adoption of Alexander is in keeping with the heroizing funerary cult attested for Carian royalty by the Mausoleum.
97. Curt. 9.6.26, 10.5.30. On the plausibility of this account in the context of other endeavors to deify the deceased in the time of Alexander, see E. D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman, OK: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2000) 217.
98. Brendan Burke, "Anatolian Origins of the Gordian Knot Legend," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 42 (2002): 255-61.
99. On the concept of the *oikoumenē* and its implications for legitimate sovereignty, see Munn, 2006, 188-96.
100. On the development of the meaning of "Asia" and its relation to the *oikoumenē*, see Munn, 2006, 178-220. For the use of the term, "Asia" specifically in the context of Alexander's conquests, see Stewart Oost, "The Alexander Historians and 'Asia,'" in *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson*, IBS 158, ed. H. J. Dell (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1981) 265-82.
101. Note the connection between the gathering of geographic information and conquest implied by the stories of Democedes and Darius (Hdt. 3.132-37), Scylax and Darius (Hdt. 4.44), Aristagoras and Cleomenes (Hdt. 5.49-50), Mardonius and Xerxes (Hdt. 7.5.3); note also the parodies of such origins of sovereign ambition by Aristophanes *Knights* 168-78, and *Birds* 175-86. For discussion of the relationship between geographic knowledge and sovereignty, see Munn, 2006, 193-96 and 213-20.
102. Note the conclusion reached by Oost, 1981, 282: "In Alexander's case, 'King of Asia' seems to be devoid of any specific meaning; it seems to signify little more than 'Great Conqueror,' or potential victorious ruler over vast lands." Similarly, E. A. Fredricksmeyer, "Alexander and the Kingship of Asia," in *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 136-66, is certainly correct in arguing that by claiming the kingship of Asia, Alexander was not claiming the Persian throne: "Alexander's kingship in Asia was a unique creation of Alexander himself" (165). Here we may add that the example of Midas had encouraged the imagination of this unique creation.

THE ROLE OF THE *Basilikoi Paides*
AT THE ARGEAD COURT

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It seems appropriate, in order to commemorate the seventy-fifth birthday of the dean of U.S. scholars of ancient Macedonia, a man who has been central to the evolution of our understanding of Philip II and Alexander III in the context of their native kingdom, to return to a topic on which I published at the beginning of my academic career, in 1981. Gene Borza's greatest scholarly accomplishment, epitomized by his *In the Shadow of Olympus: the Emergence of Macedon*, has been to craft an understanding of the cultural roots of the father and son who changed the course of Greek and ultimately Mediterranean history. In the years since 1981, important work in Macedonian studies has been done on sexuality at the Macedonian court, on hunting and banqueting, and on rites of passage. I would like to re-evaluate the institution of the *Basilikoi Paides*¹ in the light of this recent scholarship, focusing, as in my early article, on the conspiracy of Hermolaus.

Anglophone scholarship has long referred to Hermolaus and has other members of his group as "Pages" and the conspiracy that he led or inspired has been termed the "Pages' Conspiracy." This terminology is inappropriate because medieval pages were younger than most of the members of the Macedonian group, not an exclusively royal institution, and because the term in no way reflects the language of our sources. It is true that our sources use a variety of terms (which may or may not reflect actual Macedonian terminology) to refer to members of this group, but Arrian's diction may well replicate the Macedonian, so his usage—"Basilikoi Paides" or simply "Paides"—seems to be the best way to speak of them rather than to employ any

English translation.² “Boy” in English does have the advantage of replicating the Greek word’s ability to refer to either a slave or a male child, but, particularly in the plural, it seems oddly reminiscent of Peter Pan’s friends. Once I suggested “Royal Youths,” on the grounds that this usage provided a more accurate indication of the age of the *Paides*,³ but it too has no basis in extant ancient usage.

The importance of *Basilikoi Paides* to the Macedonian monarch and the elite has rarely been doubted. According to Arrian (4.13.1), they were responsible for the general care of the king, guarded him while he slept, took horses from the grooms to the king who then mounted Persian fashion,⁴ and they shared the rivalry of the hunt with him.⁵ Curtius, in addition to the tasks already mentioned, adds serving the king at banquets (although the *Paides* also dined, seated, with the king), discreetly bringing concubines to the king, and accompanying the king in battle (5.1.42, 8.6.2-6). Some have doubted that this last duty is historical,⁶ although the ability of the *Basilikoi Paides* to guard the king implies that they were armed and able to use weapons. Indeed, Aelian (*VH* 14.48) indicates that they had military training and something like battle readiness.⁷

Another area of dispute has been the origin of the Royal Youths. Arrian (4.13.1) says that it was a practice going back to the reign of Philip that the adolescent sons of Macedonian officials be enrolled for personal service to the king.⁸ Arrian’s statement does not necessarily mean that Philip invented the institution and some ancient sources speak of the *Paides* simply as a Macedonian custom.⁹ Dietmar Kienast, however, argued that Philip II modeled the *Basilikoi Paides*, as well as many other court and army practices, on a similar practice at the Persian court.¹⁰ Since the Argeads had intimate connections with the Persian court as early as the days of Alexander I (*Hdt.* 5.21.2; *Justin* 7.3.9), the institution of the *Paides* certainly could have had Persian origins that considerably predated the reign of Philip II. Nonetheless, the mere fact that Argead and Achaemenid practice resembled each other in some respect is not necessarily proof of Achaemenid influence on Macedonia.¹¹ The *Basilikoi*

Paides may have been an expansion of the practice of having cup-bearers, likely the work of Philip II as part of his general effort to centralize authority.¹² Kienast's suggestions were not so much wrong as simplistic,¹³ both in respect to the number of cultures he considered as the source of possible borrowing and in terms of his understanding of the nature of cultural influence. The Macedonian court borrowed from many cultures, including the Persian, both before and after the conquests of Alexander. It is distinctly possible that some borrowing was indirect rather than direct and that the "borrowing" was not so much a matter of copying and creating out of whole cloth an institution previously completely unknown, as it was a more subtle exchange in which, for instance, already existing customs were rationalized and given a certain non-native cultural tone. The result was often something neither traditionally Macedonian nor a duplication of foreign custom, an institution that endured until the end of Macedonian monarchy.¹⁴

The question of whether Philip invented the *Paides* out of whole cloth or streamlined and generalized an existing practice is related to the purpose of the group. The institution served a variety of needs. Curtius (5.1.42) observed that the duties of the *Paides* functioned as the training of great governors and leaders, and elsewhere (8.6.6), described the institution as a kind of training school or nursery for leaders, governors, and kings-to-be. He also believed that they were given some formal education (8.6.4).¹⁵ Aelian (*VH* 14.48) emphasized the importance of their military training.¹⁶ In addition, the institution served to tie the elite to the king (and his son¹⁷) and, in effect, centralize the elite.¹⁸ Perhaps it did so, in part, by threatening members of the elite into obedience because their sons were, in effect, hostages.¹⁹ In turn, the families of the *Paides* may have utilized them as their representatives, agents, even their spies at court.²⁰ From a social science point of view, the service of the *Paides* at court was itself a kind of rite of passage between childhood and full military adulthood.²¹

Evaluating the purpose of the institution is connected to the age of its members and to their numbers. No source clearly

states the age range of the members of the *Basilikoi Paidēs* and some scholars have thought they were quite young, between thirteen to fifteen years old,²² but a number of factors suggest that they were older, in their mid to late teens.²³ Two of the sources employ language that fits the later teens.²⁴ More indirect evidence also supports the idea that the *Paidēs* were not in, or at least not all in, early adolescence. Their duties were vital, as Alexander's near death when they conspired against him demonstrates. Defense of the person of the king would not have been consigned to children. Moreover, Alexander and Philip treated the *Paidēs* seriously; supposedly both had one or more *Paidēs* executed (Ael. VH 14.48; Curt. 8.8.20; Arr. *Anab.* 4.14.3). Alexander himself, after all, had led the cavalry charge at Chaeroneia when he was eighteen and taken the throne at barely twenty. Some of his friends were equally young when Philip exiled them. In Macedonia, maturity came early, especially for the prominent. Thus *opinio communis* now suggests that the boys became *Basilikoi Paidēs* around thirteen or fourteen and graduated from the group at the age of eighteen.²⁵

It is difficult to know whether virtually all males in the Macedonian elite served as *Paidēs*, or only one for each family,²⁶ or whether the group was considerably more select. This uncertainty is partially a consequence of the fact that we do not really know how many *Paidēs* served at a given time. At one point in Alexander's reign, there must have been more than fifty,²⁷ but we do not know how long boys tended to remain members of the group.²⁸ Surely the number of *Paidēs* must have fluctuated and changed over time. Whether or not Philip invented the institution, since he centralized control over Upper Macedonia and dramatically expanded the area he controlled and the size of the elite by recruiting new members, the number of *Paidēs* must similarly have increased greatly during his reign. Obviously, our lack of certainty about the overall size (both absolute and relative to the rest of the population) of the elite only compounds the problem. Granted the state of the evidence, it seems best to assume that many in the elite had served as *Paidēs*, but unwise to assume absolutely that all did.

In various ways, the *Paides* seem to have been a kind of focus of tension at court, partly because being younger than the rest of those in regular attendance at court they felt and acted more intensely than their elders without embracing particularly different values from the rest of the court. But youthful enthusiasm is not the only reason the group seems to have caused tension. The kind of personal services that the *Paides* provided the king were, as Curtius (8.6.2) specifically points out, not very different from those performed by slaves, despite the fact that they came from the most distinguished families in the kingdom. The *Paides* were, more or less by definition, an ambiguous group.²⁹ Aelian (VH 14.48) observes that Philip accepted this personal service from elite youths, not it is said, to insult (*enhubrizon* is the word he uses) nor to hold them cheap, but to train them. Aelian then proceeds to stories of punishments by flogging or death for seemingly minor infractions. Both authors, in short, see the slavish nature of the *Paides'* duties as an implicit threat to the honor and status of the young men. Aelian's choice of a verb whose root involves *hubris* (outrage), so often a euphemism for rape and always an action that challenges individual liberty, may be significant. The potential threat to honor may have been understood as sexual, or partially sexual.

Although we have no certain knowledge that any Macedonian king took a member of the group as an *eromenos*, we do know that there were pairs of lovers among them.³⁰ Probably there were also sexual relationships involving *Basilikoi Paides* and older members of the army and court. As we have seen, unlike other youths of their age, the *Basilikoi Paides* regularly attended royal symposia, serving the king at table as well as dining themselves. In general, in the Hellenic world, attendance at symposia signified adulthood, most especially sexual adulthood.³¹

From the Greek point of view, the thing that made sexual relationships between older and younger youths a good thing was that the relationships inspired both partners to do noble and great things, particularly in terms of battle, as in the

famous instance of the Sacred Band. On the other hand, we also know that great care had to be exercised in terms of action and understanding so that sexual relationships did not compromise masculine honor for either partner. The *Paides*, by their presence alone but also by the nature of their duties and the nature of the king's power over them, generated sexual tension, a sensitivity about honor and infringements against it, and a degree of hostile competition that could and did lead to explosions of violence.³² By inventing or expanding this institution, Philip succeeded in gaining several advantages, but, in doing so, he also assumed a number of risks.

While it is possible that *Basilikoi Paides* were involved in earlier attempts at regicide, most notably the assassination of Archelaus, this is hardly a certainty.³³ What is certain is that in 327 a group of the *Paides* planned to kill Alexander. Callisthenes,³⁴ the expedition historian and Aristotle's nephew, had recently refused to perform *proskynesis* to Alexander, though the king very much wanted his Macedonian and Greek courtiers to perform this gesture, just as his Persian courtiers already did. Callisthenes's resistance led to the failure of Alexander's effort. Though not generally popular with the Macedonians at court, Callisthenes was much respected by members of the *Basilikoi Paides* and may have functioned as a kind of tutor to them. Although Alexander used the discovery of the conspiracy against him to eliminate Callisthenes, it was primarily a Macedonian affair.

Like so many other events, one could make a distinction between the immediate, short term cause of the conspiracy and the more long-term, underlying cause. As is widely recognized, after the death of Darius, Alexander had begun to adopt aspects of Persian kingship and increasingly the Macedonians, particularly the elite, resisted these alterations in traditional kingship. Perhaps all the *Paides*, and certainly fifty of them joined Alexander's campaign as part of the reinforcements brought by Amyntas, son of Andromenes in 331/330.³⁵ Soon after their arrival, Philotas, a close associate of Amyntas, was accused of plotting against the king and executed; his famous

father Parmenio was also killed. Amyntas, so recently their leader, stood trial, essentially because of his association with Philotas. He was acquitted, but clearly fell from favor. A year or two later Alexander killed Cleitus at a symposium; both were drunk, but Cleitus's major grievance was clearly objection to his Persianizing ways. Within months of Cleitus's death, Alexander married his first wife, a Bactrian, and tried but failed to impose *proskynesis*, a gesture simply indicating the recognition of social superiority to Persians but one that Greeks and Macedonians performed only to deities.³⁶ Soon after this failed attempt, a group of the *Paides* conspired against Alexander. Thus the broad context of the conspiracy was the resistance of the Macedonian elite to changes in kingship,³⁷ a resistance that must have been particularly strongly felt by youths who had not been present for the great victories of the early campaign but arrived, fresh from traditional Macedonia, just in time for the imposition of Alexander's innovations, growing dissent because of the innovations, and the difficulties of what had become a kind of guerilla war. Thus, even though the conspirators may have been only a few years younger than some of the men of Alexander's inner circle, their experience and values would have been quite different.

Nonetheless, a specific incident, rich in cultural meaning, triggered the conspiracy. According to Arrian (4.13.2), a wild boar charged Alexander and Hermolaus struck it before Alexander could. Alexander, having missed his chance at the kill, was outraged and in his anger commanded that Hermolaus be flogged in front of the other *Paides* and deprived of his horse. In Curtius's version of the incident (8.6.7), the boar does not charge the king; Hermolaus simply is first to attack a boar the king had intended to pursue. Curtius mentions only the one punishment, flogging.³⁸ In Arrian's narrative (4.13.3-4), Hermolaus tells Sostratus, his age-mate, another member of the *Paides*, and his *erastes*, that life would not be tolerable until he had taken vengeance on Alexander for his act of *hubris*. Not only Sostratus, but Antipater son of Asclepiodorus, Epimenes son of Arseus, Anticles son of Theocritus, and Philotas son of Carsis joined the plot. In Curtius's account (8.6.7-11), Sostratus

is the instigator of the conspiracy (Curtius even speculates that, apart from the dishonor to his lover, Sostratus may already have been angry with Alexander for some other reason). Like Arrian, Curtius names Antipater, Philotas, Anticles, and Epimenes, but he also includes Asclepiodorus, Aphthonius, and Nicostratus. Members of the *Basilikoi Paides*, by definition, came from important families; based on the spotty information extant about the fathers of the conspirators, one must conclude that their families were not unimportant, but not part of the small circle of great Macedonian clans.³⁹ When by chance or warning Alexander failed to appear on the evening slated for the assassination, the delay led to the revelation of the plot. Arrian says (4.13.7-14.3) that those named were arrested and tortured. Arrian summarizes a speech (reported by several sources, he notes) that Hermolaus supposedly gave when summoned before the Macedonians; afterwards, he and the other conspirators were stoned to death. Curtius's lengthier account includes the supposed speech of Hermolaus as well as the speech Alexander gives in response. Curtius also mentions torture, but it happens after the assembly and speeches, as part of the execution of the conspirators (8.6.20-8.23).

We must now consider the motivation for this conspiracy. Unfortunately, our sources are, in a direct way, of limited use for motivation. They do, however, make fairly clear that Callisthenes, even if one pictures him as the official tutor of the *Paides* and a close associate of Hermolaus, was not a significant factor. Arrian (4.14.1-2) notes that while Ptolemy and Aristobulus claimed that Callisthenes had inspired the conspiracy, other authorities say that Alexander simply used the conspiracy as an excuse to get rid of the man he now so detested, taking advantage of Callisthenes's supposed closeness to Hermolaus. Other accounts (Plut. *Alex.* 55.2-3; Curt. 8.6.24-25) also support the notion that Callisthenes was either innocent or only indirectly involved. In terms of understanding why the conspiracy happened, Callisthenes is a red herring.

Though Callisthenes's story is a sad one, my interest here is the motivation of the teenaged Macedonians who plotted to kill Alexander.⁴⁰ The closest Plutarch comes to an explanation

is the highly dubious story that Hermolaus asked Callisthenes how to acquire the greatest glory and Callisthenes told him to do it by killing the one who had the greatest glory (*Alex.* 55.2). Arrian (4.13.3-4), as we have noted, reports that Hermolaus considered the king's treatment of him to be *hubris* and wanted vengeance. The perception that what Alexander had done was hubristic presumably explains why the other *Basilikoi Paidēs* joined in, although Arrian certainly does not say this directly.⁴¹ Arrian reinforces this understanding of Hermolaus's motivation when he has the youth tell (Arr. 4.14.2) the Macedonians who were trying him that a free man could not endure the king's *hubris* and has him connect his own experience to that of Philotas, Parmenio, Cleitus, the king's adoption of Persian dress, *proskynesis*, and Alexander's drinking and sleeping habits. Curtius says that Hermolaus was angry because of the ignominy (8.6.7), and later has Hermolaus give a defense speech (8.7.1-15) full of rhetoric about political liberty and a laundry list of grievances. He says Alexander treats them like slaves not free men, lists those Alexander has killed despite the great services rendered by them, claims Alexander has punishment administered by social inferiors, turns against his former supporters, rewards the long-suffering Macedonians with punishment, makes the victors submit to the conquered, has tried to make the Macedonians perform *proskynesis*, and has rejected Philip in favor of Zeus Ammon. Like Arrian, Curtius does not address the reasons for the participation of the other *Paidēs* (except for his presumption that Sostratus's inspiration was entirely personal), but the speech would imply that the conspirators shared Hermolaus's political complaints.

While the speeches paraphrased or recounted in Arrian and Curtius do not inspire much confidence, the perception that Alexander's initial punishment of Hermolaus somehow typified what was generally wrong, that it exemplified his tyranny because of its *hubris*, seems common to both accounts and is, in itself, not implausible. One must, however, then ask why Alexander's punishment was understood as hubristic. Apparently, the king traditionally had the right to have *Paidēs* flogged for infractions (Curt. 8.6.5, 8.3-4).⁴² Flogging was not

just painful but demeaning. Curtius (8.8. 3-4) has Alexander claim not only that Macedonian kings imposed it on the *Basilikoi Paidēs*, but that it was something done to students by their teachers, by husbands to their wives, and even by slaves to boys of their age. More generally in the Hellenic world, flogging was associated with the other sort of *paidēs*: slaves, and children.⁴³ The punishment highlighted the fact that the person upon whom it was inflicted was not a free adult male. Thus, Hermolaus and the others would not have seen the punishment itself as hubristic, but one merited only by a grave infraction and they must have considered the incident with the boar inappropriate for its imposition. Alexander, clearly, thought otherwise.

One possible reason that Alexander could have had for viewing the offense so seriously was that Hermolaus had somehow violated the rules of royal hunts.⁴⁴ Although Persian court practice supposedly required that no one attack a hunting quarry before the king, there is no evidence that this was also Macedonian practice. Certainly neither Curtius nor Arrian make such a claim. The Macedonian court had not generally been one characterized by elaborate rules and regulation. One could conclude that Alexander had recently chosen to impose this particular Persian royal custom on his courtiers, but the content of the speech attributed to Hermolaus by both ancient authors contains only general objections to Alexander's Persianizing ways. It is hard to believe that they or their sources would have omitted the Persian context of Alexander's actions if they believed there was one. Moreover, the reaction of Hermolaus and his friends implies that they had no expectation of such rules, Macedonian or Persian. Arrian's choice of words (4.13.2) implies that the king acted on impulse, out of personal anger (*orgē*) rather than in response to the violation of court rules, old or new. The pursuit of honor, so characteristic of Alexander and the rest of elite, often led to anger because of competition for *timē*. Alexander, notorious for his emulation of Achilles, not infrequently replicated his supposed ancestor's characteristic wrath. Alexander, at least, would have understood his anger as heroic, not despotic.⁴⁵ Of course, whatever Alexander's personal

motivation (let alone his own understanding of it), Hermolaus and the rest, even if our sources have failed to realize it, might have understood the king to be adopting yet another practice of Persian monarchy, but this would relate to *their* motivation, not to Alexander's. Alexander's motivation seems clearly related to the competitiveness of the court in all matters and particularly at hunting. Macedonians risked life and limb in pursuit of success at the hunt. Those who stepped between the king and his intended quarry, even if they did so because they believed the king was in danger (as we have seen, the accounts of Arrian and Curtius offer varying views of whether Hermolaus was so motivated), risked royal anger. A king who needed to be helped was, to some degree, compromised, another man's *timē* increased, the king's decreased. Lysimachus was not flogged but suffered considerably for his attempt to assist Alexander in the hunt and he was far more than a mere member of the *Paides*.⁴⁶ Alexander flogged Hermolaus for reasons arising from the values of the Macedonian elite, not because of Persian practice.⁴⁷

Similarly, the motivation of Hermolaus and the rest had a specifically Macedonian origin, one I failed to notice in 1981.⁴⁸ Macedonians could not recline at the symposium—the mark of adulthood in the Hellenic world—until they had speared a boar without using a net; until then they had to continue to sit at banquets, like children, no matter how old they were (*Athen.* 18a).⁴⁹ Alexander's action in punishing Hermolaus for killing the boar was literally emasculating him;⁵⁰ in effect he was punishing him for trying to reach manhood and negating the implication that he had by inflicting a punishment dealt out only to those who were not free adult males.⁵¹ In addition, as we have seen, Arrian mentions that Hermolaus was not only flogged but that his horse—surely a symbol of his elite status, vital to both battle and the hunt⁵²—was also removed. This denial of status was doubtless what Hermolaus and the rest found hubristic and tyrannical. Tyrants threatened the honor of other males and thus, as in the case of the assassins of Archelaus, tended to precipitate acts of vengeance meant to reestablish the *timē* of those so offended. Indeed, Archelaus's assassins, like Hermolaus, may have acted because

they perceived that the king, by various acts, was denying them adult status (see below). In any event, it is this motivation that explains why other *Paides* joined Hermolaus and Sostratus: the king's punishment threatened the honor of all of them because it demonstrated his willingness to refuse them deserved adult status.⁵³ It would be a mistake to insist that an honor killing in Macedonia was merely a personal act;⁵⁴ central to the workings of the Argead court is the absence of a line between the personal and the political.

While I think this offense against *timē* was the primary motivation of the conspirators, other factors may also have played a role. The relative youth of the conspirators doubtless made them more hotheaded than older members of the expedition. They may have heard complaints about Alexander from their fathers and other adults, but, unlike their elders, they acted rather than merely complaining.⁵⁵ The sexual relationships in the group probably contributed to sensitivity to honor; as I noted long ago, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, directly or indirectly, should be considered models.⁵⁶ Some of the conspirators may have cherished individual grievances.⁵⁷ Hatzopoulos has argued that Hermolaus and the other *Paides* were older than *Basilikoi Paides* would ordinarily have been. He believes that, lacking new members of the group because he received no reinforcements from Macedonia, Alexander prolonged their service as *Paides*, forcing them to remain, functionally, children when ordinarily they would have passed on to service in the Companion cavalry.⁵⁸ Obviously, in this circumstance, both the king's punishment of the very act that ordinarily conveyed social adulthood, and his imposition of flogging as a punishment, would have been particularly inflammatory. Hatzopoulos's argument is highly speculative and is, of course, not directly confirmed by any of our sources, but it is intriguing. Nothing more is heard of the *Basilikoi Paides* until Alexander's death (Curt. 10.5.8), possibly indicating that the king had temporarily abolished the institution, perhaps in recognition that the remaining members of the group were indeed too old to perform their quasi-servile role.

The Hermolaus Conspiracy not only demonstrates that aristocratic resistance to Alexander had come to involve members of the elite from all generations, but that understanding the resistance as hostility to Persians and Persian customs is, minimally, an over-simplification. Elite objections to Alexander's Persianizing and the series of recent confrontations at court formed the background for the Hermolaus conspiracy. But in the foreground was the apparent hatred of Hermolaus and the others for the king because he had become the kind of ruler who liked customs that seemed to threaten their personal and political identities. Archelaus and Philip II were killed because their assassins believed that they, too, were rulers who threatened the honor of members at their court. The desire of Macedonian kings to rule more absolutely and the resistance of the elite to that was not something new in the reign of Alexander, or necessarily Persian. As someone given to acts of *hubris*, a king could inspire his subjects to implement the glamorous tradition of tyrannicide, one followed not infrequently in Macedonia.

NOTES

1. For general discussions of the *Basilikoi Paides*, see H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf Prosopographischer Grundlage*, 2 vols. (Munich: Beck, 1926) 1: 37-39; N. G. L. Hammond, "Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys Trained in the Macedonian Manner During the Period of the Temenid Monarchy," *Historia* 39 (1990): 261-90; W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (London: Routledge, 1992) 237-44; E. Koulakiotis, "Domination et résistance à la cour d'Alexandre: Le cas des basilikoi paides," in *Esclavage antique et discriminations socio-culturelles*, ed. V. I. Anastasiadis and P. N. Doukellis, *Actes du XXVIII colloque GIREA, Mytilene, 5-7 December, 2003* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2005) 167-82. See also E. D. Carney, "The Conspiracy of Hermolaus," *Classical Journal* 76 (1980-81): 223-31; Carney, "Regicide in Macedonia," *Parola del passato* 211 (1983): 260-72, and M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Cultes et Rites De Passage en Macédoine, Meletemata* 19 (Athens: Kentron Hellenikes kai Romaikes Archaioytetos, 1994) 87-110.
2. Berve, 1926, 1: 39, argues for preferring the terminology of Arrian on the basis of the authority of Arrian's main sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus. See references to more variants and a useful discussion in Heckel, 1992, 241, who wonders if there really was a "term" or official Macedonian usage for the group.
3. Carney, 1980-81, 227.
4. See A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995) 92-93. This method of mounting, not necessarily Persian in origin, was recommended for the old and infirm; while one might not put Philip in either category, he had, of course, suffered a serious wound to his thigh. P. Briant, "Sources Gréco-Hellénistiques, Institutions Perses et Institutions Macédoniennes: Continuités, Changements et Bricolages," in *Continuity and Change, Achaemenid History* 8 edited by H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, A. Kuhrt, and M. C. Root (Leiden: NINO, 1994) 300-01, argues convincingly that this passage is not as good evidence for the Persian origin of the *Paides* as D. Kienast, *Philipp II, von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden*, *Abhandlungen der Marburger Gelehrten Gesellschaft* 6, 1971 (Munich: Fink, 1973), had said it was; Briant observes that the method of mounting a horse is copied because, in the absence of stirrups, the problem of mounting is the same for any heavy-armed cavalryman.
5. Hammond, 1990, 262-63, believes that only *Basilikoi Paides* and princes hunted with the king because of the dangers of assassination. He bases his conclusion on M. Andronicos, *Vergina: the Royal Tombs and the Ancient City* (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon, 1984) 117, who identified the participants in the Lion Hunt frieze from Tomb II at Vergina as the *Paides*, accompanying Alexander and Philip. Since the identity of the lion hunt participants is widely disputed this is dubious; see, for instance, discussion and references in Hatzopoulos, 1994, 93-94, and O. Palagia, "Hephaestion's pyre and the royal hunt of Alexander," in *Alexander in Fact and Fiction*, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 27, who concluded that the scene shows both *Paides* and older members of court. During Alexander's reign, we also have evidence that Craterus (Plut. *Alex.* 40.4) and Lysimachus (Curt. 8.1.14)—neither princes nor *Paides*—hunted with the king.

6. So Bosworth, 1995, 93, who points out that they are never mentioned in battle and suggests that Curtius drew a false inference from his source. W. Heckel, "King and 'Companions': Observations on the Nature of Power in the Reign of Alexander," in *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, ed. J. Roisman (Leiden: Brill, 2003) 206 n. 40, thinks that they did "occasionally" go into battle.
7. This passage refers to the disciplining of two individuals by Philip for infractions of military discipline, but it is not clear whether the two individuals named are *Paides* or whether Aelian has made a transition from talking about this group to discussing Philip's general discipline. Koulakiotis, 2005, 172, views the accounts of the institution by all three authors as based on anti-Macedonian, and ultimately Athenian sources, although only Aelian seems hostile. Curtius 8.6.3 notes the similarities between their duties and those of slaves, but it is not clear that he is being anything more than objective; their duties did include many tasks ordinarily performed by slaves. Uneasiness seems to be the reaction of these Greek authors rather than hostility.
8. Arrian describes the fathers as Macedonians "*en telei*." "*Telos*" can refer to either civil or military office.
9. Curtius simply describes the institution as customary (8.6.2), and Valerius Maximus 3.3. Ex. I, refers to it as an old Macedonian custom in the days of Alexander the Great. Hammond, 1990, 262, suggests that the source for both Roman authors' statements was the Macedonian Marsyas of Pella. Aelian (VH 14.48) merely reports that Philip had such an institution and does not comment on its origin. Berve, 1926, 2: 37; J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976) 161; Kienast, 1973, 265, believes that Arrian's statement must mean that Philip invented the *Paides*, but G. T. Griffith in N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia: Vol. II, 550-335 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 401; Hammond, 1990, 261-64; and Koulakiotis, 2005, 169, do not. I find the latter view more persuasive.
10. Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.9.3-4) describes the Persian equivalent of the *Paides*. Kienast, 1973, 255, argued that the creation of not only the *Paides*, but the *Somatophylakes*, the *Hypaspists* and as well as changes in the *Hetairos* body were all done on a Persian model.
11. Briant, 1994, 284; and see 298-302 for a convincing refutation of Kienast's arguments and the conclusion that the *Paides*, like the similar Persian custom, had their origin in local not borrowed custom. E. N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon*, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992) 249, and W. Heckel, 1992, 239, find Kienast's argument persuasive.
12. Koulakiotis, 2005, 170. Bosworth, 1995, 90-99, notes that Arrian's diction is compatible with the idea of Philip systematizing an earlier, irregular practice. Even in Alexander's reign Macedonian kings had cupbearers. Iolaus, son of Antipater, was Alexander's cupbearer (Diod. 17.118.1; Arr. *Anab.* 7.2.7; Just. 12.14.9), as was, perhaps, his brother Philip (Just. 12.14.9). J. Bremmer, "Adolescence, Symposion and Pederasty," in *Symptotica: A Symposium on the Symposion*, ed. O. Murray, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990) 140-41, interprets these northern Greek cupbearers as the continuation of older, even Homeric ways but, as we have noted with other Macedonian Homeric customs, the institution may not have been preserved, but created in self-conscious imitation of Homer. Bremmer also

points out that both Iolaus and Pyrrhus's cupbearer are said to have had lovers or been pursued by lovers, so the sexual tension the presence of the *Paidēs* clearly generated (see below) was part of the older role of cupbearer and as Bremmer rightly notes, went all the way back to the stories of Ganymede. Heckel, 1992, 293, believes that the cupbearers were also members of the *Paidēs* although they held a more defined position than the rest.

13. Koulakiotis, 2005, 168, sees the institution as influenced by a blend of factors: Philip's desire for a more modern education for the elite, archaic custom, and possible foreign influence from Persia or Thebes (see also a discussion of a possible Spartan model: N. Birgalias, "'Basilikoi Paidēs' ste Makedonia kai 'Politikoi Paidēs' ste Sparte," *Archaia Makedonia* 6.1 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1999) 143-52.

14. Hammond, 1990, 271-72. When Perseus fled to Samothrace after the battle of Pydna, he was accompanied by *Basilikoi Paidēs* (Livy 45.6.7).

15. See below on Callisthenes's possible role in this formal education. Heckel, 2003, 206, believes that not only Callisthenes but Aristotle was tutor to the *Paidēs*. Koulakiotis, 2003, 168, n. 4, puts the institution in the context of reorganization of education in the Fourth Century.

16. Here I assume that Aelian VH 14.48 refers exclusively to Philip's disciplining of the *Paidēs* (see above, n. 7). Koulakiotis, 2005, 170-71 stresses the military character of their training as characteristic of the military nature of the wider court.

17. Heckel, 2003, 206, especially n. 41.

18. Berve, 1926, 1: 37; Kienast, 1973, 30, followed by Heckel, 1992, 240, see it as fostering stability at court and in general.

19. U. Wilcken, *Alexander the Great*, ed. E. Borza, trans. G. C. Richards (New York: Norton, 1967) 33; Kienast, 1973, 266; Carney, 1980-81, 227.

20. F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse: das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens. Akademie der Wissenschaften - Philosophisch-historische Klasse* 285 (Sitzb. Vienna, 1973) 68.

21. Hatzopoulos, 1994, 94-95; J. Roisman, "Honor in Alexander's Court," in *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, ed. J. Roisman (Leiden: Brill, 2003) 303; Koulakiotis, 2005, 171. Roisman points out that typically, in a rite of passage, the young play roles opposite to those they will fill as adults. *Paidēs* may have had a distinctive dress: see discussion and references in Koulakiotis, 2005, 171, n.16. Much depends on interpretation of the controversial hunting fresco on the façade of Tomb II at Vergina (see above n. 5).

22. Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 168; Robin Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great*, (London: Allen Lane for Longman, 1973) 326.

23. See Carney, 1980-81, 228 on the ages of the *Paidēs*, as well as Bosworth, 1995, 91, who, unaware of Carney's earlier discussion, reaches a similar, if less specific conclusion: they were between puberty and military age (presumably eighteen).

24. Arrian (4.13.1) says they were those of the elite "*es elikian emeirakieuonto*." LSJ says that this verb means, "to reach puberty" and cites this very passage as a source, but defines "*elikia*" as "manhood or the mature useful years, military age." Curtius (5.1.42, 8.6.2) calls the *Paidēs* "*liberos adultos*" or "*adultos liberos*,"

a phrase more suggestive of late than early teens. Curtius (8.6.25) has Callisthenes say to Hermolaus and the others after Alexander had flogged him that they were now men. The passage is hardly likely to report Callisthenes's actual language but does offer evidence about Curtius's understanding of their age. On the other hand, Curtius (8.6.5) lists among the honors given to members of the group that they could dine with the king sitting, a piece of information that presumes that, at least as a group, they had not yet all killed their first boar (see discussion of the importance of killing a boar below).

25. See n. 23 above. Hatzopoulos, 1994, followed by Koulakiotis, 2005, 170-71, believes that this age range is certain, based on non-royal Hellenistic practice.

26. Griffith, 1979, 401, doubts that more than one brother from the same family would have served at the same time (apparently because he believes that families would have been unwilling to risk more than one) and supposes that sixty or seventy families were, therefore, represented in body of *Paides* at any given moment.

27. Diodorus (17.65.1) and Curtius (5.1.42) both note that a new draft of fifty *Basilikoi Paides* from Macedonia arrived to serve in Alexander's expedition in 331. Hammond, 1990, 265-68, argued that this was the first group of *Paides* to serve Alexander (apparently followed by Koulakiotis, 2005, 170, who simply states that there were in total fifty), but Bosworth, 1995, 92, points out that Diodorus (17.36.5) refers to *Basilikoi Paides* who prepare a bath and a meal for the king after the battle of Issus in 333. He rightly rejects Hammond's summary dismissal of Diodorus's testimony. Berve, 1926, 1: 37 n. 3, suggests about one hundred total members; Griffith, 1979, 401, estimates an overall membership around eighty-five (a number Heckel, 1992, 240, n.13 considers too low); Hammond, 1990, 266, assumes a figure of two hundred. See Griffith, 1979, 401; Hammond, 1990, 265-68; and Bosworth, 1995, 91-92, for differing discussions of the possible frequency with which *Paides* were replaced or rotated out of the unit.

28. Hammond, 1990, 266 imagines various stages in the careers of *Basilikoi Paides* and that they fought in battle only in the last year; the evidence is too thin to support his rather broad assertions, although, as guesses or estimates, they are not implausible.

29. Roisman, 2003, 302.

30. Hermolaus and his lover Sostratus (a boy of the same age; Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.3); Epimenes and his lover Charicles (Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.7), who may or may not have been a *Basilikos Pais* himself (see Heckel, 1992, 290).

31. See discussion in Bremmer, 1990.

32. Since my early discussion of sexual tensions at the Macedonian court, particularly in relation to regicide (Carney, 1980-81, 262-72), there has been much more work: D. Ogden, "Homosexuality and Warfare in Ancient Greece," in *Battle in Antiquity*, ed. A. B. Lloyd (London: Focus, 1996) 107-68; "Alexander's Sex Life," in *Alexander the Great: a New History*, ed. W. Heckel and L. Tritle (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009) forthcoming; K. Mortensen, "Homosexuality in the Macedonian Court," *Archaiia Makedonia* 7 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies) forthcoming; J. Reames-Zimmerman, "An atypical affair? Alexander the Great, Hephaistion Amyntoros and the nature of their relationship," *Ancient History Bulletin* 13.3 (1999) 81-96.

33. As we have seen, it is not known if the institution existed yet and the extant sources on the death of Archelaus (Arist. *Pol.* 1311b; Diod. 14.37.6) do not refer to the assassins as *Paides*. Hammond, 1990, 263, assumes they were because he believed that only they and the king's sons hunted with the king (see above n. 5 for the problems with this assumption). The lover of Archelaus, said by Diodorus (14.37.6) to have killed the king accidentally while hunting, could have been a member of the *Paides*, but his presence at the hunt does not prove it, *pace* Hammond. Hatzopoulos, 1994, 96, agrees with Hammond, not only because of the assassins' role in the hunt but also because some were *eromenoi* of the king and because flogging (see below) was used against one of them.

34. See W. Heckel, *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006) 76-77, for discussion and references.

35. See n. 27. Hammond, 1990, 265-68, pictured arrivals of fifty in each subsequent year (see below on the feasibility of further reinforcements). As Bosworth, 1996, 113, n. 71, notes, if Hammond's suggestion is correct, then some of the *Paides* would have been very newly come and so even more shocked. Like Bosworth (followed by Koulakiotis, 2005, 175), I doubt that Hammond's surmise is correct. Bosworth also, however, suggests that Antipater (one of the conspirators along with Hermolaus) may only have arrived in Bactria with his father in 329/8. Bosworth also assumes that the *Paides* took no part in the campaign against the Sogdian rebellion and so were witness to the failed attempt at *proskynesis* but not the death of Cleitus.

36. On these events, see Bosworth, 1988, 108-18.

37. Koulakiotis, 2005, 175, n. 26, suggests that Alexander's suspicion that people were plotting against him (and his willingness to act on the suspicion without evidence, or at least much evidence) resembled paranoid fears of slave uprisings or conspiracies.

38. Plutarch (*Alex.* 55.2-3) does not even refer to the hunting incident in his brief account of the conspiracy. Instead, he seems to believe it was inspired only by Callisthenes's rhetoric (see below).

39. E. Badian, "Conspiracies," in *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Bayhnam (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 70, considers them unimportant; Heckel, 2003, 223 n. 97, points out that Antipater's father was a former satrap and generally argues that they were men with a certain prominence. Curtius (8.8.18) claims that Alexander, abandoning Macedonian tradition, not only did not kill the kin of the conspiring *Paides*, but did not demote them either. The truth seems mixed or at least unclear: Sopolis's career may have suffered and so may Asclepiodorus's; nothing is certain (Carney, 1980-81, 229, ns. 26-28, *cf.*, Heckel, 2006, 58). On the fathers who can be identified, see discussion and references in Heckel, 2006, 253 (Sopolis), 57-58 (Asclepiodorus); and Heckel, 1992, 295 (Carsis).

40. See Carney, 1980-81; and E. D. Carney, "Hunting and the Macedonian Elite: Sharing the Rivalry of the Chase," in *The Hellenistic World: New Perspectives*, ed. D. Ogden (London: Classical Press of Wales, 2002) 59-80.

41. See below for further discussion of reasons why others joined the conspiracy. Koulakiotis, 2005, 173 suggests that in this and other court conspiracies, ties of *philia*—always involving the notion of reciprocity—contributed to group action.

Moreover, presumably many of the boys were age mates who had grown up together, quite possibly from a date well before their entry into the *Paides*.

42. Hammond, 1990, 262, understands Curtius (8.8.3) to say that the flogging of *Basilikoi Paides* for infractions was an ancestral custom practiced by the most ancient Macedonian kings. Curtius's statement, however, does not clearly say that; as written, the phrase about ancestral custom could as easily apply simply to the punishment, flogging. It is not clear evidence for the existence of the *Paides* in much more ancient times, or for flogging as a punishment uniquely limited to them, or for flogging as a punishment specifically for insolence at hunting by members of the group. Thus, I cannot agree with Hammond (1990, 263) that Decamnichus, whom Archelaus had flogged for insulting Euripides (Arist. *Pol.* 1311b) must have been a *Pais*, although he certainly could have been (Carney, 1983, 271-2, and Heckel, 1992, 238, both consider it possible but do not, as Hammond does, treat it as undisputed fact).

43. Roisman, 2003, 303, especially n. 63. See also M. Golden, "PAIS, 'Child' and 'Slave,'" *L'Antiquité Classique* 54 (1985) 91-104.

44. For recent discussions of hunting at the Macedonian court, see Carney, 2002; Koulakiotis, 2005. See also J. M. Barringer, *The Hunt in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2001).

45. W. V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001) 235-37, makes the connection between Achilles's anger and Alexander's, but Harris's analysis of the role of anger in Homer and the heroic code (131-56) tends to oversimplify Homer's view of the exercise of anger by Achilles and other heroes. Harris, in his discussion of Alexander, recognizes the ambivalence of many about Alexander but discounts that ambivalence in terms of anger in general. He also seems to ignore Philip II's wrathful qualities (240).

46. While Curtius's version offers little support for the view that Hermolaus acted to save the king, Arrian's version allows for that interpretation. The situation is similar to the hunting incident involving Alexander and Lysimachus, an incident that led to punishment as well, but a far less severe one. Craterus had a more positive experience in a similar situation. See Palagia, 2000, 184; Carney, 2002, *passim*, and 64 n. 60; Roisman, 2003, 316.

47. Koulakiotis, 2005, 179-82, simply assumes that Alexander's actions speak to Persian custom, part of his growing absolutism. While this is possible, it takes something our sources do not indicate at all as the central point of the conspiracy. On the role of hunting at the Macedonian court and the importance of competition, see discussion and references in Carney, 2002; Roisman, 2003, 313-17.

48. Here I differ considerably from my earlier views, when I described the motivation of the conspirators as "fairly obvious" (Carney, 1980-81, 230). As I have tried to indicate, I now see their motivation as a complex interaction of several factors.

49. See E. Carney, "Symposia and the Macedonian Elite: The Unmixed Life," *Syllecta Classica* 18 (2007): forthcoming, for discussion and references to the role of sympotic activity in Macedonian elite life.

50. Koulakiotis, 2005, 177, attempts to argue that physical violence was somehow only a masculine trait; the violent acts, real and alleged, of a number of royal Macedonian women indicate that this was not the case. A better case could be made for gender affecting the kind of violence that was employed.
51. P. Vidal Naquet, *Histoire d'Alexandre. L'Anabase d'Alexandre le Grand et L'Inde suivi de "Flavius Arrien entre deux mondes"* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1984) 362-3; Hatzopoulos, 1994, 97-100; Koulakiotis, 2005, 176; Briant, 1994.
52. Koulakiotis, 2005, 176.
53. Roisman, 2003, 316, is unconvincing in suggesting that it was the punishment itself that led to group action (see above) and that they were simply reacting to unfairness.
54. So Koulakiotis, 2005, 176.
55. Heckel, 2003, 223, considers the hunting incident "relatively trivial" and mainly attributes it to the adolescent nature of the conspirators; more plausibly he also concludes that the boys' violent action may have reflected views their fathers held but had not acted upon.
56. Carney, 1983. See also A. B. Bosworth, *Alexander and the East: the Tragedy of Triumph* (Cambridge: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996) 112-113, and S. S. Monoson, "The Allure of Harmodius and Aristogeiton," in *Greek Love Reconsidered*, ed. T. Hubbard (New York: Hamilton Press, 2000) 42-51.
57. Hermolaus's father Sopolis may recently have been passed over for promotion; see Lane Fox, 1973, 327; Heckel, 2003, 223; but Carney, 1983, 228 n. 24.
58. Hatzopoulos, 1994, 96-98, who also argues that Archelaus did much the same to the young men who became his assassins. Two of them were lovers of Archelaus and so, as we have seen, sensitive to threats to their honor and in the case of the third, Archelaus allowed Euripides to flog him (S. Scullion, "Euripides and Macedon or the Silence of the *Frogs*," *Classical Quarterly* (2003): 389-400, questions the historicity of Euripides's stay at Archelaus's court). See further Carney, 1983, 262-63, for discussion and references. Hatzopoulos, 1994, 97, makes a similar argument for the death of Amyntas II by Derdas. The values/motives of the assassins do seem fairly similar, but it is not clear that they had literally been denied adult status and, as we have seen, we do not know if they were *Paides*.

8

CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PHILOTAS AFFAIR ... AGAIN ¹

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Conspiracy theories of one type or another have defined modern scholarly literature on the Philotas Affair almost since the beginning.² Nearly every position has been advocated by someone: that Parmenion and Philotas were guilty of some manner of conspiracy; that Philotas was guilty, but not Parmenion; that Alexander engineered the entire incident to be rid of the House of Parmenion; that there was a conspiracy against Philotas, but engineered by his fellow marshals, not the king; that Philotas was innocent, but Alexander believed him guilty because Alexander had himself been guilty of conspiracy against his father; or that it was a conspiracy-cum-political purge.

Aside from the obvious issue of differing accounts of the matter in our sources, another significant problem in our analyses of this event is that we historians do so comfortably from our desks with 20/20 hindsight and no crisis at hand.³ Yet there exists an entire literature on how to manage people in crisis *because they think and act differently than they would normally*. The events that took place at Philotas's arrest and trial have more in common with police stations and hospital emergency rooms than the coldly-reasoned, carefully-laid plans of corporate takeovers. Understanding how those in crisis behave and think can therefore add to the discussion.

In the mid-80s, it became something of a catchphrase among crisis intervention counselors that the same Chinese character represents both crisis and opportunity, with the implication that crisis need not be viewed solely in a negative light.⁴ Likewise John Naisbitt called crisis a "time of parenthesis," and said, "If we can learn to make uncertainty our friend, we can achieve

much more than in stable eras . . . it is a great and yeasty time, filled with opportunity."⁵ The Philotas Affair became an excellent example of that principle, at least for some at the court. Before we go further, however, we must do two things. First, we should briefly define "crisis," and second, we should establish the parameters—such as we know them—of this series of events often referred to as the Philotas Affair.

One could argue that Alexander's entire campaign amounted to staggering from one battle to the next, and did that not constitute a state of near-constant crisis? Surely he and his Marshals would be well schooled at operating—and thinking—under pressure. Yet there is a difference between planned or anticipated danger and actual crisis. The difference lies in *expectation*, and the opportunity for mental preparation. By definition, crises catches us off guard, and while there are ways to prepare for handling the unexpected, crisis management workshops were not available in ancient Macedonia.

As for the Philotas affair in particular, we need to recognize that there are really two sets of events here (three, if one counts the aftermath). The first is the conspiracy against the life of Alexander set in motion by Dimnos and his fellows, and the second is the downfall of Philotas, and his father with him.⁶ Our fullest record of the entire sequence is found in Curtius, complete with rhetorical set-pieces,⁷ but Plutarch gives additional information that Curtius's source(s) either did not know or chose to ignore.⁸ Arrian glosses the affair while Diodorus is an abridged version of Curtius without speeches.⁹ Yet Diodorus alone gives any sort of motive for Dimnos.

Dimnos's plot falls into the second of Carney's two categories for Macedonian regicide: a desire to kill the king with no obvious wish to seize the throne after. Dimnos and his fellows wanted only—for unspecified reasons—to be rid of Alexander. Philotas is the one to whom the informant (Kebalinos) initially speaks, yet Philotas says nothing even though he is on his way to talk to the king. After a while, realizing that his warning went unheeded, Kebalinos tells a Royal Page, who approaches the king in his bath. Heckel says Philotas's "foolish handling

of the matter . . . gave his enemies the perfect opportunity to move against him," and Rubensohn points out, "But Philotas admitted that he was aware of the plot, that he had not informed Alexander, and that, by itself, was treason."¹⁰

In the end, only two things seem certain. First, there was a genuine conspiracy against the life of Alexander. Second, we do not have the whole story about it.

Badian views the Dimnos plot as mere fabrication in a larger conspiracy by Alexander to secure the downfall of Parmenion.¹¹ Hamilton, Heckel, Bosworth, and Rubensohn have all critiqued this aspect of Badian's arguments, and Heckel's assessment of Badian's theory as "unduly suspicious" is, I think, a fair one.¹² In addition, Carney's analysis of regicide in Macedonia shows that the Dimnos affair shares important features with other plots against Macedonian kings. Of Dimnos's motivations, we know only what Diodorus tells us: that he had a grievance against the king "*peri tinōn*"—concerning certain things—and Carney dryly observes, "it may be significant that this seemingly important question is ignored by our sources."¹³ Certainly, it represents a hole in our reconstruction of events. Perhaps Dimnos's grievance was justified, but in an attempt to avoid Alexandrolotry, we should refrain from going to the opposite extreme of always assuming Alexander is at fault.¹⁴

Part of the problem rests with a phenomenon called "actor-observer bias": we rarely perceive our own actions as evil or selfish, but may judge the actions of others to be so. This is because we know our own motivations, and are consequently more forgiving of ourselves. These differing perceptions relate to attribution theories: why people do the things they do. At the heart of attribution lies a judgment as to whether any given behavior results from the situation or environment (external attribution), or from personality (internal attribution). Actor-observer bias defines the tendency to attribute one's own behavior to external causes, but the behavior of others to internal causes. Edward Jones and Richard Nisbett explain it, "the actor's view of his behavior emphasizes the role of environmental conditions at the moment of action. The observer's

view emphasizes the causal role of stable dispositional properties of the actor."¹⁵ Historians are no more free of actor-observer bias than any other group. Further, people often have more than one motivation, acting in ways that are both self-interested and other-interested at once. All this must be kept in mind when considering the behavior of Alexander's Marshals, or of Alexander himself.

To understand what followed, we must set the stage. Dimnos's conspiracy was the first serious plot against the king's life in some time. Moreover, it was the first against Alexander as a successful king firmly on the throne, and thus represents a different sort of disaffection.¹⁶ Alexander was beginning to pose not as Persia's conqueror, but as Dareios's successor. If Spitamenes' revolt with its disastrous results had not yet occurred, nonetheless, the army was growing restless. Following the dismissal of Greek allies, a rumor that everyone was turning for home sent soldiers scrambling to pack and required a strong speech from the king to convince them to stay.¹⁷ Curtius's prelude to the Philotas affair (6.6) also recounts Alexander's adoption of Persian custom; he, at least, intends for Dimnos's conspiracy to be viewed in light of all this. We therefore have a surly army on the edge of the (to them) civilized world, when suddenly, the staff is faced by a serious plot against the king's life. Is it any wonder if his men display an unusually high degree of hypervigilance upon discovering that Philotas did not reveal the plot when first warned of it?¹⁸

The wicket sticks on *why* Philotas said nothing. Three possibilities exist. The first is that he was, indeed, part of the plot. Yet had he been part of the plot, he would surely have informed his fellow conspirators of the "leak," and the informer would have been silenced. Philotas's arrogance is often remarked on in the sources, but no one accuses him of stupidity.

The second possibility is that he was not part of the plot but would not have complained had it succeeded. Yet this, too, is unlikely for the same reason as above. Once the plot had been revealed to him, he could no longer be a passive participant. Either he warned Dimnos of the informer, or risked exactly

what happened—Kebalinos telling the story to a more receptive audience with himself damned by association.

The third possibility is that Philotas simply did not take the matter seriously, and because he did not, he perceived no threat to himself in not telling Alexander.¹⁹ Rubinsohn may have overstated the case and Heckel perhaps understates it, but both are quite correct. Philotas was not innocent; one simply does not pass over plots against the life of one's king, however unlikely one finds them. That he failed to report it made him eligible for disciplinary action, and this negligence was immediately seized upon by his enemies.²⁰ But their accusations do not indicate a conspiracy against him. "Conspiracy" means a preconceived plan. Philotas's fate is more reminiscent of a shark pack's feeding frenzy.

There is more to it than mere opportunism or guilt, however. In order to understand the reactions of Alexander and his Marshals, we must review characteristic responses to crisis.²¹ Panic resulting in hypervigilance is one; hypervigilance is an excessive, nervous caution. Anger is another response, along with an attempt to assign blame. A certain degree of "craziness" characterizes those in crisis, which, under the circumstances, is actually normal. They are frequently *unable to hear* whatever reasonable words those outside the crisis might offer.

But perhaps one of the most distinctive features is the attempt to find a cause and assign blame. Hypervigilance expresses itself by attacking the perceived source of the threat—or a proxy/scapegoat. Because adrenaline and emotions run high, conversations do not necessarily (or even often) follow a logical progression, and words and actions that normally would be considered irrelevant or unimportant are blown out of proportion. This is a function of the need to create meaning out of chaos. Crisis is, by its very nature, an *interruption* of normal patterns—and so persons in crisis react by attempting to restore order.²²

This brings us to the crux on which hangs the entire conspiracy theory: precisely what did these men believe of Philotas? Adams's "*Cui credidit?*"²³ The assumption attending premeditated conspiracy is that they knew he was not guilty,

the point of a conspiracy being to make him look guilty. Yet I am unconvinced that Alexander or his Marshals did not, at least initially, *believe* in Philotas's guilt. It must be remembered that whether they believed him guilty is independent of whether he was guilty. We are working with several perceptions of truth in addition to objective reality. We have Philotas's perception of matters (why he did what he did), then we have the king's, then those of Philotas's fellow officers and accusers (which might be further broken down into what Krateros really thought, what Hephaistion really thought . . .). Then we have the perception of our sources—both those extant and *their* sources—and finally we have our own perceptions. *None* of these should be conflated.

As recounted above, there are three ways of viewing Philotas's actions, and while rational analysis suggests Philotas probably was not guilty of more than negligence, crisis experience is not conducive to rational analyses. Their conclusion—that since he did not reveal the plot, he must be involved—overlooks the fact that, were he a participant, he should have silenced Kebalinos immediately. That recognition is more complex reasoning than persons in crisis are typically capable of.²⁴ Persons in crisis follow positive logic-flow more easily than negative. That is “if A=B, and B=C, then A=C,” is easier to grasp than “If A=B, but B does not equal C, then A cannot equal C.” This is because a negative idea flow is interruptive and difficult to process. Whatever else we may assume about their states of mind here, they were not *calm*, and even if none of them did believe Philotas to be involved in the plot, there would still be resentment over the matter of negligence, which could have ended with Alexander just as dead.

To what degree we take literally the content of Curtius's speeches is part of the continuing problem of his rhetoric. Yet we must also view suspiciously his reports about the personal (*i.e.*, internal) motivations of the players. He says at one point, “Krateros masked his personal animosity with feigned loyalty to Alexander . . .” (6.8. 4). First, how does he know this? Second, why should we assume that Krateros might not feel

both animosity towards Philotas and loyalty to Alexander?²⁵ Curtius had just declared that Krateros was an especially close friend of Alexander (6.8.2). And Plutarch—who also claimed Krateros was behind a conspiracy against Philotas in Egypt²⁶—prefaced the story of Dimnos’s conspiracy with the story of Alexander’s pun making Krateros *Philobasileus* and Hephaistion *Philalexandros* (*Alex.* 47.5-7). Yet Plutarch tells us that the conflict leading to that clever naming occurred in *India*, not Baktria, so the fact that he placed the story here is significant. He wished to make it clear how both men felt about the king. Therefore while an active dislike for Philotas is ascribed to Krateros, so is genuine friendship with Alexander.²⁷

Assessment of Hephaistion’s role in the Philotas affair has suffered from excessive backreading. For instance, Rubensohn says, “At first glance a strange list: *e.g.*, Hephaestion and Craterus, the inveterate enemies, in one camp.”²⁸ In fact, we do not know if they *are* inveterate enemies at this point. Again, Plutarch tells us that the public drawing of swords between Krateros and Hephaistion occurred in India. Apparently, they had been quarreling for some time, but we do not know if that quarrel dated back to August of 330. In fact, Plutarch implies that the tension was a direct result of the increased responsibilities that Alexander had granted to both, and that more accurately reflects the denouement of the Philotas Affair. So there is no reason to assume that because Krateros and Hephaistion did not get along in India, they did not in Baktria, either. Although a quarrelsome nature has been attributed to Hephaistion, and a desire to malign others,²⁹ he seems to have been no more quarrelsome than others around the king. Competitive natures were characteristic of most of Alexander’s Marshals, and would have been necessary to their survival. None of these fellows were nice. The only recorded instance of Hephaistion possibly maligning an innocent is during the *proskynesis* affair.³⁰ In the much later quarrel with Eumenes, it was Eumenes who approached Alexander, not Hephaistion,³¹ and in Diodorus’s version (17.114.1) of the *philobasileus/philalexandros* anecdote, it was a quip from Krateros’s supporters, not Hephaistion’s,

that prompted Alexander's pun. Hephaistion's behavior strikes me as typical of the court rather than exaggerated.

Heckel suspects Hephaistion's motives with regard to Philotas due to his analysis of Hephaistion's military career, subsequent and prior. He notes that although Hephaistion is promoted in the wake of Philotas's fall, he was often effectively demoted during combat assignments by being paired with a more competent commander.³² This is exactly what I found, as well, in a content analysis of his career, however Heckel's comment that "his contribution to the war effort before 330 had been almost negligible" is a bit too dismissive in my own estimation. Having few combat commands before 330 is not the same as calling his contribution negligible.³³ We must also remember that he had, in all likelihood, been commander of the Hypaspist *agema* already, so his rise after the downfall of Philotas—while a significant promotion—is not the same as going from nothing to something. In fact, as Heckel notes, Krateros, not Philotas, was being groomed as Parmenion's successor and had more reason to expect to benefit here than did Hephaistion.³⁴ It also seems that whatever his talents, Krateros showed a tendency to clash with direct rivals, first Philotas, and later Hephaistion.

I would like to look more closely at Philotas's torture: particularly the roles played by Krateros and Hephaistion. Plutarch suggests that Hephaistion was in charge by having Philotas direct his supplications *tois peri ton Hephaistiōna*. But in Curtius, Krateros appears to be in charge—all of which could indicate anything from no specific leader to confusion in our sources' sources.³⁵ Heckel stated that Hephaistion's "vehement advocacy of the use of torture against Philotas [is] behavior . . . not out of character and . . . reflects a rivalry with Philotas on both a personal and official level."³⁶ Yet we have no evidence of a previous rivalry, nor even a reason for such rivalry to exist yet. A much simpler explanation presents in Hephaistion's case: he was angry. Although notoriously difficult to measure, emotional motivations must not be ruled out. Going to either extreme represents a distortion.

It is Krateros whom Curtius consistently represents as spearheading the attack on Philotas, and Plutarch lodges the Egyptian conspiracy with Krateros, not Hephaistion. There is little to suggest that prior to this incident, Hephaistion disliked Philotas any more than did Erigyios, Leonnatos, or Ptolemy, which is not to say—note—that any of them particularly *liked* him, but again, we should avoid extremes. As Hephaistion's friendship with Alexander is well-attested and may have dated back to Alexander's time at Mieza, his fury at Philotas should not surprise us. Desire for revenge is not, of course, either virtue or excuse, yet attributing his participation to motives more complicated than delayed fear for a friend and rage at a convenient target—one he may have believed guilty—is not necessary.

If the diversity of human motivations for torture is not terribly surprising, the capacity for cruelty among otherwise "normal" individuals may be. The now-famous Milgram Experiment conducted at Yale University in 1961 illustrated not only our disinclination to argue with authority, but also how easily otherwise unremarkable people could inflict pain on another when told to do so.³⁷ Milgram's study has raised a number of questions in the social sciences—not least the ethics of it—but his results have become the basis for a great deal of subsequent research and represent the end of our innocence (or perhaps just our naïvete) regarding what human beings can do to other human beings given the right impetus and circumstance.³⁸

Perpetration of torture does not necessarily indicate an especially vicious individual—which is, perhaps, the most disturbing revelation to come out of these studies.³⁹ In his introduction to *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People*, journalist John Conroy observed, "I was gradually becoming aware, however, that torture is something that most of us are capable of . . ."⁴⁰ The willingness of Hephaistion, Krateros, and Koenos to torture Philotas does not, I fear, prove anything about a conspiracy against Philotas, either of their own making or of Alexander's, but only that they were none too different from the rest of

us—disturbing enough in itself. Similarly Alexander's attempt after the trial to suppress dissent among his troops can as easily be attributed to poor handling of a crisis as to indications of particular guilt.⁴¹

In the end, the question of "*Cui bono?*" in discussions of the Philotas Affair is deceptive, creating a false complexity, or false connections between events. Because X is a result of Y does not presuppose that Y occurs in order to gain X. That is where the error arises. People are not always so organized in thought or behavior as they may seem if matters are viewed only through the lens of hindsight. So ironically, both the use of torture against Philotas and Alexander's attempt to contain disaffection later suggest this was not an organized, premeditated effort, but a crisis that got out of hand very quickly.

I find no secure evidence for a premeditated conspiracy against Philotas, either by Alexander or his Marshals, with the possible exception of Krateros. Yet even in the case of Krateros, the Egyptian surveillance—if, indeed, the term surveillance is not granting it too much—had occurred over a year before, and if he were still looking for an opportunity, opportunity is not conspiracy. This is a critical point. Krateros, Hephaistion and the others did benefit; there is no question of that. They were sharks, and they did feed.

But sharks are opportunists, not conspirators. The most of which we may accuse Krateros is *carpe diem*: whipping up convenient furor against Philotas.⁴² It may have been relatively easy for him to play on Hephaistion's affection for the king, and on Koenos's fear of being damned by association, but even so, his vendetta against Philotas could have been both opportunistic as well as stemming from a genuine loyalty to and liking for the king. There could have been, and probably were, *dual* motivations at work. In focusing on opportunism among the Marshals—any of them, not just Krateros—we must not overlook their affection for the king as a catalyst. I would suggest that both these things worked in tandem. This may seem a common-sensical observation, but it still needs to be made.

The only real conspiracy was the plot against Alexander's life by Dimnos, which in turn precipitated a crisis. That crisis was then seized upon by the other Marshals as a means of getting rid of one they did not like and did not quite trust—legitimately or not. If anyone was "gunning" for Philotas, it was Krateros, who could also have anticipated benefiting most, but we need not suppose that he *planned* anything. The consequent murder of Parmenion was the denouement to the whole unhappy tale and is *exactly* what Badian claimed it was not: "a panic-stricken reaction to an unforeseen emergency."⁴³

NOTES

1. The first version of this paper was written well over a decade ago when I was a student of Gene Borza at Penn State, and later revised as a (small) part of my dissertation under his direction. While it may not reference his own work, I offer it here because of what he both taught and modeled as my academic father: that good scholarship is a mannerly conversation with fellow scholars whose work one respects regardless of whether or not one entirely agrees. Indeed, this much-revised version (presented recently [4/3/08] at Clemson as part of the Fourth International Symposium on Alexander the Great) has benefited from the kind observations and suggestions offered by my colleagues there, many of whom have been models of perceptive thoroughness to me in my own career even when I take occasional issue with some of their conclusions. If I can, in turn, be as much a shepherd to my students and younger colleagues as Gene, and others, have been to me, then I may have made some small repayment for their teaching. The best scholars are, I think, the best not only for what they write, but for what they teach by action and example.
2. The literature is extensive. The main debate, in chronological order: W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great, Vol. 1, Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1948) 270ff.; a response from E. Badian, "The Death of Parmenio" *TAPA* 91 (1960): 324-38; a response partially to Tarn, partially to Badian, R. Rubensohn, "The Philotas Affair? A Reconsideration," *Archaea Makedonia* 2 (Thessalonike: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1977) 409-20; a response largely to Badian, W. Heckel, "The Conspiracy Against Philotas," *Phoenix* 31 (1977): 9-21; Badian's revision of several previous theories, "Conspiracies," in *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynam (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 64-68; and most recently, W. Lindsay Adams, "The Episode of Philotas: An Insight" *The Age of Alexander. A Companion to the Crossroads of History*, eds. W. Heckel, and L. A. Trittle, (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2003) 113-26. Dealing with the same theme in more comprehensive works or at least not directly as part of the above dialogue are J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch: Alexander, A Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969) 132-38; Peter Green, *Alexander of Macedon: 356-323 B.C.* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1991) 339ff.; F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse: das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens*. Akademie der Wissenschaften - Philosophisch-historische Klasse 285 (Sitzb. Vienna, 1973) 326-36; A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 359-63; E. Carney, "Regicide in Macedonia," *PdP* 38 (1983): 260-72; W. Heckel, "Factions and Macedonian Politics in the Reign of Alexander the Great," *Archaea Makedonia* 4 (Thessalonike: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1986) 293-305; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: the reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) 101-04; W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (New York: Routledge, 1992) 13-33, 58-62, 73-75, 115-18, 176-84, 357-58; and E. J. Baynam, *Alexander the Great: the Unique History of Quintus Curtius* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1998) 176-80.
3. For that matter, the same can be said of the ancient historians who form our divergent sources.
4. This is somewhat simplistic—as is often the case with slogans. In Mandarin Chinese, the word in question is "ji" with a high first tone. Its primary meaning

is opportunity, with crisis/danger as a secondary meaning, or secondary radical. There is another word that has crisis as a primary meaning. My thanks to Dr. On-cho Ng, Dept. Of History, Penn State Univ., for clarification on the Chinese.

5. *Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives* (New York: Warner Books, 1982) 249, 252.

6. The third set of events, the aftermath, involves Alexander's attempt to stamp out dissatisfaction over his handling of the affair by tricking his soldiers into writing home, then reading those letters, which resulted in the creation of the Disciplinary Company, *et al.*; see Curt. 7.2.35-38, Diod. 17.80.4, and Justin 12.5.4-8.

7. 6.7-7.2; with 6.6.1-17 being of interest as a prelude. See Baynam, 1998, for an excellent discussion of Curtius's use of rhetoric here, regardless of the speeches' improbable authenticity.

8. *Alex.* 48-49; with 47 of additional interest; unless otherwise noted, all Plutarch citations in this paper come from the *Alexander*. About Kebalinos, Plutarch is less specific, and of the conspiracy, says only that a Macedonian named "Limnos" (=Dimnos) conspired against Alexander's life (49.2). The way Plutarch tells it, Dimnos's conspiracy was a matter of opportunity seized (even looked for) rather than crisis encountered that precipitated a panicked response. This sets it somewhat at odds with the other versions. Plutarch has been as creative in his framing of the incident as Curtius was in his speeches by the participants; we should not overlook that.

9. Arr. *Anab.* 3.26-27; Diod. 16.79-80.

10. Carney, 1983, 261-62; Heckel, 1977, 10; Rubensohn, 1973, 418.

11. So the gist of his entire 1960 article, but especially 330-32.

12. Heckel, 1977, especially 9-11, 14-16; Rubensohn, 1977, less directly, 412-14; and Bosworth, 1988, 101-04; but the refutation in Hamilton, 1973, 134-35, is especially succinct and pointed. Adams, 2003, 120-21, also questions it, but is more generous and elaborates on Alexander's reasons for believing the accusations (121-26).

13. Carney, 1983, 264-65.

14. One of several examples, "Nothing shows better than this cold-blooded execution of a *harmless man* [Alexander of Lynkestis] how little point there is in attempts to find a moral justification for Alexander's acts of political terrorism" (1960, 336, emphasis mine). In fact, we have no real evidence to tell us that Alexander of Lynkestis had not been guilty earlier of conspiring with Dareios. We simply do not know. Any absolute statement that Alexander of Lynkestis was either guilty or innocent is a judgment-call on the part of the statement-maker based on an *interpretation* of the evidence. See also W. E. Higgins's cautionary comments regarding Badian's tendency to negativize, especially his introductory remarks, "Aspects of Alexander's Imperial Administrations: Some Modern Methods and Views Reviewed," *Athenaeum* 58 (1980): 129.

15. Seminal work in attribution theory was done by F. Heider in "Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality," *Psych Rev* 51 (1944): 358-74, and *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1958);

also see H. Kelly, "The Process of Causal Attribution," *American Psychiatry* 28 (1973): 107-28. For actor-observer bias, the classic work is E. E. Jones and R. E. Nisbett, *The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior* (Morriston, NJ: General Learning Press, 1971), followed by L. D. Ross, "The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process," *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 10 (1977): 173-220. J. Krueger, *et al.*, explored the degrees to which people are aware (or not aware) of the tendency in themselves with "Perceptions of behavioral consistency: Are people aware of the actor-observer effect?" *Psychological Science* 7 (1996): 259-64; and some recent additions to the discourse include B. F. Malle, "The actor-observer asymmetry in causal attribution: a (surprising) meta-analysis," *Psychological Bulletin* 132 (2006): 895-919, and B. F. Malle, J. Knobe, J., and S. Nelson "Actor-observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior: New answers to an old question," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 93 (2007): 491-514. This is just a small slice of the literature available; the phenomenon is widely documented.

16. There were previous plots against Alexander's life, but all were either engineered by an outside source (such as Dareios) or were threads left dangling from Alexander's accession struggle.

17. Curt. 6.2.15-6.4.2. Curtius's rhetoric may be invention, but the tale reflects his belief that a speech was needed at this juncture and may reflect mention of one in his sources. We should remember one aspect of Argead kingship: the need—even expectation—that a king would "court" his subjects. Alexander does not order them to stay; he talks them into it.

18. Adams, 2003, 113, puts it, "*Cui creditur?*" and if we reach somewhat-if-not-entirely different conclusions, his question is, to my mind, the important one. As to be discussed, "*Cuo bono?*" is misleading.

19. This is exactly the reason Curtius attributes to him (6.7.33-35 and 6.10.14-22) and there seems no cause to doubt it, even if some of Curtius's language (*e.g., scorti*) seems more reflective of a Roman attitude than a Macedonian one.

20. Baynam, 1998, 177 and n. 21, says of Curtius's speech by Alexander (6.9.21-24) that the king cannot allow even a hint of suspicion involving Parmenion and Philotas, perhaps echoing similar sentiments expressed by Caesar in Suetonius (*Div. Iul.* 74.2) and Plutarch (*Caes.* 108). Whatever the rhetorical *topos* at work, the political logic is solid. Many a political advisor, aid, or supporting politician has formally resigned his or her position in the wake of a scandal—even if unproven—for fear of guilt by association. The hope of just such "contamination" is a major part of political offensives, in fact.

21. For what follows: C. V. Gerkin, *Crisis Experience in Modern Life* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1979), particularly Chapter Two; G. W. Baker and D. W. Chapman, *Man and Society in Disaster* (New York: Basic Books, 1962); P. Morris, *Loss and Change* (New York: Random House, 1974); but of particular interest, E. Berman, *Scapegoat: The Impact of Death-fear on an American Family* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1973), and Michael Brecher, ed., *Studies in Crisis Behavior* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1979). This does not begin to address the articles written on the subject. I should also point out that different cultures have differing responses to crisis; perhaps the best known elaboration of these differences comes from the International Crisis Behavior Project, which was instituted in 1975.

While this project was aimed primarily at political crises, their collected data is instructive; see P. James, "Systemism, Social Mechanisms, and Scientific Progress: A Case Study of the International Crisis Behavior Project," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 34.3 (2004): 352-70.

22. Gerkin, 1979, 68-71.

23. See note 18.

24. Curt. 6.8.11-14. Philotas, of course, later points this out—or Curtius has him do so (6.10.1ff.). Yet by then, matters were in motion, and doubt and pride kept distrust alive. So noted by Heckel, 1977, 20-21, but see Baynam, 1998, 177-78, for evidence of sympathy for Philotas despite Alexander's staging and speech.

25. Heckel, 1977, 14, supports Curtius saying, "He was motivated by his own strong sense of loyalty to the King, for which characteristic he won the label [*philobasileus*], and by his own personal ambition. Perhaps his zeal had brought him into open conflict with Philotas . . ." I agree, although I might say rather, "He was *probably* motivated . . .," as we cannot know for certain.

26. See Hamilton's discussion of this conspiracy and his belief in Badian's misinterpretation of it, 1960, 334-35; also Heckel, 1977, 14. Badian proposes a long-term, entirely too modern creation of a "file" (so Heckel) against Philotas, which lends credibility to his proposal that the Dimnos conspiracy was a fabrication to cover the larger one against Parmenion's family. This is too Byzantine. For all its violence, there is little evidence that the Macedonian court was so sophisticated. Even plots against kings seem to have been relatively simple in terms of motivation and planning, with short lengths of time before their execution; see Carney, 1983.

27. "Now Krateros, being an especially close friend of the king's, was consequently hostile to Philotas because of their competing for position . . ." (Curt. 6.8.2, Yardley). Plutarch also says that due to his own bitterness once he had learned of Philotas's failure to report Limnos-Dimnos's plot, Alexander "drew to himself those who had long hated the man (*epespasato tous palai misountas auton*)" [49.5]. If names are not named, Plutarch probably intends one to assume this includes Krateros, given his preface to the incident, and perhaps also Hephaistion. My thanks to Waldemar Heckel for reminding me of this line.

28. Heckel, 1977, 415.

29. Heckel further says, "but, by the time of the Philotas affair, Krateros had little to fear from either Philotas or Parmenion. In this respect, his role in the affair is much less complicated and less sinister than that of the unaccomplished Hephaistion" (1992, 117). I tend to see matters exactly the opposite. At the time, Krateros could have expected to gain far more from Philotas's downfall than Hephaistion could, and therefore his involvement is the more suspicious—although as noted above, the political gains for the principal actors as a result of their involvement has been overemphasized at the expense of emotional considerations. In any case, I doubt anyone, including Hephaistion himself, foresaw his appointment to command half the Companions.

30. Plutarch implies that Hephaistion lied about what Kallisthenes had been willing to do at the private supper party to introduce proskynesis (60.1).

31. So Plut. *Eum.* 2.1ff., although only one of the quarrels is described in detail.

32. Heckel, 1977, 18-19 ; for a more thorough discussion, Heckel, 1992, 65ff.
33. I discuss his career specifically in "The Cult of Hephaistion," in *Responses to Alexander*, ed. P. Cartledge and F. Greenland (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 2009) forthcoming. Also, and previously, J. Reames-Zimmerman, "Hephaistion Amyntoros: Eminence Grise at the Court of Alexander the Great" (Ph.D. diss., The Pennsylvania State Univ., 1998).
34. Heckel, 1977, 13.
35. Curt. 6.1110ff., Plut. 49.6-7. For Hephaistion possibly being in charge, Plut. 49.6, and for Krateros, Curt. 6.11.14-15. Although I examined the significance of Philotas's torture in the original version, my thanks to Beth Carney for suggesting that I expand further on this point.
36. Heckel presents Hephaistion as especially eager about the torture (1977, 19), yet it is useful to quote the Latin: "*Hephaestio autem et Craterus et Coenus tormentis veritatem exprimendam esse dixerunt . . .*" There is nothing here, aside from the placement of his name first, that singles out Hephaistion as being either more vehement or the instigator. The verb "dico" carries no connotation of vehemence but is perhaps the most neutral verb available. Later, in his 1992 prosopography, Heckel shares out the blame more fairly, crediting Koenos as well with hostile remarks towards his brother-in-law (61).
37. Stanley Milgram conducted his experiments shortly after the beginning of the trial for Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, and published his results in 1963, "Behavioral Study of Obedience," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 67: 371-78.
38. In order to test the theory that Milgram's subjects might have suspected the victim was faking, Charles Sheridan and Richard King repeated the experiment with a genuine victim, a puppy, only to show very similar results: "Obedience to authority with an authentic victim," *Proceedings of the 80th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association* 7 (1972): 165-66. A summary of additional confirmation occurs in Thomas Blass, "The Man Who Shocked the World," *Psychology Today* 35.2 (2002), and his biography, *The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram* (New York: Basic Books, 2004). Certain stages are now widely recognized in the process of preparing an individual to participate in torture. They include official encouragement by superiors, peer encouragement, dehumanization of the victim, disinhibition of the perpetrators, and normalization of torture as "regular procedure."
39. Horror at prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib is simply the latest in a long line of questions as to how "normal people" could do such terrible things, and do them with smiles and poses for a camera. The story was first broken on April 28 by a CBS 60 Minutes II report and in Seymour M. Hersh's article in *The New Yorker* magazine online, "The general's report: how Antonio Taguba, who investigated the the Abu Ghraib scandal, became one of its casualties," April 30, 2004. Hersh, of course, is noted for having broken the story of the My Lai Massacre in 1969, too, and wrote about Abu Ghraib in *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2004). One of the most telling (and frequently quoted) reactions in the wake of these revelations came from Colorado Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, who said in a CBS news broadcast, "I don't know how

the hell these people got into our army." We are naturally reluctant to believe that just anyone could do such things, so those who do become "these people." Milgram's Experiment would suggest over 2/3s of us could become "these people."

40. *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: the Dynamics of Torture* (New York: Knopf, 2000) ix-x. If very broad in approach and not always as unbiased as one might wish, it remains a powerful indictment of the human capacity for cruelty. Conroy's observation later in the narrative is particularly striking, and troubling: "The worst part of these interviews was that they were not difficult. Finding the men was not easy, convincing them to talk to me was hard work, but invariably our meetings went well. I never met the monster I anticipated," (122).

41. Again, one need only point to the attempts by Rumsfeld and others to play down what occurred at Abu Ghraib as illustration. On Alexander's guilt: if I found a number of Adams's points (2003) compelling, he believes that Alexander was so ready to accept Philotas's guilt because he felt guilty himself regarding what he knew of Pausanias's plot to murder Philip. I am more inclined to follow Carney's analysis (1983) of the murder, so I see less indication of a grand plot extending beyond Pausanias—but that does not negate feelings of guilt on Alexander's part. Often enough in the wake of violence, those who knew the perpetrator are heard to voice variations on, "I should have known . . .," whether or not there was any real reason that they should. I agree completely with Adams's observation, "This behavior is not necessarily part of a deep psychosis. Rather, it is an extension of normal human behavior found everywhere People interpret other's actions in light of their own experiences" (124-25). Yes, indeed.

42. Baynam, 1998, 178, comments on the mob behavior of the crowd at the trial, too.

43. Badian, 1960, 333.

9

ALEXANDER'S ORGANIZATION OF EGYPT: A NOTE ON THE CAREER OF CLEOMENES OF NAUCRATIS

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It is a pleasure to contribute to the Festschrift for Eugene Borza. For almost four decades Gene's articles and books have illuminated almost every aspect of Macedonian history. Settling on a single theme in this distinguished corpus of work that might interest him is not easy. One thread that runs through his scholarship, however, is the experiences of Greeks in Macedonian service.¹ I hope he finds interesting this brief note considering the implications of a new Egyptian text for understanding the career of one of the most prominent Greeks in Alexander's reign, Cleomenes of Naucratis.

The decade between Alexander's conquest of Egypt in 332 BCE and his death in June, 323 BCE marked the end of Egyptian independence and the beginning of three centuries of Macedonian rule. The central figure in that transition was Cleomenes of Naucratis, but understanding his role is difficult. Despite the many key developments of the period including, not least, the construction of Alexandria, the focus of modern scholarship is tightly focused on Cleomenes of Naucratis, his character and his financial manipulations, which are viewed from the perspective of Athens, not Egypt. The result is a body of scholarship that is at once relentlessly moralistic and anachronistic.²

Opinions are sharply divided between a minority of scholars who see Cleomenes as a loyal servant of Alexander³ and, more commonly, those who view him as an opportunistic but able scoundrel who, like an ancient Colbert, sought to make Egypt the center of a vast mercantilistic economic system embracing

the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean basins,⁴ while at the same time subverting Alexander's organization of Egypt,⁵ usurping the post of satrap,⁶ and using it to try to monopolize the grain trade during the great famines of the 320s BCE. What is common to both approaches in the analysis of Cleomenes's career and goals is that they ignore the Egyptian context. A full reconsideration of Cleomenes's career would exceed the space allotted to this paper. My purpose here is more modest: to reconsider Cleomenes's place in Alexander's organization of Egypt on the basis of new Egyptian evidence with regard to the question of how and when did Cleomenes become satrap of Egypt?

Answering that question is surprisingly difficult. The heart of the problem, of course, is the nature of the sources.⁷ As is so often the case with the secondary figures of Alexander's reign, the sources for the life of Cleomenes of Naucratis are meager and skewed toward the atypical, consisting of a handful of brief passages in Arrian, Curtius Rufus, Justin, Diodorus, and Pausanias, two chapters in the second book of the Ps. Aristotelian *Oeconomicus* describing stratagems Cleomenes used to extract revenue from reluctant subjects, and a passage in Ps. Demosthenes 56 accusing him of being the mastermind behind an elaborate scheme to manipulate the grain trade during the famine of 323/2 BCE. As a result, only the end of Cleomenes's career is not in dispute: in 323 BCE Egypt was a regular satrapy and Cleomenes was its satrap. In the redistribution of satrapies after Alexander's death, however, Cleomenes was demoted, becoming Ptolemy's *hyparch*, only to be murdered by Ptolemy shortly after he assumed control of Egypt because of suspicion that he was a supporter of Perdiccas.⁸ Cleomenes's career before those events can be determined only in broad outline.

Cleomenes first appears in the sources in connection with Alexander's organization of Egypt in early 331 BCE. About his life prior to Alexander's invasion of Egypt, we know nothing. Ps. Callisthenes's description of him as an engineer clearly reflects his role in the construction of Alexandria.⁹ Cleomenes's prominence, however, in the decentralized administrative system

Alexander devised for Egypt suggests that he probably was already a prominent figure in the last years of Persian rule. Arrian provides the details (*Anab.* 3.5.2-5, Brunt):¹⁰

Alexander then made his arrangements for Egypt; he appointed two Egyptians, Doloaspis and Petis, as nomarchs of Egypt, dividing the whole country of Egypt between them; Petis, however, declined the office, and Doloaspis took it all. As garrison commanders he appointed Companions, Pantaleon of Pydna at Memphis, and Polemon, son of Megacles at Pelusium; Lycidas, an Aetolian, was to command the mercenaries and Eugnostos, son of Xenophantes, one of the Companions, to be secretary in charge of the mercenaries, with Aeschylus and Ehippus, son of Chalcideus, as their overseers. The government of the neighboring country of Libya was given to Apollonius, son of Charinus; and that of Arabia round Heroonpolis¹¹ to Cleomenes from Naucratus. He was instructed to permit the nomarchs to govern their own districts in accordance with the ancient practices, but to exact the tribute from them himself, while they were ordered to pay it over to him. As generals of the army which he was leaving behind in Egypt he appointed Peucestas, son of Macartatus, and Balacrus, son of Amyntas, and as admiral of the fleet, Polemon, son of Theramenes.

Arrian apparently found no explanation of Alexander's motives for devising this scheme in either of his principal sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Accordingly he followed his usual practice in such situations and recorded a report (*legetai*) he found in another source to the effect that "Alexander divided the government of Egypt between many officers, as he was strongly impressed by the character and defensibility of the country and did not think it safe to entrust the command of all Egypt to one man."¹² The explanation agreed with Arrian's Roman experience, and modern historians have largely followed his lead. An alternative and equally plausible interpretation, however, has been proposed by the Iranist Janos Harmatta,¹³ who suggested that Alexander merely took over with slight modifications the existing Persian organization of Egypt, which was also characterized by a similarly complex division of power between civil, military, and fiscal officials.

Whatever Alexander's intentions may have been when he devised this scheme, it is clear from Arrian's account that the division of the civil administration of Egypt between two

Egyptians was not successful, since Petisis, one of the two "nomarchs of Egypt," dropped out at some point, leaving his colleague Doloaspis in sole charge of the administration of the whole country. How long Doloaspis retained his office is unknown, but, as already mentioned, at the time of Alexander's death, Egypt was a regular satrapy with Cleomenes of Naucratis as its satrap. The circumstances of his appointment are unknown, but Pausanias¹⁴ and Arrian¹⁵ both agree that Alexander was responsible for this change, the former describing Cleomenes as the individual "whom Alexander established as satrap of Egypt," while the latter noted in the *Ta meta Alexandron* that "Cleomenes had been designated by Alexander to govern this satrapy (*sc.*, Egypt)." What is in question is whether Pausanias and Arrian are referring to the routine appointment by Alexander of Cleomenes as satrap of Egypt or to the ratification by Alexander of a *fait accompli* on the part of Cleomenes.

It is not difficult to understand why Alexander might have decided to appoint Cleomenes satrap of Egypt. Arrian's account of the organization of Egypt leaves no doubt that from the beginning Alexander intended Cleomenes to exercise many of the powers of a satrap, not only governing Egypt's eastern frontier and receiving taxes from all of Egypt, but also being able to intervene in the affairs of district officials in Egypt,¹⁶ presumably when fiscal issues were involved. The reason for this extensive grant of authority, which clearly was in conflict with the decentralized character of Alexander's plan for the government of Egypt, was probably to enable Cleomenes to draw on the full resources of the country for the construction of Alexandria.¹⁷

Alexander had specifically assigned that task to Cleomenes,¹⁸ and he fulfilled it with efficiency and dispatch, overcoming Egyptian resistance to the forced population transfers Alexander had ordered to populate the city.¹⁹ All the sources agree that Alexandria was planned on a grand scale, and Alexander did not hesitate to demand that Cleomenes complete further expensive projects after Hephaestion's death. In this situation,

the anecdotes in the Ps. Aristotelian *Oeconomicus* understandably focus on Cleomenes's resourcefulness in raising revenue, illustrating how he successfully tapped the accumulated wealth of the Egyptian temples²⁰ and broke the nomarchs's control of grain exports by buying grain directly from the farmers and then exporting it himself at inflated prices, thereby increasing state revenues while at the same time maintaining sufficient reserves of grain to insulate Egypt from the worst effects of the famines of the 320s BCE.²¹ As a result of his efforts, when Ptolemy took over Egypt in late 323 BCE he found that Alexandria was a functioning city with an imperial mint²² and that the treasury contained the huge sum of 8,000 talents,²³ clear testimony to Cleomenes's efficiency and, admittedly, ruthlessness in collecting taxes.

Why Alexander might have appointed Cleomenes satrap of Egypt, therefore, is clear. Less clear, however, is when Alexander would have made the appointment. Most scholars assume that it was late in the king's reign, probably about the time of Hephaestion's death, but this is unlikely. The combined evidence of the Ps. Aristotelian *Oeconomicus* and Ps. Demosthenes 56 suggest that Cleomenes already had been in office for some time at the time of Alexander's death, probably at least since the great famine of 328/7 BCE.²⁴

What is particularly striking about the contrasting evaluations of these facts by scholars is how perfunctorily both sides present their cases. The only arguments advanced in support of Cleomenes's proper appointment as satrap are Alexander's normally hostile reaction to any hint of attempts by his subordinates to increase their power without his permission and the practical difficulties Cleomenes would have faced in making himself satrap.²⁵ Those scholars who believe he usurped the office of satrap, on the other hand, offer little more than assumptions about the nature of Alexander's plans for Egypt and the sort of individuals he believed ought to be appointed to high office with little regard for support in the sources. In place of arguments they offer various hypothetical scenarios—essentially fantasies—as to how Cleomenes might have assumed

the office and gained recognition from Alexander. Among the most elaborate examples of this practice are the accounts of W. W. Tarn and Fritz Schachermeyer.

Tarn²⁶ predictably tried to minimize the break with Alexander's original plans for Egypt, emphasizing that Cleomenes was never really satrap:

Alexander's governor Doloaspis, who was *not* a satrap, must have died while Alexander was in the East, and the king told the next highest official, Cleomenes, to carry on with the government till he (the king) should be able to attend to the matter—an exact parallel to the cases of Taxiles and Peucestas. This would entitle Cleomenes to exercise Doloaspis's powers, whatever they were; obviously he *did* act like a full-blown satrap.

Schachermeyer,²⁷ on the other hand, admitted the appointment but appealed to forces beyond Alexander's control—Egyptian geography and tradition—to explain it:

Alexander's attempted decentralization (*sc.* of Egypt) was in no way preserved. The nature of the country and tradition worked against it. The domineering personality of Cleomenes did the rest. First the Naucratis harried the two Egyptians so much that one of them resigned. The other assumed the whole administration of Upper and Lower Egypt, but apparently was little more than a puppet in Cleomenes's hands. Since the latter also raised his own troops, he created for himself at the same time a dominant executive position . . . (*sc.* and executed his duties so effectively) that Alexander pardoned him . . . and tolerated it that he had made himself the all powerful satrap of the country.

The assumptions underlying such scenarios were most clearly stated by Tarn, who remarked that "Alexander never had a satrap of Egypt, and he certainly would never have appointed a Greek financier from Naucratis to such a very important post." Behind this scholarly angst, of course, are two factors: Arrian's characterization of Cleomenes as a "bad man who had committed many injustices in Egypt"²⁸ and the discomfort Alexander historians since Arrian have felt in reconciling their vision of Alexander and Cleomenes's appointment as satrap with the infamous letter²⁹ in which Alexander promises to pardon any wrong Cleomenes may have done in the past or will do in the future if he builds all the shrines in honor

of Hephaestion that Alexander had ordered. Arrian, however, probably found both the characterization of Cleomenes and the letter in Ptolemy,³⁰ whose treatment of Cleomenes is unlikely to have been unbiased in view of his execution of his predecessor. More important, Arrian provides no details about Cleomenes's alleged "injustices," and the letter only proves that Alexander received complaints about Cleomenes, not that they were justified; and that is hardly surprising, since the anecdotes in the Ps. Aristotelian *Oeconomicus* leave no doubt that in carrying out Alexander's plans, Cleomenes encountered resistance from some of the most influential segments of Egyptian society. At most, as A. B. Bosworth pointed out, the letter proves that in Alexander's view "exploitation and peculation were permissible, even commendable, provided that sufficient profit accrued to the government."³¹

The result is that, as E. Badian³² rightly observed, Cleomenes's usurpation "has often been *suggested* (my emphasis) and remains possible" rather than demonstrated by scholars. Equally clearly, simply going over the same ground and rehashing the same passages in the sources offers no hope for a solution. The reality is that we have no way of determining what sort of person Alexander might or might not make satrap, and even if we could make such a determination, we could not apply those criteria to Cleomenes, a man whose character we do not know. Fortunately, however, new evidence allows us to assess the validity of the claim that Alexander "never had a satrap of Egypt." The key lies in determining the nature of the position of "nomarch of Egypt" to which Alexander appointed Doloaspis and Petisis.

Relatively little attention has been devoted to their offices, probably because scholars have assumed that they were meaningless, essentially shams with little power—"window dressing" in the formulation of A. B. Bosworth³³—that were intended to make Macedonian rule palatable to the Egyptians. This is unlikely, however. Arrian's account of the division of functions in Alexander's scheme for the governance of Egypt suggests that Doloaspis and Petisis must have been responsible

for all judicial and most administrative matters in Egypt. Their offices were, therefore, hardly mere empty shells. The question is: how are we to understand the title "nomarch of Egypt"?

The title "nomarch of Egypt" occurs nowhere else in the sources. Moreover, it is easily forgotten that there were no "nomarchs" before Ptolemy I made Greek the administrative language of Egypt. Nomarch, in other words, is a Greek calque for the Egyptian title *h3ti-*, the title of the official in charge of one of the forty-two *sepats* or nomes, the administrative districts into which Egypt traditionally was divided, and cannot, therefore, be equivalent to Doloaspis's and Petsis's title "nomarch of Egypt," since their responsibilities embraced all Egypt. Only two other explanations of the title are possible. Either Arrian's text is corrupt at this point or, more likely, "nomarch of Egypt" is also a calque for another Egyptian or Persian administrative title.

An interpretation along the latter lines was, in fact, suggested by the distinguished French Egyptologist Jean Yoyotte³⁴ in an important study of the Egyptian titles of financial officials, arguing that "nomarch of Egypt" was the Greek equivalent of the Egyptian title *Snti*. This interpretation, however, is unlikely. *Snti*, as Yoyotte himself demonstrates, was the title of three high fiscal officials—the Hellenistic equivalent was *dioiketes*—each of whom was responsible for one of the three regions, which made up Persian Egypt, but in Alexander's administrative plan their duties were assigned to Cleomenes of Naucratis, not Petisis and Doloaspis. Fortunately, a different and simpler solution is suggested by a Demotic ostrakon discovered during the excavation of the Sacred Animal Necropolis at Memphis that was published by H. S. Smith in 1988,³⁵ but whose implications have hitherto been ignored by historians of Alexander.

The ostrakon is fragmentary and only contains three words distributed over two lines. Script and content point to a date during the reign of Alexander. The text is as follows:

....] *Alexander*

....] *Pediese the Satrap*

Despite its fragmentary state, the Memphis ostrakon provides important new evidence for Alexander's plans for the government of Egypt and, indirectly, the career of Cleomenes of Naucratis. As I pointed out over a decade ago,³⁶ a Pediese the Satrap who was associated in some way with Alexander must be the same person as Petisis the nomarch of Egypt. The implications of that fact are threefold. First, contrary to the usual interpretation of Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.5.2-5, Pediese/Petisis did not refuse his office but served for an unknown period of time before resigning; second, the discovery of the ostrakon at Memphis indicates that his office covered northern Egypt and not southern Egypt as has been suggested;³⁷ and third, and most important, the identification of Pediese the Satrap and Petisis the nomarch of Egypt clearly implies that the Egyptian equivalent for "nomarch of Egypt" was, in fact, the old Persian title "satrap."

These facts alter fundamentally our understanding of Alexander's plans for the administration of Egypt. While Arrian and his source were probably correct in assuming that Alexander felt that it would be dangerous to assign Egypt to a single satrap, his solution to that problem was not to abolish the office of satrap of Egypt, but to divide Egypt into two satrapies with reduced powers, assigning northern Egypt to Pediese/Petisis and southern Egypt to Doloaspis. Like Cleomenes, both were probably important figures in the last years of Persian Egypt—Pediese/Petisis was possibly a member of the important aristocratic family of the Shipmasters of Heracleopolis³⁸ and Doloaspis an Egyptianized Persian³⁹—who had transferred their loyalties to Alexander.⁴⁰ The system, however, was clearly too complex and failed. Pediese/Petisis resigned, leaving Doloaspis as sole Satrap. How long the latter retained that post is unknown, but probably by 328/7 BCE Alexander had replaced him with Cleomenes of Naucratis, who then governed Egypt for the rest of the reign.

NOTES

1. He recently described it as "a subject dear to my heart" (E. N. Borza, "Commentary," *CW* 100 [2007]: 439).
2. The scholarship on Cleomenes of Naucratis is summarized in Jakob Seibert, *Alexander der Grosse* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972) 125-26. The most important subsequent study is G. L. Le Rider, "Cléomène de Naucratis," *BCH* 121 (1997): 71-93.
3. Argued most fully by B. A. van Groningen, "De Cleomene Naucratis," *Mnemosyne* 53 (1925): 101-17; Jakob Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios I* (Munich: Beck, 1969) 43-50, with Jakob Seibert, "Nochmals zu Kleomenes von Naukratis," *Chiron* 2 (1972): 99-102; and Le Rider, 1997, 71-75.
4. E.g., A. Andreades, "Antimène de Rhodes et Cléomène de Naucratis," *BCH* 53 (1929): 10-18; Karl Polanyi, *The Livelihood of Man* (New York: Academic Press, 1977) 228-51; and Hans Kloft, "Kleomenes von Naukratis: Probleme eines hellenistischen Wirtschaftsstils," *Grazer Beiträge* 15 (1988): 191-222. Cf., Le Rider, 1997, 76-83, for a more realistic assessment.
5. Cf., C. B. Welles's comment ("The Role of the Egyptians under the First Ptolemies," in *Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress of Papyrology*, ed. D. H. Samuel [Toronto: Hakkert, 1970] 508) that "it is clear that he (*sc.*, Cleomenes) had upset all of Alexander's arrangements, had got rid of all his rivals, and established himself as satrap."
6. The theory that Cleomenes usurped the position of satrap was developed by Ulrich Wilcken, "Zu den Pseudo-Aristotelischen *Oeconomica*," *Hermes* 36 (1901): 193, and has since become the *de facto* standard view. Examples are too numerous to list.
7. For the sources on Cleomenes of Naucratis see Helmut Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (Munich: Beck, 1926) no. 431 "Kleomenes."
8. Paus. 1.6.3.
9. Ps. Callisthenes 1.31.9. The description of him as Alexandrian in Ps. Aristotle, *Oeconomicus* 33a probably indicates he became an Alexandrian citizen (cf., B. A. van Groningen, ed., *Aristote, Le Second Livre de l'Économique* [Leiden: Sijthoff, 1933] 183).
10. Unfortunately Curtius's account (4.8.4-5) of Alexander's plans for the governance of Egypt is incomplete and confused, transferring Cleomenes's territory from Arabia to Libya.
11. Egyptian Pithom, modern Tell el-Maskhuta in the eastern Nile delta.
12. Arr., *Anab.* 3.5.7; cf., 1 *Pref.* 3.
13. J. Harmatta, "Das Problem der Kontinuität im Frühhellenistischen Ägypten," *AA* 11 (1968): 199-213. Cf., Edda Bresciani, "'La Satrapia d'Egitto,'" *Studi Classici e Orientali* 7 (1958): 132-47, for a detailed account.
14. Paus. 1.6.3.
15. Arrianos, *FGrH* 156 F1.5; cf. Dexippos, *FGrH* 100 F8.

16. This is implied by the statement that Cleomenes "was instructed to permit the nomarchs to govern their own districts in accordance with the ancient practices (my emphasis), but to exact the tribute from them himself" (Arr., *Anab.* 3.5.4).
17. Cleomenes's scheme to "short-change" the Egyptian garrison (Arist., [*Oec.*] 2.39; cf., van Groningen, 1925, 204-05) suggests the need to make the most of what revenues were available to him, not private profit.
18. Arist., [*Oec.*] 2.33c; Curt. 4.8.5; Just. 13.4.11.
19. Curt. 4.8.5; Arist., [*Oec.*] 2.33c.
20. Cleomenes was following in the steps of the Athenian Chabrias who resorted to similar measures to extract revenue from the priests for the Egyptian king Tachos (Arist., [*Oec.*] 2.25a).
21. Arist., [*Oec.*] 2.33a.
22. Le Rider, 1997, 83-93.
23. Diod. 18.14.1.
24. This conclusion rests on the following considerations: (1) Ps. Demosthenes's statement (56.7) that Cleomenes had harmed Athens and other Greek cities by manipulating the price of grain "from the time he took over the government [sc. of Egypt]; and (2) the actions described in Arist., [*Oec.*] 2.33, which are explicitly dated to when he was satrap (2.33a and 2.39), clearly require more time than allowed by dates in the last year of Alexander's reign; and (3) the reference to a major famine in Arist., [*Oec.*] 2.33a, combine to suggest that he was already in office at the time of the great famine of 328/7 BC (cf., van Groningen, 1925, 183l, and Peter Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-World: Responses to Risk and Crisis* [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988] 161).
25. Seibert, 1969, 43-44.
26. W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great: Volume II, Sources and Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1948) 303, n. 1.
27. F. Schachermeyer, *Alexander der Grosse: das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirken*, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1972) 238-39.
28. Arr., *Anab.* 7.23.6.
29. Arr., *Anab.* 7.23.8. For its authenticity see J. R. Hamilton, "Alexander and his 'So-Called' Father," *CQ* 3 (1953): 157. The strangest explanation of the letter is that of Joseph Vogt ("Kleomenes von Naukratis—Herr von Ägypten," *Chiron* 1 [1971]: 155-57) who argues that Alexander was merely exercising the Persian king's traditional prerogative of pardoning his subordinates.
30. Cf., Lionel Pearson, "The Diary and Letters of Alexander the Great," *Historia* 3 (1955): 449-50.
31. A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) 235.
32. E. Badian, "The Administration of the Empire," *Greece & Rome* 12 (1965): 172.
33. Bosworth, 1988, 234. Essentially repeated with the curious observation that "maybe they were intended to settle civil and criminal suits involving native

Egyptians, where interference by Macedonians would be a complex and tiresome business," in Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander, Volume I: Commentary on Books I-III* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980) 275, ad *Anabasis* 5.2-7.

34. Jean Yoyotte, "Le Nom Égyptien du 'Ministre de l'Économie'—de Saïs à Méroé," *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions*, January-March (1989) 81-82.

35. H. S. Smith, "A Memphite Miscellany" in *Pyramid Studies and Other Essays Presented to I. E. S. Edwards*, ed. John Baines, et al. (London: Egypt Exploration Soc., 1988) 184-86.

36. Stanley M. Burstein, "Alexander in Egypt: Continuity or Change" in *Graeco-Africana: Studies in the History of Greek Relations with Egypt and Nubia*, ed. Stanley M. Burstein (New Rochelle: Caratzas, 1995) 52 n. 34; cf., H. S. Smith, "Foreigners in the Documents from the Sacred Animal Necropolis, Saqqara," in *Life in a Multi-Cultural Society: Egypt from Cambyses to Constantine and Beyond*, ed. J. H. Johnson (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992) 296.

37. Harmatta, 1968, 209.

38. Cf., *Ibid.* for the name Pediese in the family of the Shipmasters of Heracleopolis, see Robert Ritner, "The End of the Libyan Anarchy in Egypt: P. Rylands IX. cols. 11-12," *Enchoria* 17 (1990) 102-03.

39. Pointed out by Harmatta, 1968, 208.

40. Cf., M. R. Falivene, "Government, Management, Literacy: Aspects of Ptolemaic Administration in the Early Hellenistic Period," *Ancient Society* 22 (1991) 207.

THE GRAVE RELIEF OF ADEA,
DAUGHTER OF CASSANDER AND CYNNANA

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The grave relief of Adea, daughter of Cassander and Cynnana (Fig. 1), was found in a partially excavated Hellenistic cemetery in Beroea.¹ It was lying outside a Hellenistic rock-cut chamber tomb, which contained inscribed niches carrying the names of members of the family of Tyrios and Galestes.² The relief of Adea clearly did not belong there, but must have been brought in as fill; it was originally erected elsewhere.

It is the earliest and finest marble grave relief from Beroea. Its iconography is unique and has so far eluded a satisfactory explanation.³ The relief is framed by tapering pilasters supporting a pediment, with the name of the deceased inscribed on the architrave: ADEA KASSANDROU (Fig. 2). A funerary epigram is inscribed on the panel under the figures, addressing the spectator:

Know that beneath me is the tomb of Adeia. Terrible Hades seized her after an illness while she was still a virgin, not ready for marriage. She died, leaving in great and everlasting mourning her mother Cynnana, who bore her, and her father Cassander.⁴

Adea has become Adeia for scanning purposes. Both are Doric forms of Hedeia, meaning "Sweet." The poem is formulaic, following the conventions of the literary motifs of premature death and the speaking monument; it nevertheless brilliantly conveys the parents' grief at the untimely death of their daughter by twice repeating the epithet *mega* (characterizing both the father's and mother's mourning), thus emphasizing the extent of their deprivation. The fact that the mother's name is mentioned is noteworthy, since the majority of funerary epigrams commemorating children only name the father. Cynnana, the mother, must have been a person of some note.



Fig. 1. Grave relief of Adea. Beroea, Archaeological Museum 160.

Photo: Olga Palagia

The deceased is commonly identified with the woman at the left, who occupies the full height of the relief background (Fig. 3).⁵ She wears a high-girt Attic *peplos* over a short-sleeved *chiton*, a *petasos*,⁶ diagonally placed on her head, bracelets and shoes. Long locks of hair fall on her shoulders. She holds a scepter in her left hand and a trident head in her lowered right hand. She is attended by a slave girl in similar high-girt dress, gazing up to her and holding a parasol over her head. Another scene with figures on a smaller scale is shown on the right (Fig. 1). Three frontal figures stand on a base inscribed, ΕΡΜΕΙ ΚΗΘΗΝΙΩΙ. Hermes Psychopompus in short *chiton*, Macedonian *chlamys* (forming a semi-circle), and *kausia* (part of the brim is visible on the left) holds a *kerykeion* and leads a heavily clad infant girl grasping a book roll. They stand next to a youthful herm that wears a wreath. Herms on grave reliefs are common from the end of the Fourth Century on.⁷ In addition, herms inscribed ΕΡΜΕΙ ΚΗΘΗΝΙΩΙ or ΕΡΜΑΟΥ ΚΗΘΗΝΙΟΥ can be found on the sculptured or painted grave *stelai* of Hellenistic Thessaly.⁸ The inscription is not a dedication but an invocation of the Underworld Hermes who is called upon to watch over the dead. Contrary to the standard appearance of herms on Hellenistic grave reliefs, the herm on the Adea relief is larger than the human figures. A parallel can be found on a late Fourth-Century Apulian calyx-krater in London, on which an over-size herm marks the boundary of the Underworld, where a dead man is being led by Orpheus.⁹

Adea's belongings hang on top as if suspended from the wall of a tomb (Fig. 2):¹⁰ a mirror, a straw hat, a fan, a box (which is common enough in funerary iconography and may have served to carry ribbons, jewelry, or sacred texts relating to the afterlife), and a wreath. These objects serve to unify the space of the two separate scenes.

The composition does not follow the conventions of sculptured grave reliefs but is more akin to painting, being divided in distinct scenes as if on a Macedonian tomb façade. This is why, I think, it has resisted interpretation. The relief conveys a rather subtle visual symbolism which, combined with an



Fig. 2. Grave relief of Adea, detail. Beroea, Archaeological Museum 160.

Photo: Olga Palagia

abundance of inscriptions, reaches beyond standard funerary iconography in an effort to enrich the imagery of death with an assertion of divine protection extended beyond the grave. It drives its message home through both word and image, for this memorial is erudite as well as eloquent. Even though rooted in the Classical idiom, it anticipates Hellenistic allegory and is steeped in religious symbolism.

The relief is difficult to date because it belongs stylistically to a period poor in grave reliefs, falling between their ban in Athens (ca. 317 BCE) and the explosion in their production in East Greece and the islands of the Aegean from the late Third Century BCE on. Grave reliefs in Macedonia are few and far between in this period. A handful of monumental grave *stelai* were produced at Pella in the late Fourth Century in a distinctly Attic style, probably created by immigrant Athenian sculptors seeking employment far from home.¹¹ The style of the Adea *stèle*, however, does not look Attic. As it is not advisable to attempt a close dating on the basis of letter-forms, we will

confine ourselves to stylistic criteria for dating the sculpture.¹² The relief has been dated to the closing years of the Third Century BCE.¹³ But Hermes's closest parallel can be found in an honorand on an Attic document relief, Athens, National Museum 2947, of the second half of the Fourth Century.¹⁴ Because the elongated proportions and high-girt dress of the female figures are current from the late Fourth Century to the end of the Hellenistic period,¹⁵ we must look to the overall shape and composition of the relief for further dating criteria. Both the form and proportions of the Adea relief are Classical. The scene occupies almost the entire available space, in sharp contrast to the elongated grave *stelai* of the Hellenistic period with their low pediments, where the deceased are allowed to dominate by virtue of their size.¹⁶ The Adea relief offers no scale discrepancy between master and slave, as seems to be the general rule in Hellenistic grave reliefs. The scale differentiation between the woman in the *petasos* and the girl with the parasol, and between Hermes and the infant girl is determined by age difference not status.

As the composition is still securely grounded in the Late Classical tradition and has similarities both to Attic document reliefs and funerary scenes on South Italian vase-paintings, the Adea relief probably dates from the late Fourth Century rather than the late Third to which it had been assigned so far.

Hermes Psychopompus in Greek art always leads the person of the deceased, not their soul or specter (*eidolon*).¹⁷ In Attic white *lekythoi* of the Fifth Century Hermes often takes the deceased, including children, to the banks of the Acheron River and hands them over to Charon.¹⁸ In a few late Fifth-Century reliefs from Athens his appearance may additionally bestow special status on the deceased as initiate of a mystery cult anticipating privileged treatment in the afterlife. Hermes leads Myrrhine to the Underworld on her marble funerary *lekythos* in Athens; he also leads Eurydice on the votive relief of Hermes, Eurydice, and Orpheus, now known from Roman copies.¹⁹ Myrrhine was probably the priestess of Athena Nike and therefore entitled to a privileged position in Hades, and

Eurydice was of course the wife of Orpheus, who was associated with mystery cults in various traditions.²⁰ Hermes also leads the dead in a Macedonian context, as on the painted façade of the Judgment Tomb at Leukadia, where the dead warrior is introduced to the judges of the Underworld.²¹ The iconography of Hermes leading the dead to judgment in Hades is carried into



Fig. 3. Grave relief of Adea, detail. Beroea, Archaeological Museum 160.

Photo: Olga Palagia

the Hellenistic period, for example, on the relief frieze of the funerary monument of Hieronymus of Tlos, where the dead man is introduced by Hermes to Pluto and Persephone (Fig. 4).²²

In light of the above, it is reasonable to suppose that the little girl led by Hermes is Adea in person, not her specter. The fact that she holds a book roll (Fig. 3) and the fan pointing to her seem to support this interpretation. Adea's diminutive size implies that she died in infancy. Book rolls held by the dead on Hellenistic grave reliefs are often taken as indications that the deceased were intellectuals. This cannot be the case here. I have argued elsewhere that book rolls held by the dead more probably represent sacred texts providing the necessary knowledge for a safe passage to Hades.²³ The meaning of book rolls in this context is made explicit on the frieze from the funerary monument of Hieronymus of Tlos (Fig. 4), where a reading of sacred texts at left is followed by Hermes' introduction of the dead initiate to the kings of the Underworld in the center. In a Macedonian context, we see both master and slave holding book rolls on the painted stele of Aristocles from Demetrias.²⁴ The Macedonians' preoccupation with mystery cults and the afterlife is also attested by the papyrus with a late Fifth-Century commentary on an Orphic text found in a late Fourth-Century tomb at Derveni and by a number of gold tablets with Orphic texts found in tombs at Pella, Vergina, and Amphipolis, among others.²⁵ We do not know at what age children could become initiates,²⁶ but if Adea was too young for it, her parents presumably were initiates and could therefore furnish her with a passport to the Underworld, held by her as a talisman.

If the deceased is identified with the infant holding a book roll, who is the woman in the hat? The two female figures looking at one another at the left (Fig. 3), on a larger scale than the rest of the figures, belong to a separate world and occupy a completely different space. The girl holding up a parasol and gazing at her mistress must indeed be a slave as is generally assumed. The fact that she stands at the center of the composition is accidental as she only serves to carry her mistress' attribute. Women shielded by parasols carried by themselves or by



Fig. 4. Relief frieze from funerary monument of Hieronymos of Tlos.
Berlin, Pergamonmuseum Sk 1888.

Photo: Hans R. Goette

slaves are known from the funerary iconography of Fourth-Century South Italian vases and East Greek Hellenistic grave reliefs.²⁷ Women on grave reliefs, however, do not wear hats, let alone men's hats, for she is generally acknowledged to wear a *petasos*, a man's hat. She has other peculiarities as well. The long hair falling on her shoulders is unknown in contemporary hairstyles and therefore more suitable for a goddess. Her scepter too indicates a goddess. Finally, the trident head in her lowered right hand is surely not a mere mortal's attribute.²⁸ In Macedonia trident heads appear as symbols on coins of Philip II (minted at Pella) and of Alexander the Great, notably his gold staters with Victory, commemorating his Panhellenic campaign against Persia.²⁹ The trident is of course a symbol of Poseidon. A Hellenistic bronze statuette of Poseidon from Pella reinforces his connection with the Macedonian capital, which functioned as an important harbor.³⁰ Macedonian kings and commanders would on occasion call themselves sons of Poseidon, possibly in celebration of a naval victory or the possession of a powerful fleet. Just before his death in 323 Alexander the Great wished to be acknowledged by the Athenians as the son of both Zeus and Poseidon [Hyperides 5 frg. VII (VIII)]. Demetrius Poliorcetes had himself addressed as son of Poseidon in the ithyphallic hymn composed in his honor in Athens in 291/0 (Athen. 6.253B-F).³¹ And Clitus the White was said to have assumed the name Poseidon and to have held a trident (Plut. *Mor.* 338A).

If we assume that the lady in the hat cannot be the deceased but must be a divine figure, is there any indication of her identity? Isis on a Hellenistic relief from Dion wears a *petasos*³² and so do the personifications of Aetolia and Macedonia. A statue of Aetolia sitting on a pile of Gaulish shields was dedicated by the Aetolians at Delphi shortly after 278 (Paus. 10.18.7). It is reflected in the Third-Century coinage of the Aetolian League.³³ Sometimes her head is shown only with the *petasos* and long locks of hair appear on the obverse. She bears a remarkable similarity to the goddess on the Adea relief. A head of Macedonia with *petasos* and long hair is also known from silver coins of the Roman Republic from the mid-First Century BCE.³⁴ If the goddess on the Adea relief is a personification, she could not be a city goddess because she lacks the mural crown. She could, however, be Macedonia, portrayed as a benign civic deity of peace. Her scepter is a royal signal and the trident may symbolize her capital, Pella. Her Attic *peplos* is suitable to youthful figures, being borrowed from Athena or Artemis and showing that she is a virginal goddess. And the parasol must be more than a mere token of female vanity. It may well derive from the parasols held over the great king of Persia and his satraps.³⁵ Even though parasols had long been adapted to the use of women in Greek life and art, having lost their original significance as status symbols,³⁶ the Adea relief could conceivably employ it as an Achaemenid symbol of authority, reintroduced by the Macedonians in that spate of Orientalism that engulfed Macedonia after Alexander's conquest of the East. If the lady in *petasos* on the Adea relief is Macedonia, then this is her earliest extant representation and may well reflect a major monument, perhaps a statue or a painting.

The appearance of a deified personification on a grave relief is a novelty. It properly belongs to the realm of Macedonian tomb painting. A personification proffering a crown to the deceased appears on the façade of the "Bella Tomb" at Vergina.³⁷ But the inclusion of a personification is not the only odd feature of the Adea relief. The appeal to Hermes (ERMĒIKHTHONIŌI) is also idiosyncratic. Both probably reflect the religious and funerary practices of the Macedonians. Adea is sent on her way under the

special protection of Hermes who will safeguard her passage to the kingdom of Hades and Persephone. She is also placed under the auspices of a smiling Macedonia and this accords her special status in the kingdom. Adea is no ordinary child.

All those who have dealt with the Adea relief have remarked on the coincidence of the names mentioned in the epigram with the historical **Cynnana**, also known as Cynna, daughter of Philip II and the Illyrian Audata (Athen. 13.557b-c; Arr. *Succ.* F 1.22; Polyae. 8. 60); **Adea**, Cynnana's daughter by Amyntas IV, son of Perdiccas III and Philip II's nephew (Athen. 13.560f; Arr. *Succ.* F 1.23; Polyae. 8.60), and finally **Cassander**, son of Antipater, who was a contemporary of Alexander the Great and became king of Macedonia after the brief reign of Philip III Arrhidaeus, Alexander's half-brother and Adea's husband.³⁸ Another Cynnana and another Adea/Adeia are recorded in Third-Century Macedonia but they occur singly, not as a pair. In Beroea, a certain Cynnana, daughter of Epigenes, served as priestess of Ennodia and dedicated an altar to that goddess in the second quarter of the Third Century.³⁹ This inscription was found reused in a Byzantine context. Chrysostomou has identified this Cynnana with the mother of Adea commemorated in the epigram of the Adea relief.⁴⁰ I think that the two Cynnanas could possibly be related given the fact that they both lived in Beroea, but the identification is by no means secure. Another Adea is named on a statue base in the sanctuary of Amphiaraus at Oropus, dating from ca. 304-281 BCE. It carried the (now lost) portrait statue of Adeia, wife of Autodicus, who was the brother of Lysimachus, king of Thrace.⁴¹ The statue was dedicated by Lysimachus himself. Adeia is otherwise unknown, and Autodicus' main claim to fame is the fact that he was appointed Philip III Arrhidaeus's bodyguard at Triparadisus (Arr. *Succ.* F 1.38).

But the combination of all three names, Cassander, Cynnana, and Adea is striking and seems to point to Macedonian royalty. What if Cassander, Adea's father, is indeed King Cassander, and what if his wife Cynnana, Adea's mother, really belonged to the family of Philip II and Alexander III? If we look at Macedonian

prosopography of the late Fourth Century, which is the period of the Adea relief, we will see that only two pairs of Adeas and Cynnanas are recorded, and in each case Adea is Cynnana's daughter: the daughter and grand-daughter of Philip II, and Adea with Cynnana on the Adea relief.⁴²

To begin with the historical pair: Cynnana, Philip II's daughter, was given by her father in marriage to his nephew Amyntas, Perdiccas III's son, at some unspecified date between ca. 340 (or a little earlier) and 336/5 (when Amyntas was executed by Alexander III).⁴³ This marriage is thought to have marked Amyntas as an heir, secondary to Alexander, and this eventually cost him his life. Their daughter Adea married King Philip III Arrhidaeus after her mother was murdered by Alcetas in 322/1.⁴⁴ Upon her marriage Adea assumed the name Eurydice and she is usually known as Adea Eurydice (Arr. *Succ.* 1.22-23). The stylistic date of the Adea relief allows the following tentative scenario: the Cynnana of the relief could be an otherwise undocumented daughter of (Philip II's daughter) Cynnana and of Amyntas IV. She could have been named after her mother or assumed her mother's name after her mother's murder. She would have been born shortly before or just after the death of her father Amyntas in 336/5, and could easily have been Adea Eurydice's younger sister. She was therefore eligible for marriage around 319, when Antipater, regent for Philip III Arrhidaeus (Alexander III's incapacitated half-brother) and the conqueror's infant son, Alexander IV, returned from Asia Minor to Macedon with his son, Cassander and the royal family in tow.⁴⁵

A dynastic marriage arranged by Antipater for his son, Cassander, with the queen's sister is perfectly plausible. Between 322 and 321 Antipater was busy giving his daughters Phila, Nicaea, and Eurydice in marriage to the Successors, Craterus, Perdiccas and Ptolemy.⁴⁶ Nicaea and Phila were soon widowed and eventually married Lysimachus and Demetrius Poliorcetes.⁴⁷ Antipater thus cemented alliances with far-reaching consequences for his family. If Adea Eurydice had an eligible sister, Cassander would have normally courted her. If

Cassander married the putative Cynnana II around 319, when he was in his mid-thirties and she around 16, they may well have had a daughter named Adea after her aunt, Queen Adea Eurydice. That daughter died in infancy and was commemorated in the Adea relief (Fig. 1). Cassander did not assume the royal title until 306/5,⁴⁸ hence the lack of title in the epigram. He was, however, ruler of Macedon since the death of Olympias in 316, and it should not be surprising if he had his daughter represented in the company of Macedonia personified.⁴⁹

Before his death in 319, Antipater recommended Polyperchon as regent of Macedon,⁵⁰ bypassing his son Cassander with disastrous consequences. Cassander set out to win the regency for himself and eventually enlisted the help of Queen Adea Eurydice, who, acting as her husband's deputy in the absence of Polyperchon, deposed Polyperchon in 317 and appointed Cassander regent instead.⁵¹ This episode is poorly documented and remains enigmatic. It would be hardly surprising, however, if Adea Eurydice deposed Polyperchon in favor of her own brother-in-law. Polyperchon then joined forces with Olympias acting in the name of her grandson, Alexander IV, and the two branches of the royal family became engaged in mortal conflict.

Taking advantage of Cassander's absence in Greece, Polyperchon with Olympias invaded Macedonia and captured Philip III Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice. Both were put to death by Olympias in autumn 317.⁵² Cassander's absence at this crucial point remains a mystery. He nevertheless was able to effect a speedy return from Greece and eventually captured Olympias at Pydna in 316 and had her executed.⁵³ In summer 316 he organized a splendid royal funeral at Aegae for Philip III Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice who had been already dead for about half a year, and Cynnana, who had been dead for six years.⁵⁴ The significance of all this is elusive although both ancient and modern historians agree that Cassander was aiming for the succession as he was burying the king of Macedon in the capacity of his successor. And if Cynnana was his mother-in-law, one would have expected him to organize a splendid funeral for her at Aegae, the traditional burial ground of the Argead dynasty.

At the same time Cassander married Thessaloniki, daughter of Philip II by the Thessalian Philina, who had accompanied Olympias and Alexander IV to Pydna.⁵⁵ In 316 both Cassander and Thessaloniki were middle-aged by ancient standards: he was pushing forty, she was in her early thirties and long past her prime. It was inconceivable that two Macedonians of the highest nobility would have stayed unmarried until that fateful encounter. We know nothing of Thessaloniki's marital status before 316 but she may have been a widow. As for Cassander, in the light of the polygamy practiced by other Macedonian rulers like Philip II, Alexander III, Lysimachus and Demetrius Poliorcetes,⁵⁶ it is likely that he was already married in 316. And even if he were already married to a granddaughter of Philip II, he would not have passed up the opportunity to marry a daughter of Philip II as well in order to strengthen his claim to the throne by forming yet another dynastic alliance with the Argeads. It seems that he had also courted Cleopatra, Alexander the Great's full sister, but to no avail (Diod. 20.37.4). Alexander himself had shown the way, having married in 324 at Susa not only the daughter of Darius III (Statira) but also the daughter of Artaxerxes III Ochus (Parysatis) in order to reinforce his claim to the Persian throne by marrying Achaemenid princesses.⁵⁷

After Cassander's death in 297, his eldest son Philip IV ruled unopposed for a few months. He died of illness at Elateia and was succeeded by his brothers Antipater I and Alexander V. They partitioned the kingdom at the instigation of their mother, Thessaloniki, who favored the youngest, Alexander.⁵⁸ The ancient sources do not name Philip IV's mother. If he was Cassander's son by Thessaloniki, then Antipater I and Alexander V could not have been older than 17 and 16 respectively at their father's death. This would necessitate the birth of three sons in rapid succession to the over thirty-year old Thessaloniki. But the fact that Philip IV succeeded unopposed and there was no triple partition of the kingdom suggests that he was older than his brothers and therefore possibly by a different mother. If he was Cynnana II's son, he could have been over 20 at his father's death. It is also possible that he was not named after Philip II

as is usually assumed, but after Philip III.⁵⁹ But we cannot rule out that Cassander had a third wife, older than the other two, and that Philip IV was in fact much older.

Three questions remain to be asked. If Adea was a princess, why not bury her at Aegae? Why in Beroea? And is the modest relief of Adea proper for a princess in a kingdom rolling in gold after Alexander's conquests? Aegae was the traditional burial ground of the Argeads and need not have been used by subsequent Macedonian dynasties. Indeed we have no evidence that they did use it. As for Beroea, if Cassander practiced polygamy, he may not have wished to keep all his wives under one roof or even in one city. He may have followed in the footsteps of Alexander the Great who kept Statira and Parysatis at Susa and Barsine at Pergamum and only had Rhoxane with him in India and later in Babylon.⁶⁰ Demetrius Poliorcetes seems to have spread out his wives as well, with Euthydice presumably staying in Athens and Lanassa in Corfu.⁶¹

The modesty of the Adea relief is explained if it was used as a tomb marker, being placed on top of a monumental tomb which is now lost. Finally, the medium quality of the relief is typical of the average quality of marble sculpture in Macedonia in the Fourth and Third centuries. Unlike the dazzling achievements of major painting, jewelry, metalworking and the minor arts, there are no outstanding Macedonian marbles in the early Hellenistic period.⁶² The Macedonians in the Fourth and early Third Centuries seem to have patronized mainly bronze sculpture, as witness the bronze equestrian group of Alexander and his Companions who perished at the battle of Granikos, dedicated by the conqueror at Dion (Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.4; Plut. *Alex.* 16.16), and the bronze statue of Zeus set up by Cassander in the same sanctuary.⁶³

If Tomb II at Vergina contained the remains of Philip III Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice,⁶⁴ the splendid funeral accorded them by Cassander would have been intended to glorify his own family as he was the king's nearest adult male relation, being married to the queen's sister. The magnificent burial would have

been dictated by family duty no less than by political expediency. It has been suggested that Cassander had himself represented in the hunting frieze on the façade of Tomb II along with Alexander the Great and Philip III Arrhidaeus.⁶⁵ A family connection to the two kings by a marriage of several years' standing would make better sense of this grouping.

NOTES

1. Beroea, Archaeological Museum 160.

The new interpretation of the Adea relief is offered to my friend and collaborator Gene Borza in memory of an enjoyable visit to the Beroea Museum.

I am indebted to Brian Bosworth and Beth Carney for help, advice and encouragement. An early version of this paper was delivered as a lecture at the Australian Archaeological Institute in Athens in 1999 and at the Institute of Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki in 2003: I am grateful to Stavros Paspalas and Vasileios Kontis respectively for inviting me and to the audiences for comments.

2. M. Karamanoli-Siganidou, *ArchDelt* 18 (1963) B2, 232-233, pl. 265a.
3. For a full publication with earlier references, see V. Allamani-Souri, "Adea Kassandrou. Epitaphia stēlē apo tē Beroia," in *Mneias Charin. Tomos stē mnēmē Mairēs Siganidou* (Athens: Tameio Archaïologikon Poron kai Apallotriōseōn, 1998) 17-30, and "Adea Kassandrou. Mia enallaktikē protasē," in *Murtos. Mnēmē Ioulías Vokotopoulou* (Thessaloniki: Univ. of Thessaloniki, 2000) 489-493. See also A. B. Tataki, *Ancient Beroea. Prosopography and Society. Melethmata* 8 (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1988) 85, no. 26.
4. SEG 24 (1969) 503. "Gnōthi ton Adeias up' emoi taphon, en et' aōron / parthenon eg nousou deinos emarpse Aidēs / matri de kēdos aei mega Kunnanai, a min etikte, / kai mega Kassandrōi patri lipousa ethanen."
5. Cf., S. Schmidt, *Hellenistische Grabreliefs* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1991) 58-59.
6. This type of hat in a Macedonian context is sometimes described as a broad-brimmed *kausia*. It is a man's hat, worn by Alexander the Great in the late Fourth-Century lion hunt mosaic from Pella: R. Ginouvès, *Macedonia* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press 1994) fig. 112.
7. H. Wrede, *Die antike Herme* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1986) 44-48.
8. *Ibid.*, 45; A. Avagianou, "ERMEI CHTHONIOI: thrēskeia kai anthrōpos stē Thessalia," in *Latreies stēn "periphēreia" tou archaiou ellinikou chosmou*, ed. A. Avagianou (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2002) 65-111.
9. British Museum F 270: A. D. Trendall and A. Cambitoglou, *The Red-figured Vases of Apulia II* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) 538, no. 318; M. L. West, *The Orphic Poems* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) 25, pl. 3.
10. Compare the women's paraphernalia (boxes, wreaths, headscarf, etc), painted as if hanging from nails on the walls of Tomb II in Aineia (second half of the Fourth Century BCE): I. P. Vokotopoulou, *Oi taphikoi tumboi tēs Aineias* (Athens: Tameiou Archaïologikon Poron kai Apallōtriōseōn, 1990) 35-49, pls. 1-6. Boxes and mirrors also hang from the walls of funerary *naïski* of women as depicted on South Italian vases of the Fourth Century: H. Lohmann, *Grabmäler auf unteritalischen Vasen* (Berlin: Mann Verlag, 1979) A 642, pl. 29,2 (Ruvo, Jatta Collection J. 419); A 55, pl. 34,1 (Bari 6095).
11. P. Chrysostomou, "O Makedonikos taphos st' me tis sakophagous tēs Pellas," *Archaia Makedonia* 6.1 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1999) 1: 281-306.

12. Allamani-Souri (1998, 27) argued that the omega represents a late Third-Century form. On the other hand, the letter-forms in general are similar to a decree of Cassander (316-297 BCE) from Cassandreia, Thessaloniki Archaeological Museum AE 16664: I. P. Vokotopoulou, *Ēpeirōtika kai Makedonika. Melethmata* 2 (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2001) 694, fig. 1.
13. Allamani-Souri, 1998.
14. C. L. Lawton, *Attic Document Reliefs* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995) 141, no. 139, pl. 74.
15. Compare Athena on the document relief honoring Euphron of 318 BCE in Athens, National Museum 1482 (Lawton [supra n. 14] 107-108, no. 54, pl. 28) but see also the slave girl on a grave relief from Samos, Vathy Museum 260 of the First Century BCE. E. Pfuhl and H. Möbius, *Die Ostgriechischen Grabreliefs*, 2 vols. 4 pts. (Mainz am Rhein: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1977) 247, no. 968, pl. 146.
16. Compare, for example, the grave stele of a woman with two slave girls in Izmir, Kultürpark 31 (Pfuhl and Möbius, 1977, 143, no. 429, pl. 70) of the Second Century BCE.
17. Allamani-Souri, 1998, 24-27, suggested that the little girl represents Adea's ghost hovering over her grave, and that the herm is a grave marker. There are no parallels for this imagery, however.
18. J. H. Oakley, *Picturing Death in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004) 137-41, and 212-13 for the depiction of *eidola*.
19. *Lekythos* of Myrrhine, Athens, National Museum 4485: C. W. Clairmont, "The *lekythos* of Myrrhine," in *Studies in Classical Art and Archaeology, A Tribute to P. H. von Blanckenhagen*, ed. G. Kopcke and M. B. Moore (Locust Valley, NY: Augustin, 1979) 103-110; N. Kaltsas, *Sculpture in the National Archaeological Museum, Athens* (Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Museum, 2002) no. 289; O. Palagia, "Archaism and the Quest for Immortality in Attic Sculpture during the Peloponnesian War," in *Art in Athens during the Peloponnesian War*, ed. O. Palagia (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming) fig. 16. Three-figure relief of Hermes, Eurydice and Orpheus: M. E. Micheli, "I rilievi a tre figure: della redazione romana al monumento greco," *ASAtene* 82, Ser. III.4, vol. 1 (2004) 92-93, figs. 7-12; Palagia, forthcoming, fig. 15.
20. Cf., O. Palagia, "Sculptures from Roman Sparta," in *Kallisteuma. Meletes pros timēn tēs Olgas Tzachou-Alexandrē*, ed. A. Alexandri and I. Leventi (Athens: ICOM, 2001) 288-289 (with earlier references); F. Graf and S. Iles Johnston, *Ritual Texts for the Afterlife* (London: Routledge, 2007) 165-184.
21. Ph. Petsas, *O taphos tōn Leukadiōn* (Athens: Archaeological Society of Athens, 1966) pl. A.
22. Berlin, Pergamonmuseum Sk 1888, from Rhodes. O. Palagia, "Initiates in the Underworld," in *Sculptors and Sculpture of Caria and the Dodecanese*, ed. I. Jenkins and G. B. Waywell (London: British Museum Press, 1997) 70, fig. 92; Palagia, 2001, 290, figs. 3-4; "Zur Hölle!" *Eine Reise in die antike Unterwelt*, ed. K. Schade and S. Altekamp (Berlin: Winckelmann-Inst. für Klassische Archäologie, 2007) 68-70, no. 15 (with earlier references).

23. Palagia, 1997, 69; Palagia, 2001, 289-290. For the meaning of book rolls as sacred texts in funerary iconography, see also A. Bernabé and A. I. J. San Cristóbal, *Instructions for the Netherworld. The Orphic Gold Tablets* (Leiden: Brill, 2008) 277-279.
24. Volos Museum. A. S. Arvanitopoulos, *Graptai stēlai Dēmētriados-Pagasōn* (Athens: Sakellarios, 1928) pl. 4.
25. Derveni papyrus: G. Betegh, *The Derveni Papyrus* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004); T. Kouremenos, *et al.*, *The Derveni Papyrus* (Florence: Olschki, 2006). Gold tablets from Macedonia: Graf and Iles Johnston, 2007, 40-47; Bernabé and San Cristóbal, 2008, 160-166. For initiates in the mysteries of Dionysus in Macedonia, see also M. Tiverios, "The Derveni krater," in *Essays in Classical Archaeology for Eleni Hatzivassiliou*, ed. D. Kurtz (Oxford: Beazley Archive and Archaeopress, Oxford Univ. Press, 2008) 203-204.
26. For a Latin funerary epigram to a child initiate from Roman Macedonia, see Walter Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987) 23 n. 61; P. M. Nigdelis, *Epigraphika Thessalonikeia* (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2006) 122 n. 61.
27. Apulian vases: Taranto 7014: Lohmann, 1979, A 686; M. Weber, *Baldacchine und Statuenschreine* (Rome: Giorgio Bretschneider, 1990) 216, S 45, pl. 52, 191. Naples 82376: Lohmann, 1979, A 468, pl. 45, 1; Weber, 1990, S 47, pl. 52, 192. Paris, Louvre K 89: Lohmann, 1979, A 569; Weber, 1990, S 48, pl. 52, 193. Avignon, Musée Calvet 23504: *Terres sacrées de Perséphone*, ed. O. Cavalier (Paris: Adam Biro, 2000) 90-93, no. 23. East Greek grave reliefs: Istanbul 4839: Pfuhl and Möbius, 1977, no. 506, pl. 80; once Izmir, now lost: Pfuhl and Möbius, 1977, no. 545, pl. 85.
28. Allamani-Souri, 2000, suggested that the hairstyle, scepter, trident and petasos could identify this figure (who according to her, is the deceased Adea) as a priestess of Isis Pelagia. She was unable, however, to cite any parallels of priestesses holding tridents.
29. G. L. Le Rider, *Le Monnayage d'argent et d'or de Philippe II* (Paris: Bourgey, 1977) 245-247, nos. 102-119, R 45-50, pls. 84-85; M. J. Price, *The Coinage in the Name of Alexander the Great and Philip Arrhidaeus* (London: British Museum, 1991) 35, 568, pl. 25, nos. 220-223 (Pella); pl. 1, no. 171b; pl. 2, nos. 172a-175b, 178-179c (uncertain mint); H. A. Troxell, *Studies in the Macedonian Coinage of Alexander the Great* (New York: American Numismatic Society, 1997) 107-110.
30. Pella Museum: Ginouvès, 1994, fig. 96.
31. C. Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1999) 92-93.
32. Dion Museum: D. Pandermalis, *Dion. E anakalupsē* (Athens: Adam Editions, 1999) 89.
33. LIMC I (1981) *s.v.*, Aitolia, nos. 1 and 5 (C. Arnold-Biucchi); K. Liampi, *Der makedonische Schild* (Bonn: Habelt, 1998) 139-140, pls. 28, M 90; 29, M 91; 32, M 91.
34. LIMC VI (1992) *s.v.*, Makedonia, nos. 10-11 (I. Touratsoglou).

35. Parasols held over rulers in Egypt (including Ptolemaic Egypt) and the Near East: Weber, 1990, 85-102; P. G. P. Meyboom, *The Nile Mosaic of Palestrina* (Leiden: Brill, 1995) 66-68; earlier references: 312-315 nos. 141-144. The parasol as status symbol in Achaemenid Persia: M. C. Miller, "The parasol: an oriental status-symbol in late archaic and classical Athens," *JHS* 112 (1992): 94-95.
36. Cf., Miller, 1992, 91-105.
37. Ginouvès, 1994, fig. 146.
38. W. Heckel, *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006) s.v., Adea; Amyntas (1); Arrhidaeus (1); Cassander; Cynanne (with earlier references).
39. Beroea Museum 639. *SEG* 31 (1981) 625; P. M. Fraser and E. Matthews, *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names IV: Macedonia, Thrace, Northern Regions of the Black Sea* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005) s.v., Kynnana (2); Tataki, 1988, no. 781.
40. P. Chrysostomou, *Ἐ Θεσσαλῆς Θεᾶς Ἐννοδίας, ἔ Φεραιᾶς Θεᾶς* (Athens: Tameio Archailogikon Poron kai Apallotriōseōn, 1998) 135-138.
41. *IG VII* 279. V. Petrakos, *Oi epigraphes tou Ōrōpou* (Athens: Archaeological Society of Athens, 1997) no. 383. For the date, see C. Habicht, "Sthenis," *HOROS* 10-12 (1992-1998): 21-26.
42. Fraser and Matthews, 2005, s.v., Kynnana (1); Adea (1 and 2).
43. E. D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman, OK: Oklahoma Univ. Press, 2000) 69-70.
44. Arr. *Succ.* F 1.22-23; Polyaen. 8.60, *Ibid.*, 132.
45. Arr. *Succ.* F 1.42-44. For the chronology, see A. B. Bosworth, *The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare and Propaganda Under the Successors* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002) 281.
46. Diod. 18.18.7; 18.23.1-3; 19.59.3; Arr. *Succ.* F 1.20; Paus. 1.6.8; Just. 13.6.5-6. D. Ogden, *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death. The Hellenistic Dynasties* (London: Duckworth, 1999) 53-54.
47. Strabo C 566; Diod. 19.59.3; Plut. *Demetr.* 14. Ogden, 1999.
48. Diod. 20.53.2-4. R. A. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990) 155-160; F. Landucci Gattinoni, *L'arte del potere. Vita e opere di Cassandro di Macedonia*. *Historia Einzelschriften* 171 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003) 124.
49. For a reference to my then unpublished suggestion that Cassander was married to Adea Eurydice's putative sister Cynnana (recorded in the Adea relief), see E. Carney, *Olympias. Mother of Alexander the Great* (New York: Routledge, 2006) 170 n. 42.
50. Diod. 18.47.4; 18.48.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1.
51. Diod. 18.75.1; 19.11.1; 19.35.1-7; Just. 14.5.1-5. On the events of the year 317/6 cf., N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia: Vol. III, 336-167 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 137-144; A. B. Bosworth, "Philip III Arrhidaeus and the chronology of the Successors," *Chiron* 22 (1992): 55-81; Carney, 2000, 135-137; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003, 17-23, 42-43; Carney, 2006, 74-85.

52. Diod. 19.11.1-7; Just. 14.5.1-10; Paus. 1.11-3-4; 1.25.6; 8.7.7; Ael. *VH* 13.36.
53. Diod. 19.31.1-36.6; 19.49.1-51.6; Just. 14.5-6; Paus. 9.7.2.
54. Diod. 19.52.5; Diyll. ap. Athen. 4.155a.
55. Diod. 19.52.1; 19.61.2; Paus. 8.7.7; 9.7.3; Just. 14.6.13. Carney, 2000, 155-157; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003, 79-82. On Cassander's policies in 316/15 bringing him closer to the kingship of Macedon, *cf.*, O. Palagia, "Hephaestion's pyre and the royal hunt of Alexander," in *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 198.
56. *Cf.*, Ogden, 1999, 17-27; 41-51; 57-65; 173-177.
57. Carney, 2000, 108-113.
58. Plut. *Demetr.* 36; Paus. 9.7.3; Just. 16.1.1-9. On the events following Cassander's death, see Hammond and Walbank, 1988, 210-211; Ogden, 1999, 53-56; Carney, 2000, 157-59.
59. Palagia, 2000, 197.
60. Statira and Parysatis: Plut. *Alex.* 70.3 ; 77.6; Carney (*supra* n. 43) 109-111. Barsine: Just. 13.2.7; Carney (*supra* n. 43) 149; Rhoxane: Curt. 10.6.9; Just. 13.2.5; Metz Epit. 70.
61. Plut. *Demetr.* 14; *Pyrrh.* 10.5.
62. For a brief survey of marble sculpture in Macedonia in this period, see Th. Stefanidou-Tiveriou, "Deka aiōnes plastikēs stē Makedonia," *To Archaialogiko Ergo stē Makedonia kai Thrakē* 20 (2006) 343-45.
63. Inscribed statue base in the Dion Museum: M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings, Vol. 2: Epigraphic Appendix, Meletemata* 22 (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1996) no. 23. The formulaic inscription ("King of the Macedonians Cassander, son of Antipater, dedicated this to Olympian Zeus") indicates that this was not a portrait as is generally assumed but a divine statue. Portrait statues were usually dedicated by a third party, *e.g.*, portrait of Adeia dedicated by Lysimachus, *supra* n. 41.
64. *Cf.*, E. N. Borza and O. Palagia, "The chronology of the royal Macedonian tombs at Vergina," *Jdl* 122 (2007): 81-125 with earlier references. For a study of the silver vessels from Tomb II, reaching the conclusion that they post-date the reign of Philip II, see D. W. J. Gill, "Inscribed silver plate from Tomb II at Vergina," *Hesperia* 77 (2008): 335-358. For an alternative view, see now M. Seyer, *Der Herrscher als Jäger* (Vienna: Phoibos Verlag, 2007) 115-117.
65. Palagia, 2000, 197, with n. 137.

ALEXANDER IN INDIA:
PTOLEMY AS NEAR EASTERN HISTORIOGRAPHER

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The ancient sources dealing with Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire vary greatly in the scope of their reporting.¹ For the most part, all cover the great battles, with each adding his own particular perspective and emphasis, and all hold to the same general chronology when detailing Alexander's pursuit of Darius III and then Bessus and his flight East. But as Alexander moves farther from the world the ancient authors knew well, the less full their narratives become, until even the most detailed military source, Arrian's *Anabasis Alexandri*, resembles a chronological narrative of accomplishments, with two main heroes, Alexander III and Ptolemy, son of Lagos, the future Macedonian king of Egypt. The advance into Swat and Bajaur, what I have called here the Indian Campaign, is narrowly focused on Ptolemy and as a result especially full of references to his heroism. It would seem that the Indian Campaign, more than any other section of Arrian's account, allows Ptolemy to shine as a commander who is equal, and at times even superior, to Alexander. In doing this, the Indian Campaign narrative is strikingly similar to other royal accomplishment narratives from Egypt in which new kings glorify their actions and justify their right to protect the "Two Lands."² The Royal Accomplishment Narrative is published in order to convey an Egyptian king's worthiness to both his subjects and his gods and can be published early in a king's reign, in order to ground his reputation. But more importantly, such narratives communicate to those in power in Egypt, the priestly class and nobles, that Egypt will persevere under the new king's protection, that Egypt will continue to move according to its time-honored, unchanged and unchangeable rhythms, with

a strong leader at the helm.³ I suggest that Ptolemy is using the narrative of Alexander's Eastern conquests, and the Indian Campaign especially, for this same purpose. Ptolemy is showing that he is a stronger leader than any of his rivals among the Successors, but he is doing so in a particularly Egyptian way: by *publishing* his Royal Accomplishment Narrative. Indeed, after the so-called "Conspiracy of Philotas," when Ptolemy and the other Marshals such as Krateros and Hephaistion gain promotions to high command, the future Egyptian king comes to play an increasingly important role in his own Alexander narrative, at the expense of his peers.⁴ As a consequence, by the time of the Indian Campaign, Ptolemy, not Alexander's close friend Hephaistion, has become Alexander's military right hand and true heir.⁵

Nonetheless, modern scholars have seen nothing out of place with the general substance of Alexander's Indian conquests as reported by Arrian.⁶ Even critics of Ptolemy such as A. B. Bosworth have largely accepted the structure offered by Arrian, even though they are skeptical of Arrian's own methodology and sources.⁷ A fine line has to be struck between criticism and outright dismissal; while the primary eyewitness sources did emphasize different events, they could not engage in wholesale fabrication. Bosworth summarizes the problem well:

Past and present enmities and friendships determined what they [the primary eyewitness sources] omitted or included, and influenced their shaping of events.... Even if there was no obvious malice or intention to misrepresent, it was inevitable that they would stress the actions in which they were prominent or had direct experience, downplay the successes of people they disliked, and interpret the events of the period according to their interests at the time of writing.⁸

But is it enough simply to recognize that the sources engage in selective reporting and self-promotion? For all of their insightful analysis, Bosworth and other commentators do not explain how and why the Alexander sources should engage in this form of historiographical construction, especially in the systematic manner we find in the fragments of Ptolemy.⁹ This paper takes up that task. Here I offer context for the agendas and the methodologies surrounding Ptolemy's selective reporting.

By comparing Arrian's narrative of the Indian Campaign (where he openly acknowledges Ptolemy as his source)¹⁰ with similar Egyptian narratives, I hope to place Ptolemy and his work within a much wider, and non-Greek, historiographical methodology and context. In a sense, Ptolemy is writing a new kind of Greek history—the royal autobiography. Unfortunately for him, there were no traditional examples of Royal Accomplishment Narratives or heroic autobiographies within the Greek literary context, though the biographies and histories of Xenophon come closest.¹¹ A different model was needed. And for Ptolemy examples were literally all around him in his new home—the victory *stelai* of his Egyptian predecessors. Essentially, Ptolemy created a new genre of historical writing by melding Egyptian and Greek historiographical traditions.¹² Arrian's main source for military matters, Ptolemy I, combined both Greek and Egyptian narrative styles and methodologies in order to highlight his own importance to those who mattered in the new world of Greeks and Barbarians that Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire had created.

While W. W. Tarn and E. Badian recognized some time ago that Ptolemy often promotes both himself and Alexander, no scholar has contextualized this within an historiographical tradition or offered explanation beyond that of royal propaganda.¹³ As Bosworth has reminded us above, of course Ptolemy was engaging in royal propaganda—both for Alexander and for himself in his struggle with his fellow Successors—but it is the form of the propaganda that deserves explanation.¹⁴ Ptolemy was chronicling Alexander's (and his own) accomplishments in an established, Near Eastern format. The first Macedonian king of Egypt was writing an account of his earliest triumphs not wholly in the Greek tradition of critical and causal analysis of actions and motives (as best exemplified by Thucydides in 1.21 and 22), or even of inquiry-based story-telling (as demonstrated by Herodotos in his *Historia*), but rather in a royal Egyptian style, perhaps even for a Hellenized Egyptian audience.¹⁵

Such portrayals were common, almost formulaic in Egyptian royal biographies from the New Kingdom forward.

One of the oldest, and perhaps best surviving examples was issued by Thutmose III, describing the first year of his sole rule. The timing of this narrative is especially significant. Thutmose III had just taken control of Egypt after the (natural) death of his powerful step-mother and aunt Hatshepsut, and very much needed to establish his own credentials to his subjects as defender of Egypt and a god incarnate. Officially, Thutmose III ruled Egypt for almost fifty-four years, from April 24, 1479 to March 11, 1425 BCE, but the first twenty-two years he was junior co-regent to Hatshepsut, who had been officially named “king”—the first and perhaps only Egyptian woman to hold that title.¹⁶ Thus, for 22 years, Thutmose had played second fiddle, while his “king” received the credit for Egypt’s military success.¹⁷ It was vitally important that Thutmose establish his credentials and quell criticism by any rivals. So when Hatshepsut died on the tenth day of the sixth month of Thutmose III’s twenty-second year, and the client king of Kadesh in Canaan rebelled against Egyptian rule and seized control of the strategic fort at Megiddo, Thutmose had to act.¹⁸ Indeed, this was Thutmose’s chance to demonstrate his capabilities and add territory to the Egyptian empire.¹⁹ He recounts his accomplishments on a victory stele as follows:

[His majesty] ordered a conference with his victorious army, speaking as follows: “That [wretched] enemy (20) of Kadesh has come and has entered into Megiddo. He is [there] at this moment. ...Will ye tell me [what is in your hearts]?” They said in the presence of his majesty: “What is it like to go [on] this [road] which becomes (so) narrow? It is [reported] that the foe is there, waiting on [the outside, while they are] becoming (more) numerous. Will not horse (have to) go after [horse, and the army] (30) and the people similarly? Will the vanguard of us be fighting while the [rear guard] is waiting here in Aruna, unable to fight? Now two (other) roads are here. One of the roads—behold, it is [to the east of] us, so that it comes out at Taanach. The other—behold, it is to the (35) north side of Djefti, and we will come out to the north of Megiddo. Let our victorious lord proceed on the one of [them] which is [satisfactory to] his heart, (but) do not make us go on that difficult road!”... [Thutmose responds] “I [swear], (40) as Re loves me, as my father Amon favors me, as my [nostrils] are rejuvenated with life and satisfaction, my majesty shall proceed upon this Aruna road! ... [Ye] shall [hold fast to the stride of your victorious lord on] that road which becomes (so)

na[rrrow. Behold, his majesty has taken] an oath, saying: 'I will not let [my victorious army] go forth ahead of my majesty in [this place!'" Now his majesty had laid it in his heart] that he himself should go forth at the head of his army....

Then [his] majesty issued forth [at the head of] his [army], which was [prepared] in many ranks.... Thereupon his majesty prevailed over them at the head of his army. When they [the enemy] saw his majesty prevailing over them, and they fled headlong [to] Megiddo with faces of fear. They abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and silver, so that someone might draw them (up) into this town by hoisting on their garments. Now the people had shut this town against them, (but) they [let down] garments to hoist them up into this town. Now, if only his majesty's army had not given up their hearts to capturing the possessions of the enemy, they would [have captured] Megiddo at this time, while the wretched enemy of Kadesh and the wretched enemy of this town were being dragged (up) hastily to get them into their town, for the fear of his majesty entered [their bodies], their arms were weak, [for] his serpent diadem had overpowered them.²⁰

Thutmose III sets out his achievements during the 1458 BCE Levantine campaign in a chronological fashion, with great emphasis on his own personal role in choosing the route and the battle strategy.²¹ If the army had not taken the difficult and narrow hidden approach to Meggido, they would not have been able to take the forces of Kadesh by surprise and would themselves have been caught in the narrow approach. Throughout the narrative Thutmose highlights his role at the front of his army. He emphasizes how his great battle skills and fearsome fighting alone caused the rout of the enemy in what will become the standard Egyptian campaign chronicle.²² Only the greed of his troops for the booty of the slain kept the great king from utterly annihilating the forces arrayed against him. Or perhaps this is a way to cover Thutmose's inability to take the fort, since the royal narrative can record nothing but victorious actions.²³ Regardless, the purpose of this campaign was simply to establish Egyptian (and Thutmose's) sovereignty over a rebellious client king. By showing that he was willing to take to the field and fight, Thutmose proved he was a worthy overlord and the king of Kadesh submitted.²⁴ Thutmose did not need to annihilate the king of Kadesh and the Kadeshians did

not need to continue the fight. Dominance had been achieved and the previous relationships were reestablished. Both kings saved face, though Thutmose chose not to record the results in quite those terms. Instead, he is the clever, brave, victorious general, fighting in the front ranks, who saves the day when others quail. Thutmose wanted to annihilate the enemy, but the weakness of character displayed by his troops prohibited him from doing so. The style and methodology of the royal accomplishment narrative require such formulae; the king, *and only the king*, must always be the hero of his own, glorious drama.

A similar structure is seen the narratives of Tutmose's co-regent, son and successor, Amenhotep II (1427-01 BCE.). Indeed, Amenhotep was even more specific on how he, personally, defeated the enemy by his own hand, with his own bow, in single combat.

His majesty crossed the Orontes (5) on dangerous waters, like Rashap. Then he turned about to watch his rear, and he saw a few Asiatics coming furtively, adorned with weapons of warfare, to attack the king's army. His majesty burst after them like the flight of a divine falcon. The confidence of their hearts was slackened, and one after another fell upon his fellow, up to their commander. Not a single one [of the Egyptians] was with his majesty, except for himself with his valiant arm. His majesty killed them by shooting. He returned thence, his heart glad like Montu the valiant, when he had triumphed. [Here follows a] list of what his majesty captured within this day: two princes and six *maryanu*, in addition to their chariots, their teams, and all their weapons of warfare.²⁵

Amenhotep is the hero, none stand with him, and none can stand against him. From the Fifteenth Century down to the Persian conquest, Egypt produced hundreds of royal *stelai* written in strikingly similar vein to those erected by Thutmose III and Amenhotep II.²⁶ By the time Ptolemy wrote his account of Alexander's conquests, the style and method of the royal accomplishment narrative had become fossilized among the Egyptian literary classes.

And we should not be surprised that the Egyptian royal autobiography might influence Greek historiography. The genre seems to have had a wide influence well beyond Egypt

itself, dating from at least the Late Bronze Age.²⁷ A classic example is the Assyrian king, Tiglath-Pileser I's (1114 - 1076 BCE) conquest narrative:

I overwhelmed the city Hunusu,²⁸ their fortified city, so that it looked like a ruin hill created by the deluge. Violently I fought with their mighty men in city and mountain and brought about their defeat. I laid low their men-at-arms in the mountains like sheep. Like lambs I cut off their heads and made their blood flow into the hollows and plains of the mountains. Thus I conquered that city. I took their gods and brought out their possessions and property. I burnt the city. The three great walls that were constructed with baked brick and the entire city I razed, destroyed, turned into a ruin hill and strewed SIPU stones over it.²⁹

This is part of a long, chronological narrative wherein the king lists all of his accomplishments, emphasizing his personal role and the number of people killed, areas subdued, natives awed, gods worshipped, garrisons emplaced, and tribute received. Indeed, all later Assyrian and Babylonian accomplishment narratives follow the pattern laid out by Tiglath-Pileser's text.³⁰

As with the Egyptian examples, no defeats are listed and all is from the great king's heroic perspective. All people the king meets are either awed by his presence among them, or treacherously reject him and must then be punished and made examples of, just as Thutmose had done with the rebellious king of Kadesh. Tiglath-Pileser is seemingly everywhere, accomplishing the greatest of deeds with his own physical strength and mental acuity. As we will see, these same characteristic elements appear in Ptolemy's account of the Indian Campaign of spring, 327 BCE. And we can talk about Ptolemy as our source for this campaign not only because Arrian tells us in his preface that Ptolemy, together with Alexander's chief engineer Aristoboulos are his main sources, but mainly because Arrian specifically identifies Ptolemy as his source for the Spring Campaign.³¹

The Indian Campaign

As Alexander marched out of Sogdiana down the Kabul River, he divided his forces into two, with Hephaistion and Perdikkas taking the bulk of the army and cavalry to secure the main road to the plains, while the king himself (together with Ptolemy and Leonnatos) took a portion of the elite troops—the hypaspists, Agrianians, the phalangites from Upper Macedonia, and the rest of the Companion Cavalry. Alexander's goal seems to have been to secure the hill country of Bajaur and Swat so that the inhabitants might not trouble his main army under Hephaistion and Perdikkas, his new ally Taxiles, or his road and supply-lines back through the Khyber Pass. He may also have simply wanted to blood his troops after their period of inaction in the highlands. For Ptolemy, this minor campaign in Bajaur and Swat offered a perfect environment in which to shine since there were no rival commanders of any importance present (other than Leonnatos) either to take a share of the glory or to dispute his version of events at a later date. Indeed, Arrian's treatment of Ptolemy's peer Leonnatos is superficial at best; despite being present at one early battle and being wounded, Leonnatus receives little more than honorable mention throughout Arrian's narrative of the campaign.

Coming down from the Hindu-Kush into the vales above the Indus, Alexander advanced into the territory of the Aspasiens, Guraiani, and Assakenians and attacked the first city in his way. The city is never named in the sources, and this probably speaks to its military insignificance. Upon arrival and seeing that the inhabitants had taken the field, Alexander and his Macedonians pushed them back and with no special effort drove the citizens inside, compelling them to man the defenses. The enemy resisted "briefly" (*oligon*), but soon fled for the hills. During the course of this exchange both Ptolemy and Alexander were wounded in hand-to-hand fighting. In the end, the greater number of Indians escaped the city, but the Macedonians killed all those they took prisoner, as punishment for their commanders' wounds before they departed for the next city, Andaca, which immediately surrendered (Arr.

Anab. 4.23-24). All the elements of this engagement, from the surrender to the inhabitants running upon the approach of the Alexander, have direct parallels with Near Eastern royal narratives. Even the lack of name for the town is common.

The battle and wounding before this unnamed Indian city sets up the comparison between Ptolemy and Alexander that will build throughout this short campaign. With each successive engagement, Ptolemy takes on more authority, becomes more heroic, until he surpasses Alexander himself. But here at the beginning, the Macedonian king and his general are starting off on an equal plane: Arrian portrays Ptolemy as fighting just as hard, and as effectively, as Alexander, and as a result both the king and his general are wounded. And yet, despite the wounds, the author tells the reader this campaign was easy, in much the same manner as Thutmose III describes the clever approach to, and battle at Meggido, and Amenhotep II his single combat with Levantine leaders. According to the methodology and formulae of the Royal Accomplishment Narrative, no setbacks or failures can be admitted, all actions are “easy” for the hero, and such skillful perseverance in the face of adversity only elevates and highlights the ultimate victory. Indeed, the wounds effectively showcase the bravery of both Alexander and Ptolemy. Furthermore, as if any more hyperbole were required, this is called a city. It is a village. Scale has been magnified, in the way of Royal Accomplishment Narrative, to offset Ptolemy’s actions and heighten the tension.

After sending word for Krateros to garrison the area (and perhaps round up fugitives?), Alexander and his Macedonians proceeded to the principle town of the region (also unnamed!), the seat of the governor of the Aspasiens. But when the inhabitants heard of the army’s approach, they fled for the hills. The Macedonians pursued and killed many before they could reach safety. Again the parallels with Thutmose’s battle at Meggido against the king of Kadesh, when Thutmose routed the enemy, who then took refuge in hills (the fort of Meggido) are striking.

As Alexander and his troops pursue, Ptolemy espied the chief of the group, who had now gained the hills, and broke off from the Macedonian forces to pursue him:

The actual leader of the Indians of this district was observed by Ptolemy son of Lagos, already close to a foothill; Ptolemy had with him some of the hypaspists, and *though far inferior in numbers, he still continued to pursue him*³² on horse, but as the hill was hard for his horse to go up, he left his mount there, handing it to one of the hypaspists to lead, *and in person followed the Indian on foot, just as he was*. When the Indian saw Ptolemy drawing near, he himself turned round at bay, and his hypaspists with him, and with his long spear stuck at close quarters through Ptolemy's corselet to his breast; the corselet checked the blow. But Ptolemy drove right through the Indian's thigh, and felled and despoiled him.³³

Arrian stresses that Ptolemy had an inferior force but nevertheless pushed on. Even when his horse could no longer proceed, Ptolemy forged ahead doggedly. Bosworth argues that Arrian and his source Ptolemy are purposely narrowing the focus.³⁴ They are choosing to highlight Ptolemy's contribution to this engagement by suppressing a description of Alexander's forces, while at the same time detailing at length Ptolemy's units. Bosworth suggests that this is done deliberately in order to efface Alexander's role—which was probably the largest.³⁵ He is certainly correct. The fact that Ptolemy commands the Agrianians, Hypaspists, Companion Cavalry, archers, light infantry—all units that traditionally stay very close to Alexander—suggest that Ptolemy has substituted himself as commander (and hero) in place of Alexander.³⁶ Bosworth summarizes Ptolemy's methodology nicely: "the achievements of others are not ignored, but they are used to underscore the outstanding contribution of the narrator, who is invariably in the right place at the right time."³⁷ Of course, all of this conforms to the methodology of Royal Accomplishment Narrative. The interplay between Thutmose and his commanders over which route to take when approaching Meggido, and Thutmose's decision to lead his forces along the most difficult way is directly comparable.

Likewise, in the vignette of single-combat between Ptolemy and the Indian we see echoes of Amenhotep II's bloodbath. As

Ptolemy mounted the hill in pursuit, his horse became useless, and he was forced to continue on foot. The Indian struck first, sending a spear through Ptolemy's breastplate, but Ptolemy, unharmed, felled the Indian with one blow. Bosworth has convincingly argued that Arrian, and his source, Ptolemy, are consciously making this combat Homeric.³⁸ He points out that the Homeric context illustrates that Ptolemy is the more fitting Patroklos to Alexander's Achilles: "he [Ptolemy] rather than Hephaestion (so the narrative implies) should be the favourite of the Macedonian Achilles."³⁹ But in Arrian's narrative, Ptolemy goes one further and accomplishes something Homer's Patroklos could not; he surpasses his Achilles: "Ptolemy did not merely lead; he could personally dispose of the enemy commander, a feat which Alexander himself had never achieved."⁴⁰ By showing himself superior to Alexander, superior to his predecessor, Ptolemy is engaging the Egyptian royal narrative's methodology. Just as Amenhotep II had to surpass his father by engaging Levantine leaders in individual combat, so too must Ptolemy surpass Alexander among the Indians. Ptolemy is working wholly within the Egyptian model, though peppering it with both Greek cultural references and Greek stylistic elements.⁴¹

As with Thutmose III (and Tiglath-Pileser I), Ptolemy and the Macedonians pushed their opponents into the hills. In a similar fashion to the inhabitants of the earlier unnamed Aspasian town, we see the enemy fleeing at the approach of the Macedonians, though here it seems that the Macedonians pushed them away rather than just scaring them away as before. Also unlike the earlier attack, the Macedonians pursued the Indians this time, either because they looked to be easy prey, or the terrain and conditions were more conducive. Whatever the case, something significant has changed in the narrative; after his one-on-one combat with the Indian commander, Ptolemy, not Alexander is in the lead. Ptolemy has now surpassed Alexander as leader of the Macedonians. Ptolemy sees the enemy chief, Ptolemy runs down the enemy on foot after his horse was disabled, Ptolemy fights the enemy in single combat and even though struck full-on in the chest, Ptolemy kills the Indian leader with one

blow. Ptolemy, not Alexander, is the hero of this piece and now commands the Macedonians in pursuit of the fugitives.

After Ptolemy's battle with the Indian, the Macedonians move on, occupying the city of Arigaïos, which had been burned and deserted by its inhabitants. At this point, Ptolemy has established his credentials and can take the commanding role. He is in the vanguard and first spies out the enemy fires in the distance. For the first time in the narrative, Ptolemy is described as in charge of his own division and consequently has the opportunity to continue his starring role. The Indians held the high ground, but when they saw the small size of the Macedonian advance force, they gave up their defensive position and descended to the plain with confidence. The Macedonians dealt with them easily. What is more, Ptolemy was not content to wait for the Indians to reach the plain and instead, he rushed out before the other Macedonian divisions commanded by Alexander and Leonnatos had arrived to attack the best and most warlike fighters on their hill:

Ptolemy's troops marshaled themselves on the uneven ground, but as the barbarians were holding a hill, they formed up into columns, and Ptolemy led them up to the point where the hill seemed most open to assault, not surrounding it on all sides, but leaving a space for flight, in case the barbarians chose to flee. Here too the battle was fierce, *both because these Indians were not like the other barbarians of these parts but much the most warlike people of the region.*⁴² But even they were pushed off the hill by the Macedonians.⁴³

Notice that the men whom Ptolemy had rushed forward (on his own) to fight were the most warlike of the region. In the manner of the Egyptian royal narrative, the hero fights the hardest battles, against the most dangerous opponents. The battle was indeed hard-fought, but the Indians were eventually driven from the hill, and the Macedonians rounded up the survivors and organized the spoils. In a rare aside, even Arrian expresses skepticism over Ptolemy's booty: over 40,000 prisoners and more than 230,000 oxen.⁴⁴

After the battle Alexander moved into the territory of the Assakenians, who "were reported" to have amassed 2,000 cavalry, over 30,000 infantry, and thirty elephants.⁴⁵ At this

time even though Alexander was still without his full strength, the Indians, learning of his approach and past success, give up the fight and flee to their mountain strongholds (Arr. *Anab.* 4.25.5-7). Alexander pursued but divided his forces, sending Koenos to the neighboring city of Bazira, while he and Ptolemy continued on to Ora. There is no further mention of Leonnatos, who may have been on administrative duty, recovering from his injuries. Only Ptolemy among the Marshals is now with the king to share his accomplishments. This dichotomy is heightened by Koenos's failure. Koenos could not take Bazira, but Ptolemy (and Alexander) had little trouble with Ora.

The Bazira-Ora juxtaposition is curious. Arrian's source, Ptolemy, seems to have set this up as a purposeful comparison: successful Ptolemy, unsuccessful Koenos. This tension is heightened by the fact that only after the people of Bazira heard about Ora, and the Macedonians' activities there, did they abandon their town and flee to the local fortress, the Rock of Aornus (Arr. *Anab.* 4.27.5-28.4). Thus, according to Ptolemy's narrative, Koenos was only able to complete his assignment because his enemy feared Ptolemy; they abandoned their town after Ptolemy and Alexander had taken Ora. The truth may be more complicated: Arrian reports that Koenos had been besieging Bazira, and in the process killed 500 warriors and took 70 hostages. It seems that Koenos was succeeding, but by shifting emphasis to the surrender, and attributing it to Ptolemy's actions at Ora, Arrian allows Ptolemy to receive the ultimate credit. In this section of the narrative only Ptolemy is permitted to take Indian cities.

The siege at The Rock of Aornus serves as a climax both for the Indian Campaign in Bajaur and Swat and for the establishment of Ptolemy as a great hero and strategist.⁴⁶ When the Macedonian forces arrived at Aornus, some natives appeared and offered to guide them to the most vulnerable point of The Rock where they might secure a valuable defensive position. According to Arrian, Alexander chose Ptolemy for the pivotal role: Ptolemy, together with a few lightly armed units proceeded up a difficult, narrow track, dug in with a defen-

sive ditch and stockade, and assailed the back entrance to The Rock (note the parallels with Thutmose's "difficult track" on the way to Meggido). On the following day, Alexander made a sortie against the main approach, which failed. The Indians saw that Alexander would accomplish nothing and so they concentrated on the real threat, Ptolemy. There was a fierce struggle, but Ptolemy repulsed the advance. On the next day Alexander, after heavy fighting, won through to Ptolemy's position. With rejoined forces and Ptolemy in the lead, the Macedonians assaulted The Rock from Ptolemy's redoubt and only then succeed in taking this impregnable fortress. Just as with Thutmose III and Meggido, Ptolemy and only Ptolemy can guarantee success for the Macedonians; even Alexander had to abandon his position and join forces with his general on the redoubt, before he could take The Rock.

The other Alexander sources report events differently. Curtius (8.11.3-19) has a certain Mullinus, one of Alexander's royal secretaries, in charge of taking the redoubt. In a confused and complicated narrative, which makes no mention of Ptolemy, Alexander eventually takes The Rock.⁴⁷ Diodoros (17.85.4-6) simply has Alexander take The Rock. From these different perspectives, we can see clearly how Ptolemy has chosen to highlight his own actions. The siege of The Rock is the most difficult of the Indian campaigns and Arrian credits Ptolemy as the author of Alexander's victory. While Arrian, and probably his source, Ptolemy, are careful to give final credit to Alexander, the future king of Egypt certainly plays a pivotal role at The Rock and outshines any other Marshal. Ptolemy follows the guides. Ptolemy secretly secures the secondary approach. Ptolemy receives the brunt of enemy attention. Alexander wins through to Ptolemy after his own assault fails, and in the end, Alexander wins The Rock because of Ptolemy. Ptolemy is the hero of his own narrative. But then, how else could it end for an Egyptian king, dictating his own story for posterity?

This paper has focused on a very narrow slice of Arrian's narrative of Alexander's Eastern campaign, during a time when the other high-ranking Macedonian commanders were absent on other tasks, in order to showcase a particular methodology: Ptolemy's historiographical style. Ptolemy used the Indian Campaign to show himself as Alexander's right-hand man, every bit as courageous and talented and daring as Alexander himself, in order to justify his succession to the throne of Egypt and emphasize his own military pedigree. At times, there are hints that Ptolemy can surpass his king, foreshadowing the succession to come. And yet for all its "just-the-facts" presentation, this terse military narrative, which has so appealed to modern scholars, is not part of the standard Greek historiographical tradition; its roots and methodology are Egyptian. Ptolemy constructed his memoirs of the greatest Macedonian king in a particularly Near Eastern, non-Greek, or at least not wholly Greek, historiographical style. To be clear, this paper does NOT suggest that Ptolemy was making things up, for as Badian reminded us some time ago, the first generation Alexander sources were not free enough to fabricate events other eye-witnesses knew to be untrue.⁴⁸ I merely offer an alternative lens through which to view Ptolemy's methodology and narrative style. Surely his stay in Babylonia, and his long reign of Egypt, acquainted him with the royal accomplishment narrative and provided him with a useful template for presenting both his and Alexander's unprecedented victories.

NOTES

* The seed for this paper came from a graduate seminar I attended at Penn State while reading Macedonian history with Eugene N. Borza. Gene encouraged me to develop the idea further within a non-Greek context, and after much reading and thinking about both Greek and Near Eastern historiography this is the result. When I gave an earlier version at the American Philological Association's Annual Meeting in San Diego in January of 2007, Gene told me afterwards that he was not quite convinced but that I should continue working at it. I have done so and hope I am closer to convincing him. This paper, more than any other, represents the great influence Gene Borza has had on both my views of the Alexander historians and my own journey as a scholar, and so it is an honor to offer here my thesis on Ptolemy as Near Eastern historiographer.

1. The standard discussions are: J. E. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni: Books 3 and 4* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1980), and "Originality and its Limits in the Alexander Sources of the Early Empire," in *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 307-25; A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980-1995); *From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, "Alexander," A Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); W. Heckel, "Commentary on Justin," in *Justin. Epitome of the Philipic History of Pompeius Trogus. Vol. 1. Books 11-12: Alexander the Great*, ed. J. C. Yardley and W. Heckel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); N. G. L. Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great. The so-called Vulgate authors. Diodorus, Justin and Curtius* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983), and *Sources for Alexander the Great. An analysis of Plutarch's Life and Arrian's Anabasis Alexandrou* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993); and Philip Stadter, *Arrian of Nicomedia* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1980).
2. Even when they lose. See below.
3. Conquerors of Egypt learned to accommodate Egyptian traditions or face the consequences. The Nubian rulers of the 25th dynasty were especially adept at portraying a "seamless" transfer. K. Kitchen, *The Third Intermediate Period in Egypt*, 2nd ed. (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1986). But the Persians, under Cambyses, son of Cyrus, were patently not, at least as the Egyptians had come to remember the event by the time of Herodotos. As a result, Persian rule over Egypt was never secure. A. B. Lloyd, "Herodotus and Cambyses: some thoughts on recent work," in *Archamenid History 3: Method and Theory*, ed. A. Kurht and H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (Leiden: Brill, 1988) 55-66. For further discussion see *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt*, ed. I Shaw (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000).
4. At least as the narrative survives in Arrian.
5. For the relevant scholarship on both the conspiracy and aftermath see the essay by J. Reames in this volume, especially her note 2. For the close relationship between Alexander and Hephaistion see J. Reames-Zimmerman, "An atypical affair? Alexander the Great, Hephaistion Amyntoros and the nature of their relationship," *Ancient History Bulletin* 13.3 (1999): 81-96.

6. The campaign narratives of W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, Vol. 1: *The Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1948); J. F. C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958); N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great. King, Commander and Statesman* (Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes), and *The Genius of Alexander the Great* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1997); and James R. Ashley, *The Macedonian Empire. The Era of Warfare under Philip II and Alexander the Great, 359-323 B.C.* (Jefferson, NC: Mcfarland & Co., 1998) reproduce Arrian's account wholesale, while the more critical, Peter Green, *Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C.* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1991), and A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), are more cautious.
7. Bosworth, 1995, and especially *Alexander and the East: the Tragedy of Triumph* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996).
8. Bosworth, 1996, 30-31.
9. To be sure, Bosworth, 1995, 1996, acknowledges that Ptolemy often engages in self-promotion to establish his worthiness to succeed Alexander but he fails to explain the historiographical context in which Ptolemy is working. See n. 11, below.
10. See Bosworth, 1996, 42-46.
11. With the *Agésilaios* and sections of the *Hellenica*. See Bosworth, 1980-1995, for Arrian's use and modeling of Xenophon.
12. S. A. Stephens, *Seeing Double. Intercultural Poetics in Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2003), argues that such melding of Egyptian and Hellenic literary and scientific traditions was common among Alexandrian scholars from the founding of the city onwards. It would be quite surprising if Ptolemy I (and his scribes) were *not* working within this scholarly milieu that he nurtured and paid for.
13. E. Badian, "The Eunuch Bagoas," *Classical Quarterly* 8 (1959): 144-157; and W. W. Tarn, "Alexander's Attitude to Sex," in *Alexander the Great, Vol. II: Sources and Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1948) 319-26. See E. D. Carney, "Artifice and Alexander History," in *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 263-85, for a discussion of "how an historian should treat narrative material which is, at best, of somewhat dubious historicity" (264).
14. See A. B. Bosworth, "The Death of Alexander the Great: Rumour and Propaganda," *Classical Quarterly* 21 (1971): 112-36, and "Ptolemy and the Will of Alexander," in *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 207-41, for a discussion of how Successor politics could color accounts of Alexander's life and conquests.
15. See Stephens, 2003.
16. Joyce Tyldesley, *Hatchepsut: The Female Pharaoh* (London: Penguin Books, 1998); Gay Robins, *Women in Ancient Egypt* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1993); Barbara Watterson, *Women in Ancient Egypt* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).
17. Thutmose had commanded earlier military missions as general for his "mother"—the missions in India where Ptolemy commanded for Alexander make

interesting comparanda—and seems to have chafed under her tight control. A. H. Gardiner, T. E. Peet, and J. Černý, *The Inscriptions of Sinai I* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952) 181.

Unfortunately, the complex relationship between Thutmose and Hatshepsut remains opaque. Indeed, evidence for Hatshepsut's accomplishments is fragmentary at best; Thutmose had conducted a very effective *damnatio memoriae*. E. H. Cline and D. O'Connor, *Thutmose III: A New Biography* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2006).

18. A common action by Canaanite and other Levantine client kings during times of regime change in Egypt. See Donald B. Redford, *Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992).

19. James P. Allen, "The Military Campaign of Thutmose III," in *Hatshepsut: From Queen to Pharaoh*, ed. Catherine Roehrig, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2005) 261, argues that Thutmose set up this text (the so-called "Armant stele") to assert his own claim over Egypt after the death of Hatshepsut.

20. James B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969) 234-38.

21. Ptolemy will also call attention to his actions and planning as playing the decisive role in a successful campaign (against the Assakenians and the siege of Aornus). See below.

22. Redford, 1992, 157; Donald B. Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III* (Leiden: Brill, 2003); and Miriam Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature. Vol. II: The New Kingdom*, 2nd rev. ed. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2006); Donald B. Redford, "Ancient Egyptian Literature: An Overview," 2223-42; and Oliver Perdu, "Ancient Egyptian Autobiographies," 2243-54, esp. 2252-53, in *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, ed. Jack M. Sasson, et al. (New York: Scribner, 1995).

23. Even when he loses, an Egyptian king will claim victory, such as Ramses II did over the Hittites at the Battle of Kadesh in 1274 BCE. See n. 26 below.

24. Redford, 1992, 157-158.

25. Pritchard, 1969, 245-248.

26. The narratives of Seti I (Pritchard, 1969, 254-5), Ramses II (Pritchard, 1969, 255-258), and Ramses III (Pritchard, 1969, 262-3) are good examples. See Nicolas Grimal, *A History of Ancient Egypt* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1992). The text of Ramses II is especially significant, since he lost the Battle of Kadesh for which he personally claims victory.

27. This is not surprising considering the influence of Egyptian culture in Syria and the Levant following the overseas empire created by Thutmose III. The so-called "Amarna Period" witnessed an impressive level of intellectual exchange. Herman Vanstiphout, "Memory and Literacy in Ancient Western Asia," 2181-96; E. L. Greenstein, "Autobiographies in Ancient Western Asia," 2421-32; John van Seters, "The Historiography of the Ancient Near East," 2433-44, in *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, ed. Jack M. Sasson, et al. (New York: Scribner, 1995).

28. This section of the narrative seems to refer to regions in the foothills of the Zagros Mountains between the Mesopotamia plain and the highlands of Media.

29. A. K. Grayson, *Assyrian Rulers of the Early 1st Millennium: (1114-859 BC). Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia Assyrian Periods 2* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1991) 2.7.
30. Amelie Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East, c. 3000-330 BC. Vol I* (London: Routledge, 1995) 358-62.
31. *Anab.* 4.25.4. See Bosworth, 1995, 166; 1996, 42.
32. Emphasis added.
33. Arr. *Anab.* 4.24.3; all Arrian translations are from P. A. Brunt, Loeb Classical Library.
34. Bosworth, 1996, 46, argues that Arrian only heightened and modified the heroic atmosphere already present in Ptolemy's original.
35. Bosworth, 1996, 42-44.
36. For the Agrianians fighting under Alexander, see Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.2, 3.20. The first time Ptolemy leads this contingent is in Arr. *Anab.* 3.30, where a similar substitution may be at work. Alternatively, the new command may reflect the restructuring after the death of Philotas.
37. Bosworth, 1996, 45.
38. *Ibid.*, 45-46.
39. *Ibid.*, 47.
40. *I.e.*, Darius III. Bosworth, 1996, 47.
41. Stephens, 2003, sees similar cultural melds at work among the Alexandrian poets and philosophers.
42. Emphasis added.
43. Arr. *Anab.* 4.25.2.
44. *Anab.* 4.25.4. See Bosworth, 1995, 166, for further discussion. *Cf.*, Thutmose III's hyperbolic description of booty taken from Meggido.
45. Ptolemy is again accentuating the enemy forces by detailing the strength and composition of individual units. Bosworth, 1995, 166-7.
46. Even Herakles, Arrian reports, son of Zeus himself could not take the Rock of Aornos, and so Alexander desired it all the more. In good Near Eastern fashion, we have comparison with a god. See Bosworth, 1996, 87-132, for discussion of Alexander's emulation of Dionysos and Herakles.
47. See Bosworth, 1996, 49-52.
48. Badian, 1959.

THE ROOTS OF MACEDONIAN AMBIGUITY IN CLASSICAL ATHENIAN LITERATURE

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I have never been less regretful for having delayed publishing a paper than in the present circumstance. What follows is a version of the talk I delivered on the occasion of my very first professional conference over a decade ago—which was also the occasion on which I first met Professor Borza. Since that day when he spoke such kind words of encouragement to me, I have continued to accumulate much debt for his unflagging support of my work on Greek perspectives about Macedonia. This debt grows even at this moment. I hope that my contribution to this volume will be taken as a gesture of profound gratitude towards a person without whose work on the Macedonian question my own certainly would have been longer to launch, and with whose support I gained early confidence in trying to bridge the gap between philology and history.

While it seems to me that near-last (if not last) words concerning the general historical attitude of the archaic and classical Greeks towards the Macedonians have been offered by Professor Borza himself and Ernst Badian,¹ there has been an insufficient appreciation for the way in which the Macedonians fitted into the Fifth and Fourth-Century Athenian literary contexts in which they are found—rife as these are with the language of identity. Identity has become somewhat of a buzzword in discussions of classical Athenian literature; while this may seem to some to indicate the (rather suspect) imposition of a post-modern obsession on a far distant past, it is hard to deny the power and ubiquity of the oppositions of Athenian self-construction—Athenian vs. Spartan, citizen vs. slave, masculine vs. feminine, to name some—that appear to underpin all genres of Athenian literature.²

Jonathan M. Hall has done much important work on Greek identity, applying to it the anthropological insight that, while identities may be bolstered by external factors such as language, religious practice, or geographical location, they are largely subjective, a matter of self-ascription. Writing specifically about the Macedonians, Hall rightly dismisses the probative value of external criteria (language being the chief among them) that have long been relied upon to answer the question of Macedonian Hellenicity, preferring instead to evaluate the evolution of the Macedonian image within the rhetoric of Greek self-ascription from the archaic period to its culminating moment in the Fourth-Century debate on Philip's Hellenicity.³ I take a similar approach to appearances of the Macedonians in Greek contexts, suggesting that they tend to indicate more about Greek identity than about Macedonian "reality."

My paper, however, goes rather further than Hall's in contextualizing the Macedonian material in classical literature. I focus on four important Athenian authors—Herodotus, Thucydides, Demosthenes and Isocrates—who, for one thing, tend to exploit the historical distinction the Argead ruling dynasty made between itself and the Macedonians to a much greater degree than has hitherto been noticed by Hall and others. Indeed, while the kings were the first Macedonian figures to attract Greek notice, it was their association with Macedonia and the Macedonians, and nothing else, that necessitated their claim to Greekness to begin with; conversely, only by making the distinction between themselves as Argeads and their Macedonian subjects would these kings be able to pass as Greeks. Hall argues that the Macedonian image evolved in ways that parallel general shifts in the bases for judging Hellenicity, from aggregative and genealogical in the archaic period—where individuals and cities could cluster onto Greek identity by proving their genealogical connection to established Hellenes—to oppositional and largely cultural in the classical (whereby one would construct his "Greek" selfhood against the idea of a culturally "barbarian" other). I am less interested in this distinction between genealogical and cultural criteria for Greekness than the distinction between the idly ambivalent views of Herodotus and Thucydides, and the slightly more

purposeful (and yet still ambivalent) readings of Demosthenes and Isocrates,⁴ since all employ genealogical and cultural criteria to some extent, as their contexts warrant. The Argead royals' position in the Fifth Century as both Athenian *proxenoi* and Persian subjects, coupled with their self-proclamation as Hellenic rulers of Macedonia, resulted in a mixed view in Herodotus and Thucydides in which both genealogy and culture work equally to undermine the Hellenic status of the Macedonians and their Argead rulers. Demosthenes and Isocrates, however, who wrote during the Fourth-Century crisis, do not merely reinforce their cultural definition of Greekness when faced with Philip, but are forced to make firmer statements on Macedonian genealogy.⁵

In the end, however, neither the Demosthenean nor the Isocratean view can stabilize the Macedonian name as a "barbarian" one, and thus they are less useful than is sometimes thought for assessing who the Greeks thought the Macedonians "were" in relation to themselves. What is most interesting about classical writers, indeed, is their ability to change their position vis-à-vis Macedonian Greekness according to immediate context.

Ambiguous Others: Herodotus and Thucydides on the Argeads and their Macedonians

While the Macedonians do not appear in Greek literature until Herodotus's *Histories*, their eponymous ancestor Makedon is mentioned in Pseudo-Hesiod's *Catalogue of Women*, where he is implicitly excluded from Hellen's family line.⁶ If the dating to the late Sixth Century is correct,⁷ the exclusion may reflect Greek uncertainty concerning the Macedonians, since it was around this time that their king Amyntas was a Persian vassal. But whatever the case may be for Amyntas's own connection to Greece, it is certain that his son Alexander I had allegiances to both Persia and Athens during the Persian Wars,⁸ and this lends a certain ambiguity to Herodotus's overall presentation of the Macedonians and of Alexander himself.

Without a doubt, Herodotus's most lasting contribution to posterity's image of the Macedonians is his support of the

Argead royal family's claim of Argive ancestry—the first such support on record. In the *Histories* Book 5.22 we learn the famous story in which Alexander I used Argive genealogy to qualify for the Olympic Games:

I can declare from my own knowledge that the descendents of Perdiccas are Greeks (according to their own account)... the *Hellenodikai*, who manage the contest at Olympia judged this to be the case. For when Alexander chose to participate in the contest and enrolled for that very reason, those of the Greeks who were about to run against him tried to bar him, saying that the contest was not for barbarian competitors but for Greek ones. Once Alexander proved that he was an Argive, he was judged to be a Greek, and contending in the stade-long race he ran a dead heat for first place.⁹

The incident's historicity is not at all certain: Alexander (who is not called "Philhellene" until the Roman era)¹⁰ appears in none of the victor lists, and we hear of no other Macedonian king entering the competition between Alexander I and Philip II.¹¹ Indeed, it seems likely that Herodotus received this story straight from the royal propaganda machine, perhaps even from Alexander himself, without independent verification.¹² But whatever the origins of the story, Herodotus's use of it to prove Argead Hellenicity suggests that Macedonian Hellenicity was not widely accepted during Alexander's reign, or was at least questionable for some members of Herodotus's audience.

Herodotus expands on Alexander's Argive lineage in 8.137, drawing it back to the Heraklid Temenus. Let us leave aside for the moment the fairy-tale context of the story—in which three brothers acquire the land of Macedonia under magical circumstances—and consider the statement of lineage itself:

This Alexander was descended in the seventh degree from Perdiccas, who obtained the tyranny (*tēn turannida*) over the Macedonians in the way which I will now relate. Three brothers, descendants of Temenus, fled from Argos to the Illyrians; their names were Gauanes, Aeropus, and Perdiccas. From Illyria they went across to Upper Macedonia, where they came to a certain town called Lebaea.

One important consequence of this picture of historical events is that it divides the Hellenic Argeads from the Macedonians genealogically—something Isocrates would later exploit to Philip II's advantage. The flipside of Argead tyranny

is Macedonian submission, which in Herodotus is coded as a definitively barbarian state of being.¹³ And yet Herodotus does not unambiguously reinforce either Alexander's Hellenicity or, conversely, the Macedonians' lack of it. Alexander's proof to the Olympic judges, for example, serves in the end to connect the Argead kings genealogically to Heracles,¹⁴ but neither Argive origins nor siring by Heracles necessarily guarantees "Greekness."¹⁵ Elsewhere, Herodotus allows the Macedonians the "Dorian" status that had been claimed by Alexander.¹⁶

In any case, genealogy is hardly everything to Herodotus, who believes that not even the Athenians—the mouthpiece of his famous "programmatic" litany of Panhellenic criteria at the end of 8.144, "our common brotherhood with the Greeks: our common language, the altars and the sacrifices of which we all partake, and the common character which we bear"—were historically Greek until they acquired literacy in the Greek language. Prior to that they were "Pelasgians" rather than "Hellenes."¹⁷ The historian's keener interest seems to be in cultural and political Greekness, and indeed it is in the arenas of culture and politics (especially the latter) that Herodotus most tellingly exploits the peculiar status of Alexander I between Greek, Macedonian, and barbarian.

More specifically, we should note that the genealogies in both Book 5 and Book 8 are couched within narratives where culture and politics play a larger role. To begin with Book 5: the story of Alexander at the Olympics in chapter 22 is preceded by another story in chapters 18-21 (the first mention of the Macedonians and their kings in the *Histories*), where Alexander and his Macedonians come off looking quite ambiguous both culturally and politically. It can be summarized as follows. Having just conquered Paeonia (roughly where the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is today), the Persians bear down on the Macedonians and send an embassy of the seven best Persian warriors to Amyntas, Alexander I's father, to ask for the usual signs of submission: earth and water. Amyntas agrees to this, and also invites the Persian embassy to a feast. After eating and drinking, the Persians ask Amyntas to bring women to them,

following Persian custom, which he does in deference to his new lords. The Persians then try to molest the women. Amyntas, out of fear of the Persians, disguises his upset, but his son Alexander gains revenge by tricking the envoys, substituting Macedonian youths disguised as women. The Persians put their hands on these young men-as-women, who in turn take out daggers and murder their molesters.

Just before he gives the signal for the attack to the disguised youths, Alexander utters these words to the Persian envoys: “[take back word to your king] that there was one man, a Greek, the satrap of Macedonia, by whom you were both feasted and lodged hospitably.”¹⁸ As Ernst Badian has pointed out, Herodotus uses the word *huparchos* of Alexander’s status in Macedonia, which he happens to always employ for “satrap” in lieu of *satrapēs*.¹⁹ In the context of the Macedonians’ trick and Alexander’s Persian addressees, the king’s self-description as a satrap is ironic, preparing the reader for Herodotus’s assertion of the king’s Hellenic status in 5.22. And yet the mention inevitably also calls to mind the double status of Alexander who, like his father, would eventually end up submitting to the king. Similarly with the outcome of the story of the envoys: Herodotus tells us that Alexander offered his sister Gygaea in marriage to a Persian lord as a way of distracting him from his search for the missing envoys, simultaneously calling to attention the king’s connection to the Persians and justifying it as necessary bribery.

On the other hand, intratextual evidence suggests that Herodotus conceived the story of Alexander I as analogous to a story of a barbarian king—and not just a non-barbarian king pretending to be one. Amyntas’s silent witnessing of the humiliation of Macedonian women, and Alexander’s revenge, call to mind the humiliation and secret revenge of Candaules’s wife over her husband, who had forced his vassal Gyges to view her naked (1.8-12). Vivienne Gray has shown that, far from demonstrating “female power” as is often thought, the story of Candaules follows a common Herodotean pattern whose focus is the arbitrary injustice that barbarians perpetrate on other

barbarians who are subservient to them (again, their subservience always being a sign of their barbarism).²⁰ Gyges submits to Candaulus's wishes because he is the king's favorite body-guard; Amyntas brings the Persians women because they are, in his own words, his "lords."

The same holds true for 8.137-139, where Herodotus gives us the full fairy-tale version of the story of founding-king Perdiccas's acquisition of the "tyranny" of Macedonia.²¹ Gray groups the Perdiccas story with other tyrant-stories like that of Pisistratus.²² There is a difference: while the Pisistratus-story (as well as those of the Corinthian tyrants told by Socles the Corinthian in Book 5)²³ speaks to Herodotus's general attitude against tyranny, the Perdiccas story exists to validate Alexander I's Greek lineage.²⁴ That said, in the same way that stories of early Athenian tyranny show Athens in a genealogically and culturally pre-Greek stage, the story of Perdiccas's tyranny helps cancel out the ideological strength of his claim of Dorian origins.

We should consider, too, the even wider context of the foundation story, which is framed by the story of Alexander and the Spartans' embassies to Athens. Alexander's goal is to persuade Athens to come to the Persian side; the Spartans' goal is to prevent such an alliance. In 8.136, we learn exactly why Mardonius chose Alexander as a go-between for Xerxes and Athens: because of his official position as part of both Persian and Greek worlds. Mardonius has bidden Alexander to deliver to the Athenians the contents of an oracle originally pronounced in Carian, a barbarian tongue (*promantin barbarōi glōssēi chran*),²⁵ which he himself translated into Greek:

Mardonius read whatever it was the oracle said, and then sent Alexander, the son of Amyntas, to Athens with a message. He chose Alexander, who was a Macedonian (*andra Makedona*), for two reasons: first, because he was connected with the Persians by marriage—Bubares, a Persian, had married Alexander's sister Gygaea; they had a son who stayed in Asia, named Amyntas after his maternal grandfather, who enjoyed by the king's gift the revenues of an important Phrygian town of Alabanda; secondly, because he was well aware that Alexander's friendship (*proxeinos*) with Athens was an official

relationship, and was backed by deeds. Mardonius therefore thought that by sending him he would be most likely to bring Athens over to the Persian interest; he knew that the Athenians were a numerous and gallant people, and had been chiefly responsible for the defeat of the Persian navy, and expected that if only he could form an alliance with them, he would have no difficulty in getting the mastery of the sea—an expectation which was perfectly justified—while he was already confident of his superiority on land. In this way he reckoned that the defeat of Greece would be within his grasp.²⁶

Mardonius's very strategy depends here on Alexander's duality, one that is implicitly connected to his status as a Macedonian man (*andra Makedona*). Asking of the Macedonians, he is a suitable ambassador to the Athenians of the Persian cause through his political alliance with the Persians on the one hand, and his *proxeny* with the Athenians on the other.

The narrative that follows produces an even hazier image of Alexander. The king begins his speech to the Athenians by directly quoting Mardonius's words, which are designed both to appeal to the Greek sense of freedom, "Xerxes has bid me, Mardonius, to restore the Greeks' land to them and let them take whatever other land they want and to live free," and to frighten them into submission, "how can you possibly believe you will overcome such a powerful empire?" Alexander adds to this his own pledge of goodwill towards the Athenians before urging them to accept Mardonius's terms, fearing that their land will always be the chief battleground should they expose themselves to war. The Spartans reply that the Athenians should not be swayed by the mollifying words of Alexander, a tyrant helping a tyrant's cause. Given Herodotus's earlier characterization of the Spartans as potential tyrants,²⁷ we are not necessarily encouraged at this point in the narrative to trust a Spartan reading of Alexander's motives; and yet we soon see that Alexander's and the Spartans' viewpoints cancel one another out. The Athenian response, directed to both Alexander and the Spartans, is unambiguous and triumphantly patriotic: neither should think that the Athenians are incapable of carrying the Panhellenic torch of revenge against the Persians on their own.

So much for the Persian Wars story. The Macedonians' continuing alliance with the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War seems to have somewhat mitigated the sense among Greeks of their creeping threat, and yet there remains a certain ambiguity to their image fifty years later, at least if Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War* is any indication. Thucydides is less overtly interested than Herodotus, in the Macedonians but his overall view of their Hellenicity is equally mixed.

Given Thucydides's general concerns in his *History*, it is not surprising that his interest in the Macedonians is largely political, although he does follow Herodotus in making a statement on Argead genealogy, again seeing Perdiccas and his line as descendents of Temenus:

Of the Macedonians there are also the Lyncestians, Elimiotas, and other tribes of the upper country, which, though in alliance with the nearer Macedonians and subject to them, have kings of their own;²⁸ but the country by the sea that is now called Macedonia was first obtained and made their kingdom by Alexander, Perdiccas' father, and his forefathers who were originally Temenidae from Argos.²⁹

Thucydides's genealogy follows Herodotus's in implicitly excluding the Macedonians—here especially those of “nearer Macedonia” who were conquered by the Temenid rulers. But note that this vouching for Argead Hellenic ancestry is couched within an uncharacteristic “ethnographic” digression (still more political for Thucydides than cultural, of course), in which the historian dwells on the connection between the Thracian Odrysians and the Macedonians—both constant potential threats to the Greeks (Odrysian king Sitalkes had allied both with the Athenians and with Perdiccas II against Perdiccas's brother Philip). Although Thucydides does not explicitly make mention of Perdiccas's slipperiness, that is fully apparent from the stories he tells throughout his history of the king's shifting alliances. As David Cartwright puts it, Perdiccas's “catalog of caprice speaks for itself.”³⁰

It may be the political slipperiness of Perdiccas II that influences the Macedonians' own slippage between semi-barbarous and barbarous in political contexts. Take the run of passages

from 4.124-126. In 124 we see the Macedonians both as barbarians and quasi-barbarians:

[Perdiccas] led (*kai ēgon*) the army of the *Macedonians*, whom he ruled, and hoplites from those *Greeks* living in the area . . . The entire force of the Greeks counted about three thousand; the whole cavalry (*hippēs*) of the Macedonians, along with *Chalcidians*, went along with them, and counted almost one thousand, in addition to the rest of the crowd of barbarians [or: there was, *in addition, a great multitude of barbarians*] (*kai allos homilos tōn barbarōn polus*).³¹

The Macedonians and the Hellenes first appear in opposition, but towards the end of the passage we see a division among Greeks, Macedonians/Chalcidians³² and barbarians. The words *kai allos homilos tōn barbarōn polus* in the last segment has created some controversy,³³ but surely Hornblower is correct in suggesting that

[Thucydides's] view was not absolutely rigid or consistent. If he had to choose between saying whether Macedonians were Greeks or barbarians, hence the binary opposition in the sentence beginning *kai ēgon* near the beginning of 124.1 . . . But at the same time he thought there were degrees of barbarian-ness, so that it was possible for him to distinguish between Macedonians and e.g. Illyrians by saying 'the Macedonians' and 'the barbarians.'³⁴

Whatever the case may be, in the next section (4.126) Thucydides has the Spartan Brasidas classify the Macedonians as barbarians in an exhortation to his men: "As far as the barbarians go . . . from the contests you have already fought with the Macedonians among them (*tois Makedosin autōn*) . . . you know that they will not be fearsome." Perhaps this is meant to reflect only Brasidas's viewpoint,³⁵ but it nonetheless demonstrates how easily the Macedonians can slide between semi-barbarian to barbarian, depending on the context.

To sum up: Herodotus and Thucydides grapple in different ways with the "identity" of the Macedonians from the point of view of their own sense of Greekness. Whether in a particular context they define Greekness as a matter of blood/place of origin, culture, or political nature, both easily accept and promote the story of Argead origins in mainland Greece. But this does not prevent them from seeing the kings as quasi-

barbarians in cultural and especially in political contexts. The Macedonian people (generally equated with the Macedonian soldiery), whose ethnic status was left open by Argead propaganda, are neither “proven Greek,” nor are they definitively ranked as barbarians, although sometimes they are classified as such. By the time Philip II entered onto the scene in the Fourth Century, however, the major voices in Athenian politics seem to take a firmer position on the matter of Macedonian Hellenicity.

Taking a Stand: The Athenian Orators and Philip II

For Herodotus and Thucydides, the Hellenicity of the Macedonians was hardly a matter of public exigency. But the situation is different in the Fourth Century, when the Macedonians become major players in Athenian politics and, thus, in public debate. What is particularly interesting is the reinvention of panhellenic language, as well as a strengthening of the language of “genetic” Greekness, that we find in the speeches of Demosthenes and Isocrates that deal with Philip II. For both orators the genealogical argument against Philip seems to lie in the perceived power of the Macedonian name over the audience: while Demosthenes uses it against Philip, Isocrates pushes it away from the king in order to cast him in a finer light.

Any person who has considered the “Macedonian Question,” ancient or modern, will be familiar with Demosthenes’s direct attack on Philip II in a speech delivered in 341, the third *Philippic*. In sections 30-31 the orator urges the Athenians to consider the king’s hostilities an open declaration of war:

And indeed, you also know this: that whatever the Greeks suffered at the hands of the Lacedaemonians or us, they were wronged by true sons of Greece (*gnēsion g’ ontōn tēs Hellados*); in the same way, a person might have seen this as an instance in which a legitimate son (*huios...gnesios*) born into great estate had done something badly or incorrectly had fault or error in running his property. To this extent the act would be seen as worthy of blame and castigation, but it would not be possible to say that someone who is neither a relative nor an heir (*ou prosēkōn ē ōs ou klēronomos*) did it. But if some slave

(*doulos*) or supposititious bastard (*hupobolimaïos*) were destroying and squandering things that didn't belong to him, by Heracles, how much more terrible and worthy of anger would everyone have called it. But they do not take this attitude towards Philip and the things that he's doing now, even though he is not only not a Hellene nor related (*prosēkontos*) to the Hellenes but is not even a barbarian (*barbarou*) from a place that can be spoken well of, but a pest from Macedonia, a place where you couldn't even buy a good slave in the past.

The question Demosthenes is addressing in the immediate context is whether Philip could ever qualify for the *hegemonia* of the panhellenic forces against their common enemies—or, as things stand here, the license of one Greek city-state to cause suffering to another city-state in the never-ending quest for *hegemonia*. Demosthenes answers with scathing near-ridicule. It is true that when Demosthenes calls into question the king's "Hellenic purity," he is playing on a familiar enough rhetorical *topos*; indeed, Demosthenes himself had been castigated as a "barbarian" and a "Scythian, a Greek-speaking barbarian" by Aeschines in, respectively, *On the False Embassy* 183 and *Against Ctesiphon* 172.³⁶ Nevertheless, it is worth dwelling for a moment on the subtle differences between these characterizations and those made of Philip.

So in the case of Demosthenes and Aeschines, allusions to "origins" are conjoined with the question of citizenship, a fundamental criterion for political power of any sort in Athenian society. In *On the False Embassy* Demosthenes is a "sycophant and a barbarian"; in *Against Ctesiphon* 172, Scythian "barbarism" is connected to a state of being *epichōrios*, a word again used in *On the False Embassy* 22, where Demosthenes is "no citizen born (*epichōrios*)...nor akin to us (*eggenēs*)."³⁷ Thus what we see is some notion of purity of origins, underscored by the clever use of the Greek/barbarian dichotomy in *Skuthōs barbaros Hellēnizōn*, conflated with the political right of the Athenian citizenry through autochthony, used to throw doubt on Demosthenes's patriotic intent.³⁷ In attacking Aeschines, Demosthenes in *On the Crown* also uses a variation on the Greek vs. barbarian theme to contrast the slave with the good citizen. Aeschines's life has been an abomination to the *demos*;

(130) he has been raised from servitude to freedom (*eleutheros ek doulou*); he has corrupted his fellow-citizens with bribery and intrigues (*misthosas sauton kata toutoni politeuē*) (131). Aeschines's inappropriateness as a speaker on the stage of Athenian politics is also underlined by the mention of his "recent" acquisition of Athenian citizenship (*chthes men oun kai prōien ham' Athenaios kai rhētor gegone* [130]). Jonathan Hall has noted that by the Fifth Century Athenian self-definition had already shifted from its attachment to the notions of genealogy from Ion to one that was based on autochthony (seen first in Aeschylus's *Agamemnon* [536]);³⁸ thus it is not surprising that "Scythian" and "slave birth" are opposed less to the "Greek" than to the "Athenian."

But the context is different with Philip. References to foreign origin or slave birth among Athenian politicians are like accusations of prostitution: they are meant to call into question an opponent's legitimacy to hold political power, but can hardly have been taken literally.³⁹ The struggle over league hegemony inevitably forces the debate into panhellenic terms, recalling its presence in Herodotus's *Histories*: in presenting the struggles among the Spartans, Athenians, and the Syracusan Gelon over the *hegemonia* in 481 (7.149-161), Herodotus does not allow Athenian autochthony to stand as a sufficient platform for gaining the position: the Athenians must also argue for their superior naval power. But the genealogical arguments that the Fourth-Century orators invoke in the debate on Philip's suitability for the *hegemonia* actually suggest a partial reversion to older definitions of Hellenicity. In the *Third Philippic* 30-31, we are to understand that Philip's desire to overpower Greece is unacceptable because he is a barbarian, and that what makes him a barbarian is specifically his "illegitimate" relationship with the Greeks. Demosthenes suggests that part of what would make Philip acceptable was if he were an "heir" or "legitimate son" to Greece (he uses the word *gnēsios*, etymologically connected to *genos* and *gignomai*, twice). He further claims that Philip is neither a Greek nor a relative of the Greeks (*ou monon ouch Hellēnos ontos oude prosēkontos ouden tois Hellēsin*). It is true that *gnēsios* is not precisely a "genealogical"

term: to be a “bastard” does not necessarily connote barbarian ancestry; just like the mutual slanders of Demosthenes and Aeschines, it implies a lack of Athenian citizenship. But the phrase that Demosthenes uses, “true-born sons of Greece” (*gnēsion g’ ontōn tēs Hellados*), is unusual: the orator uses a rhetorical twist to distinguish Philip from “citizens of the Greek world,” as if a “Greek” citizenship based on genealogy actually existed in the same way an Athenian citizenship did.⁴⁰

Demosthenes’s presentation of Philip in terms that are quasi-panhellenic and genealogical is a response in part to Isocrates’s *To Philip*, written five years before the *Third Philippic*. Isocrates had employed throughout his decades of speechwriting the rhetorical cliché that germinated in Herodotus 7.158, where the *hēgemon* is represented by the Greek *polis* that would unite and lead the Greeks against, or free the Greeks from, the barbarians.⁴¹ Isocrates had also argued for Athens’s right to rule through autochthony, given its mix of genealogical and political “correctness”:

Who can show a leadership more hereditary than this, which arose before most cities of the Greeks were founded, or a more serviceable leadership than the one that made the barbarians refugees and led the Greeks forward into such great wealth?⁴²

But Philip’s treatment is, again, exceptional. Isocrates’s acceptance of an individual as *hegemon* is not the real surprise. After all, the orator has once called himself a leader of speeches (*hēgemon logōn*),⁴³ using the language of military *hēgemonia*, and he is one of the few public individuals at the time to explicitly uphold kingship as a desirable form of government.⁴⁴ But elsewhere Isocrates sees Philip and himself as a joint force (as evidenced by his self-conception as Philip’s adviser in *To Philip*), suggesting that even for him there is a tension involved in the idea of one-man rule of Greece. This would explain why he does not use either *hēgemon* or *archon* for Philip as he does for himself or for Athens. Demosthenes will use the word freely of Philip to provoke outrage in his audience.⁴⁵ Instead he counsels the king to “champion (*prostēnai*) unanimity among the Greeks and an expedition against the barbarian,”⁴⁶ using

prostēnai as a substitute for *hēgemon* to assimilate Philip to a role that would traditionally be held by a Greek city-state; we will see examples below of other euphemisms. In any event, Philip is only acceptable in this “hegemon-type” of role at all as a pure-blooded “Argive” and descendent of Heracles:

Now you would understand that it is not fitting for you to hold these cities in low esteem if you review their deeds towards your ancestors (*progonous*). For you will discover that each city has a great friendship towards your house and has provided great services for it. Argos is your ancestral land, which is as entitled to your forethought as your own ancestors (*gōneōn*). The Thebans pay tribute to the founder of your race (*ton archon tou genous*) [*i.e.* Heracles] by solemn processions and sacrifices, more than all the other gods. The Lacedaemonians have given to those descended from him both the kingship and the hegemony. As for our city, those whom we trust when it comes to ancient events say that it was the joint cause with Heracles of his immortality . . . and that was the savior of his children.⁴⁷

Like Herodotus, Isocrates attributes Greek origins to the Argeads but not to the Macedonians. But Isocrates goes further than Herodotus in telling the reader how to understand the relationship between Philip and the Macedonians. Macedonian submissiveness becomes a justification for Philip’s kingship: the Argeads ruled over the Macedonians because they needed to be ruled, but this could never be the case for Greeks:

Although the man who founded your empire [Perdiccas], was higher-minded than his fellow-citizens [of Argos] and desired kingly power, he did not wish to act like others who strive for such distinctions. While those men were acquiring this honor by producing factions, disturbances, and slaughter in their own cities, this man altogether avoided Greek territory (*topon ton Hellēnikon*) and longed to attain the throne of Macedon (*tēn d’ en Makedonia basileian*), for he understood that the Greeks (*tous Hellēnas*) were not used to submitting to monarchies, but others (*tous allous*) were not able to keep their own lives in order without being under some sort of domination. So, you see, it came to pass that, because of his native knowledge concerning these things, his kingship as well turned out much different from others. For because he alone of the Greeks did not think it was appropriate to rule over a like people (*homophulou*), he alone was able to flee the attendant dangers of one-man rule.⁴⁸

Again, Isocrates shows his ambivalence concerning one-man rule, even in the promotion of Philip as the “unifier” of Greece (*tous men Hellēnas ouk eithismenous hupomenein tas monarchias*). But to the extent that he does accept Philip in this role, it is as one of a line of Greek-blooded kings who came to rule over Macedonia. The orator does not call the Macedonians barbarians. Choosing a milder opposition, Isocrates implies that the Macedonians are *allophulos* to the Greeks by saying that Philip did not try to rule over “like people”—i.e., Greeks—like a tyrant. This single appearance of the word *homophulos* in his corpus is especially striking because Isocrates usually relies on the Greek/barbarian dichotomy to talk about non-Greeks, and because he normally uses the word *sungeneia* when speaking of interstate relations. In this situation, therefore, not only has Isocrates found new language with which to accommodate the Macedonians, but in doing so, has also shifted the language he uses of the Greeks.

If he uses the *homophulos/allophulos* dichotomy to put the Macedonians into a uniquely mild opposition with the Greeks with respect to “blood,” Isocrates finds yet another means of accommodating the Macedonians politically by creating a new status for them between Greek and barbarian:

I declare that you [Philip] must work to be a benefactor to the Greeks (*tous men Hellēnas*), to be king over the Macedonians (*Makedonōn de basileuein*), and to rule over as many of the barbarians as possible (*tōn barbarōn hōs pleistōn archein*); for if you do these things, everyone will be grateful to you: the Greeks for the good you have done them; the Macedonians like a king (*basilikōs*) but not tyrannically (*turannikōs*); and the race of others, if set free by your hands from barbaric despotism (*barbarikēs despoteias*) they are brought under Greek care.⁴⁹

The euphemisms for Philip’s potential hegemony over Greece (work to be a benefactor, the good you have done them) are, once again, rather stunning. The clearest contrast is with the barbarians, whom Philip will ideally rescue from their native despotism. The position of the Macedonians is slightly less clear. Within a panhellenic rhetoric, the fact that they can be ruled by a king makes them not-Greek. On the other hand,

the imperative that Philip not treat the Macedonians tyrannically is somewhat different from the imperative to treat barbarians better than they are used to being treated.

Conclusion

While some aspects of these writers' presentation of the Macedonians may reflect Fifth and Fourth-Century Athenians' "general" understandings of them, ultimately they fail to provide an easy answer to the question of whether or not Greeks considered the Macedonians to be Greek (let alone whether Macedonians considered themselves to be Greek, which, given the lack of Macedonian voices in the classical period, is hard to say much about at all). In the end, Isocrates's resolution of the ambiguous Macedonians of Herodotus and Thucydides into a "third term" is both more radical and less than it seems. It is more radical because elsewhere in his corpus Isocrates is so fully locked into an oppositional conception of the world, and because his new third term, prefigures the great third term of the Romans (who inherited Greece through their Macedonian overlords in the Hellenistic period). It is less radical because Isocrates's presentation of the Macedonians as a third term can do nothing to *permanently* alter their status between Greek and barbarian. They are, once and forever, figures that can be quasi-Greek, quasi-barbarian, or something in the middle, depending on the writer and the particular circumstance of the writing. The consequences of this ancient ambiguity, of course, goes far beyond the ancient world. Ancient authors continue to surface in contemporary discourses concerning who should "own" the Macedonian name, but perhaps we should resist trying to pinpoint an ancient Greek definition of "Macedonian" and embrace its ambiguity, as the pinpoint can only ever be an approximation.

CHAPTER 12

1. The loci classici are Eugene N. Borza, "Athenians, Macedonians and the Origins of the Macedonian Royal House," in *Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History and Topography, Presented to Eugene Vanderpool*, Hesperia Suppl. 19 (Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1982) 7-31, and Ernst Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," in *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times, Studies in the History of Art*, Vol. 10 ed. B. Barr-Sharrar and E. N. Borza (Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art, 1982), 33-51. Borza continues the discussion in *In the Shadow of Olympus: the Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990) 76-97, and *Before Alexander: Constructing early Macedonia*. Publications of the Association of Ancient Historians 6 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1999) 27-50.
2. For a general study on the habit on opposition in Greek thought see G. E. R. Lloyd's *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1992).
3. J. M. Hall, "Contested Ethnicities: Perceptions of Macedonia within Evolving Definitions of Greek Identity," in *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity*, ed. Irad Malkin (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001) 159-86.
4. While these four writers are not the only ones who discussed the matter of Macedonian ethnicity in the classical period, I privilege their views as the most influential in both the ancient and modern traditions. For one, Herodotus' positive proof of Argead Hellenicity yields an undeniable influence on Thucydides and Isocrates; Isocrates's stance on Philip, in turn, is the foil for Demosthenes's negative one; and all four authors seem to show up as authorities in the modern Macedonian debate.
5. The latter notion is slightly at variance with Hall's idea (2001, 172) that, while the conservative Isocrates reverts back to genealogy, Demosthenes makes a *cultural* proof against Philip. There seems to me no good reason to undermine the presence of the genealogical in Demosthenes's view of Philip, even if his main argument is against his tyrannical behavior.
6. In fr. 7 in *Fragmenta Hesiodica*, ed. Reinhold Merkelbach and M. L. West (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) 6. "The land of Macedonia was named after Macedon son of Zeus and Thyia, daughter of Deucalion, as Hesiod says: 'And she conceived and bore to Zeus the thunderbolt-lover the two sons Magnes and Macedon the horse-rejoicer, who live around Pieria and Olympus.'" See also Jonathan M. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997) 63.
7. For the dating, see M. L. West, *The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 127-137 (followed by Hall, 1997, 44f).
8. On Alexander I in general see Borza, 1990, 98-131.
9. This is one of two explicit assertions of Alexander's Hellenicity: the second is at 9.45, a rhetorically "panhellenic" context in which Alexander uses the claim that he is "originally a Greek by birth" (*Hellēn genos eimi tō'rchaion*) to prove that he "would not willingly see Greece exchange freedom for slavery" (*ant' eleutherēs dedōulēmenēn ouk an etheloimi horan tēn Hellada*).

10. N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Macedonia: Vol I, Historical Geography and Prehistory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) 101, cites the following sources: Harp. s.v., *Alexandros*; Schol. Thuc. 1.57.2; Dio Chrys. 2.23; Dim. Hal. *De D.* dict. 26; Bekker *Anecd. Gr.* 375.19; Schol. Dem. *Oly.* 3.35.7 (Dind.).
11. Badian, 1982, 36.
12. Borza, 1982, 9. On the other hand, there may have been at least one good motivation for Alexander's bid for entry at the Olympics that was internal to Macedonia: as Ernst Badian has suggested, making a claim to Hellenicity may have been a way for the Argeads to deepen the hierarchy between themselves and less powerful Macedonian clans vying for power, and it also may explain why a Macedonian counter-Olympics was instituted later by Archelaus. See Ernst Badian, "Herodotus on Alexander I of Macedon: A Study in Some Subtle Silences," in *Greek Historiography*, ed. S. Hornblower (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 119, n. 13; Hall, 2001, 169; and see the paper by W. Lindsey Adams in this same volume.
13. See H. Dörrie, "Die Wertung der Barbaren im Urteil der Griechen. Knechtsnaturen? Oder Bewahrer und Kunder heilbringender Weisheit?" in *Antike und Universalgeschichte, Festschrift für H. Stier*, ed. R. Stiehl and G. A. Lehmann (Munster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1974) 1436-75.
14. Not that genealogical proofs were unimportant in diplomacy. From the classical period into the imperial times there are plentiful epigraphical references to inter-poleis *sungeneia*. A. Giovannini, "Greek Cities and Greek Commonwealth," in *Images and Ideologies: Self-definition in the Hellenistic World*, ed. Anthony Bulloch, et al. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993) 265-86.
15. Hall, 2001, 168.
16. Hdt. 8.43, in reference to the Peloponnesian fleet: "All these [the Lacedaemonians, etc.], except the people of Hermione, were of Dorian and Macedonian stock (*genos*), and had last come from Erineus and Pindus and the Dryopian region." Herodotus here seems to project the Argeads' claim to Dorian ancestry backwards from Macedonia to the Peloponnese. One should also note that there seems to a tradition, attested by Hellanicus (4 *FGrH* 74), that Makedon was the grandson of Hellen through Aeolus (Hall, 2001, 169), which would have made the Macedonian Hellenes (although not Heraclids).
17. See Hall, 2001, 170.
18. Hdt. 5.20.
19. Badian, 1994, 114.
20. See Vivienne Gray, "Herodotus and the Rhetoric of Otherness," *AJP* 116.2 (1995): 185-211.
21. To summarize: the three brothers Gauanes, Aeropus, and Perdiccas fled Argos from the Illyrians and landed in a town called Lebaea, where they worked odd jobs. The king's wife would bake bread for the laborers; calling the king's attention to the fact that Perdiccas's bread would always double in size, the king interpreted this as a miracle and tried to run the men out of town, giving them only a ray of sunshine as "payment." Of the three brothers, only Perdiccas accepted this, taking the ray into his breast three times; then the three ran off. Seeing this as a bad harbinger for himself, the king sent horsemen after the boys, but the river swelled

up becoming uncrossable. The brothers settled on the other side of the river, near the “Gardens of Midas,” and proceed to conquer Macedonia.

22. Vivienne Gray, “Reading the Rise of Pisistratus: Herodotus 1.56-68,” *Histos* 1 (1997): <http://www.dur.ac.uk/Classics/histos/1997/gray.html> (accessed May 5, 2008).

23. Vivienne Gray, “Herodotus and Images of Tyranny: The Tyrants of Corinth,” *AJP* 117.3 (1996): 361-389.

24. Hdt. 8.139: “From the Perdiccas of this story Alexander was descended: he was the son of Amyntas, Amyntas of Alcetas; the father of Alcetas was Aeropus; of Aeropus, Philippos; of Philippos, Argaeus; and of Argeaus, Perdiccas—who first won the sovereign power.”

25. Hdt. 8.135.

26. Hdt. 8.136.

27. By Socles the Corinthian: Hdt. 5.92.

28. Thuc. 2.99. As S. Hornblower notes, *A Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. 1: Books I-III* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991) 374, Thucydides acknowledges that the tribes of the upper country had their own kings, but nevertheless anachronistically calls them “Macedonian” here, anticipating Philip II’s later unification of upper and lower Macedonia.

29. Thuc. 2. 99.

30. David Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides: A Companion to Rex Warner’s Penguin Translation* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1997) 36: “For the erratic course of his relations with Athens see II.29 (Perdiccas is an ally); II.80, 95 (Perdiccas is an enemy); IV.79 (Perdiccas is still an enemy, supporting Brasidas); IV.128, 132 (Perdiccas falls out with Brasidas and goes over to Athens); V.80 (Perdiccas breaks with Athens and in V.83 is at war with it); VII.9 (by this time, 414, Athens and Perdiccas are again allies).”

31. Thuc. 4.124.

32. Chalcidice can itself be considered both Hellenic and Macedonian; according to Strabo, in Book 7, fr. 11, it had been inhabited both by the Argeadae (who here appear to be Thracians; with this, Strabo is, interestingly, conflating the Macedonians with the Thracians) and the Euboean Greeks.

33. J. Setup, editing Classen, emended by adding the word *hippēs* to a similar phrase in 4.125 (*hoi men Makedones kai to plēthos tōn barbarōn*: “the Macedonians and the whole crowd of barbarians”) to correspond to *hippēs* in 4.124, explaining that the crowd of barbarians in both cases must refer to the infantry. Hornblower rejects the emendation (see next note).

34. Hornblower, 1997, 392; see Jonathan Hall, 2001, 172.

35. Hornblower, 1997, 392, comments that in a speech by Brasidas, “a slighting reference to a recently defeated sub-group of Macedonians, namely the Lynkestians, as ‘barbarians’ is rhetorically appropriate and says nothing about Th.’s own categorization.”

36. *On the False Embassy* 183 (barbarian); *Against Ctesiphon* 172 (Scythian by his mother, a Greek-tongued barbarian). The epithet “Greek-speaking barbarian”

suggests that, in the Fourth Century, the word “barbarian” can be completely dissociated from its original linguistic connotations. These insults are in response to Demosthenes’s insinuating references to Aeschines’s original lowly state as son of a slave father and prostitute mother in *De Corona* 129.

37. Notice that when Dinarchus calls Demosthenes a “Scythian” in *Against Demosthenes* 15, he too uses the slur in a specifically political and Atheno-centric context: “This despicable man, and a Scythian to boot ... whom not one man, but the entire council of the Areopagus, having looked into the matter, has shown to possess money against your interests, and has been absolutely proven to be involved in bribery and kickbacks against the city, will you refuse to punish this man and make an example of him to others?” Diogenes the Cynic fr. 11. also refers to Demosthenes as a Scythian.

38. Hall, 1997, 54, following Nicole Loraux, *The Invention Of Athens: The Funeral Oration In The Classical City* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986) 1: “An advantage of this was that it distinguished ‘ethnically pure’ Athenians from those whose descent from ancestors such as Pelops, Kadmos, Aigyptos or Danaos made them ‘barbarian’ by nature, even if nominally Greek.”

39. See Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989) 269.

40. That Demosthenes’s panhellenic rhetoric surrounding Philip’s incursion into Greek politics is exceptional is suggested in H. B. Dunkel, “Was Demosthenes A Panhellenist?” *CP* 33.3 (1938): 291-305.

41. See for example *Antidosis* 57.

42. *Panegyricus* 37.

43. *Panathenaicus* 13.

44. For Isocrates on kingship see especially *To Nicocles*.

45. In *De Corona* 185 above; see also *De Corona* 201, where Philip is chosen as “*hēgemon* and *kurios* of all” and *De Corona* 236: “where he is the absolute autocrat, commander, and master [*despotēs, hēgemon, kurios*] of everybody and everything.” Aeschines does not address Philip’s ethnicity directly as do Isocrates and Demosthenes, though he does conflate the king with the Greeks in *On the False Embassy* 32, where he speaks of “Philip” in a context with “other Greeks” (*tōn allōn Hellēnōn*). Aeschines was at different times in both pro- and anti-Macedonian camps, so it was to his advantage to deflect attention from his own dealings with Macedonia when anti-Macedonian sentiment was running high among the Athenians, so it is not surprising that he skirts the issue.

46. *To Philip* 16.

47. *To Philip* 32-33.

48. *To Philip* 106-108.

49. *To Philip* 154.

LEGION OVER PHALANX:
THE BATTLE OF MAGNESIA, 190 B.C.

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The Battle of *Magnesia sub Sipylum* proved decisive in two ways. First, it is often considered the turning point in the political fortunes of the Seleucid Empire, and second, it is hailed, along with the Battles of Cynocephalae and Pydna, as vindicating the Roman legion over the Macedonian phalanx. Scholars have focused on the first issue. Today it is still debated whether the defeat at Magnesia, followed by the Peace of Apamea that imposed heavy indemnities and territorial cessions on Antiochus III, marked the beginning of Seleucid decline.¹ The second issue, the course of the battle itself, has attracted far less attention. Yet, by the standards of ancient battles, Magnesia is well documented because two lengthy accounts have survived, and the location of the battlefield is known.² Livy preserves the fullest account, written from a favorable view on the Roman commander Lucius Cornelius Scipio, brother of Scipio Africanus. Appian penned the other account. He drew primarily on Polybius's lost narrative, but he made use of other sources. Among the other sources, Cassius Dio, Justin, and Florus provide important details on the battle.³

Bar-Kochva, who has offered the most current view on the course of the battle, minimizes the success of Roman arms, and so calls into question the significance of Magnesia.⁴ Based on Appian's account, Bar Kochva reconstructs the battle of *Magnesia sub Sipylum* as a near run, as Wellington remarked on Waterloo, rather than the lopsided victory reported by Livy. Bar-Kochva, in favoring Appian over Livy, offers an implausible attack by Antiochus III against the Roman left wing, and center left. First, Bar-Kochva argues that Antiochus III at the head of 4,000 Seleucid cavalry broke through a Roman legion

which was drawn up, contrary to Roman practice at the time, to the left of center which was occupied by the two allied Italian legions.⁵ Second, a Macedonian phalanx, *argyraspides* or "Silver Shields," reckoned by Bar-Kochva as 10,000 strong, was drawn up on the right wing and so could have supported Antiochus' cavalry attack.⁶ Both these points, essential to Bar-Kochva's reconstruction of the battle, are without foundation.

As to his first point, Seleucid cavalry could not overrun veteran Roman legionaries, as Bar-Kochva claims.⁷ Appian writes that Antiochus: "*En dexiai de, ēper autos ho Antiokhos etetakto, diakopsas to syntagma tēs Rhōmaiōn phalangos apespasen epi polu diōkōn.*"⁸ In this context, Appian is most likely using *ho phulax* to denote the Roman battle line (*acies*) rather than a specific Roman legion. Furthermore, Appian, in abbreviating Polybius's account, erred in presenting a Roman order of march in Polybius's account as the order of battle.⁹ Appian also sought to give the credit for the Roman victory to the senior legate Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 192 B.C.), who circulated this claim at Rome soon after Lucius Cornelius Scipio came under investigation in 187 B.C.¹⁰ Hence, Appian reports that Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus directed the campaign and the battle of Magnesia. Appian attributes to Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus the decision to cross the Phrygius to establish the second camp, the construction of the third camp, the command of the left wing in the battle (apparently part of the center), and the rally and repulse of Antiochus's attack that broke through to the Roman camp.¹¹ Domitius Ahenobarbus, in Appian's account, moves with a speed and ubiquity even greater than Julius Caesar at the Battle of the Sambre.¹²

It is difficult to know precisely what Polybius wrote given the abbreviations and obscurities in the narrative of Appian. These problems extend beyond just the events of the battle. Appian commits similar errors by his compression of Polybius's narrative of the entire campaign. Hence, his account of the march of the Roman army from the Troad to the Phrygius River is unintelligible without reference to Livy's account.¹³ In fairness, such errors were bound to happen given the purpose and methods of

Appian. As a result, Appian, or perhaps his source, has muddled the account of Polybius in the interests of praising Domitius Ahenobarbus, an ancestor of the emperor Nero.¹⁴

As to Bar-Kochva's second point, the *argyraspides*, veteran phalangites 10,000 strong, could have supported the cavalry attack of Antiochus, and so their participation in the attack would explain the rout of a Roman legion. But this view is vitiated on three grounds. First, Livy and Appian do not consider the *argyraspides* a phalanx of any great size. Livy designates them as the equivalent of a cohort, a unit of 500 to 600 men.¹⁵ The name *argyraspides* designated elite phalangites, equivalent to grenadiers, rather than a unit of a specific size. Appian considered the *argyraspides* as one of the cavalry units on the Seleucid left, and so a unit of comparable size.¹⁶ There is no reason to posit a second phalanx based on the name shared between the *argyraspides* at Magnesia with those who had fought at Raphia in 217 B.C.¹⁷ It is most unlikely the size of any Seleucid unit remained the same in the twenty-seven years between Raphia and Magnesia. Second, if Bar-Kochva's view were correct, it would require us to believe both Livy and Appian missed the fact that Antiochus fielded two phalanxes rather than just the one they name in the Seleucid center. Furthermore, Bar-Kochva's view raises the question why Antiochus did not station this second phalanx, the *argyraspides*, on his left wing in place of the Galatian and Cappadocian swordsmen who failed to stand up to the Roman charge. Third, based on visits to the battlefield, I do not believe that there was sufficient space to marshal a phalanx of 10,000 *argyraspides* on the Seleucid right wing. Instead, Livy must surely be correct that the *argyraspides* were drawn up as a reserve of 500 men with elephant support.

In the absence of Polybius's account, Livy preserves the fullest, most plausible narrative of the battle so that any reconstruction of the battle must be based on his account. Discrepancies between the accounts of Livy and Appian result from Appian's desire to credit Domitius Ahenobarbus for the rally on the Roman left (instead of M. Aemilius Lepidus), and for the overall victory (instead of Lucius Scipio). Otherwise,

Livy, Appian, and other Classical authors commenting on the battle are in agreement on essentials.¹⁸ They agree that terrain and weather favored the Romans, because the damp, drizzling weather relaxed the bow strings of the Seleucid archers who were supposed to flank and pour enfilading fire into the Roman ranks. Cassius Dio even claims that it rained in the later stages of the battle.¹⁹ The Romans launched violent attacks against the Seleucid left wing and center and Roman legionaries drove the Seleucid elephants into the ranks of Antiochus's phalanx in the center. Antiochus delivered his cavalry charge against the Roman left wing too late to decide the battle. His charge was checked by 2,000 Macedonian and Thracian peltasts issuing from the Roman camp, an elephant reserve, and 200 Pergamene cavalry under Attalus, brother of King Eumenes II, detached from the Roman right wing. Finally, the Romans won a decisive victory that ended the war. Antiochus's army was destroyed as an effective force, even if Seleucid casualties are exaggerated by Classical authors favorable to Rome.

It is also significant that Livy's account is consistent with the topography of the battlefield as identified by Kromayer.²⁰ Based on my experience and observations, terrain and weather favored the Romans decisively.²¹ Livy stressed how the damp conditions relaxed bowstrings, and gave advantage to Romans depending on shock over missile weapons. Even more important, morning mist rising off the rivers Phrygius and Hermus in winter obscured the ability of Antiochus to control battle. Furthermore, the plain offered no vantage from which Antiochus could direct his army. This proved fatal because Antiochus had lacked seasoned officers and time to impose a sense of cohesion on the many recently levied units. In contrast, many veteran tribunes, centurions, and soldiers served in Lucius Scipio's army. They not only could carry out their orders, but they also could exploit the confusion brought on by mist and drizzling weather (or perhaps even rain in the later stages of the battle).

Lucius Scipio used his position to good effect. He attacked out of a position that was, in effect, a funnel, and his legionaries could move out of a dense formation into a more open order

as circumstances dictated.²² Antiochus, with the larger and less disciplined army, had the more difficult task of attacking into a funnel, and so the terrain negated the Seleucid advantage in numbers. Lucius Scipio might even have used the terrain in anticipation of the danger of his weak left wing being flanked as the Roman army advanced. Initially the Roman left wing was protected by the Phrygius River, but it soon lost contact with the river so that it was flanked and overwhelmed by the Seleucid cavalry led by Antiochus. The Roman camp was likely built closer to the Phrygius rather than the Hermus River. Hence, Lucius Scipio might have seen the forces guarding the camp as a reserve behind his weak left wing. Antiochus overran the Roman left wing, but he lacked the room to maneuver cavalry to take the Roman center in the rear so that Macedonian and Thracian peltasts could sally out of the Roman camp and break the impetus of Antiochus's cavalry attack.²³

In my opinion, the account of Livy, in tandem with the topography, allows for a reconstruction of the Battle of Magnesia as a decisive Roman victory late in 190 B.C. Most decisive battles are fought by permission; some are fought by accident, such as the Battle of Cynocephalae, which was inadvertently brought on by lesser engagements. At Magneisa, Lucius Scipio forced the battle. Antiochus III had to accept the offer because of the lateness of the season, and his failure to secure a settlement by negotiation.

The battle of *Magnesia sub Sipylum* was the climax to the campaign of 190 B.C. that ended the Asian War in Rome's favor, and gained L. Cornelius Scipio, the younger brother of Scipio Africanus, a worthy epithet Asiaticus.²⁴ The battle was most likely fought late in the season, either November or December, in the damp winter weather.²⁵ Six weeks earlier, Lucius Scipio, had crossed the Hellespont into Asia Minor after the Seleucid garrison had withdrawn from Lysimachia.²⁶ Then he had pressed his men to march along the coasts of the Troad and Aeolis to Elaea, the port at the mouth of the Caicus valley (Baki Çayı), and then east to Pergamum, and then southwest via Thyatira (Akhisar) to the Hyrcanian plain, which is imme-

diately east of *Magneisa sub Siplyum* (Manisa) and watered by the rivers Phrygius (Kum Çayı) and Hermus (Gediz Çayı).²⁷ There he found Antiochus III, encamped on the east side of the juncture of the two rivers. During the summer of 190 B.C., the king had amassed a large army to replace his losses sustained in the previous year's fighting in Greece.

Logistics determined Antiochus's choice of camps. Initially, he had concentrated his army, numbered by Livy at 60,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, near Thyatira (Akhisar), the nexus of highways from Smyrna on the coast and Sardes (the Seleucid capital of the west) that led into the Caicus valley to Pergamum.²⁸ From this position, Antiochus threatened the security of the Pergamene kingdom. But when Antiochus learned that Roman forces had reached Elaea (the Attalid port that was but one day's march from Pergamum), Antiochus withdrew to the southwest, to the Hyrcanian plain at the confluence of the Phrygius and Hermus rivers near *Magnesia sub Sipylum*.²⁹ The hinterland of Thyatira could not support so large an army, but the rich fields of grain and orchards of the Hyrcanian plain, along with river transportation by barge, allowed Antiochus to supply his army. Livy notes that Antiochus's withdrawal from Thyatira to Magnesia demoralized his soldiers, and the army then suffered considerable attrition due to desertion and sickness.³⁰ The Seleucid infantry that went into battle at Magnesia numbered less than 35,000 men, one-half of their numbers reported at Thyatira.

In contrast, morale was running high among the Romans, but Lucius Scipio had to keep his army on the move in search of supplies, and so he needed to force a decisive battle. Antiochus III hoped that, given the lateness of the season, Lucius Scipio would be inclined to negotiate, but Antiochus failed to understand the motives of Roman magistrates.³¹ Lucius Scipio, eager to cover himself in glory before his command expired, pressed for battle. What Antiochus surmised would lead Scipio Asiaticus to enter negotiations instead spurred Scipio to risk a winter campaign. In this, Antiochus was most likely surprised, but then he had been misreading Roman intentions and motives for years.

Antiochus built his camp several miles southeast of the confluences of the Phrygius (Kum Çayı) and Hermus rivers (Gediz Çayı). By so doing, Antiochus frustrated Lucius Scipio and Eumenes whose army had marched with limited rations over difficult routes in early winter in hopes of forcing a battle near Thyatira, where the rugged terrain favored a smaller army. By retiring to the Hyrcanian plain, Antiochus regained tactical mobility for his cavalry and ample supplies, and he put a logistical strain on the Romans. Scipio and Eumenes were thus compelled to negotiate or to follow Antiochus.

On the western side of the river Phrygius (Kum Çayı), near the modern village of Karaagaçlı, on the fifth day since his departure from Thyatira, Scipio pitched camp four miles from the Seleucid encampment on the eastern side of the river. Scipio repelled a reconnaissance force composed of 1,000 Galatian and Dahae cavalry.³² The two armies remained inactive for two days, and then on the third day Lucius Scipio must have surprised Antiochus by crossing the Phrygius and constructing a new, second, camp that was two and one-half miles away from the Seleucid encampment.³³ This tactical move required careful planning and timing, even though the Seleucid army failed to patrol aggressively the river line of the Hermus and Phrygius. The relatively shallow rivers with gentle banks meander through an alluvial plain and offer many fordable points. Lucius Scipio could have easily effected a predawn crossing by light infantry and cavalry, and so conveyed his army across the river unopposed. Overcast and rainy conditions assisted in cloaking the Roman crossing. A force of 3,000 Seleucid infantry attacked the Romans engaged in the construction of the second camp, but the Seleucid soldiers were driven off with heavy losses.³⁴

For the next five days, Antiochus declined battle even though Lucius Scipio boldly ordered his men to advance close to the Seleucid lines.³⁵ On the sixth day, Lucius Scipio executed another difficult tactical maneuver, advancing his camp within one and one-quarter miles of the Seleucid camp.³⁶ What is taken as an alternate order of battle preserved by Appian is most likely the order of march as Lucius Scipio advanced his camp.³⁷

After his men constructed this third camp, Lucius Scipio again offered battle each day.³⁸ On the third day, Antiochus risked a general engagement “lest he diminish the spirits of his men by declining battle, and increased the hope of the enemy.”³⁹

According to the order of battle reported by Livy, Antiochus III put on the field nearly 35,000 infantry and perhaps just over 12,000 cavalry.⁴⁰ Antiochus had raised mercenaries and allies to make up for the heavy losses he had sustained in Greece in the previous years so that he fielded Macedonian and Near Eastern units typical of Hellenistic armies.

Antiochus possessed some 20,000 to 25,000 men, cavalry and infantry together, who were trained in Macedonian arms and tactics. His phalangites and heavy cavalry fought bravely at Magnesia, but they lacked the élan and experience of common service, and above all—seasoned officers. He had raised a phalanx from among his Macedonian colonists, a force of 16,000 men, armed with the twenty-one foot *sarissa*. His elite phalangites, the Silver Shields, mauled in the pass of Thermopylae in 191 B.C., had been reformed. His elite cavalry, 4,000 strong, were armored lancers who could scatter any opponents, and, as in the army of Alexander the Great, could deliver the decisive blow while the phalanx pinned the enemy front. Antiochus fielded many Iranian and Anatolian units of light cavalry, swordsmen, and archers that doubled the size of his army without providing a corresponding amount of strength.

Lucius Scipio had the superior officers. The Asian War saw a number of notable *consulares* such as M. Porcius Cato, P. Cornelius Scipio, and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus volunteer to serve as legates on the staff of consuls and senators of praetorian rank serving as tribunes. Patriotic, experienced senior officers and courageous junior officers with a sense of initiative proved as critical as veteran centurions proved crucial in leading legionaries in battle. In fact, Roman officers of all ranks were vital because Lucius Scipio commanded a coalition army that was half the size of the Seleucid army, numbering at least 28,600 infantry, just over 3,200 cavalry, and 16 smaller African elephants. But they had the superior drill, courage,

and discipline. The four legions—two Roman and two Italian allied—at full strength numbered 21,600 men.⁴¹ Many Roman and Italian legionaries had fought against the Carthaginians in Africa under Lucius's brother Scipio Africanus or had defeated Antiochus in the pass of Thermopylae a year earlier. Lucius Scipio fielded 7,000 light infantry, notably veteran peltasts of Pergamenes, Achaeans, Trallians, Macedonians, and Thracians, as well as Cretan archers. The cavalry—Roman, Pergamene and possibly 100 Achaean horse—were most likely all armed as lancers. The sixteen African elephants were used to support the reserve infantry.⁴²

We know surprisingly little about the organization and tactics of the legion of this period. Livy, writing with the legion of the Principate in mind, assumes that Lucius Scipio's forces resembled those that had fought in the Second Punic and Second Macedonian Wars. Based on our best reconstructions, the army resembled the one described by Polybius in ca. 160 B.C., although the Romans were continually changing formations, drill, and weapons in the course of their conquest of the Mediterranean world.⁴³ Light-armed infantry, *velites*, carrying javelins and slings, screened the heavy infantry formation, which was drawn up in three ranks. The first two of these ranks were armed with two *pila* and a sword (the precise type still debated, but likely a version of the later *gladius*), and an oval *scutum* with metal boss and leather cover over heavy layers of plywood. These two front ranks, *principes* and *hastati*, wore articulated body armor and fought in relays, depending upon the sword. The third rank of *triarii* were armed as hoplites with a thrusting spear (*hasta*) and they acted as the reserve, should the attack by the swordsmen be driven back. The tactical unit was probably a maniple. The Romans most likely did not close with the enemy to fight in the checker-board pattern or *quincunx* (a term coined in the Sixteenth Century), but rather they attacked in a continual line.⁴⁴ Whatever the precise formation, Roman legionaries fought in a line, not a column, and they drew up their formations so that their soldiers could deliver maximum effect with volleys of heavy *pila*, followed by a rapid advance and brutal, even ferocious, attack by swordsmen whose

skill required two years of training to perfect. The Romans thus were not unlike the classic British infantry line of shot and musket, with two well-timed volleys (delivered in an extended line by platoon fire), followed by an intimidating bayonet charge that often put opponents to flight before the infantry closed.⁴⁵ By 190 B.C., the Latin and Italian allies are assumed to have followed Roman drill and arms.

The topography, on first glance, would seem to have favored the Seleucid army, but this was not the case. Lucius Scipio drew up his army with its left wing resting on the river Phrygius. The Roman line is estimated to have stretched three kilometers (just under two miles).⁴⁶ Lucius Scipio, who knew his army could be outflanked, might have extended his line. Antiochus drew up his army along the axis between the Phrygius (Krum Çayı) and Hermus (Gediz Çayı), so that his army stretched some four kilometers (or nearly two and half miles) on the modern road between the modern villages of Mütevelli on the north and Harmandali on the south. This dirt and gravel road today serves as access to the irrigated fields and orchards between the villages. It crosses the railroad line, and the Hermus, before it runs north to cross the Phrygius River. Mütevelli was just beyond the point of the Seleucid battle line, and it is currently being developed for industry and high-rise apartments accommodating Turkish professionals who are moving out of Manisa and Izmir.

The two converging rivers protected the Roman army from wide flanking movements. The river embankment was low, and did not provide a high ground for Seleucid forces to seize and lay down enfilading fire. Seleucid archers could not have easily negotiated the river banks soaked by autumn rains. Strategically, the Romans were attacking out of a position protected on its flanks by the two converging rivers, whereas Antiochus had to attack into a narrow position that was in effect a funnel, and so his units, especially on his right wing, would have to attack in successive waves. The Hyrcanian plain was then, as now, intensively farmed, and just as today, irrigated and laced with ditches and country dirt roads. The levelness

of the plain was deceptive. Even though it had been trampled and leveled by foraging parties, it was criss-crossed with stumps, furrows, and irrigation ditches. These were pitfalls to any tight formations of the phalanx and heavy cavalry, and so peltasts and legionaries employing open order tactics were favored.

More important was the fact that the plain offered no high points from which to survey the battlefield. This drawback was far more of a concern to Antiochus who did not possess enough experienced officers and men to direct his army. The plain and weather prevented Antiochus from reading the tactical dispositions of Lucius Scipio. Therefore, each side drew up the battle line based on previous experience, and trusted their officers to follow tactical doctrine. But the Seleucid army, given its great size and heterogeneous nature, lost cohesion early in the battle. In the mist and rain, Antiochus's officers could not redirect their units or respond to crises in battle.

Early in the morning, as the armies assembled into line, they would have viewed to the west Mount Sipylus (Spil Dağ), for it would have loomed in the distance on the left of the Seleucid army, and the right of the Roman army, thereby providing a possible means of general orientation. Immediately, the dampness undermined the mission of the archers, slingers, and javelin men assigned to flank the Roman army and lay down enfilading fire.⁴⁷ The slings, bow strings and thongs for javelins were relaxed, and so these unit dared not close with the Romans who depended on close order fighting. The mist that rose off the river also favored the Romans who attacked out of the mist, striking terror in the Seleucid line so that from the start the Seleucid army probably heard and sensed rather than saw their foes. The weather favored the aggressor who could achieve surprise and confuse his enemy. Waiting for an attack, or even hesitation, was to court disaster.

Antiochus, heir to Macedonian and Achaemenid military traditions, drew up his army in a classic Hellenistic formation, employing a variation of his order of battle used at Apolloniatis, Raphia, and Panium.⁴⁸ Some 16,000 phalangites held the center and they were drawn up in ten *merē* (an equivalent to the *taxis*

of Alexander the Great) of 50 men across and 32 deep for veritable square 1,024 men per unit.⁴⁹ Antiochus III had experienced Roman tactics at Thermopylae, and his guest Hannibal too might have recounted his own experience fighting the Romans at Zama.⁵⁰ Instead of wearing down the Roman swordsmen by successive lines (as Hannibal had done at Zama), Antiochus III preferred to smash the Roman infantry with a deep column attack of phalanx and elephants combined with a crushing right wing assault by his heavy cavalry.⁵¹

The placement of the elephants in the Seleucid line is a matter of debate. In advance, or in the intervals between the units of phalangites, two Indian elephants were deployed as a unit with supporting light infantry.⁵² Livy numbers Seleucid elephants at 54, and 22 were drawn up in the center line with the Macedonian phalanx. Each elephant was supported by 50 men so that 1,100 infantry served with the 22 elephants as well as 60 men atop the elephants (1 mahout and 4 warriors per elephant).⁵³ Scullard argued that the Seleucid elephants were stationed between the gaps of the phalangite regiments, but this deployment is not attested in any sources. Instead, Livy and Appian both clearly note that the elephants stood in front of the phalangites' ranks.⁵⁴ However they were deployed initially, the elephants were likely to advance before the phalanx. Since the phalanx was vulnerable to breaking apart given the different rates of advance and obstacles, Macedonian kings learned to appreciate how elephants could terrify opponents, and so provide a shield behind which the phalanx could advance by stages and redress its lines. This was especially important when the phalanx massed in a dense column that contained many men who were not well-drilled.

The Galatians (1,500) immediately to the right of center, and Galatian (1,500) and Cappadocian infantry (2,000) immediately to the left of center supported the phalanx.⁵⁵ They were light-armed infantry carrying javelins and slashing swords so that they fought in open order. Since Galatians and Cappadocians excelled in skirmishing, they were likely expected to engage the *velites*, while the phalanx closed with the Roman legionaries.

The *corps de rupture* of the Seleucid army was heavy cavalry, but Livy is not precise in his description of the armament and tactics of the Seleucid cavalry. The *cataphracti* (3,000) and royal *agema* on the Seleucid right commanded by Antiochus were the prime shock troops of the army, lancers fighting in tight formations comparable to those of the Companions of Alexander the Great.⁵⁶

Antiochus marshaled many missile- and light-infantry units on his right wing, but these forces could not be expected to close with the Roman left and center left.⁵⁷ Since his army had to attack into a narrow front, Antiochus probably intended his archers to loosen barrages of missiles, then he would lead the charges of crack units to break up the Roman line. Antiochus followed tactics that he had used at Raphia in 217 B.C., and his ancestor Seleucus Nicator had employed at Ipsus in 301 B.C. The Dahae (1,200), mounted bowman, after discharging their arrows, could retire behind the 16 elephants and *argyraspides*, who were an equivalent to a *meros* of the phalanx in the center.⁵⁸ This elephant and infantry force might have acted as a reserve to exploit any gap and so these might have been the forces that assaulted the Roman camp reported in the epitome of Cassius Dio's account.⁵⁹ The *argyraspides* also would have prevented an enemy flanking movement once Antiochus led the charge into the Roman left; such reserve units were common in Hellenistic battles.

The Seleucid far left wing was occupied by 9,500 slingers, archers, and javelin men who were supposed to fire volleys of missiles into the Roman ranks as a preliminary to the Seleucid cavalry charge—a classic tactic of the Persian army.⁶⁰ These units were not to close until after the cavalry attack had smashed the Roman right wing. On the left, the future Seleucus IV and his cousin Antiochus commanded. The infantry formations (from center to left)—1,500 Galatians, 2,000 Cappadocians and 2,700 mixed auxiliaries—operated as supports to the phalanx in the center rather than as part of the left wing.⁶¹ They most likely engaged the *velites* and legionaries of the allies and perhaps one of the Roman legions. The royal princes commanded the strike

force on the left wing, some 7,000 cavalry—a royal squadron of 1,000 Medes, 3,000 *cataphracti* (Syrian, Lydian, Phrygian units), Tarentini cavalry (mounted javelin men 500 strong), and 2,500 Greco-Galatian cavalry who perhaps were armed as shock cavalry.⁶² They faced a Roman-Pergamene cavalry of only 2,400 so that, if Livy's figures are accepted, Seleucid cavalry outnumbered Roman by three to one. But the Seleucid cavalry on the left was screened by chariots and Arab archers mounted on camels, who were to open battle by throwing into confusion the Roman right wing cavalry and peltasts.⁶³ This deployment betrayed the fact that this Seleucid cavalry was not an elite force but rather a mix of units who could exploit an enemy's confusion but were not expected to deliver a decisive attack. Screening with chariots and camel corps tipped off to Lucius Scipio and Eumenes II that the Seleucid left wing was weak.

In his order of battle, Lucius Scipio, who commanded in the Roman center, also followed tactical doctrine.⁶⁴ On the right wing, he concentrated the peltasts of Eumenes (2,000) and the Achaean peltasts (1,000), and 3,000 cavalry, 800 of whom were Pergamenes, and 2,200 Roman and allied Italian horse. On the far right stood Trallian light armed infantry (500) and 500 Cretan archers. The Roman center consisted of four legions, with the two Romans in the center, and the allied legions occupying the wings drawn up in usual ranks (although Livy makes no mention of *velites* in the battle). The sixteen elephants were marshaled in the rear with *triarii* as a reserve (these might have been assigned the task of checking a flanking movement by Seleucid cavalry). On the left wing, commanded by the senior legate Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, were only four *turmae* of cavalry (numbering either 120 or 200 men), supported by 500 Trallian infantry (Balkan peltasts) and 500 Cretan archers.⁶⁵ Ahenobarbus was probably instructed to avoid direct contact with the enemy for as long as possible. The position of the third Roman camp is unknown, but from the account of Livy and Appian this camp was probably near the river Phrygius so that it acted as a reserve behind the weak Roman left. The 2,000 Macedonian and Thracian peltasts and the *triarii* with 16

elephants were perhaps intended as reserves that would check a Seleucid breakthrough on the Roman left.

On the other side of the field, Lucius Scipio had read King Antiochus's plan, for it was a standard order of battle used by professional Hellenistic armies the Romans had fought over the past two decades. Lucius Scipio ordered King Eumenes II of Pergamum, commanding on the right wing, to initiate the battle with open order tactics against the Seleucid left wing.⁶⁶ On the Roman right, skilled peltasts, missile units, and cavalry fanned out and attacked the chariots and Arab camels posted before the cavalry on the Seleucid left. Eumenes followed well known aggressive tactics for breaking up chariot formations, because chariots (just as heavy cavalry) were vulnerable to attack when stationary. Pergamene and Achaean peltasts attacked unexpectedly, before the Seleucid army could advance. Eumenes had a keen sense of timing and an eye for terrain, judging that the mist coming off the river favored the Pergamenes and Achaeans, who, in effect, emerged out of the mist. This initial Roman attack against the Seleucid left was preparatory for decisive charges by the legionaries.

It is unclear how long Eumenes's initial attack action lasted before Lucius Scipio ordered the main attack by his right and center. But Eumenes's attack should be measured in minutes, and the attack caught the Seleucid line before it was properly arrayed. The two Seleucid princes could not impose order along their extended left wing. Eumenes followed the peltasts with a furious cavalry charge that hit the Seleucid heavy cavalry before it could regroup from the confusion of panicked chariots and camel riders that had been thrown into their ranks.⁶⁷ A number of the chariots and camel archers retired to the far left, avoiding contact with the Seleucid cavalry. In the mist and tumult of battle, their retreat probably unnerved many of the light infantry on the far left who fled in fear of close order fighting. Archers and slingers at most shot only one ineffective volley before quitting the field. The only forces on the far left that did any fighting were the heavy cavalry, and the supporting infantry between the cavalry and the phalanx.

Most likely Roman cavalry or allied peltasts swept around the Seleucid cavalry on their far right, and so struck more confusion into the Seleucid cavalry from the rear.

Eumenes's cavalry charge was followed simultaneously by a furious infantry assault and an advance of the entire Roman army. Some chariots and camels might have blundered into the elephant screen or supporting Galatian and Cappadocian infantry just left of the phalanx, thereby communicating confusion to the Seleucid center. The Roman legionaries fearlessly attacked the elephants, and slaughtered the supporting infantry in savage close-order fighting.⁶⁸ Many Roman veterans had fought elephants at Zama in 202 B.C., and their attack unnerved Seleucid soldiers. The sheer terror struck into Seleucid soldiers by such savage and deadly tactics can be easily missed by modern readers. Roman legionaries were noted for cool bravery, and each legionary fought with ferocious courage and individual daring that terrified enemies. The elephants and phalanx had no chance of gaining any momentum when the legionaries crashed into the line and started slaughtering the elephants and infantry screens, then hurling *pila* into the phalanx and slashing their way into the gaps. Within ten to twenty minutes, the Romans had overwhelmed the entire Seleucid center, and the fighting was deadly. The slaughter could well have impeded a pursuit by the Roman legionaries.⁶⁹ In fact, the *principes* and the *triarii* probably did not engage in the actual killing until after the collapse of the Seleucid center.

As the Roman army charged, its weak left wing lost contact with the river bank of the Phrygius, and so Antiochus III led a heavy cavalry charge against the weak Roman left, but he attacked during or just after the general advance of the Roman line.⁷⁰ The tumult and poor visibility might have restrained him at first. From the accounts of Livy and Appian, only the 4,000 cavalry on the right engaged, and this makes sense given the fact that Antiochus was in effect attacking into a funnel so that many of his light cavalry and infantry units had little room to maneuver. The supporting missile units failed to find a vantage along the river bank where they could deploy and discharge

volleys into the exposed Roman left once it lost contact with the riverbank. Antiochus delivered what he hoped would be the decisive charge, but attacked after both his left wing and center were disintegrating so that his charge could not reverse defeat. In contrast, Alexander the Great had coordinated his decisive cavalry attack with a successful attack led by at least part of the phalanx in his center, while senior officers conducted effective defenses along the rest of his line. At Magnesia, Antiochus thus committed the same tactical errors that had lost him victory at Raphia in 217 B.C.

Antiochus scattered the Romans on the far left and so turned the Roman infantry line, but Antiochus's cavalry was blocked by the Roman camp and the 2,000 Thracian and Macedonian peltasts who counterattacked from prepared positions. The tribune M. Aemilius Lepidus ruthlessly rallied the Roman fugitives from the left wing.⁷¹ The future Attalus II also showed initiative by detaching 200 horsemen from the pursuit on the right wing to ride around and stiffen the Roman left, probably the gap between the *triarii* and the Roman camp.⁷² The Romans who were put to flight by Antiochus's attack were most likely the cavalry and the supporting Trallian and Cretan infantry. Perhaps maniples of *principes* and *triarii* of the allied legion on the Roman left center were hit in flank and rear by this attack. The attack, however, lost impetus, and Antiochus did not slay many Romans before he ran into the forces rallied by Aemilius Lepidus. The attack came too late. The Seleucid center and left wing were already in retreat when Antiochus penetrated behind the Roman center left so that Eumenes could spare Attalus and 200 horsemen from the general pursuit on the Roman right. Furthermore, none of the infantry on the Seleucid right supported the attack of Antiochus; at least this is the impression from the accounts of Livy and Appian.⁷³

Livy put Roman losses at 300 infantry and 24 cavalry, most of whom fell on the left flank. Eumenes lost 25 infantry, cavalry, and peltasts in the initial attack. These losses represent 1.4% of the Roman infantry, 1% of the Roman cavalry, and less than 1% of the Pergamene forces engaged. These were

trivial in comparison to the losses sustained by Antiochus III. Livy claims Seleucid losses at 50,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry killed; 1,400 cavalry and 15 elephants captured.⁷⁴ Many more elephants were killed or mortally wounded. The figure for the infantry casualties is conventional, and grossly inflated, even if the figures included many who were cut down as they fled or who later died of wounds and exposure. The cavalry losses were more accurately reported, and heavy, one third of the 12,200 cavalry reported to have engaged in the fighting. Whatever its casualties, the Seleucid army was finished as a fighting force.

At Magnesia the generals have often been seen as evenly matched, and so the battle has been seen as a clash between Roman and Seleucid discipline, weapons and tactics. Indeed, the battle of Magnesia is rightly viewed as vindicating the legion over the phalanx.⁷⁵ Magnesia, far more than the Roman victory at Cynocephalae, marked the recognition of the Roman legion as the arbiter of battles. At Cynocephale in 197 B.C., King Philip V had been drawn into a general engagement prematurely, and, despite the adverse terrain and weather, he won on his right wing in a frontal encounter with the legionaries. An attack against the Macedonian rear by an enterprising Roman tribune threw Philip's victorious phalanx into confusion.⁷⁶ Instead, at Magnesia, Lucius Scipio coordinated attacks by heavily armored Roman swordsmen trained in shock action, supported by peltasts and cavalry, who crushed on an open plain a superior professional army trained in the Macedonian way of war and commanded by the leading monarch of the Hellenistic world. Magnesia was the victory of Roman combined arms learned in the wars against the professional armies of Hannibal and Philip V. The Romans had learned how to break up dense infantry formations depending on pike and supporting units of elephants or chariots. From their own mistakes at Cannae in 216 B.C., the Romans learned to attack in open order, and, at Zama, to drive enemy elephants upon the ranks of the main army.⁷⁷ Dense infantry formations or column attacks were vulnerable to confusion and panic, and, if gaps opened, such formations could be easily penetrated and cut up by Roman swordsmen. Few phanagites could regain their dressing and close ranks

under these circumstances. At Magnesia, the Romans took the tactical offensive at the outset, and so dictated the course of the battle and never relinquished the initiative. Rapid, furious assaults negated missile units, and kept the heavy infantry and elephants from gaining any momentum to advance *en masse*. To be sure, the legionaries did not win the battle alone, for the Romans had learned the value of skilled peltasts in Spain and Liguria, and appreciated the heavily armed Greek and Macedonian cavalry. But henceforth swordsmen, trained in the Roman fashion, dominated the battlefields and so changed infantry tactics forever.

Generalship too made the difference, even if Lucius Cornelius Scipio cannot be numbered among the great captains. The key to the Roman victory was in the deployment and initial attack, and credit here must go to Lucius Cornelius Scipio, and so his countrymen named him *Asiagenus* or *Asiaticus*.⁷⁸ Lucius Scipio had forced the battle, planned the Roman attacks, and so seized the initiative. But Lucius Scipio was well served by subordinate officers—King Eumenes II of Pergamum and his brother Attalus—and above all, by his men. Lucius Scipio had superior officers who could drill and direct veteran infantry on the battlefield, and they enabled their commander Lucius Cornelius Scipio to retain control over his army, and to dominate the battlefield. Together, they waged a Roman way of war that ended forever Macedonian military domination.

NOTES

1. See Polyb. 21.43.1-24, Livy 38.38.1-28, and App. *Syr.* 38-39. For reconsideration against views of Seleucid decline after the Apamea, see E. S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984) I: 32-33, and II: 611-71.
2. See Livy 37.39.7-44. 2, and App. *Syr.* 30-36, and consult J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXIV-XXXVII* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981) 343-58. For the topography of the battle field, see J. Kronmayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland, Römische Abteilung, vol. II.2* (Berlin: Weidmanischen Buchhandlung, 1907) 154-79, and Sh. 9, M. 8.
3. See Zon. 9.20.5-8, epitomizing the account of Cassius Dio; Just. 31.8.6-7, and Flor. 1.24.14-17. For briefer comments, see Diod. 29.8.1-2, Front., *Strat.* 4.7.30, Veg. *De re mil.* 3.24, and Vir. *ill.* 53.
4. See B. Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976) 163-73; his account is followed by J. D. Grainger, *The Roman War of Antiochos the Great*, *Mnemosyne Sup.* 239 (Leiden: Brill, 2002) 307-27.
5. See Bar-Kochva, 1976, 170-71; the second Roman legion is thus placed by Bar-Kochva on right of the allied legions in the center. This order of battle is otherwise unprecedented. Scipio Africanus had altered the deployment at Ilipa in 206 B.C. by stationing his Celtiberians in the center, and his Roman and Italian allied legionaries on the wings; see Polyb. 22.2.6, and Livy 38.14.6. See H. H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1970) 84-95.
6. See Bar-Kochva, 1976, 169, and, *cf.*, 60-62 and 207, n. 8, for the unit of *argyraspides* numbering 10,000, but at 239, n. 75, accepts Livy's use of *cohors* for the Tarentini cavalry to denote a unit of 500 men.
7. See John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Penguin, 1976) 94-97 and 153-157, and *cf.*, A. K. Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War, 100 B.C. - A.D. 200* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996) 220-237; heavy cavalry could not overrun unbroken veteran Roman infantry.
8. App. *Syr.* 34; *cf.* Just. 36.8.6, who states that Antiochus's cavalry broke a Roman legion. But Justin almost certainly erred in writing *legio* for *ala*; see Briscoe, 1981, 355. See Livy 37.4.5-8, who plausibly reports Antiochus's cavalry broke through the left wing Roman cavalry.
9. See App. *Syr.* 31: "*Kai exēgoeti nuktos amphō peri eskhatēn phylakēn, diekosmei d' autōn hekateros hōde. To men laion eikhon oplitai Rhōmaiōn guriōi, para ton potamon auton; kai met' ekeininous ēsan Italōn heteroi myrioi, treis hekaterōn taxeis epi bathos.*" Appian states clearly that the Romans held the "left wing" resting on the river. Next to them (*met' ekeininos*) stood the Italian allies drawn up in three ranks (presumably the classic *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*). What Polybius actually wrote is unknown, and *laion* could be a mistake for *meson* or Appian has conflated the wording describing the four *turmae* of Roman cavalry with the position of the Roman legions. As the description stands, a Roman legion is drawn up along the river bank of the Phrygius, and this is most unlikely.

It seems that Appian has a conflation of an order of march (hence the use of *meta*) with a line of battle. The Roman legions advanced, followed by the Italians, the peltasts, and then the cavalry and Pergamene forces of Eumenes. For the Roman order of march, see Polyb. 6.40-42, and *cf.*, Joseph. *BJ* 3.115-156 and 5.57-58. My thanks to J. E. Lendon for his assistance on Appian's language.

10. For the trial, see Livy 38. 50. 5-12 and App. *Syr.* 40 (dated to 187 B.C.), but, if M. Naevius prosecuted, the trial must date to 184 B.C., see Broughton, *MRR* I: 376. See discussion by H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics, 220-150 B.C.* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981) 290-303.

11. App. *Syr.* 31. See J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "Lucius Cornelius Scipio: A Salvage Operation," *Historia* 21 (1972): 229-33, for the hostile sources seeking to deny Lucius Scipio credit for the victory at Magnesia.

12. App. *Syr.* 32 and 34-35; *cf.*, Caes. *BG* 3.20-26. Appian's account of Domitius Ahenobarbus's movements is impossible; see Balsdon, 1972, 230. In contrast, Julius Caesar presents a plausible account of his role in battle; see K. Kagan, *The Eye of Command* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2006) 99-115.

13. App. *Syr.* 31. See Livy 37.38.1-39.6, and *cf.* Kromayer, 1907, 163-179. Logistics dictated that Lucius Scipio follow the same route taken by Alexander the Great in 334 B.C. until he turned east towards Pergamum; see D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1978) 31-33.

14. See Suet., *Nero* 11, for Nero's consciousness of descent from the Domitii Ahenobarbi.

15. Livy 37.40.8: "*Ab eadem parte, paulum producto cornu, regia cohors erat, argyraspides a genere armorum appellantur.*" See Kromayer, 1907, 182-183, who reckons the *argyraspides* at 1,000 men.

16. App. *Syr.* 32: "*Epi d' autois ta kerata kateikhon en men dexia psiloi te tines kai eteroi eppeis argyraspides kai hippotaxotai diakosioi.*" Appian misconstrues Silver shields as cavalry due to their placement in the battle line.

17. *Contra* Bar Kochva, 1976, 60-62 and 167. A Macedonian unit of same name won over by Eumenes of Cardia in 318-316 B.C. was numbered at 3,000. See Diod. 18.59.1-2.

18. See Zon. 9.20.5-8, epitomizing the account of Cassius Dio, Just. 31.8.6-7, and Flor. 1.24.14-17.

19. Zon. 9.20.5. Cassius Dio may have heightened this incident from his own narrative of Marcus Aurelius's victory in the Rain Miracle; *cf.*, Dio 71.8-10.

20. See Kromayer, 1907, 179-195, who prefers Livy over Appian in his reconstruction of the battle.

21. With thanks to the American Research Institute in Turkey for supporting my own surveys of the battlefield in 1996, 1997, and 2002.

22. See E. Wheeler, "The Roman Legion as Phalanx," *Chiron* 9 (1979): 303-18, for Roman use of dense infantry formations, and *cf.*, Goldsworthy, 1996, 131-45.

23. See Kromayer, 1907, Sh 9, M. 8, who places the third Roman camp close to the surmised ancient course of the river Phrygius.

24. See Balsdon, 1972, 230-33. Front. *Strat.* 4.7.30, credited Scipio Africanus as directing the Battle of Magnesia by letters to his brother Lucius, because Scipio Africanus had remained at Elaea to convalesce.
25. See Livy 37.33.7. Lucius Scipio halted his army in the Troad because his brother P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, as one the Salii, had to obey the religious tabu of not crossing water during the priesthood's holiday, probably between October 25 to November 17, 190 B.C. The Roman army waited only several days, presumably so that Scipio Africanus could preside over the procession of the *ancilia*, and then cross to Asia. Hence, Lucius Scipio started his march from the Hellespont to Magnesia in late October or early November. See H. H. Scullard, *Festivals and Ceremonies of the Roman Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1981) 85-86. It is unlikely the army remained in the Troad for a month during the entire festival of the Salii as argued by F. W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1940) 332, who dates the battle to early 189 B.C.
26. For naval war, see J. S. Morrison, *Greek and Roman Oared Warships*, Oxbow Monographs in Archaeology 62, with contributions from J. F. Coates (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1996) 102-08. See Livy 37.31.1, for the Roman-Rhodian victory at Myonnesus that permitted Lucius Cornelius Scipio to cross the Hellespont into Asia Minor, and so force a decisive battle.
27. Livy 37.37.3. In late October or early November, Lucius Scipio marched five days from Ilium, to Elaea, at the mouth of the Caicus, where Eumenes with his forces joined the Romans. From Elaea, the army marched in one or two days to Pergamum where Pergamenes, Achaeans, and other allied forces joined. Scipio Asiaticus then marched to Thyatira, and then to Magnesia, perhaps a march of ten days. From Ilium to Magnesia, the army had marched at least seventeen days, with several days so that the Romans had been on the move for twenty or twenty-one when they made first contact with the Seleucid army on the banks of the Phrygius.
28. Livy 37.38.6-9.
29. See Livy 37.38.10-11.
30. Livy 37.38.9 reports that the Seleucid army at Thyatira numbered 12,000 cavalry and 60,000 infantry; *cf.*, App. *Syr.* 31, who reports a total of 70,000 men. At Magnesia, the Seleucid units reported by Livy (37.40.1-14) numbered 30,700, 12,500 cavalry, and 54 Indian elephants if the *argyraspides* and Tarentini cavalry is each reckoned at 500 men. An additional 2,970 men likely served in the elephant corps; see Bar-Kochva 1976, 169. Additional men, perhaps several thousand, were detached to guard the Seleucid camp. The best estimates are those by Kromayer, 1907, 182-83 and 207-11.
31. See Baldson, 1972, 228-229, for Lucius Scipio's determination to fight rather than negotiate. For the senatorial martial ethos, see W. V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B.C.* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979) 9-53.
32. Livy 37.38.3.
33. Livy 37.38.5-6. *Cf.*, Kromayer, 1907, 176.
34. Livy 37.38.6-8.

35. Livy 37.38.8-10.
36. Livy 37.39.4-5. *Cf.*, Kromayer, 1907, 177.
37. App. *Syr.* 31; see above note 10.
38. Livy 37.39.5-6; see Kromayer, 1907, 178-79. Therefore, by Livy's reckoning, eleven or twelve days more had passed before Antiochus risked battle so that it was just over a month since the Romans had left Ilium when they closed with their enemy. It was twenty-two or twenty-three days since they marched up the Caicus from Pergamum in search of the Seleucid army so that they had probably consumed the rations they had obtained at Pergamum.
39. Livy 37.39.6: "*nec Antiochus ultra tergiversandum ratus, ne et suorum animos minueret detractando certamen et hostium spem auget.*"
40. Livy 37.40.1-14, and see above note 37. The Seleucid order of battle presented by Appian (*Syr.* 32) is compressed and difficult to understand.
41. Livy 37. 39. 7-8, reckons each legion at 5,400 men, the strength in the imperial age. If Livy's figures are correct, then each legion had an additional 900 men, most likely *velites*, *hastati* and *principes*, rather than the senior *triarii*. Livy (8.8-10), describing a legion of the Fourth Century B.C., reckoned its infantry at 1,200 *velites*, 1,200 *hastati*, 1,200 *principes*, 600 *triarii*, with 300 cavalry for a total of 4,500 men. Polybius (6.20.8-9), writing in ca. 150 B.C., reports the legion's infantry could range between 4,200 and 5,000 men. See P. A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower, 225 B.C. - A. D. 14* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971) 671-77, for an average strength between 4,500 and 5,400 men, including cavalry, in the period of 225-167 B.C.
42. See Livy 36.4.3-5; the 500 Numidian cavalry and 200 elephants promised by Masinissa apparently missed the battle.
43. See Livy 8.8-10, and Polyb. 6.19-27, for the legion organized by maniples.
44. See Wheeler, 1979, 303-313. My thanks to the author for his advice on Roman tactics at Magnesia.
45. See Goldsworthy, 1996, 197-227. For linear British tactics, see B. Nosworthy, *The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763* (New York: Hippocrene, 1990) 47-65.
46. See Bar-Kochva, 1976, 166-167 and 263, n. 12; his length for the Seleucid line must be shortened because the *argyraspides* numbered 500 or 1,000 men rather than 10,000. I have followed the estimates of Kromayer, 1907, 183-184. Calculations of the frontage of units is based on Polyb. 12.18.35; see J. Kromayer and G. Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer*, vol. II, HdA 4,3,2 (Munich: Beck, 1928) 359 and 369. Commanders adjusted the depth of formations to cover wider fronts. For example, Alexander the Great drew up his phalanx eight- rather than sixteen-men deep to cover the longer fronts at the battles of Granicus and Issus; see K. W. Harl, "Alexander's Cavalry Battle at the Granicus," in *Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics, War, and History in Ancient Greece in Honor of Donald Kagan*, ed. C. D. Hamilton and P. Krentz (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1997), 316.
47. Livy 37.41.2-4 and Zon. 9.20.5; App. *Syr.* 31, reports the armies formed up before dawn, but he does not report the weather.
48. Livy 37.40.1-14.

49. Livy 37.40.1-2: "*Regia acies varia magis multis gentibus dissimilitudine armorum auxiliorumque erat. Decem et sex milia peditum more Macedonum armati fuere, qui phalangitae appellabantur. Haec media acies fuit, in fronte in decem partes divisa; partes eas interpositis binis elephantis distinguebat; a fronte introrsus in duos et triginta ordines armatorum acies patebat.*"

50. Polyb. 15.12.1-16.2, Livy 30. 32.1-35.4, and App. *Liby.* 40-41. See Scullard, 1970, 143-59.

51. Antiochus III used the classic Macedonian attack in his great battles of Apolloniatis (221 B.C.), Raphia (217 B.C.), and Panium (200 B.C.); see Bar-Kochva, 1976, 117-23, 128-41, and 146-57. At Apolloniatis, Antiochus's cavalry charge proved decisive because the phalanx of the usurper Molon collapsed (Polyb. 5.48.17-54). At Raphia, the Ptolemaic phalangites smashed the Seleucid center so that Antiochus's cavalry charge failed to decide the battle and the Seleucid army suffered heavy casualties (Polyb. 5.65 and 79-85). At Panium, Antiochus delivered the classic Macedonian attack with heavy cavalry on the right, and the phalanx in the center (Polyb.16.18-19).

52. Livy 37.40.2-4: "*Haec media acies fuit, in fronte in decem partes divisa; partes eas interpositis binis elephantis distinguebat; a fronte introrsus in duos et triginta ordines armatorum acies patebat. Hoc et roboris in regulis copiis erat, et perinde eum alia specie tum eminentibus tantum inter armatos elephantis magnum terrorem praebebat. Ingentes ipsi erant; addebant speciem frontalia et cristae et tergo impositae turres turribusque suspenstantes praeter rectorum quateni armati. Ad latus dextrum phalangitarum mille et quingentos Gallograecorum pedites opposuit.*"

53. See Bar-Kochva, 1976, 8 and 167. By his reckoning a total of 2,970 men (270 atop the elephants and 2,700 on foot) served in the elephant corps.

54. Livy 37.39.13. Appian (*Syr.* 32) conveys the same impression with the simile that the elephants stood before the phalanx, like the towers of city wall: "*Hē d' hopsis en tēs men phalangos oia teikhous, tōn d' elephantōn oia pyrgōn.*"

See H. H. Scullard, *The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1974) 180-81, who first proposed that the elephant units were stationed between the intervals of each regiment of the phalanx, but this deployment is not otherwise documented. Since the Battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.), elephants were deployed in advance of the infantry; see analysis of the tactics by R. Billows, *Antigonos the One-eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990) 89-103.

55. Livy 37.40.13-14 (left) and 37.40.4 (right). Cf., App. *Syr.* 32.

56. Livy 37.40.3-7 and 41.1.

57. Livy 34.40.8.

58. *Contra* Bar-Kochva, 1976, 167-168; the order of battle by Kromayer, 1907, 207-211, is to be preferred.

59. See Zon. 9.20.8, who reports that Zeuxis, commanding in the Seleucid center, launched an attack against the Roman camp. It is not clear what forces Zeuxis would have commanded in such an attack, either regiments of the phalanx or Galatians flanking the phalanx.

60. Livy 37.40.12-14. The force included 16 elephants acting as a flank guard, 2,000 Cyritan slingers, Elymaean archers (2,000), 4,000 peltasts (Pisidians, Pamphylians, Lycians) and 1,000 Neocretans (missile or light infantry). If deployed in an open order for skirmishing, they were out of the vision of Antiochus or his son Seleucus so that they were essentially not in the action.
61. Livy 37.40.10-12.
62. Livy 37.40.14. See Kromayer, 1907, 209-10, for the size of the Tarentini cavalry. See G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1935) 246-250, for their armament and organization.
63. Livy 37. 40.13 and 41.5-8. The presence of chariots and a camel corps fascinated epitomators; see Flor. 1.24.16-17 and Zon. 9.20.5.
64. Livy 37.39.7-13.
65. See Polyb. 6. 25, for size of *turmae* and armament of Roman cavalry. Polybius notes that a *turma* of Roman cavalry was composed of 30 men; an allied Latin or Italian *turma* might have been 50 men. The Roman legions furnished 600 horse, and the allies, at a ratio of 1:3, should have numbered 1,800 horsemen for a total of 2,400 men.
66. Livy 37. 42. 9-12; the same fighting is reported by App. *Syr.* 33.
67. Livy 37. 41. 1-3, and App. *Syr.* 33.
68. Livy 37.42.4-6; the same fighting is reported by App. *Syr.* 35. See Goldsworthy, 1996, 201-09, for shock of Roman attacks.
69. See Livy 37.43.7-11, for the general pursuit.
70. Livy 37.42.7-8; *cf.*, Zon. 9.20.6-8 and App. *Syr.* 34. The Roman left wing comprised four *turmae* of Roman horse arrayed in a thin, extended line with supporting light infantry of Trallians (500 men) and Cretan archers (500 men). The Galatian infantry (1,500) might have engaged the *velites* of the allied legion as the Seleucid cavalry drove into the exposed flank. The *argyraspides* and 16 elephants were too far to the right to engage in this action unless they marched at an oblique angle behind the cavalry after it had charged the Roman left wing. In this reconstruction, I have preferred the opinion of Kronmayer, 1907, 193-95, over that of Bar-Kochva, 1976, 170-171.
71. See Livy 37.43.14; *cf.*, Just. 31.8.6-7 and Zon. 9.20.6. Appian (*Syr.* 34) implausibly transfers the credit to Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus.
72. Livy 37.43.5-6.
73. See Livy 37.42.7-8, and *cf.* App., *Syr.* 34, for the fighting on the Roman left flank. Note Cassius Dio (Zon. 9.20.7) reports that uncertain infantry units under Zeuxis might have engaged in the fighting.
74. Livy 44.1-3; *cf.*, App., *Syr.* 36, who reports Seleucid casualties as 50,000.
75. The Roman victory at Magnesia, had for the Greek world, an impact comparable to the that of the English victory at Blenheim in 1704. Each battle decisively altered the military, and so political and cultural balance of Western Europe. See Paul Rahe, "Empire, Ancient and Modern," *Wilson Quarterly* 28.3 (2004): 68-84, and "The Book that Never Was: Montesquieu's Considerations on the Romans in Historical Context," *History of Political Thought* 26.1 (2005): 43-89.

76. See Polyb. 18.21-27, Livy 33.7.4-10, Plut. *Flam.* 8, Just. 30.4, and Zon. 9.16; see Walbank, 1940, 167-72.

77. Polyb. 3.112-117 and Livy 22.45-49, and see A. K. Goldsworthy, *Cannae* (London: Sterling, 2001) 95-156.

78. See Baldson, 1972, 230-234.

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TABULA MEMORIAE

WILLIAM BIER

University of Missouri

I first met Gene Borza when I was Secretary of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens in 1967 and he was there on a research leave from Penn State. We quickly became friends and have enjoyed each other's company numerous times since then. I was unaware of his great writing ability until it was suddenly brought home to me in 1980.

In the autumn of that year I was up for promotion at the University of Missouri and received in the mail a copy of a letter Gene said he had sent to the then Department Chair to support my application. I was delighted with this unsolicited recommendation and settled down to read it with great expectations. However, my hair stood on end and my heart almost stopped when I read sentences such as: "I cannot comment on the importance of his excavations since his sites are for the most part obscure and part of the backwater of Greek history," and "I have heard his lectures several times at the annual meetings of the Archaeological Institute of America, and can testify that his reports are not a complete loss," and "his professional articles are so sophisticated that only eight people in the world can understand them." In the letter he also called me a "Bon Vivant," with comments on my fondness for "strong drink and wine" and that he could not comment on my time as Department Chair since he felt that it would not be fair "to report the rumors at large in the profession." He ends by saying that I seem to possess the normal qualifications for promotion.

After I recovered from the initial shock, I realized that this was not a letter he sent but just an example of his humor and clever writing. I still keep it, however.

ERICH GRUEN

University of California, Berkeley

There is a special bond between persons whose friendship stretches for more than four decades. Although we have seen each other only intermittently over the years, at meetings, colloquia, or visits to one another's campuses, the intimacy that comes from shared experience over so long a period immediately erases long absences whenever we are together.

The first time was a particularly memorable one—when we were both freshly minted PhDs or about to become so and were out on the job market. Competitors then, eying one another warily, nervous about the future and wondering where we would land. But at least we knew that we would land. The job market boomed then—and a sense of security that our students have rarely enjoyed at that stage of the game. Hence the friendship counted for more than the rival candidacies.

And that friendship endured, ever more strongly over the years. I treasure it. I beam with pleasure whenever I see you at a conference, and we steal away for a drink, a lunch, or a dinner. I recall vividly and fondly your visit to Berkeley (too many years ago) when you and Kathleen stayed with Joan and me. The closeness, even at a distance, means a great deal to me.

You have much to be proud of in a distinguished career. No one speaks with greater authority on Macedonian matters than does Gene Borza. Few know the land and terrain so well. In addition to your other countless contributions, *In the Shadow of Olympus* remains, in my view, the best single volume treatment of Macedonia in all its aspects in any language. And the articles you produced when you weaved your way through the bitterly disputed Vergina tomb controversy exhibited a judicious restraint and an admirable command that none other could have brought to that subject.

There is much that I admire in you as a scholar and a leader in the profession (not to mention a jazz musician and a connoisseur of wines), too much to express in the space allowed here. But nothing perhaps more than the enviable richness of tone

whenever you are at a speaker's podium. It is not the deep and impressive voice alone, but the thoroughness of preparation and the lucidity of presentation that make you so powerful and impressive a speaker.

You are an ornament to the profession and a greatly valued friend.

JENNIFER ROBERTS
City University of New York

When I first spoke with Gene Borza long ago at a meeting of the Association of Ancient Historians, I had no idea it would be the beginning of a friendship that would last for over a quarter-century—and that's only so far. Nor could I know that during that time period both Gene and I would serve two terms as president of this organization that we both love so much, and that his wisdom and support would ultimately make my presidency possible as I turned constantly to past presidents for counsel in challenging moments. While the AAH has over 600 members, our meetings are much smaller—about a hundred in any given year—and Gene's unique blend of good sense and self-deprecating wit invariably makes him a strong and much appreciated presence. On those rare occasions when Gene was not able to attend a meeting (some silly excuse, like living in Greece), his absence was felt keenly.

It goes without saying that Gene is an extraordinary scholar. Even people who have never met him know this. At the Princeton meeting of the AAH in 2007 Gene (typically) approached a shy young woman and introduced himself. What he didn't know was that she was one of my graduate students. Not long afterwards, she came over to me practically hyperventilating as she announced, "I just met Gene Borza!" I suspect she believed on the basis of his scholarship that he lived too close to Olympus to actually attend a meeting in Princeton. What is less well known is that he is an extraordinary friend. Gene and Kathleen gather to them new friends wherever they go. Finally, Gene has mastered the secret of relishing life with all that it brings. It is a privilege to write just these few words on the occasion of this well-conceived Festschrift.

LAWRENCE TRITLE

Loyola Marymount University

It was Byron Tsangadas who first told me of Gene Borza in 1971 when I began thinking about grad school, and had Stewart Oost not taken me on a year later I might be co-editing the present volume! But fortune took me to Chicago where I learned more not only of Gene, but also those he had studied with there, Mike Clover and Briggs Twyman, and I saw in them all role models, that is if I could only survive the rigorous training regimen imposed by Stewart Oost (like having class the day after Thanksgiving—who else did that then, would anyone now?). It would not be until APA 1979 that I would finally meet Gene and Kathleen, but that initial meeting was followed by many other AAH and APA gatherings through the years. There were also a number of memorable Athenian dinners in the 1980s and some happy times too in Los Angeles. Through the years I've heard Gene's stimulating and informative AIA lectures (and others!), learned much from him about ancient and modern Macedonia, and once debated with him the impact of surviving war on Thucydides. In every instance the knowledge was impressive, the technique and manner smooth, and the conclusions mostly persuasive! It was always a pleasure, fun even, being in Gene's company and having the opportunity to talk—and sometimes debate—so much. And yes, I was right thirty some years ago about the role model thing!

